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Preface
This study establishes that a normative order of the internet has emerged, which is made 
up of norms of varied regulatory genesis and legitimacy, but which are all materially and 
normatively connected to the internet. The challenge of analyzing such an order, its origin, 
legitimacy, and implications, is substantial in light of the special role of the internet within 
our lived realities and societies. We used to watch television on our TVs, play music on CD 
players, listen to radio channels on a radio, go to libraries for printed books, read printed 
newspapers, and use fixed- line telephones. Today, we use the internet to contact friends, to 
watch video or record it, to seek out information, and to consume entertainment or news. 
Different media— TV, books, radio, CDs, newspapers— were once regulated by different 
regimes. Their content is now being delivered, in a trend called digital convergence, through 
Internet Protocol (IP)- based services: through “the internet.” This convergence of commu-
nicative acts has not yet been mirrored by a clear understanding of the dynamics of the cog-
nate convergence of normativity, of normative rule.
The author set out to normatively frame the implications of this digital convergence. 
Just as content is now delivered via the internet, norms apply to the internet. They need to 
be systematized and assessed and understood in their complexity. As digital convergence 
reduces the number of channels delivering media content and allowing for free expression 
from many to one, any regulation of the internet— nationally, supranationally, internation-
ally, transnationally— has substantial implications for all sectors of society.
People now sell and buy goods online, create non- governmental organizations (NGOs) 
and vote and run campaigns online, conduct research and scams through the internet, form 
international NGOs and crime syndicates, conduct peace initiatives and cyberattacks, share 
videos containing playful cats and hateful speech, create and share memes and viruses, 
download online courses or upload pirated videos, watch instruction videos on social net-
working sites or consult bomb- making manuals. All these activities— to a lesser (peace 
initiatives and cat videos) and greater (cyberattacks and bomb- making manuals) degree— 
need to be regulated. It is with regard to the multitude of activities and involved actors (indi-
viduals, non- state actors, states) and the breadth of the normative vocabulary available (ius 
cogens, conventions, custom, laws, regulations, standards, soft law, affordances) that the 
challenge of developing, legitimizing, and implementing a normative order of the internet 
becomes apparent.
This is a challenge that the author gratefully undertook. The research here conducted 
builds on previously published studies by the author on the role of individuals, and the legit-
imizing impact of their participation on international legal aspects of the internet,1 the in-
fluence of internet governance on international customary law (and vice versa),2 the impact 
 1 Matthias C. Kettemann, The Future of Individuals in International Law. Lessons from International Internet 
Law (Utrecht: Eleven, 2013).
 2 Matthias C. Kettemann, “Grotius goes Google:  Der Einfluss der Internet Governance auf das 
Völkergewohnheitsrecht,” in Christoph Vedder (ed.), Völkerrecht 2012. Richterliche Praxis und politische Realität. 
Tagungsband 37. Österreichischer Völkerrechtstag 2012 (Vienna: Peter Lang, 2013).
 
 
viii Preface
of the protection of the internet’s integrity as a global interest on international law,3 the de-
velopment of international rules for the internet,4 the emergence of the concept of internet 
governance,5 the legality of internet shutdowns and state duties regarding the internet,6 the 
protection of freedom of expression online,7 the protection of cybersecurity through inter-
national law,8 and the role of human rights in the times of multistakeholder approaches to 
norm creation.9
Scholarship and practice can mutually support each other.10 Throughout the time of 
this research the author has been involved in the process of developing international legal 
foundations of the normative order of the internet. As correspondent for the Internet & 
Jurisdiction Network, thematic lead for a number of research initiatives on human rights 
on the internet, rapporteur of a number of international conferences on human rights on 
the internet, former co- chair and steering committee member of the Internet Rights and 
Principles Coalition, representative of the global academic community in the Executive 
Multistakeholder Committee of the Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future of 
the Internet, and rapporteur of the Council of Europe Committee of Experts on roles and 
responsibilities of Internet intermediaries, the author has been deeply involved in the pro-
cesses of developing norms regarding the internet and its governance. This action- oriented 
research methodology coupled with a reflective approach is responsive to the challenges of 
the internet as a relatively new normative field.
This study is based on the author’s Habilitationsschrift submitted to the Faculty of Law of 
the University of Frankfurt in November 2018. In June 2019, the Faculty of Law granted the 
author the venia legendi for international law, internet law, and legal theory.
The author was lucky enough to present and discuss some of the ideas that flowed into this 
study in recent years at institutions such as the universities of Vienna, Linz, Graz, Hamburg, 
Berlin, and Venice, and at workshops and conferences in London, Paris, Brussels, Lisbon, 
New York, and Cambridge, MA; and at a number of locations in Frankfurt, including art 
museums and cinemas. The latter were realized through outreach activities of the Cluster of 
Excellence “The Formation of Normative Orders” at the University of Frankfurt am Main. 
The DFG- funded Cluster awarded the author a postdoctoral fellowship for 2014– 2018 that 
allowed him to freely complete this study. For that possibility and the excellent conception 
 3 Matthias C. Kettemann, “Das Internet  als internationales Schutzgut:  Entwicklungsperspektiven des 
Internetvölkerrechts anlässlich des Arabischen Frühlings,”, ZaöRV 72 (2012), 469– 82; Matthias C. Kettemann, 
“The Common Interest in the Protection of the Internet. An International Legal Perspective,” in Wolfgang Benedek, 
Koen De Feyter, Matthias C. Kettemann, and Christina Voigt (eds.), The Common Interest in International Law 
(Antwerp: Intersentia, 2014), 167– 84.
 4 Matthias C. Kettemann, Völkerrecht in Zeiten des Netzes:  Perspektiven auf den effektiven Schutz von 
Grund- und Menschenrechten in der Informationsgesellschaft zwischen Völkerrecht, Europarecht und Staatsrecht 
(Bonn: Friedrich- Ebert- Siftung, 2015), http:// library.fes.de/ pdf- files/ akademie/ 12068.pdf.
 5 Matthias C. Kettemann, “Internet Governance,” in Dietmar Jahnel, Alfred Schramm, and Elisabeth 
Staudegger (eds.), Informatikrecht, 3rd edn. (Vienna: Springer, 2012), 48– 62.
 6 Matthias C. Kettemann, “Nationale Sicherheit und Informationsfreiheit. Zur Völkerrechtmäßigkeit von 
Internetabschaltungen,” in Kirsten Schmalenbach (ed.), Aktuelle Herausforderungen des Völkerrechts. Beiträge 
zum 36. Österreichischen Völkerrechtstag 2011 (Vienna: Peter Lang, 2012), 41– 62.
 7 Wolfgang Benedek and Matthias C. Kettemann, Freedom of Expression on the Internet (Strasbourg: Council of 
Europe, 2014).
 8 Matthias C. Kettemann, “Ensuring Cybersecurity through International Law,” Revista Española de Derecho 
internacional (2017), 281– 90.
 9 Matthias C. Kettemann, “Menschenrechte im Multistakeholder- Zeitalter: Mehr Demokratie für das Internet,” 
ZFMR 1 (2016), 24– 36.
 10 Anne Peters, “Realizing Utopia as a Scholarly Endeavour,” EJIL 24 (2013), 533– 52 (542– 4).
Preface ix
of the Cluster’s postdoctoral program the author wishes to extend his thanks to the two 
coordinators of the Cluster, Prof. Klaus Günther and Prof. Rainer Forst, and to Rebecca 
Schmidt, the Cluster’s head of administration.
The author’s biggest gratitude, however, goes to his advisor, Prof. Stefan Kadelbach, 
LL.M., who is the most excellent of teachers and scholars. While there is a “Doktorvater” 
(the academic advisor (literally: father) during doctoral studies), in the author’s case the 
highly esteemed Prof. Wolfgang Benedek at the University of Graz, who inspired the author 
to tackle questions of human rights on the internet early in his career and with whom the 
author continues to collaborate, the concept of “Habilitationsvater” (advisor for the post-
doctoral phase) seems to remain in obscurity. For Stefan Kadelbach, however, the author 
would definitely feel it apt to introduce the notion into the academic discourse. The author’s 
gratitude further extends to Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Thomas Vesting, who was kind enough to 
write the second evaluation of this study and whose insights into, and reading of, the pre-
sent study have been important for the author.
At the University of Frankfurt, the author’s thanks go further to Professors Georg 
Hermes, Ute Sacksofsky, and Indra Spiecker gen. Döhmann for enriching discussions. At 
the Cluster of Excellence “The Formation of Normative Orders” the author is indebted to 
Professors Christoph Burchard, Rainer Forst, Klaus Günther, and Alexander Peukert. The 
author’s thanks also extend to Professors Anuscheh Farahat, Isabel Feichtner, and Thomas 
Kleinlein for insights and inputs during the early phases of this work. For input on central 
theses of the study later in the writing process, the author thanks Julia Pohle, Thorsten Thiel, 
and the postdoctoral fellows of the Cluster of Excellence “The Formation of Normative 
Orders.”
The last revisions of this study profited from enriching conversations at the Leibniz 
Institute for Media Research | Hans- Bredow- Institut (HBI), where the author is especially 
grateful to Wolfgang Schulz, Uwe Hasebrink, Stephan Dreyer, Jan- Hinrik Schmidt, and 
Kristina Hein. No scholar of the internet and its regulatory framework could wish for a 
better place at which to study the normative dynamics, regulatory approaches, and tech-
nological developments than the HBI, which, under the leadership of Wolfgang Schulz and 
Uwe Hasebrink, has solidified its position as Germany’s foremost interdisciplinary institute 
studying media, media transformation, and the futures of media— in which the internet 
will play a key role.
The author could not have successfully completed this study without the love and con-
tinued substantial support from his wife, Simone. The love of his two children, Cleo and 
Philipp, and the love and support of his parents are also essential to him.
Establishing the normative order of the internet as a legal and holistic order feels to the 
author to be an important exercise of systematizing and of reestablishing epistemic sover-
eignty, in a certain sense, over seemingly accelerating societal developments connected to 
the internet and information and communication technologies more broadly. In discus-
sions with representatives from governments from all continents over the last few years, 
and representatives from many different tech companies, from platforms to Internet 
Exchange Points to cloud services providers, a sense of wonder, surprise— and less be-
nignly: powerlessness— over the speed of technological progress and the problems inherent 
in the only reactionary powers of public or private regulation shone through. Technology 
was perceived by many discussants as an agent, a force (sometimes for the good, sometimes 
not) that could be harnessed only with difficulty. This study is an attempt to counteract this 
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view by developing a comprehensive legal model for explaining and predicting the origin 
and application of norms impacting the internet’s use and development. In brief, the study 
will show how the norms that matter online emerge and how they are legitimated.
The author has always appreciated the intellectual vigor of Philip Allott, who, in 2014, 
held a talk at London’s Inner Temple on the dilemma of being an idealist, as a good inter-
national lawyer should be in his view.11 “There has never been a better time to be an inter-
national lawyer,” Allott said, “International Law is at last emerging as a sophisticated legal 
system.” We international lawyers are the “most privileged of all lawyers. International Law 
is the law of all laws, the law of the whole human world. International lawyers are front and 
centre in the drama of making the new international society.” He had one important con-
cern though: “The international world suffers from a grotesque poverty of philosophy.”12
The author takes up both ideas— that international law is at the front and center of nor-
matively framing key political and legal challenges of today and that there is too little theory 
and too much practice— and takes them seriously throughout the following study. The re-
search presented on the subsequent pages thus has two interlinked aims: “making” (that 
is: providing a normative order for) one important part of “the new international society,” 
namely the society transformed by information and communication technologies medi-
ated through the internet and providing a comprehensive theory (or philosophy) of that 
same order.
The internet is premised upon freely exchanging information. Any research into the 
internet, especially when publicly funded, should therefore be freely accessible to all. The 
author is therefore very grateful to the Open Access Monograph Publishing Fund of the 
Leibniz Association, which enabled the Open Access publication of this book. At the Fund, 
the author especially thanks Monika Pohlschmidt for her advice.
At Oxford University Press, the author would like to express his thanks to Alex Flach, 
Imogen Hill, and especially John Smallman for turning this manuscript into a book.
The author is also very thankful for editing and language support by the publisher’s 
team and by Ilse Kettemann (Graz), and formatting and indexing support received from 
Max Gradulewski, Thorian Schmied, Johanna Friederike Stelling, and Carlotta Siegel 
(Hamburg), Bernhard Kettemann (Graz), and Birgit David and Polina Kulish (Jena).
In a 2006 article in the Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, Antonio Segura- 
Serrano, who early on recognized the relevance of international law for the internet, called 
on international law to “take a normative stance”13 regarding the internet’s future. Some 
fourteen years later, this study submits that normative progress, and not only in interna-
tional law, has been substantial: the following study thus shows which normative stance 
international law, national law, and transnational regulatory arrangements take toward the 
internet, and how this normative order shapes its (and our) future.
Hamburg and Frankfurt am Main, May 2020
Matthias C. Kettemann
 11 Philip Allott, “The Idealist’s Dilemma: Re- Imagining International Society,” EJIL: Talk!, June 9, 2014, https:// 
www.ejiltalk.org/ the- idealists- dilemma- re- imagining- international- society.
 12 Ibid (emphasis in the original).
 13 Antonio Segura- Serrano, “Internet Regulation and the Role of International Law”, Max Planck Yearbook of 
United Nations Law, Vol. 10 (The Hague: Brill, 2006), 191– 272 (271).
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Leading Theses
 (1) There is a normative order of the internet. This study has established the emergence 
of a normative order of the internet. This order integrates norms materially and nor-
matively connected to the use and development of the internet at three different lev-
els (regional, national, international), of two types (privately and publicly authored), 
and of different character (from ius cogens to technical standards).
 (2) This order is a legal order. As a legal order, it operates through the form of law and 
analogously to it. Its actors— states, legal persons, natural persons— fulfil diverse 
functions as norm entrepreneurs, norm appliers, and norm enforcers. The order’s 
justification narratives control new norms by assessing their technical consistency 
and their legal- cultural consonance vis- à- vis the order’s purposes. Though not 
without autonomous elements, the normative order of the internet is interlinked 
through legitimation relationships with national and international legal orders. The 
study then analyzes the order’s genealogy, ontology, legitimacy, finality, and impact.
 (3) The order is made up of international law, national law, and transnational regulatory 
arrangements of variable normativity. Apart from international and national norms, 
a “third” category of norms exists, a normative tertium, which has only recently 
emerged as a normative category in its own right. Tertium norms are fundamentally 
technical standards and soft law norms that emerge in the contested space between 
technical necessity and socio- legal values. They evidence a variable normativity and 
transcend binary normative solutions and can thus counteract diffusions of regula-
tory responsibility in transnational settings.
 (4) The order’s normativity shapes technicity. The technology- orientation of non- 
legal normativity, including its focus on code and standards, needs to be reori-
ented through a value- based normative approach, while the effective internal norm 
(re)production mechanisms of private standards need to be embraced. It is thus not 
technicity that shapes normativity. Rather than letting a technical medium define 
our societal values, it is the values embedded in the normative order of the internet 
that define the evolution of the internet’s underlying technologies through normative 
framing and regulatory interventions. Value- based normativity, it is hypothesized, 
must influence standard- setting to ensure the primacy of international legal com-
mitments, and their national legal counterparts, in determining the finality of the 
normative order of the internet. Rather than accepting arguments out of technical 
necessity, this study hypothesizes that technical norms are properly placed within the 
value- oriented common frame of the normative order of the internet.
 (5) The internet’s forces of normative disorder can be identified and countered. 
Centrifugal forces contribute to the emergence of normative redundancies (“nor-
mative froth”), real conflicts of norms between regulatory layers and geographically 
bounded normative spheres (“normative friction”), substantial structural prob-
lems (“normative fractures”), and political, commercial, and technological frag-
mentation of the internet. However, technical invariants of the internet exercise 
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defragmentation forces. These are then normatively reified within the normative 
order of the internet.
 (6) The internet has taken a normative turn. The rules on rule- making that have de-
veloped within the normative order of the internet can be used to explain, predict, 
and legitimize the creation of new order- internal norms through processes of self- 
learning normativity. These norms are then assessed as to their internal coherence, 
their consonance with other order norms, and their consistency with the order’s fi-
nality. The normative order of the internet thus is based on and produces a liquefied 
system characterized by self- learning normativity. However, normativity that learns 
from its environment can no longer be described using traditional categories of, and 
criteria for, subjectivity. Thus a theory of normativity (“of the law”) that goes back to 
Kant needs to be fundamentally rethought: with norm- based self- organization as the 
principle of life that enables the transcendental constitution of normativity.
 (7) The normative order of the internet is a legal and legitimate order which is con-
nected to, and legitimated by, international and national legal processes. The nor-
mative order of the internet is a legitimate order of norms. Processes of legitimation 
of norms take place within the order, but also through national law and the inter-
national legal system. Internationally, the norm creation process, which allows for 
the integration of all actors, legitimizes the normative outcome. Nationally, tertium 
norms have been progressively recognized within national legal orders through pro-
cesses of formal and non- formal application, transposition, and referencing.
Judgments
INTERNATIONAL
Arbitral award, Lake Lanoux Arbitration, France v. Spain, (1963) XII RIAA 281,  
(1961) 24 ILR 101, 16th November 1957, Arbitration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95– 96
Arbitral award, Trail Smelter Case, United States v. Canada, First decision, (1949) III RIAA  
1905, (1941) 35 AJIL 684, 16th April 1938, Arbitration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95– 96
Human Rights Committee, Mukung v. Cameroon, Comm. No. 458/ 1991,  
UN Doc. CCPR/ C/ 51/ D/ 458/ 1991 of 10 August 1994  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223– 24
ICJ, Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/ Republic of Mali) (Merits),  
ICJ Rep. (1986), 554 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
ICJ, Case Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area  
(Canada v. United States of America), ICJ Rep. (1984), 246 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
ICJ, Arrest Warrant Case (Democratic Rep. of the Congo v. Belgium) (Merits), ICJ Rep. (2002), 3 . . . . . . 80
ICJ, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo Cases (Democratic Republic of the  
Congo v. Uganda), ICJ Rep. (2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
ICJ, North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark; Federal  
Republic of Germany v. Netherlands) (Merits), ICJ Rep. (1969), 3  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
ICJ, Gabčikovo- Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia) (Merits), ICJ Rep. (1997), 7 . . . . . . . . . . . 101
ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States  
of America) (Merits), ICJ Rep. (1986), 14  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
ICJ, Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 (Pakistan v. India) (Jurisdiction of the Court)  . . . . . . . . . . 92– 93
ICJ, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia  
(South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (Advisory Opinion),  
ICJ Rep. (1970), 1971 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81– 82
ICJ, Corfu Channel Case (UK v. Albania), ICJ Rep. (1949) 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83– 84
ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory  
(Advisory Opinion), ICJ Rep 136, (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion), ICJ Rep. (1996), 226 . . . . 96
PCIJ, The Factory at Chorzow (Federal Republic of Germany v. Poland), judgment on the  
merits (1928) PCIJ Rep. ser. A, No. 17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81– 82
PCIJ, The Case of the SS Lotus (France v.Turkey), judgment, PCIJ Rep. ser. A, No. 10  . . . . . . . . . . 81– 82
PCIJ, Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. Great Britain) (Jurisdiction),  
(1924) PCIJ Rep. ser. B., No. 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
PCIJ, Customs Régime between Germany and Austria (Protocol of March 19th, 1931), Advisory 
Opinion, (1931) PCIJ ser. A/ B, No. 41; Individual Opinion by M. Anzilotti (55 et seq.) . . . . . . . 84
EUROPEAN COURTS
CJEU, C- 293/ 12 and C- 594/ 12, Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger et al., judgment  
of April 8, 2014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
CJEU, C- 131/ 12, Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos  
(AEPD), Mario Costeja González (“Google Spain”), judgment of May 13, 2014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
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Introduction
1.1 Ubi Societas, Ibi Ius
1.1.1 Approaching Online Order
Law is force of order. It always reacts, usually with a necessary time delay, to techno-
logical progress. Only twelve years after Samuel Morse presented the first workable 
telegraph system in New York in 1838 and six years after completion of the first tel-
egraph line from Washington to Baltimore, central European states agreed on an in-
ternational framework for telegraphs. It has been much more than twelve years since 
the technologies underlying the internet’s popularity today, such as the “World Wide 
Web,” were invented. No international framework has emerged, even though normative 
approaches abound. There are norms that are applied to the internet, but the recogni-
tion of the existence of an underlying, structuring order is missing. This motivates the 
present study.
This study will establish the emergence of a normative order of the internet that inte-
grates norms materially and normatively connected to the use and development of the 
internet nationally, regionally, and internationally. While the establishment of such a nor-
mative order of the internet will be an innovative step, concrete legal answers to technolog-
ical challenges often have a long pedigree.
After showing that regulation of communicative spaces is a historical constant 
(1.1.2), certain distinguishing features of cyberspace1 will be discussed (1.1.3) and the 
need to establish a comprehensive order confirmed (1.1.4). Convincingly establishing 
the concept of a normative order of the internet is premised upon: first, a clear per-
spective of current research on orders and ordering; second, and especially, the by now 
substantial international legal literature on aspects of online (dis)order; and, third, a 
first exposition of the “normative orders” approach based on the idea that orders are 
complexes of norms and values through which relationships, exercises of authority, and 
distributions of basic goods are legitimated (1.2). Then this chapter will turn to the 
six leading hypotheses of the present study, which frame and underlie the subsequent 
chapters (1.3). After explaining the methodology used (1.4), the structure of the study 
itself is presented (1.5) with each of the following chapters following the flow of the 
argument, namely
 – that regulating the internet is challenging in light of its societal role and technical char-
acteristics ( chapter 2);
 1 “Cyberspace” is a notion referring to the social sphere that has emerged to describe the loci of mediatized 
information and communication interchange. Cf. Johann- Christoph Woltag, “Internet,” in Rüdiger Wolfrum 
(ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (MPEPIL) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 
(September 2010) [online].
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 – that international law and internet governance regimes are foundational orders for the 
internet’s regulation ( chapter 3);
 – that the state of internet regulation is one of normative disorder ( chapter 4);
 – that theoretical approaches can deliver insights into ordering networked structures 
( chapter 5);
 – that a normative order of the internet exists as a legal and legitimate order with auton-
omous elements ( chapter 6); and
 – that this order is integrated into national legal orders with legitimating effects, es-
pecially in relation to transnational regulatory arrangements, such as standards 
( chapter 7).
1.1.2 Regulating Communicative Spaces as a Historical Constant
While the concept of normative order applied to the internet is new, the regulation of com-
municative spaces appears as a historical constant. Indeed, the regulation of technological 
progress was one of the dynamizing factors in the evolution of international law and the law 
of international organizations.2
Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, and Saxony signed the 1850 Treaty on the Creation of the 
German- Austrian Telegraph Union3 “in order to have public and private [communica-
tion] traffic profit from the advantages of a telegraph system based on equal principles.”4 
The treaty came as an attempt to regulate the free(r) flow of information by telegraphs, a 
new technology that the conservative regimes in Europe at the time perceived as potentially 
destabilizing the traditional order and their position in it.
Many of the novel principles introduced in the 1850 Treaty are of great relevance 
today for the regulation of information and communication technologies (ICTs) and 
in particular the regulation and governance of the network of interconnected networks 
we commonly call the internet. In Article 4 of the 1850 Treaty, states mutually commit 
to transmitting “with all possible speed and reliability” telegraphic cables to each other.5 
They agree to a due diligence duty to inform the contracting parties if they need to put a 
line out of order. The one exception to the duty to transmit cables speedily is contained 
in Article 19, which allows the head of each telegraph station to decide not to accept and 
transmit cables if the content violates the law or the transfer seems unsuitable with a 
view to “the public good and morality.”6 Article 6 of the 1850 Treaty contains a right for 
 2 Sabine von Schorlemer, “Telecommunications, International Regulation,” in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed.), Max 
Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (MPEPIL) (Oxford: OUP, 2008) (March 2009) [online].
 3 Staatsvertrag zwischen Oesterreich, Preußen, Baiern und Sachsen vom 25. Juli 1850 über die Bildung 
des deutsch- österreichischen Telegraphenvereins, Allgemeines Reichs- Gesetz und Regierungsblatt für das 
Kaiserthum Österreich, No. CXXVII of 30 September 1850, 266 et seq.
 4 Ibid., preamble: “[ . . . ] in der Absicht, dem öffentlichen wie dem Privatverkehre Ihrer respectiven Staaten die 
Vortheile eines nach gleichmäßigen Grundsätzen geregelten Telegraphensystemes zuzuführen [ . . . ]” (translation 
by the author).
 5 Ibid., Art. 4: “mit möglichster Schnelligkeit und Zuverlässigkeit” (translation by the author). The word “tele-
gram” entered common usage only after the Treaty.
 6 Ibid., Art. 19: “[Die Telegraphenbureaus sind] verpflichtet, solche Privatdepeschen von der Annahme oder 
Weiterbeförderung auszuschließen, deren Inhalt gegen die Gesetze verstößt, oder aus Rücksichten des öffentli-
chen Wohles und der Sittlichkeit zur Mittheilung für nicht geeignet erachtet wird. [ . . . ] Die Entschließung liegt 
 
Ubi Societas, Ibi Ius 3
“everyone without exception” to use the telegraphs.7 They could do so, as per Article 9, 
daily, including Sundays and holidays, from 7 a.m. to 9 p.m. from April to September and 
from 8 a.m. to 9 p.m. from October to March.8 Article 12, in a prefiguration of Twitter’s 
abbreviated style, limits cables to fewer than a hundred words.9 Data retention avant 
la lettre is also enshrined: “Original concepts [of the cables] and telegraphic renditions 
of all cables are to be kept for two years.”10 Even reading this from the vantage point of 
the twenty- first century neither the content of the treaty nor the regulatory goals are 
surprising.
Though motivated by an anti- liberal impetus (visible especially in the 1850 Treaty’s 
Article 19 with the head of a telegraph station acting as a de facto censor), the nineteenth 
century distinguished itself, in terms of rapid normative framing of technological develop-
ment. Similar to international(ized) transport regimes, technology became a vector for the 
evolution of law- based international cooperation. The normative web woven around ICTs 
quickly became stronger. The German- Austrian Telegraph Union was complemented by the 
West European Telegraph Union in 1855, the subsequent foundation of the International 
Telegraph Union (ITU) in 1865— still an important regulatory player more than 150 years 
later— , and the adoption of the International Telegraph Treaty in 1875.11 This normative 
approach to the telegraph shows how international law— through multilateral treaties and 
the creation of international organizations— was used from the earliest days of ICTs as an 
instrument to regulate the use of a new and promising technology in light of international 
and national public policy concerns.12
Many of the themes that the 1850 Treaty regulated reemerged when it came to regulating 
the telephone and, with even more force, when the advance of ICTs culminated in the wide-
spread use of the internet, its commercialization, and politicization. These include duties 
of states to each other vis- à- vis the use of the new technology (Article 4), “telegraph neu-
trality” with public order exceptions (Articles 4 and 19), the right for all to access telegraph 
services (Article 6), and data retention (Article 14). This time, however, the bottom- up non- 
statal evolution of the underlying technology and substantial divergences in the regulatory 
interests discouraged the evolution of an international treaty regime and the foundation of 
a specialized international organization.
in solchen Fällen dem Vorsteher der Telegraphenstation oder dessen Stellvertreter ob. An welche Behörde die 
gegen derartige Entscheidungen etwa zu erhebenden Beschwerden zu richten sind, wird von den betreffenden 
Regierungen bestimmt werden” (translation by the author).
 7 Ibid., Art. 6: “Benützung der Telegraphen [ . . . ] steht Jedermann ohne Ausnahme zu” (translation by the 
author).
 8 Ibid., Art. 9.
 9 Ibid., Art. 12: “nicht aus mehr als 100 Worten bestehen” (translation by the author).
 10 Ibid., Art. 14: “Original Concepte der aufgegebenen Depeschen, sowie die telegraphischen Niederschriften 
sämtlicher Depeschen sind mindestens zwei Jahre lang aufzubewahren” (translation by the author).
 11 Cf. Miloš Vec, Recht und Normierung in der Industriellen Revolution:  neue Strukturen der Normsetzung in 
Völkerrecht, staatlicher Gesetzgebung und gesellschaftlicher Selbstnormierung (Frankfurt am Main:  Klostermann, 
2006), 205– 6.
 12 For other examples of technology- responsive regulation, see Gregory N. Mandel, “Legal Evolution in 
Response to Technological Change,” in Roger Brownsword, Eloise Scotford, and Karen Yeung (eds.), Oxford 
Handbook of Law, Regulation, and Technology (Oxford: OUP, 2017), 225– 45.
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1.1.3 Distinguishing Cyberspace
There is neither a key international treaty document nor a single organization dealing pri-
marily with regulating cyberspace. Yet norms matter on the internet. Cyberspace is not in-
dependent of regulation. It is no legal terra nullius.13 An independent “space of sovereignty” 
does not exist.14 Indeed, the very concept of “cyberspace” is a politicized fiction and, like 
other metaphors used to differentiate online and offline experiences and interactions, it is 
misleading.15 Online, just as offline, (international) law applies. Ubi societas, ibi ius holds 
true through the long run of human socialization as it does in today’s information society. 
Or as Malcolm N. Shaw put it in the first lines of his introduction into international law: “In 
the long march of mankind from the cave to the computer a central role has always been 
played by the idea of law— the idea that order is necessary and chaos inimical to a just and 
stable existence.”16
There is a variety of normative gradations between chaos and order. A  state of non- 
normation (anomia) may not equal one of chaos (anarchy); and not all underregulated 
societies are necessarily chaotic, especially if they are imagined rather than real. Ovid con-
ceived of his Golden Age as one in which people “without coercion, without laws, spontane-
ously nurtured the good and the true.” People lived safely there “without protection,”17 and, 
more importantly, without the need for protection. The lack of protection through norms 
thus does not imply per se a Hobbesian society. But just as Ovid’s vision of a Golden Age 
turned sour, the increasing level of activities and intricacy of interactions between humans, 
between humans and things, and between things in today’s multidimensional relational 
spaces have necessitated normative reactions.
Complexity of a relational space is one factor suggesting a need for normativity; the im-
portance of that space within the increasingly globalized processes of production, use, and 
consumption of public and private goods is another. Indeed, the internet is deeply con-
nected to the provision and enjoyment of public goods and the production and consump-
tion of private ones. In light of these characteristics, especially the internet’s universality 
and global nature, anchoring its protection in the national common interest (or a collection 
thereof) falls short. Public choice analysis shows that (even democratic) governments can 
be subject to corporate capture;18 and authoritarian regimes, as monopolizers of legislative 
normativity, are not accountable to their people. Companies, as actors in the market, are 
not able to deal effectively with externalities and may overuse common resources or apply 
norms selectively.
There is “society” on the internet, therefore ibi ius. This ius is, and must be, more than 
a collection of discrete national normative orders. Protecting the internet and governing 
and regulating it with a view to implementing legitimate public policy choices on a national 
 13 Stephan Hobe, “Cyberspace— der virtuelle Raum,” in Josef Isensee and Paul Kirchhof et al. (eds.), Handbuch 
des Staatsrechts, Band XI: Internationale Bezüge, 3rd edn. (2013), § 231.
 14 Peter Mankowski, Rechtskultur (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2016), 131.
 15 Mark Graham, “Geography/ Internet: Ethereal Alternate Dimensions of Cyberspace or Grounded Augmented 
Realities?” The Geographical Journal 179 (2013) 2, 177– 82.
 16 Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, 8th edn. (Oxford: OUP, 2017), 1.
 17 Publius Ovidius (Ovid) Naso, Metamorphoses (translated by Anthony S. Kline) (London: Borders, 2004), 
I, 89– 90.
 18 Cf. Terry Moe, “The Positive Theory of Public Bureaucracy,” in Dennis C. Mueller (ed.), Perspectives on Public 
Choice: A Handbook (Cambridge: CUP, 1996), 455– 80.
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level, through integration of the normative order of the internet in national legal orders, lies 
in the international common interest. This presupposes that actors are allocated rights and 
responsibilities on par with the “needs of the community,”19 the key standard, according to 
the International Court of Justice, for assessing progress in the evolution and interpretation 
of international law.
Even though international law is the most legitimate system to justifiably develop 
norms relevant for the governance and regulation of the internet, national legal systems 
also matter. So do transnational regulatory arrangements, such as technical standards 
and soft law, including rules of internet governance. It is not suggested here that a new 
normative order needs to be (artificially) developed regulating “the internet,” similar to 
international regimes regarding the seabed, Antarctica, or the moon and other celestial 
objects. Rather, this study argues that the norms which the order is made up of already 
exist, even if they may not be understood in their impact on the internet and their con-
nection to another.
1.1.4 Norms Without Order?
Cars connected to the internet and sharing routing information, fridges that reorder milk, 
and networked attacks against companies using robot networks (botnets) challenge the tra-
ditional distribution of responsibility between states and non- state actors in safeguarding 
the common interest. Companies exercise influence over communication and information 
interchanges online. Courts and, in some cases, states have given them the power (and re-
sponsibility) to weigh on a massive scale, algorithmically, freedom of information and pri-
vacy rights.20
Information and communication technologies, mediated through the internet, have had 
a substantial impact on global societies, their communicative processes, and the develop-
ment of individual social mores. The widespread use of the internet has changed specific 
sectors in most societies more fundamentally and more quickly than any other technology 
in the past.21 By the end of 2017, more than half of the world’s population, 54.4 percent, were 
online— some 4.2 billion people.22 As newly coined or used notions indicate, ICTs have im-
pacted our daily lives on a massive scale: from robots,23 drones,24 and (semi- )automated 
cars (mobility and human– object interaction), cloud computing and big data (data use and 
storage) to smart grids (energy), from e- government (politics) to mobile banking and bit-
coins (finance), from the internet of things (appliances) to Massively Multiplayer Online 
Role- Playing Games (MMORPGs) (leisure), from cyberwar (security) to online grooming 
 19 ICJ, Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion of April 11, 1949, 
ICJ Reports (1949), 179.
 20 CJEU, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of May 13, 2014, Case C- 131/ 12, Google Spain SL, Google Inc. 
v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González (“Google Spain”).
 21 Cf. David Reed, Jennifer Haroon, and Patrick Ryan, “Technologies and Policies to Connect the Next 5 Billion,” 
Berkeley Technology Law Journal 29 (2015) 2, 1205– 52.
 22 Internet Usage Statistics, World Internet Users and 2018 Population Stats, December 31, 2017, http:// www.
Internetworldstats.com/ stats.htm.
 23 John Jordan, Robots (Cambridge, MA/ London: MIT Press, 2016).
 24 With implications for all fields of law. For international and constitutional law, see e.g. Robert Frau (ed.), 
Drohnen und das Recht. Völker- und verfassungsrechtliche Fragen automatisierter und autonomer Kriegführung 
(Tübingen: Mohr, 2014).
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and botnets (crime), from fake news and hate speech to microtargeted advertisements, and 
from social networks to blogs, vlogs, and memes (private- to- private and private- to- public 
communication).
This massive growth in internet penetration over the last two decades only begins to sug-
gest the implications that ICTs and the underlying infrastructure have on society. The use 
and development of ICTs need to be studied in tandem in order to ensure a solid foundation 
for their regulation and governance. These foundations are based, just as early normative 
approaches to regulating telegraphs, on international law but, unlike their counterpart two 
centuries ago, extend normatively much beyond treaties and custom. Yet the set of interna-
tional legal rules relating to internet- based information and communication flows function 
as the backbone of the normative order of the internet and ensure the internet’s security, 
stability, robustness, resilience, and functionality— thus:  its integrity.25 The protection of 
the internet’s integrity and of states from danger emanating from the use and misuse of the 
internet lies, as this study will show, in the global (common) interest and the discrete inter-
ests of all states and other actors.
Just as technology is important for prosperity,26 technologies can threaten societal prog-
ress. The World Economic Forum’s 2017 Global Risks Report names weaponized Artificial 
Intelligence and digital espionage27 as key risks. Other opportunities connected to ICTs 
with hidden risks include robotics, new computing technologies, 3D printing, blockchain 
and distributed ledger, virtual and augmented realities, and proliferation and ubiquitous 
presence of linked sensors.28
A coordinated international approach to regulating the internet and its key resources— 
through a treaty regulating or an international organization governing the internet— has 
not yet materialized, but states have made important commitments bearing upon the regu-
lation of the internet.
In 2005, at the end of the two- phased World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), 
states affirmed in the Tunis Commitment their goal to build a “people- centred, inclusive and 
development- oriented Information Society” premised on the “purposes and principles of 
the Charter of the United Nations, international law and multilateralism, and respecting 
fully and upholding the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”29 In “international as in 
national affairs” relating to internet governance, states “resolve[d] to strengthen respect for 
the rule of law.”30
These are indications of (at least) normative preferences, confirmed years later in the 
reports of a United Nations (UN)- backed expert group, the Group of Governmental Experts 
on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of 
 25 In the following, the study will use the notion “integrity” of the internet to refer to its security, stability, ro-
bustness, resilience, and functionality.
 26 Robert Pepper and John Garrity, “ICTs, Income Inequality, and Ensuring Inclusive Growth, World Economic 
Forum,” Global Information Technology Report 2015 (2015), http:// reports.weforum.org/ global- information- 
technology- report- 2015/ 1- 2- icts- income- inequality- and- ensuring- inclusive- growth (with macro- and micro-
economic data demonstrating the positive income and growth effects of ICTs on lower- income countries and 
populations).
 27 World Economic Forum, “The Global Risks Report 2017,” January 11, 2017, https:// www.weforum.org/ 
agenda/ 2017/ 01/ technology- risks- amplified- by- global- tensions.
 28 Ibid.
 29 World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), Tunis Commitment, WSIS- 05/ TUNIS/ DOC/ 7- E, 18 
November 2005, para. 2.
 30 Ibid., para. 3.
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International Security (GGE). The group’s first report of 2013 underlined that international 
law, and “in particular the Charter of the United Nations, is applicable and is essential to 
maintaining peace and stability and promoting an open, secure, peaceful and accessible 
ICT environment.”31 With important states such as Germany, the US, and China present at 
the adoption of the report, we find here if not already expressions of opinio iuris then at least 
clear indicia of common undertakings regarding the importance of international law for the 
internet and for the ICT environment.32 These commitments have not (yet) been stabilized 
by conventional norms;33 however, customary international law and general principles of 
international law provide for the protection of and from the internet. The continued ab-
sence of a treaty regime complicates the analysis of norms applicable to the internet and its 
use. Normative preferences for a rule- of- law- based international internet- related govern-
ance model34 are counterindicated by destabilizing state actions including cyberattacks,35 
pervasive state surveillance via the internet,36 and attempts by states to create national 
internet segments.37 The complexity of regulating for these challenges suggests the need for 
a comprehensive normative order of the internet.
1.2 Situating the Research
1.2.1 Within Interdisciplinary Approaches
In light of the challenge of establishing order on the internet, it is surprising that more than 
thirty years after the standardization of the internet protocol suites, more than twenty years 
after the invention of the hypertext system, which enabled the evolution of the internet into 
the medium we are presented with today, the launch of the World Wide Web, and more 
than ten years after commitments by states in the WSIS process to a finality of the internet, 
no theoretically comprehensive and substance- oriented research has been undertaken 
on the interaction of different regulatory layers on the internet, i.e. international law, na-
tional law, and transnational regulatory arrangements. No research, that is, that develops 
a coherent theory of a law- based normative order of the internet including an approach 
allowing for the assessment of norms of different character as to their substance, sources, 
and legitimation.
 31 Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and 
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, UN Doc. A/ 68/ 98 of 24 June 2013, para. 19.
 32 See UK Attorney General Jeremy Wright, Speech: “Cyber and International Law in the 21st Century,” May 23, 
2018, https:// www.gov.uk/ government/ speeches/ cyber- and- international- law- in- the- 21st- century (setting out 
the United Kingdom (UK)’s position on applying international law to cyberspace).
 33 But, as will be shown later, customary international law fills the gap. See  chapter 3.
 34 See, e.g., NetMundial Multistakeholder Statement, April 2014, http:// netmundial.br/ wp- content/ uploads/ 
2014/ 04/ NETmundial- Multistakeholder- Document.pdf.
 35 For an overview, see Dan Efrony and Yuval Shany, “A Rule Book on the Shelf? Tallinn Manual 2.0 on Cyber 
Operations and Subsequent State Practice,” Hebrew University of Jerusalem Legal Research Paper No. 18- 22, 
https:// papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_ id=3172743.
 36 Marko Milanovic, “Human Rights Treaties and Foreign Surveillance: Privacy in the Digital Age,” Harvard 
International Law Journal 56 (2015) 1, 81– 146.
 37 Cf. Russia, UAE, China, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Sudan, and Egypt, Proposal for the Work of the Conference 
[WCIT- 12], ITU Doc. DT- X of 5 December 2012, WCIT12/ 27(Rev.1)- E, § 3A.2 and 3A.3, http:// files.wcitleaks.
org/ public/ Merged%20UAE%20081212.pdf.
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This study will fill the gap by systematically and comprehensively evaluating and norma-
tively framing the (international) legal foundations of norms bearing upon the internet and 
submitting that a normative order has emerged made up of international law, national law, 
and transnational regulatory arrangements, encompassing private and public norms, and 
establishing the primacy of normativity over technicity.
The study can build on important intellectual foundations. Foundational research exists 
on both the evolution of the internet38 and the role and impact of the emergence of the in-
formation society,39 a phenomenon as multi- faceted as globalization. The field of “internet 
studies”40 includes law, politics, international relations, sociology, and psychology— to name 
just the non- technical disciplines. The present study uses a normative approach, focusing 
on normativity and on the normative elements of governing and regulating the internet, but 
taking into account the substantial literature on the role of power and control in and over 
the internet,41 literature on limits of state power on the internet,42 and the role of institutions 
that exercise power through managing information.43 The research also takes inspiration 
from network and political science approaches44 in order to better understand the multiple 
dynamics defining the interactions between actors in complex processes of global politics45 
and global communications governance46 but will, again, focus on the normative dimension 
of their relationships. In order to identify myths underlying technological solutionism and 
Sachzwang arguments, the study uses previous research on the relationship of code and law, 
especially regarding the role of standards47 and codes in regulating behavior,48 of code- level 
interoperability rules,49 and of the relationship between standards and architectural prin-
ciples of internet integrity.50 Previous research has identified the process of code influen-
cing norms as “protocol politics”;51 this study develops the foundations of a normative order 
within which the limits of protocol politics and their normative basis are delineated.
The importance of internet governance is reflected in the breadth of studies from dif-
ferent methodological angles. Earlier publications have identified the “civilizing” aspect of 
internet governance.52 From 2008 onward the focus has lain more on reforming internet 
 38 Janet Abbate, Inventing the Internet (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009).
 39 Hassan Robert, The Information Society (Cambridge: Polity, 2008).
 40 William H. Dutton, The Oxford Handbook of Internet Studies (Oxford: OUP, 2013).
 41 Adam Thierer and Clyde Wayne Crews Jr. (eds.), Who Rules the Net? Internet Governance and Jurisdiction 
(Washington:  Cato Institute, 2003); William Drake and Ernest Wilson III, Governing Global Electronic 
Networks: International Perspectives on Policy and Power (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2008).
 42 Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu, Who Controls the Internet? Illusions of a Borderless World (Oxford: OUP, 2008); 
Tim Wu, The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires (New York: Vintage, 2011).
 43 Sandra Braman, Change of State: Information, Policy, and Power (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009).
 44 Mikkel Flyverbom, The Power of Networks: Organizing the Global Politics of the Internet (London: Edward 
Elgar, 2011).
 45 Milton Mueller, Networks and States: The Global Politics of Internet Governance (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2010).
 46 Elena Pavan, Frames and Connections in the Governance of Global Communications (New York: Lexington 
Books, 2012).
 47 Laura DeNardis (ed.), Opening Standards. The Global Politics of Interoperability (Cambridge:  MIT 
Press, 2011).
 48 Alexander Galloway, Protocol:  How Control Exists after Decentralization (Cambridge:  MIT Press, 2004); 
Lawrence Lessig, Code: Version 2.0 (New York: Basic Books, 2007); Shane Greenstein and Victor Stango (eds.), 
Standards and Public Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
 49 John Palfrey and Urs Gasser, Interop: The Promise and Perils of Highly Interconnected Systems (New York: Basic 
Books, 2012).
 50 Barbara van Schewick, Internet Architecture and Innovation (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2010).
 51 Laura DeNardis, Protocol Politics: The Globalization of Internet Governance (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009).
 52 Milton Mueller, Ruling the Root: Internet Governance and the Taming of Cyberspace (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
2002); Daniel J. Paré, Internet Governance in Transition: Who Is the Master of This Domain? (London: Rowman 
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governance53 and identifying regulatory54 and institutional55 shortcomings in terms of 
legitimacy and effectiveness, both with regard to infrastructure management and institu-
tional design.56 More recent publications have given new impetus to the study of the role 
of different actors in internet governance,57 have diagnosed a “global war for internet gov-
ernance,”58 or have discussed legitimacy and the normative integration of multiple actors 
as aspects of the broader governance debates.59 Important works have also been written on 
sectoral issues that influence the use and development of ICTs. To name just three: threats 
to privacy,60 the challenges of regulating online speech,61 and perspectives to solve jurisdic-
tional conflicts.62
1.2.2 Within (International) Legal Approaches
In 2006, Antonio Segura- Serrano was already describing international law not only 
as a “tool for solving regulatory conflicts, but [ . . . ] a tool for governance” regarding key 
aspects of internet regulation, especially privacy, intellectual property, the use of force, 
and human rights online, such as the right to internet access.63 He called on international 
law to “take a normative stance.”64 In 2009, Robert Uerpmann- Wittzack popularized the 
term “Internetvölkerrecht” (“international internet law”)65 as a descriptive denomina-
tion of “all rules of public international law pertaining to the functioning and use of the 
internet.”66 Other authors have written about “supranational cyberspace law” or a “supra-
national internet law” developing in tandem with a “customary law of the internet.”67 More 
& Littlefield, 2003); Don MacLean, Internet Governance: A Grand Collaboration (New York: UN Publications, 
2005); Wolfgang Benedek, Veronika Bauer, and Matthias C. Kettemann (eds.), Internet Governance and 
the Information Society:  Global Perspectives and European Dimensions (Utrecht:  Eleven International 
Publishing, 2008).
 53 William Drake, Reforming Internet Governance: Perspectives from the Working Group on Internet Governance 
(New York: UN Publications, 2008).
 54 Rolf H. Weber, Shaping Internet Governance: Regulatory Challenges (Vienna/ New York: Springer, 2009).
 55 John Mathiason, Internet Governance: The New Frontier of Global Institutions (London: Routledge, 2008).
 56 Lee A. Bygrave and Jon Bing (eds.), Internet Governance:  Infrastructure and Institutions (Oxford: 
OUP, 2009).
 57 Eric Brousseau, Meryem Marzouki, and Cécile Méadel (eds.), Governance, Regulation, and Powers on the 
Internet (Cambridge: CUP, 2012); Matthias C. Kettemann, The Future of Individuals in International Law. Lessons 
from International Internet Law (Utrecht: Eleven International Publishing, 2013).
 58 Laura DeNardis, The Global War for Internet Governance (New Haven and London:  Yale University 
Press, 2014).
 59 Roxana Radu, Jean- Marie Chenou, and Rolf H. Weber (eds.), The Evolution of Global Internet Governance. 
Principles and Policies in the Making (Zurich: Schulthess, 2014).
 60 Lee A. Bygrave, Data Privacy Law: An International Perspective (Oxford: OUP, 2014).
 61 Emily Laidlaw, Regulating Speech in Cyberspace. Gatekeepers, Human Rights and Corporate Responsibility 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2015).
 62 Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, Solving the Internet Jurisdiction Puzzle (Oxford: OUP, 2017).
 63 Antonio Segura- Serrano, “Internet Regulation and the Role of International Law,” in Max Planck Yearbook of 
United Nations Law, Vol. 10 (The Hague: Brill, 2006), 191– 272 (192).
 64 Ibid., 271.
 65 Robert Uerpmann- Wittzack, “Internetvölkerrecht,” Archiv des Völkerrechts 47 (2009) 3, 261– 83. See, more 
recently, with the same terminology, Joanna Kulesza, International Internet Law (London: Routledge, 2012).
 66 Robert Uerpmann- Wittzack, “Principles of International Internet Law,” German Law Journal 11 (2010), 
1245– 63 (1245).
 67 Przemysław Paul Polański, Customary Law of the Internet: in the Search for a Supranational Cyberspace Law 
(The Hague: T.M.C. Asser, 2007).
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recently, authors have analyzed the reliance of internet- related normative processes on non- 
traditional norms68 or criticized their prevalence.69
Within traditionalist approaches to internet law it is argued that, as “all online activities have 
noticeable effects on states’ territories [ . . . ], current internet problems have to be evaluated 
relying on traditional concepts and legal structures.”70 Yet “traditional concepts” and “legal 
structures” do not suffice to explain the norms and normative actors on the internet. While 
using traditional concepts of (international) law in order to situate the present research and 
describing how international legal regimes de lege lata protect internet integrity and remedy 
externalities, this study goes further. Where Molly Land develops the “foundation for an 
‘International Law of the internet’ ”71 on principles derived from Article 19 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the approach followed here is more comprehensive. 
Rather than trying to develop a “supranational cyberspace law” on the basis of customary law of 
the internet, this study has a more ambitious goal in establishing the contours and the content, 
the genesis and finality of a normative order of the internet and assessing how it is implemented 
in, and legitimized by, the international legal order and national legal orders. An important part 
of the present research will also lie in assessing the relationship of public and private norms,72 
the authority over public, private, and hybrid spaces online, of co- regulation (also in the form 
of regulierte Selbstregulierung) and state regulation,73 and the role of hybrid and non- traditional 
sources of law, such as standards and “Request for Comments.”
Ensuring human rights is a key aspect of legitimating normative orders. The dual nature 
of the internet— as a space to use for the promotion of human rights and a space in which 
abuses can take place— has been convincingly established.74 Therefore, achieving public 
policy goals lying in the international common interest, like the protection of human rights 
online, figures centrally in the present research. Since at least 2006, the protection of human 
rights on the internet has been closely studied,75 with freedom of expression identified as 
the key “enabling” right.76 The importance of ensuring human rights on the internet glob-
ally has been recognized on the UN level, with states confirming their obligation to respect 
rights offline just as online.77 This is an important precedent for procedures to establish 
 68 Martha Finnemore and Duncan B. Hollis, “Constructing Norms for Global Cybersecurity,” AJIL 110 (2016), 
425– 79 (477).
 69 Calling on states to develop a treaty- based international law of cybersecurity: Kubo Macak, “From Cyber 
Norms to Cyber Rules: Re- engaging States as Law- makers,” Leiden Journal of International Law 30 (2017) 4, 
877– 99.
 70 Stefanie Schmahl, “Zwischenstaatliche Kompetenzabgrenzung im Cyberspace,” Archiv des Völkerrechts 47 
(2009) 3, 284– 327.
 71 Molly Land, “Toward an International Law of the Internet,” Harvard International Law Journal 54 (2013) 2, 
393– 458.
 72 Lee A. Bygrave, Internet Governance by Contract (Oxford: OUP, 2015).
 73 Christopher T. Marsden, Net Neutrality: Towards a Co- Regulatory Solution (London: Bloomsbury, 2010); 
Christopher T. Marsden, Internet Co- Regulation (Cambridge: CUP, 2011); Ian Brown and Christopher T. Marsden, 
Regulating Code. Good Governance and Better Regulation in the Information Age (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2013).
 74 Andrew Murray, “Uses and Abuses of Cyberspace: Coming to Grips with the Present Dangers,” in Antonio 
Cassese (ed.), Realizing Utopia. The Future of International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2012), 497– 506 (arguing that space 
and cyberspace are vastly different spheres and international legal regulation of corporeal aspects is limited to 
objects in actual space).
 75 Rikke F. Jørgensen (ed.), Human Rights in the Global Information Society (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006).
 76 Dragos Cuceranu, Aspects of Regulating Freedom of Expression on the Internet (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2012); 
Wolfgang Benedek and Matthias C. Kettemann, Freedom of Expression on the Internet (Strasbourg: Council of 
Europe, 2014).
 77 See the first Human Rights Council Resolution 20/ 8, The promotion, protection and enjoyment of human 
rights on the Internet, UN Doc. A/ HRC/ RES/ 20/ 8 of 5 July 2012 and Human Rights Council Resolution 32/ 13, 
The promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet, A/ HRC/ RES/ 32/ 13 of 18 July 2016. 
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internet- related duties of states based on existing international law. The international mon-
itoring of human rights violations online, through filtering and blocking, gave rise to early 
analyses of international legal duties of states regarding the internet.78 Questions of internet 
access and the bridging of the digital divide have also led to research on the international 
duties of states regarding infrastructure development.79
1.2.3 With Regard to the Concept of “Normative Orders”
From the management of critical internet resources to the uploading of pictures on social net-
working sites: actions on, and with relevance to the running of, the internet are controlled by 
norms. International and national rules and public and private norms apply. There are thus 
rules (or norms)80 on the internet— but is there also a rule, in particular a rule of law? The 
closest approximation to a rule or a coherent and controlling regulatory system of the internet 
is, this study submits, the concept of a normative order of the internet. In light of the impor-
tance of the concept for the analytical efforts undertaken here, it must be briefly explained.
The notion of “normative order” suggests an order made of norms. This misses the point 
as a normative order is not (or not strictly) an ordered i.e. layered or hierarchical system of 
(only) explicit norms. Rather than a hierarchical system, like Kelsen’s Stufenbau, a norma-
tive order, according to Rainer Forst and Klaus Günther, is a “complex of norms and values 
with which the fundamental structure of a society (or the structure of international, supra-
national or transnational relationships) is legitimated, in particular the exercise of political 
authority and the distribution of basic goods.”81
For the purposes of this study, the normative order of the internet is a complex of norms, 
values, and practices that relate to the use and development of the internet and with which 
the activities of, and relationships among, states, private companies, and civil society with 
regard to the use and development of the internet are legitimated, in particular the exercise 
of private or public authority and the distribution of basic goods, including internet access 
and access to internet content. Put more succinctly, the normative order of the internet is the 
set of norms and normative expectations that shape the use and development of the internet.
The concept of normative order is more holistic than that of a “regime,” a notion with 
which International Relations scholars are more familiar. Stephen D.  Krasner defined 
See, for an introduction, Rebecca MacKinnon, Consent of the Networked: The Worldwide Struggle for Internet 
Freedom (New York: Basic Books, 2012) and Rikke F. Jørgensen, Framing the Net. The Internet and Human Rights 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2013).
 78 Ronald Deibert, John Palfrey, Rafal Rohozinski, and Jonathan Zittrain (eds.), Access Denied: The Practice 
and Policy of Global Internet Filtering (Cambridge:  MIT Press, 2008); Ronald Deibert, John Palfrey, Rafal 
Rohozinski, and Jonathan Zittrain (eds.), Access Controlled: The Shaping of Power, Rights, and Rule in Cyberspace 
(Cambridge:  MIT Press, 2010); Ronald Deibert, John Palfrey, Rafal Rohozinski, and Jonathan Zittrain (eds.), 
Access Contested: Security, Identity, and Resistance in Asian Cyberspace (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2011).
 79 Nivien Saleh, Third World Citizens and the Information Technology Revolution (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2010); Gaëlle Krikorian and Amy Kapczynski (eds.), Access to Knowledge in the Age of Intellectual Property 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2010).
 80 “Norms” is a broader concept and normative theory uses that term over “rules”. Cf. Duncan Kennedy, “Form 
and Substance in Private Law Adjudication,” Harvard Law Review 89 (1976), 1685– 778.
 81 Rainer Forst and Klaus Günther, “Die Herausbildung normativer Ordnungen. Zur Idee eines interdisziplinären 
Forschungsprogramms,” in Rainer Forst and Klaus Günther (eds.), Die Herausbildung normativer Ordnungen. 
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“regime” as the sum of “implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision- making 
procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international re-
lations.” The normative order of the internet contains the “internet governance regime” and 
embraces both explicit norms and implicit norms (normative expectations). The Frankfurt 
“normative orders” approach offers analytical advantages over a regime- theoretical one, es-
pecially by encompassing the importance of narratives (including justification narratives) 
in establishing, stratifying, and contesting a normative order.
Robert M. Cover developed the notion of nomos (law) and narrative. He argued that 
we live in a “normative world,” in which “law and narrative are inseparably related.” Every 
norm needs to be “located in discourse,” to be given “history and destiny, beginning and 
end, explanation and purpose.” The narrative, too, is insistent in its “demand for its prescrip-
tive point, its moral.”82 This location of norms in discourse (by giving it context) and “expla-
nation” (through being imbued with meaning and purpose) is an important characteristic 
of a normative order and arguably an epistemic advantage over other attempts to stratify 
norm collections (by describing them, e.g., as a “regime”).
The normative orders approach does not only look at norms. Cover, a normative orders 
designer avant la lettre, makes this point in combining nomos and narrative: “[n] o set of 
legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it and give it 
meaning.”83 These narratives are important. Each societal order, according to Rainer Forst, 
is related to a “specific understanding of the purpose, the goals and rules of this order.”84 
The purpose, the goals, and rules need to be justified. The orders are thus “orders of justifi-
cation” (Rechtfertigungsordnungen) and the justifications are formulated as narratives (“jus-
tification narratives”) (Rechtfertigungsnarrative).85 Thus justification narratives are a form 
of “embodied rationality”86 and important for normative analysis. This study will show that 
ensuring internet integrity and protecting states and society from uses and misuses of the 
internet is the purpose of the normative order of the internet. Further, the order is premised 
on this justification and through it justifies the norms (and institutions) within it.87 Though 
this study will not focus in depth on the narratives of the participants in the normative order 
of the internet, the fact that they exist matters, because normative orders that are narratively 
Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven (Frankfurt/ New  York:  Campus, 2011), 11– 30 (15):  “Unter ‘normativer Ordnung’ 
verstehen wir den Komplex von Normen und Werten, mit denen die Grundstruktur einer Gesellschaft (beziehung-
sweise die Struktur inter- bzw. supra- oder transnationaler Verhältnisse) legitimiert wird, namentlich die Ausübung 
politischer Autorität und die Verteilung von elementaren Lebens- und Grundgütern” (translation by the author).
 82 Robert M. Cover, “The Supreme Court, 1982 Term – Foreword. Nomos and Narrative,” Harvard Law Review 
97 (1983) 4, 1– 68 (5).
 83 Ibid., 4 (notes omitted).
 84 Rainer Forst, Normativität und Macht. Zur Analyse sozialer Rechtfertigungsordnungen (Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp, 2015), 70: “Jede gesellschaftliche Ordnung im Allgemeinen und jedes Subsystem im Besonderen 
beruht auf einem bestimmten Verständnis des Zwecks, der Ziele und Regeln dieser Ordnung oder des Systems – 
sie sind somit normative Ordnungen bzw. Teilordnungen als Rechtfertigungsordnungen” (translation by the 
author).
 85 Ibid., 70, 87. See also Ibid., 96– 7.
 86 Ibid., 87:  “Rechtfertigungsnarrative betrachten wir als Formen einer verkörperten Rationalität, 
denn hier verdichten sich Bilder, Partikularerzählungen, Rituale, Fakten sowie Mythen zu wirkmächtigen 
Gesamterzählungen, die als Ressource der Ordnungssinngebung fungieren.”
 87 Cf. ibid., 87: “ ‘Normative Ordnungen’ beruhen auf basalen Rechtfertigungen und dienen entsprechend der 
Rechtfertigung von sozialen Regeln, Normen und Institutionen; [ . . . ] Insofern ist eine normative Ordnung als 
Rechtfertigungsordnung anzusehen: Sie setzt Rechtfertigungen voraus und generiert sie zugleich.”
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configured exert special force and authority. They are historically meaningful and exert at-
traction through power of identification,88 which in turn favors norm adherence.
Importantly, the study will investigate where the power within the normative order of the 
internet lies. Justifications are related to power: having power means being able to “influ-
ence, order, occupy, or close the realm of reasons and justifications for other subjects.”89 The 
way that this power is distributed and controlled in the normative order of the internet is a 
key theme of the theoretical approaches presented in  chapter 4.
The normative order of the internet (or nomos of the internet following Cover’s termi-
nology) is not dependent on any particular state or legal system. Creating legal meaning, 
the process of “jurisgenesis,” takes place “through an essentially cultural medium”90 in so-
cial or collective processes. Similarly, the normative order of the internet proceduralizes the 
jurisgenesis related to the use and development of the internet and the services running on it.
Norms that make up normative orders are not (only or even primarily) Kelsenian 
Sollenssätze91 but, pursuant to Forst and Günther, “practical reasons to act [containing] 
the claim of being binding upon the addressee.”92 They are “contextualized culturally, eco-
nomically, politically, communicatively, and psychologically, sedimented and habituated in 
practices, contained in conventions as the result of long procedures to find compromises, 
challenged [ . . . ], discussed in processes of interpretation and constant revision [ . . . ].”93 In 
the context of the normative development of the internet “norms” are normatively relevant 
commitments, exercising pull on the addressee, that can crystallize into (international) law. 
Norms in the context of this study are thus not necessarily legally binding but are formu-
lated in a way that influences behavior and, through their consonance with the order’s pur-
pose, incentivize adherence.
Actors able to pass legally binding norms may nevertheless use non- binding norms. 
According to Christoph Möllers, in an in- depth study on norms, setting non- binding 
norms (he calls them “non- norms”) already means accepting their content and showing 
the recipient a “picture” of expected behavior, thus cognitively closing alternative options.94 
Möllers describes norms as “positively marked possibilities” pointing to a “possible situ-
ation” or a “possible event” which “should be realized.”95 This relates single norms to the 
 88 Cf. ibid., 87: “In Narrative eingefasst [ . . . ] haben normativen Ordnungen eine besondere Bindungskraft und 
Autorität; sie erhalten historische Bedeutung und zugleich emotionale Identifikationskraft.”
 89 Ibid., 96– 7: “Macht zu haben bedeutet, den Raum der Gründe und Rechtfertigungen anderer Subjekte – und hier 
sind die Grade wichtig – beeinflussen, bestimmen, besetzen oder gar abschließen zu können” (translation by the author).
 90 Robert M. Cover, “The Supreme Court, 1982 Term – Foreword. Nomos and Narrative,” Harvard Law Review 
97 (1983) 4, 1– 68 (11).
 91 Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (1934), 21 (Matthias Jestaedt (ed.), Reine Rechtslehre. Studienausgabe der 
1. Auflage 1934) (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 33.
 92 Rainer Forst and Klaus Günther, “Die Herausbildung normativer Ordnungen. Zur Idee eines interdisziplinären 
Forschungsprogramms,” in Rainer Forst and Klaus Günther (eds.), Die Herausbildung normativer Ordnungen. 
Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven (Frankfurt/ New York: Campus, 2011), 11– 30 (16): “[Normen sind] praktische Gründe 
für Handlungen, die den Anspruch erheben, verbindlich zu sein, und die ihre Adressaten entsprechend dazu verp-
flichten, sich diesen Grund als ein Handlungsmotiv zu eigen zu machen” (translation by the author).
 93 Ibid., 16:  “[Normen sind] in kulturelle, ökonomische, politische, kommunikative und psychologische 
Kontexte eingebettet, in Institutionen verkörpert, in Praktiken sedimentiert und habitualisiert, in Konventionen 
als Ergebnis langwieriger Kompromissbildungsverfahren enthalten, in Konfliktarenen herausgefordert, in 
Prozessen der Interpretation und Dauerrevision thematisiert und bestritten, in Ritualen und Dramen bekräftigt 
und stabilisiert” (translation by the author).
 94 Christoph Möllers, Die Möglichkeit der Normen (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2016), 137.
 95 Ibid., 13– 14: “Normen sind [ . . . ] als positiv markierte Möglichkeiten zu verstehen. Normen verweisen auf 
einen möglichen Zustand oder ein mögliches Ereignis. [ . . . ] Die positive Markierung einer Möglichkeit zeigt an, 
dass diese sich verwirklichen soll” (translation by the author).
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normative order, which defines, through its purpose, embedded in justification narratives, 
why a certain norm/ normative goal should be realized.
The normative order of the internet must be capable of predicting, explaining, or justifying 
normative challenges for (and normative answers by) different actors for a vast array of chal-
lenges: from the right to be forgotten to the exercise of control over Internet Exchange Points, 
from the development and implementation of cybersecurity strategies to the role of search en-
gines and social media companies vis- à- vis online harassment and hate speech. A successful 
normative order of the internet must be able to address macro- issues, such as the protection of 
the internet’s critical infrastructure, but must also be detailed enough to contain, contextualize, 
and justify norms capable of influencing individual decisions regarding the use of the internet 
and connected technologies.
1.3  Hypotheses
The overall research question that motivates this study is related to a concept this study estab-
lished for the first time: the normative order of the internet. What is the genealogy, ontology, 
legitimacy, finality, and impact of the normative order of the internet? Put differently: how did 
it evolve, what is it made up of, how is it legitimized, what is its finality, and how is it (and its con-
stituent norms) implemented and legitimated within and through the international legal order 
and in national legal orders?
In developing answers to these queries, the study will test, develop, and confirm six inter-
linked hypotheses:
 (1) The leading hypothesis of this study is that a normative order of the internet has 
emerged that integrates norms materially and normatively connected to the use and 
development of the internet at three different levels (national, regional, international), 
of two types (privately and publicly authored) and of substantially different character 
(from ius cogens to technical standards). As a legal order it operates through the form 
of law and analogously to it. Its actors— states, legal persons, natural persons— fulfill 
diverse functions as norm entrepreneurs, norm appliers, and norm enforcers. The 
order’s justification narratives control new norms by assessing their technical con-
sistency and legal– cultural consonancy with the order’s purpose. Though not without 
autonomous elements, the normative order of the internet is interlinked through le-
gitimation relationships with national and international legal orders. Its genealogy, 
ontology, legitimacy, finality, and impact are subsequently analyzed.
 (2) It is hypothesized that apart from international and national norms a “third” category of 
norms exists, a normative tertium, which has only recently emerged as a normative cate-
gory in its own right. Tertium norms are fundamentally technical standards and soft law 
norms, which emerge in the contested space between technical necessity and socio- legal 
values. They evidence a variable normativity and transcend binary normative solutions 
and can thus counteract diffusions of regulatory responsibility in transnational settings.
 (3) The study also hypothesizes that the technology- orientation of non- legal norma-
tivity, including the focus on code and standards, needs to be reoriented through a 
value- based normative approach, while embracing the internal norm (re)production 
mechanisms of private standards. It is thus not technicity that shapes normativity. 
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Rather than letting a “technical medium [ . . . ] define our societal values”96 it is the 
values embedded in the normative order of the internet that define the evolution 
of the internet’s underlying technologies through normative framing and regulatory 
interventions. Value- based normativity, it is hypothesized, must influence standard- 
setting to ensure the primacy of international legal commitments, and their national 
legal counterparts, as to the finality of normative ordering on the internet. Rather 
than accepting arguments out of technical necessity, this study hypothesizes that 
technical norms are properly placed within the value- oriented common frame of the 
normative order of the internet.
 (4) Centrifugal forces contribute to the emergence of normative redundancies (“nor-
mative froth”), real conflicts of norms between regulatory layers and geographically 
bounded normative spheres (“normative friction”), substantial structural problems 
(“normative fractures”), and political, commercial, and technological fragmentation 
of the internet. However, technical invariants of the internet exercise defragmentation 
forces. These are then normatively reified within the normative order of the internet.
 (5) Consequently, it is hypothesized that a normative turn has taken place on the internet 
allowing norms, which impact its use and development, to self- constitutionalize 
and— through autonomous normative processes— to develop and legitimize other 
norms within the order. This approach has considerable explanatory and predictive 
potential as to the evolution of norms impacting the internet, as norms which do not 
cohere with other order norms or are in dissonance with key principles of the order 
will remain unsuccessful attempts at norm entrepreneurship.
 (6) It is finally hypothesized that the normative order of the internet is a legitimate order 
of norms. Processes of legitimation of norms take place within the order, but also 
through the national law and the international legal system. Internationally, the 
norm creation process which allows for the integration of all actors legitimizes the 
normative outcome. Nationally, tertium norms have been progressively recognized 
within national legal orders through processes of formal and non- formal applica-
tion, transposition, and referencing.
This study uses a number of different methodological approaches. Aware of the merely ep-
istemic legitimacy of scholars, the author performs normative analysis through evaluation 
and systematization.97 Chapters 2 and 3 analytically establish essential concepts and nor-
mative dynamics. Analytical parts identify challenges to internet regulation. Descriptive 
parts provide for a phenomenology of the internet and the technology- related specificities. 
An empirical and largely positivist analysis of international legal regimes exposes them to 
rationalized scientific discourse. Chapter 4 will provide space for more normative reflection 
on the “disordering” of the internet on the basis of critical normativity. Chapter 5 will allow 
for a comprehensive presentation of the theoretical approaches to ordering the internet’s 
norms, including network theory, systems theory, transnationalism, global constitution-
alism, and conflict studies.
 96 Indra Spiecker gen. Döhmann, “Online- und Offline- Nutzung von Daten:  Einige Überlegungen zum 
Umgang mit Informationen im Internetzeitalter,” in Michael Bartsch and Robert G. Briner (eds.), DGRI- Jahrbuch 
(Cologne: Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt), 39– 53 (53): “[Das Internet] ist ein rechtsfreier Raum nur solange, wie wir 
zulassen, dass ein technisches Medium unsere gesellschaftlichen Werte bestimmt” (translation by the author).
 97 As counselled by Anne Peters, “Realizing Utopia as A Scholarly Endeavour,” EJIL 24 (2013), 533– 52 (552).
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It is in  chapter  6 where the approach informing all other chapters is centrally em-
ployed: the normative orders of the Frankfurt School of Critical Norms Studies (or studies 
of normativity; Normenforschung, Normativitätsforschung), developed in a Habermasian 
tradition by Rainer Forst and Klaus Günther and continued by other researchers within 
the Cluster of Excellence “The Formation of Normative Orders.”98 The study will empiri-
cally assess and describe and normatively reflect on the evolution of the normative order of 
the internet based on international law, national rules, and private regulation. Informed by 
critical positivism and following Forst,99 the study understands normativity as having two 
dimensions, both of which are necessary to conceptualize normative orders: a descriptive 
and a critical one. Descriptive normativity delineates the normative power of existing jus-
tification narratives, while critical normativity reflectively analyzes normativity in light of 
criteria such as generality and reciprocity.100
This study seeks to avoid only “identify[ing] the normative world with the professional 
paraphernalia of social control,” as Robert M. Cover warned. A positivistic approach— just 
or primarily looking at the “rules and principles of justice, the formal institutions of the law 
and the conventions of a social order”— is methodologically unproductive in a normative 
field with variable normative geometries such as the internet. The normative order of the 
internet can only be understood if the narratives behind it are identified and dissected: what 
applies to normative orders within states applies to the internet: “No set of legal institutions 
or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it and give it meaning. For every 
constitution there is an epic, for each decalogue a scripture.”101
The normative order of the internet is a theory in the sense that it helps explain, justify, 
and predict normative phenomena, tie together data points (such as normative develop-
ments and behavioral patterns) and, generally, serve as normative orientation in a com-
plex world.102 The study’s analysis is based on a critical analysis of both theory and legal 
developments, but will go beyond them and take into account what a critical scholar has 
called the “emancipatory political possibilities [ . . . ] within the historically unfolding con-
stellation.”103 Investigating the role of normativity on the internet, this study remains never-
theless cautious: “annoying Westphalian objections” act as an important anchor for overly 
optimistic approaches to internet regulation.104 To name just three examples: calls for the 
independence of cyberspace have given way to an overwhelming consensus regarding the 
key role of law as an ordering agent in the online world; calls for states to accept their ir-
relevance in regulating the internet have been silenced by the reality of the continued re-
sponsibility of states to secure to everyone within their territories and under their control 
all human and fundamental rights in exercising the territorial sovereignty; and calls for 
 98 Cf., for an introduction, Rainer Forst und Klaus Günther, “Die Herausbildung normativer Ordnungen. Zur 
Idee eines interdisziplinären Forschungsprogramms,” in Rainer Forst and Klaus Günther (eds.), Die Herausbildung 
normativer Ordnungen. Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven (Frankfurt/ New York: Campus, 2011), 11– 30 (16).
 99 Rainer Forst, Normativität und Macht. Zur Analyse sozialer Rechtfertigungsordnungen (Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp, 2015), 96– 7.
 100 Ibid., 101.
 101 Robert M. Cover, “The Supreme Court, 1982 Term – Foreword. Nomos and Narrative,” Harvard Law Review 
97 (1983) 4, 1– 68 (4) (notes omitted).
 102 Anne Peters, “Realizing Utopia as A Scholarly Endeavour,” EJIL 24 (2013), 533– 52 (536).
 103 Nancy Fraser, “Transnationalizing the Public Sphere: On the Legitimacy and Efficacy of Public Opinion in a 
Post- Westphalian World,” Theory, Culture & Society 24 (2007) 4, 7– 30 (8).
 104 Timothy William Waters, “The Momentous Gravity of the State of Things Now Obtaining:  Annoying 
Westphalian Objections to the Idea of Global Governance,” Indiana Journal of Global Studies 16 (2009), 25– 58.
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complete self- regulation of internet content on privately owned sites by the intermediaries 
controlling these spaces have given way to (at least) regulated self- regulation by states and 
international organizations.
Hersch Lauterpacht criticized the tendency of positivists to merely register state practice 
without relating it to “higher legal principles [or] the conception of international law as a 
whole.”105 Using a critical positivist approach remedies this problem. In consequence, this 
study will ensure that observed norms are related to their position in, and justification by 
(and reciprocal justificatory potential for), the normative order of the internet. This pro-
ductive tension between positivist and normative analyses allows this study to present a 
detailed picture of the varied attempts to normatively order the internet.
The research needs to encompass interdisciplinary aspects. ICTs have pervaded most 
sectors of society so thoroughly that a disciplinary analysis of “the internet” from a uniquely 
legal perspective is impossible:  “digital information exchange diffuses throughout the 
economy and society.”106 The societal implications of the internet, according to Ian Brown 
and Christopher T. Marsden, make it impossible to develop “simple magic bullet solutions 
based on study of one discipline (whether computer science, law, or economics), one in-
dustry sector (telecommunication or free software), or one solution (efficiency and human 
rights).”107 This holds true to the degree that the challenges of regulating the internet need 
to be evaluated based on the “dynamism of markets and the even greater dynamism of 
code.”108 It is only partly true in that there is, as this study posits, a coherent normative 
order that explains and justifies the functional protection of the internet’s integrity (and the 
protection of states and society from uses and misuses of the internet), the role of actors in 
normative processes, their justification narratives, and the normative instruments used in 
regulating and governing the internet: the normative order of the internet.
1.4  Structure
This introductory chapter presents first foundations on normativity on (and of) the internet, 
situates the research in the global academic discourse, explains the concept of norma-
tive orders, and discusses the research questions and hypotheses and the methodology 
employed.
Chapter 2 opens with a foundational analysis of regulatory approaches to technology. 
In particular, the chapter’s sections sketch the regulation of ICTs through time, the criti-
cality of the internet in its societal context, and the importance of protecting the internet in 
the common interest. Thereafter, special challenges of internet regulation are examined, in-
cluding the role of non- state actors (intermediaries) and the flexible use of non- traditional 
regulatory means, such as code and algorithms.
Chapter  3 analyzes existing international legal rules safeguarding internet integrity 
and presents the evolution of internet governance as a global regime arrangement for the 
 105 Hersch Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 
1933), 438.
 106 Ian Brown and Christopher T. Marsden, Regulating Code. Good Governance and Better Regulation in the 
Information Age (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2013) xi.
 107 Ibid., 1.
 108 Ibid..
 
18 Introduction
internet. While there exist no international treaties directly protecting the internet (or pro-
tecting states and society from its dangers), indirectly protective norms exist both in treaty 
law and customary international law. Further, the majority of established principles of in-
ternational law are relevant for the use and development of the internet. By describing ex-
isting elements of the internet’s order and the normative dynamics that have shaped the 
evolution of internet- related principles,  chapters 2 and 3 together set the scene for the dis-
cussion of normative disorder on the internet.
Chapter 4 makes the case that internet regulation today is in normative disarray. Due 
(inter alia) to normative dissonance and politico- economic preferences of rational actors 
between normative players and the disconnect between regulatory layers, the internet has 
partially fragmented. Normative froth, normative friction, and normative fractures are 
exemplified as elements of disorder. The overall fragmentation of the internet is described 
in more detail as being caused by technical, political, and legal developments. However, the 
forces at work are truly centrifugal in that they are only “apparent”109 when experienced 
from within the system. Observing from the outside, there are actually centripetal forces at 
work, keeping objects within the rotating system. These “centripetal” forces, including not 
only technical elements of the internet, the “internet invariants,” but also shared commit-
ments to internet integrity, are key elements of (the self- constitutionalization of) the nor-
mative order of the internet.
Chapter 5 shows the potential of theoretical approaches to solving the normative crisis on 
the internet. In turn, key theories of order in the broader sense are presented and discussed. 
Though the majority of these theories were not posited with a view to the internet, the pre-
sent study draws from their epistemic potential for the regulation of the internet. Theories 
(and key representatives of that theory) include systems theory (Luhmann/ Teubner), 
constitutionalization/ global constitutionalism (Pernice), transnationalism (Viellechner, 
Calliess), legal pluralism (Seinecke), multi- normativity (Forst), network theory (Vesting), 
interoperability theory (Palfrey, Gasser, Weber), massive online micro justice (De Werra), 
conflict studies (Mueller), and infrastructuralization (DeNardis). Further, the study as-
sesses the historically sedimented discourses on internet governance and their influence on 
ordering the internet as well as more recent attempts to define “cybernorms.”
Chapter 6 presents in detail the normative order of the internet based on the notion of 
a necessary identification of, and turn toward, a nomos of the internet, which is embedded 
in, and configures, the normative order of the internet. The study shows that this order has 
many facets, contains national, international, public, and private norms, but has impor-
tantly developed its own normative instruments and rules on the relation of actors and the 
legitimacy of norms. The normative order provides a normative infrastructure in which 
the internet’s nomos, including its means of normative production and justification, are 
anchored. The study will determine norms belonging to the normative order of the internet 
to be those that have a material (non- trivial) and a normative (not merely factual) connec-
tion to the internet as a network of networks. These norms will be shown to be formally and 
materially legitimated. Formal legitimation will be shown to be achievable through sym-
bolic validation through norm emergence in processes involving multiple actors. Material 
 109 Centrifugal force is an “apparent force” (Scheinkraft). As part of a (rotating) system you seem to experi-
ence centrifugal force pushing you away from the rotating center, while you are actually feeling inward centripetal 
forces.
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legitimation is possible through norms being determinate enough for their purpose (thus 
allowing for non- binding instruments), coherent with the core principles of the normative 
order of the internet, consonant with the order’s values as expressed in its principles, and 
adhering systematically to the normative order as a whole.
Chapter 7 takes a close look at the norms of the normative order of the internet and 
studies how they are integrated into national legal orders and especially how non- traditional 
norms, such as standards and soft law (as a legal “tertium” next to national and international 
law), are legitimated through national legal processes. The chapter will show that national 
legal orders have recognized international law and national law. Monism and dualism have 
emerged to explain how the two dominions relate to each other: the choices ranged from 
subordination to coordination with varying primacies. Together with global constitution-
alists, the study goes beyond this debate. It will argue that this tertium of normativity has 
been recognized by national orders: normative instruments that are neither “national” law 
nor “international” law, but part of the normative order of the internet. This enrichment of 
the legal vocabulary has been called a “change in the composition of the medium of law”110 
by Jürgen Habermas.
The study also demonstrates and justifies the integration into national legal orders of 
a set of non- binding rules and practices, processes, and normative expectations that are 
embedded in the normative order of the internet, which influence normative processes 
impacting the internet (and being impacted by the internet) on a national level.
The study ends with conclusions in  chapter 8, in which the study’s results will be summa-
rized, namely that, as the following pages will show, a legal and legitimate normative order 
of the internet has emerged, made up of international and national law and transnational 
regulatory arrangements.
The regulatory challenges of the internet become clear and the need for a comprehensive 
order evident when one considers, as the next chapter will suggest we do, how a stable and 
secure internet is critical and must be ensured in the common interest to reduce dangers to 
society emanating from its use.
 110 Jürgen Habermas, “Im Sog der Technokratie,” in Jürgen Habermas, Im Sog der Technokratie: kleine politische 
Schriften XII (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2013), 7.
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2
 Foundations of Online Order
2.1 A Network of Networks
2.1.1  Foundations
In the following chapter key foundations and first fractures of the internet and its norms 
will be presented. Section 2.1 discusses the beginning of the information society and clari-
fies semantic questions. Section 2.2 shows why internet integrity is critical for society and 
that both the internet’s physicality and its intangibles need to be protected. Section 2.3 dem-
onstrates why protecting the internet lies in the global common interest. Section 2.4 shows 
which (normative) challenges emerge when regulating the internet. The final section 2.5 
shows which hypotheses as to the hybridity of the internet and the importance of values- 
based normativity are already shown to be valid.
2.1.2 Beginnings of the Information Society
The creation of the internet was the key development in the evolution of information so-
ciety.1 Just as freedom of expression in all its forms is widely considered the right essential to 
meaningful internet use,2 the evolution of the internet has become so determinative of the 
development of information society that the former notion has largely supplanted the latter 
in defining our time. We now do not (usually) speak of “information society,” but rather 
of the “internet age.” Information and communication technologies, however, predate the 
internet by far.
Exchanging messages between stations was the premise of telegraphs, with international 
regulation, as we have seen, going back to the 1850s. But the revolutionary premise of what 
would later become the internet was that of a global information exchange and commu-
nication network. In the Brief History of the Internet, some of the key thinkers and engin-
eers behind its evolution pinpoint the 1962 memos of J.C.R. Licklider of the Massachussetts 
 1 Especially notable among the large number of publications offering accounts of information society theories 
are Alistair Duff, Information Society Studies (London: Routledge, 2000); Frank Webster, Theories of the Information 
Society, 3rd edn. (London: Routledge, 2006); and Robert Hassan, The Information Society (Cambridge: Polity, 
2008). For a critical perspective on informationalization, see Christopher May, The Information Society:  A 
Skeptical View (Cambridge: Polity, 2002). Fundamental texts still are Manuel Castells’s three- part account: Manuel 
Castells, The Information Society: Economy, Society and Culture; Vol. 1: The Rise of the Network Society, 2nd edn. 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1996/ 2000); Vol. 2: The Power of Identity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997); Vol. 3: End of Millennium, 
2nd edn. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998/ 2000).
 2 Cf. Human Rights Council Resolution 20/ 8, The promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the 
Internet, July 5, 2012, para. 1: “[The Human Rights Council] [a] ffirms that the same rights that people have offline 
must also be protected online, in particular freedom of expression, which is applicable regardless of frontiers and 
through any media of one’s choice, in accordance with Articles 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights” (emphasis added).
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Institute of Technology (MIT) as the first references to the potential of global networking. 
Licklider called his vision the “Galactic Network.”3 In late 1969, first messages were 
exchanged via ARPAnet (Advanced Research Projects Agency Network), a network de-
veloped through funds of DARPA, the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, 
that supports research in new technologies. By 1971, emailing technology and by 1973 the 
Transfer Control Protocol/ Internet Protocol (TCP/ IP) suite of internet protocols had been 
developed. It took until 1983, however, for ARPAnet computers to switch to TCP/ IP, thus 
making it part of the newly emerging internet.4
The 1980s also saw the “Protocol Wars” take place, a conflict about the best approach to 
develop a global ICT network. The European competitor OSI (Open Systems Interconnect)5 
and two corporate networks, including one by IBM (International Business Machines), 
eventually lost because of ARPANnet’s higher flexibility. Thus technical fragmentation 
of the internet, a force of disorder today, was the lived reality for the first two decades of 
internet- based communication. There were, in fact, internets. The year 1984 saw the cre-
ation of the Domain Name System (DNS) and 1989 the invention, by Tim Berners- Lee at 
CERN (the European Organization for Nuclear Research), of WWW, the World Wide Web 
application, to run on the internet.6 Following this, from 1991 onward, the first end- user- 
friendlier web pages were created and the popularization of the internet as a communicative 
tool outside academia started. From the mid- 1990s onward the internet was mainstreamed 
in that it became relevant beyond the technical and academic sectors and achieved a signif-
icant role both as a topic and a medium for business and society. The internet’s commercial-
ization ensued which in turn led to a politicization and, responsively, to a still incomplete 
juridification of the internet.
In decades of internet time, the 1970s appear as the time of the invention of the internet, 
the 1980s as the time of its operational birth, the 1990s as the time of its increasing com-
mercialization and politicization, the 2000s as the decade of its fruition into the global in-
formation and communication network (a role it continues to fulfill), and the 2010s as the 
emergence of a governance discussion framework in response to the growing role of the 
internet for human sociality.
The internet today has become, as UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, 
Frank La Rue, put in his 2011 report, a “vital communications medium which individuals 
can use to exercise their right to freedom of expression, or the right to seek, receive and im-
part information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers.”7 Unlike any other medium 
in history, “the internet allows individuals to communicate instantaneously and inexpen-
sively, and it has had a dramatic impact on the way information and ideas are shared and 
accessed.”8 It is the most innovative and fastest developing communicative environment in 
the history of the world and dynamizes human- to- human (e.g. through social networks), 
 3 Barry M. Leiner, Vinton G. Cerf, David D. Clark, Robert E. Kahn, Leonard Kleinrock, Daniel C. Lynch, Jon 
Postel, Larry G. Roberts, and Stephen Wolff, “Brief History of the Internet,” Internet Society (2012), http:// www.
internetsociety.org/ brief- history- internet.
 4 Cf. Robert H. Zakon, Hobbes’ Internet Timeline 25, http:// www.zakon.org/ robert/ internet/ timeline.
 5 See NetAffair (Mariann Unterluggauer), “Background,” March 2014, http:// www.netaffair.at/ background.html.
 6 See Tim Berners- Lee, “Information Management:  A Proposal,” (1989/ 1990), http:// www.w3.org/ History/ 
1989/ proposal.html.
 7 Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Frank 
La Rue, Promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, UN Doc. A/ 66/ 290 of 10 
August 2011, http:// www.ohchr.org/ Documents/ Issues/ Opinion/ A.66.290.pdf, para. 10.
 8 Ibid.
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human- to- object (e.g. through mobile communication devices, such as smartphone), and 
object- to- object (e.g. smart cars or appliances) interactions.9 It has developed into, in the 
words of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in the 2015 Cengiz and Others 
v. Turkey judgment, “one of the principal means by which individuals exercise their right to 
freedom to receive and impart information and ideas, providing as it does essential tools for 
participation in activities and discussions concerning political issues and issues of general 
interest.”10 Or as the German Federal Court of Justice (BGH) confirmed: the internet is of 
“central importance” for daily life and non- access “significantly impacts the material foun-
dation of living.”11
To many, the internet has become a central feature of their lives. The average German 
internet user is online between 196 and 214 minutes a day, depending on age.12 Globally, by 
the end of 2019, more than half of the world’s population was online.13 In developed coun-
tries like Iceland and Finland, internet penetration is inching toward 100 percent. There is, 
however, still a substantial digital divide between North America and Europe (with internet 
penetration rates of 89.4% and 87.7%, respectively) and Africa and Asia (39.6% and 54.2%, 
respectively).14 With just over half (54.2%) of its people connected, Asia amounts to half 
(50.7%) of the world’s internet users. As internet penetration and use in Europe and North 
America can no longer grow substantially, the majority of new internet users will come 
from Africa and Asia.
2.1.3 Internet and “Internet(s)”
“The internet is that medium through which your e- mail is delivered and web pages get 
published,” wrote Harvard law professor Lawrence Lessig in a definition of the internet, 
which resonates with most users, “[i] t’s what you use to order books on Amazon [ . . . ].”15 
Less functionally, the internet can be described as a network of interconnected computer 
networks (hence the term internet). According to one standard definition, the internet 
is “[a] global computer network providing a variety of information and communication 
facilities, consisting of interconnected networks using standardized communication pro-
tocols.”16 With a view to its technical DNA,17 Mueller, Mathiason, and Klein have defined 
 9 Cf. Ian Brown and Christopher T. Marsden, Regulating Code. Good Governance and Better Regulation in the 
Information Age (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2013), xi.
 10 ECtHR, Cengiz and Others v. Turkey, judgment of December 1, 2015, application nos. 48226/ 10 and 14027/ 
11, paras. 49 and 52.
 11 BGH, judgment of January 24, 2013 – III ZR 98/ 12, 22 (“Die Nutzbarkeit des Internets ist ein Wirtschaftsgut, 
dessen ständige Verfügbarkeit seit längerer Zeit [  . . .  ] auch im privaten Bereich für die eigenwirtschaftliche 
Lebenshaltung typischerweise von zentraler Bedeutung ist und bei dem sich eine Funktionsstörung als solche auf 
die materiale Grundlage der Lebenshaltung signifikant auswirkt”) (translation by the author).
 12 Statista, Internetnutzung in Deutschland (2019), https:// de.statista.com/ themen/ 2033/ internetnutzung- in-  
deutschland.
 13 Internet Usage Statistics, World Internet Users and 2019 Population Stats, Internet User Distribution, Mid- 
Year 2019, http:// www.Internetworldstats.com/ stats.htm.
 14 Ibid.
 15 Lawrence Lessig, Code: Version 2.0 (New York: Basic Books, 2007), 9.
 16 Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “Internet” (2018), https:// en.oxforddictionaries.com/ definition/ internet.
 17 In German, DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid), the biomolecule carrying the genes, is abbreviated DNS 
(Desoxyribonukleinsäure). Thus, in German, the internet’s “DNS” is actually its “DNS”— the domain name system 
ensuring unique assignation of numbers and their translation into and from names.
 
A Network of Networks 23
the internet as “the global data communication capability realized by the interconnection 
of public and private telecommunication networks using [different protocols].”18 Lessig’s 
definition looks at what we can “do” with the internet, its function, while Mueller et al.’s 
definition teases out what the internet technically “is,” its essence.19 Both dimensions— the 
internet as a borderless technological information and communication, empowerment, 
and consumption facility and the internet as communication capability running on kinetic 
artifacts— are relevant for a study of the norms to be applied to its governance and its uses.
In the network of interconnected networks, a certain standard protocol (TCP/ IP) is used 
to communicate. The connected networks are private and public. They are linked to each 
other through different technologies. When we say that we “go on the internet,” we usually 
mean that we send emails, open our browsers to access a page or a search engine on the 
World Wide Web (WWW), use a hyperlink that connects one website to another, post a 
status update on a social media site, conduct research in an online repository of academic 
papers, or play an online game. Mail programs, the WWW, online gaming systems including 
virtual realities are layered on top of the internet as services of it. The internet enables them, 
and its running— broadly speaking— is the precondition for their functioning.20
Essentially, the internet is hardware- based data- transfer capability running software that 
ensures interconnectivity, that is connectivity between largely privately owned and oper-
ated networks. The internet needs physical infrastructure to run, but it does not “consist” 
(only) of it. However, without the physical infrastructure the internet would not be able to 
function.21 The protection of the internet is therefore connected to the protection of certain 
critical internet resources (CIRs), but also encompasses protection of its content (informa-
tion and communication interchange, services, etc.). But the protection of the internet also 
includes protecion from the internet, i.e. the dangers of misuses of the internet including 
dangers for CIRs.
The internet is not like the “environment” or the “sea” in that it was created by humans 
with a distinct purpose in mind. It is not an entity that, if left alone, would thrive according 
to natural laws. It is made up of a majority of privately owned networks, based on data flows 
premised upon privately owned cloud- based services offered by private companies, pro-
viding applications and social media channels for content consumption and production 
under private terms and service. All this happens within a frame governed by national law, 
as states have the sovereign right to regulate for their territory, and international law, appli-
cable to any issues transcending borders. This brief description already hints at the concep-
tual challenges involved in developing a normative order of the internet.
 18 Milton Mueller, John Mathiason, and Hans Klein, “The Internet and Global Governance: Principles and 
Norms for a New Regime,” Global Governance 13 (2007), 237– 54 (245). Protocols include “Internet Protocol (IP), 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), and the other protocols required to implement IP internetworking on a 
global scale, such as DNS [domain name system] and packet routing protocols” (ibid.). See also John Mathiason, 
Internet Governance: The New Frontier of Global Institutions (London: Routledge, 2008), 11.
 19 Karl Auerbach, “Deconstructing Internet Governance” (2004), http:// www.cavebear.com/ archive/ rw/ 
deconstructing- internet- governance- ITU- Feb26- 27- 2004.htm uses an even narrower definition: “The internet is 
the open system that carries IP packets from source IP addresses to destination IP addresses.”
 20 Technically, the global Internet would not need to function for services to work. Each company or state could 
create their own “Internet.” Yet calls for “national Internets” or “independent Internets” usually translate into calls 
for more national oversight or independence of backbone cables managed by the US or US companies or running 
over US territory.
 21 Cf. Milton Mueller, John Mathiason, and Hans Klein, “The Internet and Global Governance: Principles and 
Norms for a New Regime,” Global Governance 13 (2007), 237– 54 (244).
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When referring to the internet as the network of networks, the “I” is capitalized more often 
than not (54%). Though mostly British publications, such as the Economist, tend toward the 
lower- case “i,”22 most US publications (like Time, Associated Press (AP), and the New York 
Times23) do not.24 Would capitalizing the “I” in “internet” reflect historic usage (like “States” 
and “Governments”)25 and assign an ethereal or agent- like function to the “internet”? Rather, 
capitalizing “Internet” when referring to the global information and communication exchange 
facility is linguistically correct because it distinguishes between the Internet and the internet(s). 
The Internet is made up of many smaller interconnected networks, which are also internets. 
The internet protocol suite was aimed at building a global interconnection out of the various 
networks, an internetwork, or internet. As an IBM publication points out, “when written with 
a capital ‘I’, the ‘Internet’ refers to the worldwide set of interconnected networks. Therefore, 
the Internet is an internet, but the reverse does not apply.”26 In this reading, the Internet thus 
consists of many internets and is an internet itself.27 Nevertheless, this study will not capi-
talize internet when referring to the global communication facility, as this gives a collection of 
hardware- based artifacts an ethereal quality and positions it as an actant in its own right.
2.2 Criticality of the Internet
2.2.1 Conditions of its Functionality
Protecting the internet is essential to our way of life. As Laura DeNardis puts it, “[n] o less 
than economic security, modern social life, culture, political discourse, and national secu-
rity are at stake in keeping the internet globally operational and secure.”28 This raises the 
question of what exactly needs to be protected when protecting “the internet.”
The internet’s functioning is premised on kinetic and non- kinetic resources: cables, data 
centers, and working internet Exchange Points, and a functioning naming and addressing 
 22 Cf. Tony Long, “It’s Just the ‘internet’ Now,” August 16, 2004, https:// www.wired.com/ 2004/ 08/ its- just- the- 
internet- now/ ́ ; Economist, Style Guide (London: Profile Books, 2005), 46, https:// bordeure.files.wordpress.com/ 
2008/ 11/ the- economist- style- guide.pdf.
 23 Philip B. Corbett, “The Latest Style,” New York Times, October 29, 2013, http:// afterdeadline.blogs.nytimes.
com/ 2013/ 10/ 29/ the- latest- style/ ?php=true&_ type=blogs&_ r=0 (summing up updates in the New  York Times 
Manual of Style and Usage: “we’ll lowercase website and make it one word. [ . . . ] But the Internet remains upper-
case, in line with the most common current practice in the United. States”).
 24 Though this may change in the future, see Katherine Connor Martin, “Should You Capitalize the Word 
Internet?” Oxford Dictionaries Blog, April 5, 2016, https:// blog.oxforddictionaries.com/ 2016/ 04/ 05/ should- you- 
capitalize- internet (predicting that the British English preference for “internet” will prevail, as did the British 
English preference for “email” over “e- mail”).
 25 Language reflects power relations. This author previously made the case for not adhering to the traditional 
capitalization of states as “States” and governments as “Governments” because it seemed to be as a bow to the 
traditional assignation of quasi- religious significance to them— just as “He” and “Him” are capitalized in English 
when referring to God (who is also capitalized): an “international legal order that, figuratively, capitalizes states, 
and is supported by international legal scholarship that reflects this emphasis and focuses on the protection of 
states, and the status quo, [ . . . ] cannot function as a framework conducive to a holistic assessment of the position 
of individuals in international law or the interposition of states” (Matthias C. Kettemann, The Future of Individuals 
in International Law. Lessons from International Internet Law (Utrecht: Eleven Publishing, 2013), 8). This applies to 
the “internet” vs. “Internet” debate as well.
 26 Lydia Parziale, David T. Britt, Chuck Davis, Jason Forrester, Wie Liu, Carolyn Matthews, and Nicolas 
Rosselot, TCP/ IP Tutorial and Technical Overview, 8th edn. (IBM: IBM Redbooks, 2006), 4.
 27 Cf. also the RFC 675 (Vinton Cerf, Yogen Dalal, Carl Sunshine), Specification of Internet Transmission 
Control Program, December 1974, http:// tools.ietf.org/ html/ rfc675.
 28 Laura DeNardis, The Global War for Internet Governance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 17.
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system based on technical standards that ensure successful information interchange through 
routing and interconnections. Given all this, the internet can “work.” Protection of and from 
the internet must therefore necessarily encompass all these elements. However, ensuring basic 
infrastructure and fundamental non- kinetic elements of the internet is only one aspect of the 
internet’s functionality. The functionality of the internet is deeply connected to users’ ability to 
communicate effectively, in realization of their applicable human rights and in fulfillment of 
their right to human development.29 Therefore, ensuring a functioning (working) internet (that 
is an internet where data packets are sent and received) is not enough.
This argument runs parallel to the one developed by UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom 
of Expression, Frank La Rue, in his 2011 report. He distinguished between two dimensions 
of access: physical access to the internet and access to content on the internet.30 Having the 
infrastructure (cables, computers, routers) necessary to access the internet in place is not 
enough. The right to internet access, according to the Special Rapporteur, includes access 
to content “without any restrictions except in a few limited cases permitted under interna-
tional human rights law.”31 Table 2.1 stratifies the two dimensions of protection:
2.2.2 Internet Integrity
The internet’s protection thus encompasses both its physicality and its intangible assets. However, 
governing and regulating its physicality (e.g. by protecting underwater cables in international 
 29 Therefore its protection lies in the common interest, as this study will show at 2.4.
 30 Cf. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression, Frank La Rue, UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 17/ 27 of 16 May 2011, para. 3 (and chapters IV (access to content) and 
V (availability of infrastructure) of the report).
 31 Ibid., para. 3.
Table 2.1 Dichotomies in the Discourse on the Protection of the Internet
Comparative Vector Internet’s Physicality Internet’s Intangibles
Internet access as a modus 
comparandi
infrastructurally premised access 
to the internet
access to internet content
Infrastructure physical infrastructure normative infrastructure
Primary normative sphere private regulation public regulation (frame)
private regulation (spaces)
Vulnerability primarily technical:
physical infrastructure; 
institution- level outage; Domain 
Name System; switching- level 
infrastructure
primarily institutional: network 
management disruptions; 
application- level blocking; 
protocol- level blocking; 
financial and transactional 
services outages
Possible attack vector undersea cables, power systems; 
ISP service termination; cellular 
service disruption; DNS filtering, 
registries, and registrars; routing 
infrastructure, IXPs
Distributed Denial of Service 
(DDos) attacks, Deep Packet 
Inspection (DPI) filtering; 
email, social media sites, 
Skype; VoIP, HTTP; credit card 
transactions, payment systems
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waters) and its intangible assets (e.g. by endangering internet freedom by making internet inter-
mediaries liable for lèse- majesté or hateful comments by angry readers) demands a nuanced 
approach. At the same time any protection of the internet must encompass protection from the 
internet, that is protection of states and society from uses and misuses of the internet.
Most examples of national internet shutdowns show that Internet Service Providers 
(ISPs) were technically able to cause a blackout (technical vulnerability) and that the legal 
system did not contain enough procedural or substantive safeguards to stop the executive 
order from being implemented (institutional vulnerability).32
National internet policies are limited by international legal rules that influence, for in-
stance, under which circumstances content can be censored.33 This runs counter to the 
normative narratives of sovereignty- oriented states, who see both the internet’s physical in-
frastructure as far as it can be controlled by states and the internet’s content (produced by 
and consumed from that state) as falling under sovereign regulatory powers.34 It is at these 
friction points of internet regulation that the concept of normative order, as detailed below, 
will offer normative solutions. Protecting the security, stability, robustness, resilience, and 
functionality of the internet— briefly:  its integrity— can only be ensured through an ap-
proach that includes regulation of technical artifacts and a functioning legal system.
2.2.3 The Internet as/ and Critical Infrastructure
Even though internet access seems like a given in most of today’s developed societies, it 
is “delicate in many ways, with its unowned character threatened from many quarters.”35 
What both the kinetic and the non- kinetic elements of the internet have in common is that 
they are considered “critical” for our society. The notion of critical infrastructure includes 
“[s] ensitive elements of a larger ecosystem, encompassing the public and private sectors 
and society at large.”36 In a directive on the identification and designation of European crit-
ical infrastructures the European Union (EU) defined critical infrastructure as
an asset, system or part thereof located in Member States which is essential for the main-
tenance of vital societal functions, health, safety, security, economic or social well- being 
of people, and the disruption or destruction of which would have a significant impact in a 
Member State as a result of the failure to maintain those functions.37
 32 Cf. Matthias C. Kettemann, “Das Internet  als internationales Schutzgut:  Entwicklungsperspektiven des 
Internetvölkerrechts anlässlich des Arabischen Frühlings,” ZaöRV 72 (2012), 469– 82. On shutdowns, see Internet 
Society, Internet Shutdowns Are Not a Solution to Africa’s Challenges (June 2017), https:// www.internetsociety.
org/ blog/ 2017/ 06/ internet- shutdowns- are- not- a- solution- to- africas- challenges.
 33 Cf. Internet Society, Perspectives on Internet Content Blocking: An Overview (2017), https:// www.inter-
netsociety.org/ resources/ doc/ 2017/ internet- content- blocking.
 34 Cf. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, International Code of Conduct for 
Information Security, submission to NetMundial, http:// content.netmundial.br/ contribution/ international- code- 
of- conduct- for- information- security/ 67. People’s Republic of China, State Council, The Internet in China, June 8, 
2010, http:// www.china.org.cn/ government/ whitepaper/ node_ 7093508.htm, sect. I.
 35 Jonathan Zittrain, “No, Barack Obama Isn’t Handing Control of the Internet over to China,” The New Republic, 
March 24, 2014.
 36 Dave Clemente, “Cyber Security and Global Interdependence:  What Is Critical?” Chatham House 
Programme Report (2013), http:// www.chathamhouse.org/ publications/ papers/ view/ 189645.
 37 EU Council Directive 2008/ 114/ EC of 8 December 2008 on the identification and designation of European 
critical infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve their protection, OJ L 345/ 75, 23 December 2008.
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Though the internet is not “located” in any single member state, key kinetic elements rel-
evant for the stable running of the internet are. Further, the maintenance of vital state 
functions— such as energy security— without a stable and secure information and com-
munication infrastructure is very difficult in today’s highly technical and interconnected 
world. The internet can therefore be understood, first, as highly critical for other critical in-
frastructure resources, and, second, as technically necessary for the running of ICT systems 
and thus foundational for critical infrastructures. This duality of the internet’s criticality is 
evident in the EU’s definition of critical infrastructural resources as encompassing “ICT 
systems that are critical infrastructures for themselves or that are essential for the operation 
of critical infrastructures [ . . . ].”38 The core data centers, internet Exchange Points, and in-
tercontinental cables are included in the notion of critical information infrastructure.
Protecting the security, stability, robustness, resilience, and functionality (thus: the integrity) 
of the internet is also a question of protecting the infrastructure. Both an oversecuritization of 
infrastructure protection and a lack of sufficient protection can result in insufficient protec-
tion and may violate state obligations. In a 2012 resolution by the European Parliament (EP), 
the need for critical information infrastructure protection was explained by the importance 
of ICTs “to deploy their full capacity for advancing the economy and society,” which can only 
happen when “users have trust and confidence in their security and resilience, and if existing 
legislation on matters such as data privacy and intellectual property rights is enforced effec-
tively in the internet environment.”39 This important link between infrastructure protection 
from a security perspective and from a human rights perspective40 lies at the core of the role of 
the internet as a tool to enhance human development.
We have thus established that protecting the internet is essential for protecting critical 
infrastructure and critical information infrastructure and that the internet is also, within 
limits, critical infrastructure. However, clearly not every website, server, or data center 
is critical information infrastructure. We can differentiate between the critical and non- 
critical elements of the internet’s infrastructure by defining the CIRs.
2.2.4 Critical Internet Resources
2.2.4.1  Concept and Vulnerabilities
What needs to be protected for the internet to function effectively is made visible through the 
thought experiment of “destroying the internet.”41 Such an attempt would be impossible because 
of the multiple redundancies built into the infrastructure. Nevertheless, if one were to entertain 
the notion, the following three steps would be necessary: cutting the transcontinental internet 
 38 European Commission, Green Paper on a European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection, 
COM(2005) 576 final, 17 November 2005, 19.
 39 European Parliament resolution of 12 June 2012 on critical information infrastructure protection— 
achievements and next steps:  towards global cyber- security (2011/ 2284(INI)), http:// www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
sides/ getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7- TA- 2012- 0237&language=EN, para. A.
 40 Following the human security approach, security and human rights “approaches” should actually be the same 
perspective: Cf. Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, “In Defense of the Broad View of Human Security,” in Mary Martin 
and Taylor Owen (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Human Security (London: Routledge, 2013), 43– 56; and Gerd 
Oberleitner, “Human Security: Idea, Policy and Law,” in ibid., 219– 30.
 41 Sam Biddle, “How to Destroy the Internet,” Gizmodo, May 23, 2012, http:// gizmodo.com/ 5912383/ 
how- to- destroy- the- internet.
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cables, disabling the root servers, and destroying the data centers containing the physical data. 
The cables, the actual root servers, and the data centers are aspects of the internet’s physicality 
and need to be physically protected. The larger ones are doubtless CIRs. Natural events, foraging, 
pipeline building, or fishing regularly damages overland and underwater cables. A 2006 earth-
quake in southern Taiwan led to underwater slides that broke nine fiber optic cables, which led 
to substantial connectivitiy problems in the proximity of the event. Usually, however, a multitude 
of cables ensuring connection redundancies allows rerouting.42
The most effective “kill- switch” for the internet thus lies less in its technical infrastruc-
ture alone than in a combination of control over physical infrastructure, such as servers, and 
institutional- legal authority.43 In a study of the “dark side” of internet governance, Laura 
DeNardis identifies eight levels of control of the internet where interruption, unintentional 
or not, can take place.44 These can be stratified according to four key aspects internet in-
tegrity is meant to ensure: the internet’s basic functionality; access through a working ad-
dressing and routing system; communication and information through applications based 
on protocols (“use”); and transactions or transactionary functionality (see Table 2.2).
As demonstrated before, for the internet to function properly, non- kinetic internet re-
sources need to be protected as well. CIRs are more than key cables, root servers, and data 
centers. They include names and numbers (numerical addresses)45 and the addressing 
 42 UNEP/ WCMC, Submarine cables and the oceans: connecting the world, January 2009, http:// www.iscpc.
org/ publications/ ICPC- UNEP_ Report.pdf, 42.
 43 Cf. Laura DeNardis, The Global War for Internet Governance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 211.
 44 Ibid., 209.
 45 Laura DeNardis, “Internet Points of Control as Global Governance,” CIGI Internet Governance Paper No. 2 
(2013), http:// www.cigionline.org/ publications/ 2013/ 8/ internet- points- of- control- global- governance, 3.
Table 2.2 Internet Vulnerabilities
Goal Control Question Vulnerability Attack Vector
Functionality Does the internet work? physical infrastructure undersea cables, power 
systems
institution- level outage ISP service termination, 
cellular service 
disruption
Access Can I access specific 
sites?
Domain Name System DNS filtering, registries 
and registrars
switching- level 
infrastructure
routing infrastructure, 
IXPs
Use Is my content 
transmitted?
network management 
disruptions
DDos attacks, DPI 
filtering
application- level  
blocking
email, social media 
sites, Skype
protocol- level blocking VoIP, HTTP
Transactions Can I pay for services? financial and transactional 
services outages
credit card transactions, 
payment systems
Based on Figure 9.1 “Inter Control Points Susceptible to Intentional or Unintentional Disruptions” (DeNardis 
(2014), 209).
Criticality of the Internet 29
system that ensures they are properly resolved (i.e. decoded) to facilitate human use and 
interaction. Thus 199.59.148.10 becomes twitter.com, and vice- versa.
Other studies entertain broader notions of CIRs, including e.g. “policies supporting 
trust” and “affordable end- point access devices.”46 These notions, however important for 
a development- oriented conception of the internet, are too vague to enter the protective 
sphere of CIRs in the sense used in this study. Nevertheless, there are two further aspects 
of the internet that need protection and coordination: technical standards and the routing 
system and the administration of interconnections. Together with the management of the 
addressing system, they are non- kinetic CIRs. It is with regard to them that key governance 
decisions are made, and they have to be part of any meaningful conception of a normative 
order of the internet. The control over these decisions, and the resources themselves, is at 
the center of the debate over the governance and regulation of the internet. Their analysis 
will also serve as an introduction into the key technical actors of internet governance.
2.2.4.2  Addressing System
The two elements of the addressing system on the internet are the names and numbers 
making up Internet Protocol (IP) addresses and the Domain Name System, which trans-
lates the names (for the use of humans) to binary addresses (used by computers) and back. 
The IPv4 (Internet Protocol version 4) standard assigns 32 bits— 0s and 1s— to a binary 
address which, when written in decimal form, becomes four groups of numbers, such as 
199.59.148.10. The newer IPv6 (Internet Protocol version 6)  substantially increases the 
number of available addresses by increasing the bits assigned per address from 32 to 128. 
Users do not have to enter the decimal form of the binary address, but— because the DNS 
translates between humans and computer— can use the alphanumeric equivalent of the ad-
dress, such as ejil.org.
Just as having two houses with identical numbers on the same street address would lead 
to confusion with the postal services, the internet is premised upon unique identifiers. Each 
IP address is linked to one addressee (a computer or a handheld device, for example, but 
also, in the internet of things, a freezer or a pair of smart glasses).47 Allocating IP addresses 
(actually IP address blocks) needs to be coordinated to ensure that no number is assigned 
twice. IP address blocks have to be distributed to regional registrars who further distribute 
the numbers to ISPs. Further, the management of Autonomous System Numbers (ASNs) 
that are necessary for other networks to become network operators have to be coordinated, 
as do top- level domains (TLDs), both country code (ccTLDs, such as .at or .de) and ge-
neric (gTLDs, such as .com or .org) ones. It is necessary, DeNardis writes, to have “a de-
finitive record of how to resolve names into numbers for each TLD and for the root zone 
file containing the master, most centralized list that dictates how each TLD maps to binary 
addresses.”48
This task is performed by ICANN, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers, a not- for- profit entity incorporated under Californian law, and its entities and 
affiliates. The key coordination, administration, and allocation tasks regarding protocols, 
 46 Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT), “What Does ‘Governance’ Mean? What are ‘Critical Internet 
Resources’?” November 2007, https:// www.cdt.org/ files/ pdfs/ 20071114Internet%20gov.pdf.
 47 Samuel Greengard, The Internet of Things (Cambridge, MA/ London: MIT Press, 2015).
 48 Laura DeNardis, The Global War for Internet Governance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 17.
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DNS root zone management, and internet numbering resources are ICANN’s so- called 
“IANA (Internet Assigned Numbers Authority)” functions.49 These include management 
of the DNS Root Zone (and assigning ccTLDs and gTLDs), the coordination of the global 
internet protocol and autonomous server number spaces, including allocations made to 
Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), and acting as a repository for protocol names and 
numbers used in internet protocols.50
Public Technical Identifiers,51 an ICANN affiliate established to provide the IANA 
functions on behalf of ICANN, assumed responsibility for the operational aspects of 
coordinating the internet’s unique identifiers in October 2016. ICANN used to be the 
operator of the IANA functions “on behalf of the United States Government, through a 
[procurement] contract”52 with the National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration (NTIA) of the United States Department of Commerce (DOC).53 The last 
zero- cost contract was terminated by NTIA, which asked ICANN to develop a system to 
replace NTIA’s stewardship role and enhance ICANN accountability toward the “global 
multistakeholder community,”54 a vague term that has been only imperfectly clarified 
through later practice. ICANN submitted two proposals regarding its technical perfor-
mance of the IANA functions55 and enhancements of its accountability.56 The intricate 
accountability mechanisms are enshrined in ICANN’s bylaws.57 ICANN’s chief mission 
(also with regard to IANA functions) is to “coordinate the development and implementa-
tion of policies [ . . . ] developed through a bottom- up consensus- based multistakeholder 
process and designed to ensure the stable and secure operation of the internet’s unique 
names systems.”58 Note the continued commitment to “multistakeholderism,” which is 
characteristic of the internet governance discourse field. Unfortunately, often these com-
mitments are not realized by a truly effective “consensus- based multistakeholder process” 
as a tool to develop policies because power imbalances within norm- making processes 
and standardization organizations continue to undermine commitments to the inclusion 
of all relevant actors.
The transition of the responsibility of all functions related to the internet’s unique identifier 
system to ICANN was a big step. The IANA functions include running the DNS root, which 
 49 Cf. IANA, Introducing IANA, http:// www.iana.org.
 50 Ibid. See further, ICANN, The IANA Functions, December 18, 2015, https:// www.icann.org/ en/ system/ files/ 
files/ iana- functions- 18dec15- en.pdf.
 51 Public Technical Identifiers, http:// pti.icann.org.
 52 Affirmation of Commitments by the United States Department of Commerce and the Internet Corporation 
for Assigned Names and Numbers, September 30, 2009, http:// www.icann.org/ en/ about/ agreements/ aoc/ 
affirmation- of- commitments- 30sep09- en.htm.
 53 NTIA, Commerce Department Awards Contract for Management of Key Internet Functions to ICANN, July 
2, 2012, http:// www.ntia.doc.gov/ press- release/ 2012/ commerce- department- awards- contract- management- key- 
internet- functions- icann.
 54 NTIA, NTIA Finds IANA Stewardship Transition Proposal Meets Criteria to Complete Privatization June 9, 
2016, https:// www.ntia.doc.gov/ press- release/ 2016/ iana- stewardship- transition- proposal- meets- criteria- complete- 
privatization.
 55 ICANN IANA Stewardship Transition Coordination Group (ICG), Proposal to Transition the Stewardship 
of the IANA Functions from the U.S. Commerce Department’s NTIA to the Global Multistakeholder Community, 
March 2016, https:// www.icann.org/ en/ system/ files/ files/ iana- stewardship- transition- proposal- 10mar16- en.pdf.
 56 ICANN CCWG Accountability, Supplemental Final Proposal on Work Stream 1 Recommendations, February 2016, 
https:// www.icann.org/ en/ system/ files/ files/ ccwg- accountability- supp- proposal- work- stream- 1- recs- 23feb16- en.pdf.
 57 ICANN, Bylaws for Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, as amended July 22, 2017, 
https:// www.icann.org/ resources/ pages/ governance/ bylaws- en.
 58 Ibid., section 1.1 (i).
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encompasses the root zone file and the root name servers.59 The authoritative root servers 
(where the root zone file is first uploaded) distribute the information on to thirteen root 
name servers who copy the file. Before the transition in 2016, any change in the authoritative 
root zone had to be authorized by the US government. Other root servers then cache the au-
thoritative root to reduce dependence. The number of root servers is limited to thirteen, but 
two of them are distributed using “anycast” and have multiple “instances” amounting to hun-
dreds of copies of the root which ensure quicker access for users worldwide.60
Though formally allowing the US to exercise geo- strategic power over the internet, the 
US control of the DNS was theoretical. The US could (have) order(ed) ICANN to delete a 
ccTLD in the master zone file. However, there were a number of technical ways for a con-
cerned country to limit the impact of such a step. Internationally, it would have ruined the 
US reputation as a responsible steward of the DNS and would have further been ineffec-
tive as other root servers, especially those located outside of the US, would either not have 
copied the altered master root or reverted to cached versions.61
The US- centrality of key internet resource management is only somewhat alleviated by 
ICANN’s accountability to the “global multistakeholder community” and its formal com-
mitment to “multistakeholder” decision- making. In practice, however, the inclusion of all 
relevant actors in decision- making processes is complicated by high levels of entry due to 
the technicality of discussions, lack of epistemic authority by non- ICANN- related norm 
entrepreneurs, and simple economic reasons. More effective than mere commitments to 
vague notions such as “multistakeholderism” is the allocation by ICANN of local address 
management to the RIRs.62 The RIRs distribute their tasks (and their address spaces) to 
local and national internet registries that assign IP addresses to ISPs who then assign them 
to their customers. The contractual and non- contractual framework underlying the DNS 
and ICANN’s relationship with other registries is highly complex— both with regard to the 
types of normative mechanisms and the quantity of mechanisms used.63 ICANN also ac-
credits registrars to manage TLDs. These can sell domain names further on, either directly 
to consumers or to registries.64
2.2.4.3  Technical Standards
The internet’s universality is premised upon universal standards and protocols that ensure 
frictionless use of software on hardware. They are, as DeNardis notes, “written specifications 
 59 Mueller, Milton, Ruling the Root: Internet Governance and the Taming of Cyberspace (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
2002), 47. Historically, the key coordination functions regarding the address space were performed by DARPA and 
the University of Southern California (and originally by one person, Jon Postel), but in 1999 the coordination was 
handed to ICANN by the NTIA.
 60 These servers are run by private and public entities: Verisign, Inc. (two), University of Southern California, 
Cogent Communications, University of Maryland, NASA, Internet Systems Consortium, Defense Information 
Agency, US Army Research lab, Netnod, RIPE NCC, ICANN, and the WIDE Project. Cf. Root Servers, http:// 
www.root- servers.org.
 61 Froomkin, Michael, “Almost Free:  An Analysis of ICANN’s ‘Affirmation of Commitments’,” Journal of 
Telecommunications and High Technology Law 9 (2011), 187– 233 (219).
 62 AFRINIC (Africa, portions of the Indian Ocean), APNIC (parts of Asia and Oceania), ARIN (Canada, 
US, Caribbean, and North Atlantic Islands), LACNIC (Latin America, parts of the Caribbean), and RIPE NCC 
(Europe, Middle East, Central Asia).
 63 Cf. Emily M. Weitzenboeck, “Hybrid net: the regulatory framework of ICANN and the DNS,” International 
Journal of Law and Information Technology 22 (2014) 1, 49– 73 (62) (arguing for the applicability of Ost and van 
de Kerchove’s mesh (or network) theory of regulation).
 64 ICANN, Statement of Registrar Accreditation Policy (.com, .net, and .org top- level domains), http:// www.
icann.org/ en/ resources/ registrars/ accreditation/ policy- statement.
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dictating how to develop software and hardware to be compatible with any other type of 
software and hardware that also adheres to these specifications.”65 Some of the best known 
and most often used standards are HTTP, the HyperText Transfer Protocol, and VoIP, Voice 
over IP. The introduction of the TCP/ IP suite was central to the evolution of the internet. 
A key element of standards is that they ensure interoperability.66 Without interoperability, 
devices from different manufacturers or devices running different operating systems or ap-
plications would not be able to communicate. Much of the internet’s economic ecosystem is 
premised upon interconnectedness and interoperability.67 Defining standards ensuring in-
teroperability thus has substantial implications for the way information is transmitted and 
communication takes place.
The standards are interesting normatively because they are authored and implemented 
not by states or their national standardization bodies but by international, private, non- 
profit standard- setting technical entities, such as the Internet Engineering Task Force 
(IETF). Today, the IETF is part— actually an “organized activity”68— of ISOC, the Internet 
Society, founded in 1992.69 As discussed in more detail below,70 the IETF is an influential 
body as it proposes, accepts by consensus, and applies standards, including in recent years 
a number of them with relevance to public policy issues, including Request for Comments 
(RFC) 8280 on Research into Human Rights Protocol Considerations.71 Before IETF 
proposals crystallize into standards, they often begin as “memos.” Two current memos, 
Freedom of Association on the Internet72 and On the Politics of Standards,73 as well an in-
tensive discussion on how to transcend the nomenclature of controlling/ controlled com-
ponents in software engineering (“master/ slave”) show that the IETF understands itself as 
beyond a technicity- oriented normative focus. The master/ slave terminology was only re-
cently removed from the popular programming language Python and some years earlier by 
programming languages Drupal and Django.74
The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) is responsible for establishing standards for 
the Web. Founded by WWW inventor and programmer of the HTML (HyperText Markup 
Language), Tim Berners- Lee, the W3C adopts by consensus, in a process in which all ac-
tors can participate, Web standards (called recommendations) related to web design and 
applications (e.g. rendering of web pages, internationalizing them, and making them more 
 65 Laura DeNardis, The Global War for Internet Governance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 8.
 66 Cf. John Palfrey and Urs Gasser, Interop: The Promise and Perils of Highly Interconnected Systems (New York: Basic 
Books, 2012). They argue that at the institutional level of interoperability, legal systems must engage effectively (6). 
International private law, then, could be considered as an interoperability standard (for legal systems).
 67 Law can be responsible for creating beneficial forms of interoperability, creating fair market rules through 
interoperability, and constraining unwanted interoperability effects, such as a race to the bottom in privacy and 
security standards (cf. Palfrey and Gasser (2012), 88).
 68 Cf. Internet Engineering Task Force, http:// www.ietf.org.
 69 ISOC oversees the Internet Architecture Board (IAB) that directs both the IETF and the Internet Research 
Task Force (IRTF). The Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG) is responsible for managing IETF activities 
and the Internet standards process technically. ISOC has 65,000 personal members, 100 chapters and 145 organi-
zation members. Cf. Internet Society, Our Members, http:// www.internetsociety.org/ who- we- are/ our- members.
 70 See 2.4.4.
 71 Internet Research Task Force (IRTF), RFC 8280, Research into Human Rights Protocol Considerations, 
https:// tools.ietf.org/ html/ rfc8280.
 72 IETF, Memo: Freedom of Association on the Internet (2018), https:// datatracker.ietf.org/ doc/ draft- tenoever- 
hrpc- association.
 73 IETF, Memo: On the Politics of Standards (2018), https:// datatracker.ietf.org/ doc/ draft- tenoever- hrpc- political.
 74 Daniel Oberhaus, “‘Master/ Slave’ Terminology Was Removed from Python Programming Language,” 
Motherboard, September 13, 2018, https:// motherboard.vice.com/ en_ us/ article/ 8x7akv/ masterslave- terminology- 
was- removed- from- python- programming- language.
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accessible to people with different abilities), web of devices- applications (including usage 
of Web technology in cars and consumer goods), web architecture, and semantic web (web of 
data).75 A further standard- setter with relevance for internet traffic is IEEE, the Institute of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers, which is responsible for setting certain ethernet Local 
Area Network (LAN) standards and Wi- Fi specifications.
2.2.4.4  Routing and Interconnections
Further critical kinetic elements of the internet are the autonomous systems or collec-
tions of routers. Each system is identified by a unique number (its ASN), which ensures 
that traffic reaches its destination. It is between routers (or rather collections of routers, 
and then routers) that packets of information are transmitted. It is ICANN’s responsibility 
to ensure that the ASNs are properly registered for an autonomous system to be identi-
fied. There are, however, no formal agreements between the managers of autonomous sys-
tems and ICANN. Interconnection is based largely on trust between operators of networks. 
Physically, networks connect at large shared Internet Exchange Points (IXPs). The costs of 
managing the IXPs are not settled but rather depend on market forces and the relevance of 
companies and ISPs within specific regions. Sometimes this “peering” is settlement- free, 
sometimes there are paid (transit) arrangements.76 Within autonomous systems, so- called 
Interior Gateway Protocols regulate routing. Between systems, Border Gateway Protocols 
(BGPs) fulfill this function.
2.3 Common Interest and the Internet
2.3.1 Protection of and from the Internet as a Common Interest?
We have already established what aspects of the internet need to be protected (2.2). We now 
need to discuss whether protecting these kinetic and non- kinetic resources, including the 
normative infrastructure, lie in the common interest. If they do, then there is a strong prima 
facie case to be made for the necessity of a coherent normative order. First, we will look at 
how safeguarding an entity, good, or commons becomes a “common interest’ in interna-
tional law and what consequences follow from such designation.
There is no closed list of global common interests. Due to the state- orientation of tradi-
tional international law, the development of international legal protection regimes of the 
common interest has progressed only slowly77 between, what Bardo Fassbender argued 
were, the two normative poles of Staatsräson and Gemeinschaftsbindung.78 Under the con-
ditions of today’s connected world and the facticity of globalized communication and trade 
flows, however, pursuing common interests is Staatsräson. States that withdraw from the 
 75 W3C, W3C standards, https:// www.w3.org/ standards.
 76 Cf. Laura DeNardis, The Global War for Internet Governance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 12.
 77 Matthias C. Kettemann, “The Common Interest in the Protection of the Internet: An International Legal 
Perspective,” in Wolfgang Benedek, Koen De Feyter, Matthias C. Kettemann, and Christina Voigt (eds.), The 
Common Interest in International Law (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2014), 167– 84, from which this section draws.
 78 Bardo Fassbender, “Zwischen Staatsräson und Gemeinschaftsbindung. Zur Gemeinwohlorientierung des 
Völkerrechts der Gegenwart,” in Herfried Münkler and Karsten Fischer (eds.), Gemeinwohl und Gemeinsinn im 
Recht: Konkretisierung und Realisierung öffentlicher Interessen (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2002), 231– 74.
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international arena by putting up figurative and actual walls reduce their impact as actors in 
the international community. As a growing number of regulatory challenges migrates to the 
realm of international law, they thereby disenfranchise their citizens and violate their rights 
to— varying Thomas M. Franck— (global) democratic governance.79 The transformation of 
the pursuance of common interest goals by international law from a choice based on nar-
rowly interpreted notions of national interest to an obligation owed both to citizens and to 
the international community as a whole has evolved gradually, with the League of Nations, 
and more decisively with the foundation of the UN and the treaty regimes developed under 
its aegis, but has gathered substantial momentum in the second half of the last century. The 
protection of common interest values has become essential to international law, from peace, 
human rights, human dignity, and equality of men and women to justice and social and 
economic progress.80 It is no coincidence that the preamble of the United Nations Charter 
forbids the use of force “save in the common interest.”81
A growing number of references to “common interest,” “common responsibilities,” 
“common heritage of mankind,” or “common concerns of humanity” have been made both 
in international legal instruments and in legal literature on internet law over the years. 
Already in 2006, Artura Seguro- Serrano argued for the installation of a system of “common 
management” of the “common heritage of mankind” he saw embodied in the communi-
cative potential of the internet and the technology undergirding it and called for the cre-
ation of a “centralized, democratically structured international regime [  . . . ] in order to 
achieve a legitimate representation” in the process of managing these common resources.82 
The heritage, concerns, and interests described as being “of mankind” or “of humanity” or 
“common” are not of states alone. The pursuit of these common interests lies in the collec-
tive national interests. As put previously, Gemeinwohlorientierung ist Staatsraison. Article 
6(1) of the UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization) 
Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, for in-
stance, refers to “the duty of the international community as a whole” to cooperate in safe-
guarding cultural and natural heritage.83 But protection takes place not only through treaties 
but also through ius cogens, customary law, and general principles of international law.
International legal norms of different character and obligatory nature are connected 
through a common “Gemeinwohlorientierung,”84 a normatively relevant orientation 
toward the common good.85 Fassbender enumerates four categories:  ius cogens, erga 
omnes duties, international crimes, and “constitutional law” of the international commu-
nity. Today, it is more common to approach “areas” of international law with prominent 
 79 Cf. Thomas M. Franck, “The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance,” AJIL 86 (1992), 46.
 80 Cf. on the fundamental change from coexistence to cooperation, Wolfgang Friedmann, The Changing 
Structure of International Law (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974).
 81 UN Charter, preamble: “We the Peoples of the United Nations Determined [...] to ensure, by the acceptance of 
principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, [ . . . ].”
 82 See already Antonio Segura- Serrano, “Internet Regulation and the Role of International Law,” in Max Planck 
Yearbook of United Nations Law, Vol. 10 (The Hague: Brill, 2006), 257– 8.
 83 UNESCO, Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (1972), http:// 
whc.unesco.org/ en/ conventiontext.
 84 Bardo Fassbender, “Zwischen Staatsräson und Gemeinschaftsbindung. Zur Gemeinwohlorientierung des 
Völkerrechts der Gegenwart,” in Herfried Münkler and Karsten Fischer (eds.), Gemeinwohl und Gemeinsinn im 
Recht: Konkretisierung und Realisierung öffentlicher Interessen (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2002), 231– 74 (242 ff).
 85 For an ethical analysis of the common good, see Donna Dickenson, “The Common Good,” in Roger 
Brownsword, Eloise Scotford, and Karen Yeung (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Law, Regulation, and Technology 
(Oxford: OUP, 2017), 135– 52.
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common interests. These include the law of the sea (protecting the international seabed), 
cultural heritage (protection of monuments), development law (sustainable development), 
climate change law (protecting biological diversity, reducing emission of greenhouse gases, 
and counteracting man- made influence on climate change), human rights law (safeguard-
ing human dignity), international criminal law (ending impunity for genocide), and non- 
proliferation law (stopping nuclear proliferation).86
Following Fassbender, international law has arrived at a point in its development where 
pursuing the common interest is the only reasonable answer to its Sinnfrage87 (as opposed 
to its Existenzfrage as a normative order, which is no longer of particular interest88). Apart 
from some voices among the postmodernist authors critical of the transformative power of 
concepts such as international law, there is no Gegenentwurf against an international law 
oriented toward pursuing common interests.89 But the pursuit of the common interest is 
still disorganized and the identification of issues as lying in the common interest, especially 
in emerging areas of law, is challenging.
In 1998, experts working on behalf of UNESCO posed the question of whether the 
“United Nations General Assembly [could] affirm the principle of regarding cyberspace 
as ‘the common heritage of humanity’ ”90 and thus safeguard it. But only designating cy-
berspace (or, rather, the internet) as such is not enough. Safeguarding the internet means 
ensuring that the internet is stable, secure, and functional— that its integrity is ensured. 
This is premised upon the protection of CIRs, including the kinetic and non- kinetic (and 
normative) infrastructures, “in the same way that other critical common resources are 
protected.”91
The definition of a global common interest is a process driven by international actors. 
In that process, we have to be aware of the danger of interest capture, namely that a partic-
ular group of actors with specific interest wishes to establish their particular interest as a 
global interest. Though defining the integrity of a network (of interconnected networks) as 
a common interest would be a first, the case for the protection of and from the internet as 
a common interest is convincing in light of its functions and role in today’s economy and 
social reality.
The internet’s security, stability, robustness, resilience, and functionality— its integrity— 
are essential to national and international economies, financial systems, transnational com-
munications infrastructure, national defense, national and international energy networks 
 86 Cf. the contributions to Wolfgang Benedek, Koen De Feyter, Matthias C. Kettemann, and Christina Voigt 
(eds.), The Common Interest in International Law (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2014).
 87 Bardo Fassbender, “Zwischen Staatsräson und Gemeinschaftsbindung. Zur Gemeinwohlorientierung des 
Völkerrechts der Gegenwart,” in Herfried Münkler and Karsten Fischer (eds.), Gemeinwohl und Gemeinsinn im 
Recht: Konkretisierung und Realisierung öffentlicher Interessen (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2002), 231– 74 (231).
 88 With few exceptions:  Cf. Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law 
(New York: OUP, 2005), 188– 9. But see Anne van Aaken, “To Do Away with International Law? Some Limits to 
‘The Limits of International Law’,” EJIL (2006), 289– 308.
 89 Bardo Fassbender, “Zwischen Staatsräson und Gemeinschaftsbindung. Zur Gemeinwohlorientierung des 
Völkerrechts der Gegenwart,” in Herfried Münkler and Karsten Fischer (eds.), Gemeinwohl und Gemeinsinn im 
Recht: Konkretisierung und Realisierung öffentlicher Interessen (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2002), 231– 74 (239).
 90 UNESCO, Report of the Experts’ Meeting on Cyberspace Law, Monte Carlo, 29– 30 September 1998, http:// 
unesdoc.unesco.org/ images/ 0011/ 001163/ 116300e.pdf, para. 9.
 91 Council of Europe, Internet governance and critical internet resources, 1st Council of Europe Conference of 
Ministers Responsible for Media and New Communication Services: A New Notion of Media, May 28– 29, 2009, 
Reykjavik, Iceland, 23.
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and electricity grids, commerce, and, of course chiefly, the full realization of all human be-
ings of their human rights.92
2.3.2 Relating Internet Integrity to Human Rights
The internet’s integrity is important for human rights, human security, and human develop-
ment. Let us address these claims in turn. The UN Special Rapporteur for freedom of expres-
sion, Frank La Rue, in his 2011 report on the impact of the internet on freedom of expression, 
described the internet as a “catalyst for individuals to exercise their right to freedom of 
opinion and expression.”93 Freedom of expression on the internet, being intrinsically linked 
to information, is a key human right of the information society. It includes freedom of 
opinion, of information, of the press and the media, of international communication, of ar-
tistic expression, of cultural expression, and of science.94 But it also facilitates the realization 
of other human rights, notwithstanding the multiple challenges of human rights protection 
under conditions of connectedness, internet blackouts, or failures that seriously challenge 
the realization of human rights. There are important corollary rights that are premised upon 
exercising free speech on the internet. These include the freedom of assembly and associa-
tion online, the right to (digital) education, and the right of access to digital knowledge.95 
From all these rights we can also derive a dual right to internet access which is crucial for 
human rights protection:96 access to internet content (threatened, inter alia, by filtering) and 
access to the internet per se (threatened, inter alia, by underdeployment of ICTs).
The importance of access to internet content has been echoed by courts and interna-
tional organizations.97 Ensuring universal access, as the Special Rapporteur, La Rue, con-
cluded in his report, “should be a priority for all States.”98 Similarly, the four rapporteurs on 
freedom of expression made it clear in a joint declaration in 2011 that “giving effect to the 
right to freedom of expression imposes an obligation on States to promote universal access 
to the internet.”99 The internet introduces new threat vectors to human rights, but greatly 
enhances the potential of people to realize their human rights. It is similarly a facilitator for 
human security.
 92 WSIS, Geneva Declaration of Principles, WSIS- 03/ GENEVA/ DOC/ 4- E, 12 December 2003, para. 1.
 93 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and ex-
pression, Frank La Rue, UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 17/ 27 of 16 May 2011, paras. 22, 23.
 94 Wolfgang Benedek, Koen De Feyter, Matthias C. Kettemann, and Christina Voigt (eds.), The Common Interest 
in International Law (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2014), 26– 36.
 95 Ibid., 39. See also Mary Rundle and Malcolm Birding, “Filtering and the International System: A Question of 
Commitment,” in Ronald Deibert, John Palfrey, Rafal Rohozinski, and Jonathan Zittrain (eds.), Access Denied. The 
Practice and Policy of Global Internet Filtering (Cambridge, Mass./ London: The MIT Press, 2008), 73– 102.
 96 Cf. Matthias C. Kettemann, “Das Internet  als internationales Schutzgut:  Entwicklungsperspektiven des 
Internetvölkerrechts anlässlich des Arabischen Frühlings,” ZaöRV 72 (2012), 469– 82, 475 (arguing for a right to 
access which translates into an institutional protection of the internet).
 97 ECtHR, Yıldırım v.  Turkey (18 December 2012), application No. 3111/ 10, and Council of Europe, 
Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1877 on the protection of freedom of expression and information on the 
Internet and online media (2012).
 98 Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, 
Frank La Rue, Promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, UN Doc. A/ 66/ 290 of 
10 August 2011, http:// www.ohchr.org/ Documents/ Issues/ Opinion/ A.66.290.pdf, para. 85.
 99 International mechanisms for promoting freedom of expression (1 June 2011), Joint Declaration on Freedom 
of Expression and the Internet, http:// www.osce.org/ form/ 78309.
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The concept of human security (connected to but different from the concept of human 
rights100) de- emphasizes state- centricity and reconsiders traditional conceptualizations 
of states as the (only) providers and referents of security. The United Nations101 (and the 
EU102) have committed to the concept, which the 2010 Secretary- General’s report on human 
security describes as providing for “people- centred, comprehensive, context- specific and 
preventive responses” that “focus attention on current and emerging threats.”103 Human 
security approaches favor bottom- up responses to threats and are targeted at protecting 
and empowering people and communities.104 The stability, security, and functionality of the 
internet is essential for certain aspects of human security. In light of the informational-
ization of critical infrastructure and the character of the internet as critical information 
infrastructure in its own right, serious threats to the security, stability, and the function-
ality of the internet can endanger human security. The concept is also interesting in another 
light: human security approaches treat state failure105 and state fragility106 as serious threats 
to human security just as securitization by states. Similarly, a lack of regulation or regula-
tory failure can endanger the internet’s integrity just as much as state overreach (such as in 
the “War against Terror”107) and the nationalization of CIRs.
2.3.3 Relating Internet Integrity to Human Development
A similar case can be made with regard to human development (which is interlinked with 
both the protection of human rights and human security108). The General Assembly, in 
a 2012 resolution on ICTs and development,109 acknowledged the “positive trends in the 
global connectivity and affordability of information and communications technologies, in 
particular the steady increase in internet access to one third of the world’s population” and 
reaffirmed the need to harness the potential of ICTs to promote achieving the Millennium 
 100 See Gerd Oberleitner, “Human Security: Idea, Policy and Law,” in Mary Martin and Taylor Owen (eds.), 
Routledge Handbook on Human Security (London: Routledge, 2013), 324– 5: “Human rights provide the strongest 
legal underpinning of human security and can give content, structure and clarity to a concept which suffers from 
analytical uncertainties but the relationship between the political concept of human security and the legal regime 
of human rights remains precarious and the two are by no means synonymous” (notes omitted).
 101 UN, General Assembly President Calls for New Culture of International Relations, with Principle of Human 
Security at Its Core, during Day- long Debate, Press Release, UN Doc. GA/ 10711 (2008) of 22 May 2008, http:// 
www.un.org/ News/ Press/ docs/ 2008/ ga10711.doc.htm.
 102 See Wolfgang Benedek, “Mainstreaming Human Security in United Nations and European Union Peace and 
Crisis Management Operations: Policies and Practice,” in Wolfgang Benedek, Matthias C. Kettemann, and Markus 
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Potential (Routledge: London, 2010), 13– 31.
 103 UN Secretary- General, Human Security. Report of the Secretary- General, UN Doc. A/ 64/ 701 of 8 March 
2001, para. 69.
 104 Barbara Tigerstrom, Human Security and International Law – Problems and Prospects (Oxford: Hart, 2007).
 105 Tobias Debiel, UN- Friedensoperationen in Afrika. Weltinnenpolitik und die Realität von Bürgerkriegen 
(Bonn: J.H.W. Dietz Nachf., 2003).
 106 Monty Marshall, Benjamin Cole, Global Report 2009: Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility (2009), http:// 
www.humansecuritygateway.com/ documents/ CSP_ GlobalReport2009_ ConflictGovernanceStateFragility.pdf.
 107 Wolfgang Benedek, “Human Security and Prevention of Terrorism,” in Wolfgang Benedek and A. 
Yotopoulos- Marangopoulos (eds.), Anti- terrorist Measures and Human Rights (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 171– 83 (on 
violations of human security through anti- terrorism policies and law).
 108 Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh and Anuradha M. Chenoy, Human Security. Concepts and Implications 
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 109 UN General Assembly, Resolution 67/ 195 of 21 December 2012, Information and communications technol-
ogies for development, UN Doc. A/ RES/ 67/ 195 of 5 February 2013.
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Development Goals (MDGs) “through sustained, inclusive and equitable economic growth 
and sustainable development.”110
It is difficult to prove empirically a measurable positive impact of the internet or of ICTs 
on human development because numerous other factors influence causality. Merely finding 
correlations between heuristical stand- ins, such as internet penetration and development 
measured by numbers taken from the Human Development Index, does not fully satisfy. It 
may well be impossible to scientifically establish a causal relationship between the increased 
use of ICTs and the elimination of absolute poverty because of the complexity of the use 
of technology and its impact, because of the lack of useful data, and because levels of ab-
solute poverty are worryingly resistant.111 A 2009 study for the World Bank by the Boston 
Consulting Group (BCG) on behalf of Telenor exemplifies these problems. The study con-
centrates on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth arguing that a “10 percentage point 
increase in internet penetration is correlated with a 1% increase in the annual rate of new 
business formation.”112 Similarly, a World Bank reports concludes that a 10 percent increase 
in broadband penetration correlates with a 1.38 percent increase in GDP growth.113
Economic growth does not equal human development, but it is a useful heuristic. The 
internet has had a demonstrably positive impact on economic growth.114 Already in 2010, the 
internet economy amounted to $ 2.3 trillion or 4.1 percent of GDP across the G- 20 countries 
and was expected to rise to $ 4.2 trillion or 5.3 percent of GDP by 2016.115 A McKinsey report on 
internet economies of the G- 8 and Brazil, China, India, South Korea, and Sweden finds that, as 
a sector, internet- related consumption and expenditure surpasses both agriculture and energy. 
By 2011, on average, the internet made a contribution of 3.4 percent to the GDP116 and up to 
8 percent in countries with higher ICT use.117 By 2017 its contribution to the US economy in real 
terms was around 10 percent (5% as share of GDP in official statistics),118 though the impact of 
the internet economy on other economies makes it difficult to establish indisputable figures.119
 110 Ibid., para. 1.
 111 Cf. Tim Unwin, ICT4D: Information and Communication Technologies for Development (Cambridge: CUP, 
2009). Cf. also Tim Unwin, “The Internet and Development: A Critical Perspective,” in William H. Dutton (ed.), 
The Oxford Handbook of Internet Studies (Oxford: OUP, 2013), 531– 54 (533) (criticizing that most ICT- related 
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 112 Telenor/ Boston Consulting Group, Towards a Connected World. Socio- economic Impact of Internet in 
Emerging and Developing Economies (2009), https:// www.telenor.com/ wp- content/ uploads/ 2012/ 03/ Towards- 
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 113 Christine Zhen- Wei Qiang, Carlo M. Rossotto, and Kaoru Kimura, “Economic Impacts of Broadband,” in 
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Cloud computing, made possible through broadband connections and decreasing data 
storage costs,120 has had, according to another study focusing on the EU, “a significant im-
pact for the European Union with the creation of a few hundred thousand new SMEs [small 
and medium enterprises] and a significant contribution to growth.”121 The Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), an organization dedicated to fur-
thering economic progress, has successfully linked reaching economy- related public policy 
objectives to engaging with internet intermediaries.122 Economic growth is a public policy 
objective; but so is development which is— it is worth repeating— more than economic 
growth.
The 2008 Seoul Declaration on the Future of the Internet Economy underlined that ex-
panding the “internet Economy” will lead to “sustainable economic growth and prosperity.” 
The internet “will bolster the free flow of information, freedom of expression, and pro-
tection of individual liberties, as critical components of a democratic society and cultural 
diversity.”123 Similarly, the EU Digital Agenda’s objective is to “maximize the social and ec-
onomic potential of ICT, most notably the internet, a vital medium of economic and soci-
etal activity: for doing business, working, playing, communicating and expressing ourselves 
freely.”124
Development is more than the elimination of absolute poverty: it is also the reduction of 
relative poverty and, as Amartya Sen demonstrated, the freedom of people to realize their 
capabilities.125 But even with a critical perception of the concrete impact of ICTs for devel-
opment, we can accept, with the United Nations and its Human Rights Council, that the 
potential of the internet for development is great.126 Human Rights Council Resolution 20/ 
8 (2012) recognized the globality and openness of the internet as a “driving force in accel-
erating progress towards development in its various forms.”127 The Human Rights Council 
also confirmed the connection between development, human rights, and the internet by 
committing itself to further studying how the internet can be an “important tool for devel-
opment and for exercising human rights.”128
The Resolution’s reference to the internet’s positive impact on development in its “var-
ious forms” is prefigured in the BCG/ Telenor study that points to the social benefits of 
increased internet penetration for education, better income, enhanced healthcare, and 
 120 Nayan B. Ruparelia, Cloud Computing (Cambridge, MA/ London: MIT Press, 2016).
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increased lifestyle opportunities, especially in rural areas.129 These benefits, though 
real, are usually presented anecdotally. Taken together, however, they leave little doubt 
as to the potential of ICTs for economic growth and human development. The example 
of many African states shows how big (government) data and open data approaches are 
used by local start- ups in cooperation with communities to monitor delivery of health 
services.130 The internet and internet- based applications can be effective tools to visualize 
money flows and increase accountability of public officials, which in turn has positive ef-
fects on development. In fact, Judith Randel of Development Initiatives, an organization 
working toward poverty eradication, argues that “the effective use of information [is] key 
to the debate on resource allocation and ultimately poverty eradication.”131 Similarly, a 
comprehensive study by the think tank Dalberg finds positive anecdotal and systemic im-
pacts of the internet in African areas as different as agriculture, health, education, SMEs, 
and financial inclusion.132
This approach unites human rights- based and human development- oriented internet 
policy development in that the right to access the internet (and through it receive and im-
part ideas) is a key, enabling the right to realize the potential of human rights online and 
ensure human development.133 This approach has emerged as a common theme in develop-
ment policy. The UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development134 identified the building 
of resilient infrastructure, the promotion of inclusive and sustainable industrialization, and 
the fostering of innovation as key goals of sustainable development.135 In Target 9.c of the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) states commit to “[s] ignificantly increase[ing] ac-
cess to information and communications technology and striv[ing] to provide universal 
and affordable access to the internet in least developed countries by 2020.” There exists thus 
a commitment by UN member states to strive for universal internet access by 2020. Even if 
this commitment is difficult to realize, the importance of the commitment, which evidences 
these states’ opinion vis- à- vis the internet, is hard to overstate. Committing to universal 
 129 Telenor/ BCG (2009), 8. Interestingly, the report defines benefits that the internet can bring as “needs” and 
“wants”: needs include productivity gains from household businesses and agriculture, cost savings from online 
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access means, by implication, that internet integrity as a precondition for meaningful access 
needs to be ensured and is therefore in the common interest.
This commitment closes the circle to the BCG report, which evidentiates the positive 
impact of the internet for private businesses. The High Level Panel established by United 
Nations Secretary- General Ban Ki- moon also called for a “data revolution for sustain-
able development, with a new international initiative to improve the quality of statistics 
and information available to citizens.” ICTs were considered crucial for development as 
empowering tools: “new technology, crowd sourcing, and improved connectivity to em-
power people with information on the progress towards the [development] targets.”136 
Disaggregated data to ensure that the “neediest [ . . . ] are receiving essential services” is 
necessary— and the “revolution in information technology over the last decade provides 
[us with] an opportunity to strengthen data and statistics for accountability and decision- 
making purposes.”137
This is not to deny that digital inequalities are persistent and the different dimensions of 
the digital divide, even within developed societies, are difficult to bridge.138 The General 
Assembly resolution on ICTs and development expresses concerns at the digital divide, 
at the gender divide within the digital divide, and that the development promise of ICTs 
remains unfulfilled for the majority of the poor.139 Targeted policies are required to ame-
liorate this situation, but the finding does not detract from the validity of identifying the 
internet’s protection as lying in the common interest because of its potential for human 
rights protection and development.
ICTs and their facility to organize data and draw societal benefits from data are thus ac-
cepted tools in pursuance of the UN’s development goals. The Broadband Commission for 
Digital Development, established by the ITU and UNESCO in 2010, confirmed that without 
the internet the MDGs of 2015 could not have been achieved nor progress effectively mon-
itored.140 The internet does not equal ICTs, but ICTs run on the internet. Therefore, the use 
of ICTs is premised upon the protection of and from the internet— which is in the common 
interest. ICTs are a “growth driver and transformative technology for the global economy,”141 
and for human information and communication— and as such for the realization of human 
rights, human security, and human development. Harnessing ICTs in order to ensure human 
rights, human security, and human development (and, as a means toward these ends, ec-
onomic growth) is premised upon the integrity of the internet. If ensuring these goals lies 
in the common interest— as it indubitably does— , the latter needs to be protected in the 
common interest.
 136 Ibid., 7.
 137 Ibid., 23.
 138 Cf. Eszter Hargittai and Yuli Patrick Hsieh, “Digital Inequality,” in William H. Dutton (ed.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Internet Studies (Oxford: OUP, 2013), 129– 50.
 139 UN General Assembly, Resolution 67/ 195 of 21 December 2012, Information and communications technol-
ogies for development, UN Doc. A/ RES/ 67/ 195 of 5 February 2013, paras. 3– 5.
 140 Cf. UN Broadband Commission for Digital Development, The State of Broadband 2013: Universalizing 
Broadband, September 2013, http:// www.broadbandcommission.org/ Documents/ bb- annualreport2013.pdf, 
26 et seq. (citing examples such as improved exam results through computers- to- schools projects, closing 
gender gaps through ICT programs targeted at women, mobile apps assisting parents in developing countries 
assess immunization, height, weight, and child development milestones, ultrasound tests through telemed-
icine, web- based hubs for healthcare workers, and reduction of Greenhouse gases emissions through smart 
ICT use (30)).
 141 Ian Brown and Christopher T. Marsden, Regulating Code. Good Governance and Better Regulation in the 
Information Age (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2013), 196.
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2.3.4 Relating Internet Integrity to International Security
Protecting the internet’s integrity and (global) society from the dangers emanating from or 
mediated through the internet is essential for ensuring international security and the effec-
tive fight against cybercrime. Political and legal approaches to preventing cyberwar142 and 
cybercrime143 have attracted considerable attention internationally. This study has shown 
that the internet is critical infrastructure in itself and also functionally essential for other 
critical infrastructure. The General Assembly, in Resolution 64/ 211 of 21 December 2009, 
promoted the creation of a global culture of cybersecurity144 and expressed concerns in 
light of growing threats to the reliable functioning of the internet (technically: “of critical in-
formation infrastructures and to the integrity of the information carried over those”). These 
affect “domestic, national and international welfare.” The Resolution affirms that states are 
obliged to deal systematically with these threats and coordinate both with national actors 
and internationally with the goal of facilitating the achievement of cybersecurity.145
The 2013 GGEs report underlined that applying norms derived from “existing interna-
tional law relevant to the use of ICTs by States is an essential measure to reduce risks to 
international peace, security and stability.” The Charter of the United Nations is applicable 
to the whole gamut of socioeconomic activity on the internet and in that “essential to main-
taining peace and stability and promoting an open, secure, peaceful and accessible ICT en-
vironment.”146 Applying international law to the internet lies in the common interest and 
safeguarding the internet as such also lies in the common interest because a stable, secure, 
and functional internet is essential for international security.
Protecting internet integrity and protecting kinetic artifacts and the offline world by re-
ducing the potential for criminal misuses of computers and networks is important in the 
international fight against cybercrime and cyberterrorism. Common criminals continue 
to misuse the internet both for online variants of common scams and for internet- specific 
(technology- based) attacks. The size of monetary loss is small compared to the scale of the 
internet economy,147 but the problem is nevertheless serious.148 Black markets both for 
buying cybercrime tools (such as complete botnets for as little as 50 USD) and for selling 
on the proceeds of cybercrime activities (such as credit card information) are increasingly 
 142 Cf. just Katharina Ziolkowski, Peacetime Regime for State Activities in Cyberspace. International Law, 
International Relations and Diplomacy (Tallinn:  NATO CCD COE Publications, 2013), http:// ccdcoe.org/ 427.
html; and Michael N. Schmitt (ed.), The Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2013), http:// issuu.com/ nato_ ccd_ coe/ docs/ tallinnmanual?e=5903855/ 1802381.
 143 Cf., on the taxonomy of cybercrime, David S. Wall, Cybercrime (Cambridge:  CUP, 2007); and Jonathan 
Clough, Principles of Cybercrime (Cambridge: CUP, 2010) (arguing that broad consensus on fighting cybercrime 
has led to the successful Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention, 22).
 144 General Assembly, Resolution 64/ 211 of 21 December 2009, Creation of a global culture of cybersecurity 
and taking stock of national efforts to protect critical information infrastructures, UN Doc. A/ RES/ 64/ 211 of 17 
March 2010.
 145 Cybersecurity is discussed in more detail below, at 4.3. Customary duties regarding cybersecurity, including 
the principle of prevention, are discussed below, in 3.3.
 146 Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and 
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, UN Doc. A/ 68/ 98 of 24 June 2013, para. 19.
 147 According to its latest available report, the US- based Internet Crime Complaint Center has received, in 2012, 
just under 300,000 consumer complaints with an adjusted dollar loss of US$ 530 million, an increase of 8.3% since 
2011 (cf. Internet Crime Complaint Center (I3C), Internet Crime Report 2012 (2012), http:// www.ic3.gov/ media/ 
annualreport/ 2012_ IC3Report.pdf).
 148 Cf. Robert Moore, Cybercrime:  Investigating High- Technology Computer Crime (Oxford:  Elsevier, 2011) 
(arguing that cybercrimes have been steadily increasing in recent years and now amount to “a very serious 
problem,” 5).
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sophisticated, resilient, and international.149 This threat requires international coopera-
tion. At the same time, most criminal misuses of the internet are not direct threats to the 
internet’s integrity, as criminal networks rely on the internet to conduct their activities. 
However, attacks, especially if conducted for purposes not linked to monetary gain— such 
as terrorism or political destabilization— can amount to substantial threats to the internet’s 
functionality and threaten offline values, institutions, and society.
The internet has been used for the coordination of terrorist attacks and the promo-
tion of terrorist ideology.150 However, the internet is only one factor or mode in radicali-
zation processes and not a key method. Its relative significance remains unclear.151 But at 
the same time the technologicalization and informationalization of many key infrastruc-
ture provision functions and of many industry control systems open up new vulnerabilities 
within states that can threaten, if an attack is substantial, international peace and security. 
Similarly, the increased use of mobile devices, cloud computing, and the use of social net-
works increases the vulnerability of citizens to acts of cybercrime.152
Different levels of internet security awareness and capabilities globally matter to all states 
because of the interconnectedness of ICTs and the networked nature of the internet. “These 
vulnerabilities are amplified,” the UN’s Group of Governmental Experts complained in 
2013, “by disparities in national law, regulations and practices related to the use of ICTs.”153 
Only international cooperation in the protection of and from the internet can help meet 
these challenges. The role of the internet’s integrity in ensuring international security and 
the threats posed by international cybercrime and cyberterrorism are further reasons for 
considering that the protection of the integrity of the internet lies in the common interest.
2.3.5 Custodial Sovereignty
The normative ordering of the internet necessitates a review of traditional notions of sover-
eignty.154 But the consequences of identifying an issue as lying in the common interest of all 
states remain the same with regard to the public core of the internet as with regard to other 
common interest goods: that the state exercising primary jurisdiction is limited in its sover-
eignty. Its acts may not affect negatively the pursuance of the common interest. Other states 
have a right to monitor this respect and offer assistance. They also have duties regarding the 
international community with a view to safeguarding common interests which are norma-
tively framed, inter alia, as the no harm and the sic utere tuo principles.
While protection of the integrity of the internet lies in the common interest, there is no 
intrinsic value in the internet. Its protection is functional. To the extent that a state con-
trols CIRs, it has to exercise this jurisdiction in a manner that ensures the common interest. 
 149 Lillian Ablon, Martin C. Libicki, and Andrea A. Golay, “Markets for Cybercrime Tools and Stolen Data. 
Hackers’ Bazaar,” RAND National Security Research Division (March 2014), http:// www.rand.org/ pubs/ research_ 
reports/ RR610.html.
 150 GGE Report (2013), para. 7.
 151 Ines von Behr, Anais Reding, Charlie Edwards, and Luke Gribbon, “Radicalisation in the Digital Era. the 
Use of the Internet in 15 Cases of Terrorism and Extremism,” RAND Europe (2013), http:// www.rand.org/ pubs/ 
research_ reports/ RR453.html, 48.
 152 Cf. GGE Report (2013)., para. 9.
 153 Ibid., para. 10.
 154 Rolf H. Weber, “New Sovereignty Concepts in the Age of Internet?” Journal of Internet Law 14 (2010), 12– 20.
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To the extent that national politics, e.g. new laws, could affect the internet negatively, a state 
must refrain from their implementation. This will often be a question of weighing probabil-
ities while respecting the precautionary principle.155 The limit of a state’s equal sovereignty 
is rechartered in light of its erga omnes obligations regarding the protection of and from the 
internet as a common interest.
Even when the US still exercised ultimate authority over the internet’s key addressing re-
sources, including its root servers, it could be argued that the US government only had “custodial 
sovereignty” regarding the delegated IANA functions.156 This approach combines a common 
global responsibility of all states for the internet with differentiated responsibilities of the custo-
dial state to protect and all other states to support the state in its custodial role (and, if needed, 
take measures to ensure that the custodial state does not fail the international community).157
In delegating and supervising the delegated exercise of the root zone management au-
thority, the US had to act as a custodian of the global common interest in the internet’s 
integrity. This implies that the US had to enter into consultations with other states with 
regard to the management of CIRs and make sure that the management is transparent and 
accountable, ideally to all actors of the international community. States also have to ensure 
that they implement the protection of and from the internet as a common interest within 
their territory (through national legislation) and that all actors, including private actors, 
contribute to the protection.
Though sovereignty- oriented states have suggested exercising exclusive sovereignty 
over a “national internet segment,”158 the character of the internet as protected by inter-
national law as a common interest limits their sovereignty. Even criminal legislation, often 
perceived as a hallmark of state sovereignty, has been influenced (if not actively shaped) by 
international cooperation to combat cybercrime, though it remains at the core of national 
sovereignty. The 2005 Tunis Agenda, though valuable in its description of the normative 
goals of information society, supports a more traditional view in equating “policy authority 
for internet- related public policy issues” to a “sovereign right of States.”159 This needs to be 
qualified in light of a common interest approach to protecting the internet in that the states’ 
policy authority is no longer an exclusively sovereign right but, as part and parcel of their 
sovereignty, to be exercised in the common interest, when common interest issues are at 
stake. Sovereignty has to be understood in light of changing circumstances and the impor-
tance of the pursuance of the common interest of protecting the integrity of the internet.
 155 On its applications both in international law and in national jurisdictions, see Joakim Zander, The Application 
of the Precautionary Principle in Practice. Comparative Dimensions (Cambridge: CUP, 2010) (internationally, at 
3; EU law at 76; UK at 215; and the US at 267). More critically, see Cass R. Sunstein, Laws of Fear. Beyond the 
Precautionary Principle (Cambridge: CUP, 2005) (arguing for alternatives to the precautionary principle (espe-
cially its unreflective use) because it may paralyze policymakers, 31).
 156 On the concept of custodial sovereignty, see Werner Scholtz, “Custodial Sovereignty: Reconciling Sovereignty 
and Global Environmental Challenges amongst the Vestiges of Colonialism,” Netherlands International Law 
Review 3 (2008), 323– 41. With the transitioning of the NTIA’s IANA- related functions completed by 2015, this 
assessment is still of historical value.
 157 Cf. Werner Scholtz, “Collective (Environmental) Security: The Yeast for the Refinement of International 
Law,” in Ole Kristian Fauchald, David Hunter, and Wang Xi (eds.), Yearbook of International Environmental Law, 
Vol. 19 (Oxford: OUP, 2008), 135– 62 (148).
 158 Cf. Russia, UAE, China, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Sudan, and Egypt, Proposal for the Work of the Conference 
[WCIT- 12], ITU Doc. DT- X of 5 December 2012, WCIT12/ 27(Rev.1)- E, § 3A.2 and 3A.3, http:// files.wcitleaks.
org/ public/ Merged%20UAE%20081212.pdf.
 159 World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), Tunis Agenda for The Information Society, WSIS- 05/ 
TUNIS/ DOC/ 6(Rev. 1)- E of 18 November 2005.
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In order to ensure that all states exercise their sovereignty in a way that reflects the global 
common interest in the internet, all other states have monitoring and assistance rights and 
duties.160 This also applied to the exercise, by the United States, of its custodial sovereignty 
regarding root zone management and IANA functions before the transition to the internet’s 
technical organizations, as well as to states that host important Internet Exchange Points, 
like Germany with the DE- CIX in Frankfurt/ Main. Monitoring includes a right to oversee 
and criticize implementation, and suggest improvements, and may amount— in extreme 
cases— in rights to take, collectively, action against a state if the failure to protect common 
interests leads or amounts to a situation under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations (a threat to, or a breach of, the peace), similar to the concept of humanitarian inter-
vention. Assistance by the international community includes, if needed, financial, technical, 
and organizational support, but also further ex ante obligations such as an extraterritorial 
duty not to cause harm in its preventive and due diligence dimensions. The principles of 
good neighborliness and sic utere tuo have especially strong implications when states regu-
late common interest resources.161
This section has established that protecting the integrity of the internet lies in the global 
common interest. Therefore, international law obliges states to protect the integrity of the 
internet. Yet there exist a number of challenges of regulating the internet that lie in its spe-
cial character.
2.4 Challenges of Regulating the Internet
2.4.1 Foundational Myths
This study has established that regulating the internet in the common interest is essential 
to safeguarding the values of the international community. Previously, this chapter has 
identified how standards and contracts, and non- binding norms, safeguard the internet’s 
criticality for societal progress. This study has earlier hypothesized that a normative order 
has emerged, made up of international law, national law, and transnational regulatory ar-
rangements. The last category has been shown to exist. But what about “international law 
of the internet”? Can the internet be ruled by (international) law? The affirmative answer 
seems obvious, but it is historically contingent. In the early phase of the internet’s develop-
ment neither national laws nor international law were perceived as necessary to structure 
the address space or solve transnational technological conflicts as to its use and evolution. 
The development of standards took place in private academic settings. The first larger (and 
internationally relevant) legal questions emerged when the internet was commercialized 
and politicized in the 1990s. Pioneers of technological development discounted any nor-
mative legitimacy for states regarding the rule of the internet and questioned traditional 
democratic means of conferring legitimacy to rule through democratic processes. In 1992, 
David Clark of the IETF explained the philosophy of engineers in the following words: “We 
 160 Cf. Wolfgang Benedek, Koen De Feyter, Matthias C. Kettemann, and Christina Voigt, “Introduction,” in 
Wolfgang Benedek, Koen De Feyter, Matthias C. Kettemann, and Christina Voigt (eds.), The Common Interest in 
International Law (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2014), 1– 8.
 161 These rules and their legal status and effect will be discussed in more detail in section 3.3.4.
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reject kings, presidents and voting. We belive in rough consensus and running code.”162 In 
1996, former Grateful Dead lyricist and later founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation 
(EFF), John Perry Barlow, argued in Davos that “governments of the industrial world” had 
“no moral right to rule us [citizens of cyberspace] nor do [they] possess any methods of en-
forcement we have true reason to fear.”163
The internet challenges the law and traditional notions of normativity. The defenders 
of utopian models, such as Barlow, attacked the law as a legitimate normative tool.164 But 
“cyberspace” or “the internet” does not exist as an “independent area of sovereignty.”165 
States have a moral right (and even a legal duty), based on their obligations both toward 
their citizens and toward the global community of states, to develop the normative order of 
the internet and to apply and enforce norms on the internet.166
Though discounting the role of traditional norms, neither Barlow nor Clark argued for a 
completely unregulated societal space. They realized that this would be inimical to progress 
in science as in economy and human sociality. What they saw as the real alternative to the 
application of national laws— thus enforcing a hetero- normative order on the internet— 
was self- regulation by engineers through standards. Though the normative difference be-
tween standards and laws is one of gradation, not of principle, the complexification of the 
internet, its international dimension, the hurdles to participation in standard- setting pro-
cesses, and the progressive exercise of public authority by non- traditional and non- state 
actors necessitate critical thinking about their legitimation.167 Providing legitimation for 
the exercise of authority is a key component of law, and, in international settings, of interna-
tional law. The homogeneity of users of the 1970s and 1980s— academics and engineers— is 
gone, the commercialization and politicization of the internet has delegitimized utopian 
approaches: “user- generated law is a utopia.”168
Historically, the internet was not “ruled” by any single normative order. But this is not 
necessary for establishing that it can be ruled by laws and norms from different sources 
systematized within the normative order of the internet. When David Clark rejected 
“kings, presidents and voting,” he implied that democratic legitimacy (voting) was not 
something he sought for standard- setting authorities (neither did he seek charismatic 
or traditional legitimacy, through kings or presidents). Denying ex ante the importance 
of democratic legitimacy is problematic. As Malcolm N. Shaw put it, “[p] rogress, with 
its inexplicable leaps and bounds, has always been based upon the group as men and 
women combine to pursue commonly accepted goals [ . . . ].”169 This common pursuit is 
 162 David Clark, in a 1992 talk describing the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Cf. David D. Clark, “A 
Cloudy Crystal Ball, Visions of the Future,” plenary presentation, 24th meeting of the Internet Engineering Task 
Force, Cambridge, MA, 13– 17 July 1992, http:/ ietf20.isoc.org/ videos/ future_ ietf_ 92.pdf.
 163 John Perry Barlow, “A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace,” Davos, February 8, 1996, https:// 
projects.eff.org/ ~barlow/ Declaration- Final.html.
 164 Cf. Peter Mankowski, Rechtskultur (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2016), 192.
 165 Ibid., 131.
 166 Just see ECtHR, K.U. v. Finland (2 December 2008), application No. 2872/ 02 (confirming that states have 
obligations to protect children online); Editorial Board of Pravoye Delo and Shtekel v. Ukraine (5 May 2011), ap-
plication No. 33014/ 05 (states must create a regulatory framework to ensure effective protection of freedom of 
expression on the internet for journalists).
 167 Myriam Senn, Non- State Regulatory Regimes. Understanding Institutional Transformation (Heidelberg: 
Springer, 2011).
 168 Peter Mankowski, Rechtskultur (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2016), 131 (translation by the author).
 169 Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, 6th edn. (Oxford: OUP, 2008), 1.
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explained and justified by the concomitant evolution of (international) legal norms and 
their influence on the rule of the internet.
2.4.2 Evolving Composition of the Normative Medium
In their introduction to a collection of essays on Law without the State (Recht ohne Staat), 
Stefan Kadelbach and Klaus Günther describe the “lex digitalis, the law of the internet” as 
“perhaps the biggest challenge for the representatives of a state- oriented notion of law.”170 
Though they admit that states have technical difficulties to police events happening “on the 
internet” but outside their jurisdiction, they diagnose a lack of “meta norms” enabling the 
emergence of lex digitalis as a self- regulated order: “private law of the internet seems to be 
currently rather a virtual project if [it] develops any rules at all.”171 As this study will show 
in  chapter 6, these meta- norms have developed and can be substantiated to the point where 
they shape the normative order of the internet.
As this study will submit in  chapter 5, the notion of normative order of the internet is 
useful to overcome the state- vs. self- regulation debate that Kadelbach and Günther cor-
rectly identify as non- productive. As indicated in the previous section on intermediaries, 
companies’ terms of service as private law fulfill an important normative function within 
the normative order of the internet. There is not, however, an independent private law of 
the internet. Rather, it is one of the challenges of regulating the internet that it is made up of 
public and private norms (contract being often preferred over less flexible statutes172), au-
thored and executed by governments and companies alike.
Jürgen Habermas identified this trend as a “change in the composition of the me-
dium of law.”173 Indeed, as this section and the following demonstrate, what is consid-
ered “law” within a society has been greatly impacted by the development of the internet 
with its norms and standards. Legal orders are not closed in the sense that only norms 
exist which have been (democratically) legitimated by those subjected to the norm.174 The 
classical state- oriented law paradigm is challenged by globalization and deterritorializa-
tion through the use of ICTs.175 This does not, of course, mean that states fade away: “The 
virtual space does not mean [ . . . ] the end of the sovereign constitutional state.”176 States 
 170 Stefan Kadelbach und Klaus Günther, “Recht ohne Staat?” in Stefan Kadelbach und Klaus Günther (eds.), 
Recht ohne Staat? Zur Normativität nichtstaatlicher Normsetzung (Frankfurt/ New  York:  Campus, 2011), 9– 47 
(23): “Die vielleicht größte Herausforderung für die Vertreter eines staatszentrierten Rechtsbegriffes ist die lex 
digitalis, das Recht des Internet” (translation by the author).
 171 Ibid., 35: “Allerdings scheint auch ein von wem auch immer initiiertes privates Recht des Internet derzeit ein 
eher virtuelles Projekt zu sein – soweit es überhaupt Regelungen treffen kann” (translation by the author).
 172 Lee A. Bygrave, Internet Governance by Contract (Oxford: OUP, 2015).
 173 Jürgen Habermas, “Im Sog der Technokratie,” in Jürgen Habermas, Im Sog der Technokratie: kleine politische 
Schriften XII (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2013), 7: “Heute zeigen sich auch auf internationaler Ebene Anzeichen für 
eine Rationalisierung der staatlichen Herrschaftsausübung, welche einer Veränderung in der Komposition des 
Rechtsmediums entspricht” (translation by the author).
 174 Klaus Günther, “Normativer Rechtspluralismus— Eine Kritik,” Normative Orders Working Paper 03/ 2014, 
http:// publikationen.ub.uni- frankfurt.de/ files/ 34664/ Guenther_ Normativer+Rechtspluralismus.pdf, 1.
 175 Lars Viellechner, Transnationalisierung des Rechts (Weilerswist: Velbrück, 2013), 99. On ICANN’s domain 
regime, see ibid., 127 et seq.
 176 Stephan Hobe, “Cyberspace— der virtuelle Raum,” in Josef Isensee, Paul Kirchhof et al. (eds.), Handbuch des 
Staatsrechts, Band XI: Internationale Bezüge, 3rd edn., § 271, no. 44 (“Der virtuelle Raum bedeutet [ . . . ] nicht das 
Ende des souveränen Verfassungsstaates”) (translation by the author).
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continue to exercise an essential role in protecting their citizens from threats emanating 
from new technologies and from social change that these technological advances en-
gender. This task is made difficult because of the multilayer, multiplayer normative archi-
tecture and norm production machinery on the internet. The norms on which internet 
regulation and internet governance are based emanate from state constitutions, public law, 
supranational (EU) law, international law, private law- based contracts and terms of serv-
ice, standards, code, and hybrid sources, such as internet principles and cybernorms.177 It 
is difficult to ensure coherent protection of fundamental freedoms in this mosaic of rules 
(“Regelungsmosaik”178).
The real issue with the evolving composition of the normative medium is thus not that 
the internet is a space without applicable national norms, as the foundational myths of the 
internet would have us believe (recall Barlow’s axiom that states had “no authority where we 
[denizens of cyberspace] gather”179). Rather, the internet is a space with too many norms by 
too many normative actors and varying normative geometries. Depending on which aspect 
of the use and development we focus on, we will find regulation leaning more toward self- 
regulation through e.g. informal agreement, toward private law and contract, and toward 
public law.
The public core of the internet (the fundamental parts of infrastructure and the key stan-
dards necessary for the internet to run) have always been ruled (and managed) effectively. 
Without rules in the broadest sense (in their emanation as technical specifications), without 
some norms on cooperation and sharing information, information and communication ex-
change would not have been possible at all. The fact that the more technical “rules of the 
road” for the early internet were published in RFCs and developed bottom- up in meet-
ings of engineers does not detract from the fact that some (mainly technical) norms have 
been considered highly legitimate by the norm subjects. But engineers have also formulated 
behavior- oriented norms such as Jon Postel’s “Be liberal in what you accept, and conserva-
tive in what you send.”180 Furthermore, the activity of engineers and companies has taken 
place within a framework of national and international norms that have bearing upon eve-
rything they do. These norms emerging in the force field of technology and law may be 
hybridized and to a large degree privatized but remain within the confines set by national 
and international law.
That norms rule the internet is not an issue of much controversy today. Jack L. Goldsmith, 
even doubtful as to the normative pull of international law,181 still agrees that law governs 
activities in cyberspace.182 “Persistent” objections are usually based on misunderstandings 
of the dynamic character of “norms.” Andrew Murray, for instance, argues that “legal docu-
ments” cannot rule cyberspace but rather a “web of terms and conditions of service and 
 177 Matthias C. Kettemann, “Internet Governance,” in Dietmar Jahnel, Peter Mader, and Elisabeth Staudegger 
(eds.), IT- Recht, 3rd edn. (Vienna: Verlag Österreich, 2013), 43– 63.
 178 Wolfgang Hoffmann- Riem, “Freiheitsschutz in den globalen Kommunikationsinfrastrukturen,” JZ 69 (2014) 
2, 53– 63 (63).
 179 John Perry Barlow, “A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace,” Davos, February 8, 1996, https:// 
projects.eff.org/ ~barlow/ Declaration- Final.html.
 180 R. Braden (ed.), RFC 1222, Requirements for Internet Hosts— Communication Layers, October 1989, http:// 
www.ietf.org/ rfc/ rfc1122.txt, 1.2.2.
 181 Cf. Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law (New York: OUP, 2005), 188– 9.
 182 Cf. Jack L. Goldsmith, “Regulation of the Internet: Three Persistent Fallacies,” Chicago- Kent Law Review 73 
(1998), 1119.
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[ . . . ] Lessigian code- based solutions.”183 Murray misunderstands the diffused normativity 
in the regulation of online behavior. There is indeed no single international “legal docu-
ment” that regulates cyberspace, but there are many international and national norms that 
shape the behavior of actors online. Terms and conditions of service are influenced by na-
tional and international law, laying down standards for behavior of corporate actors and 
protecting individual internet users.184 There can be no action by natural or legal persons 
outside sovereign jurisdictions.185
Internet companies’ terms of service are normative in nature and embedded in an infra- 
and suprastructure of norms (including laws and treaties) that together form the normative 
order of the internet.186 Murray is right in arguing that the “transborder nature of internet 
activity has presented a significant challenge to traditional legal institutions in enforcing 
jurisdiction over online activities.”187 But the fact that challenges to enforcing national ju-
risdiction exist means that more international cooperation and coordination, through in-
ternational law, are necessary (and have partly been achieved188)— and not that regulation 
itself is impossible.
National law is important to normatively frame the development and applications of 
norms and processes bearing upon the evolution of the internet on a local level. Some argue 
that the role of national laws in mediating conflicting values has been supplanted by “tech-
nologies of internet governance” that have become the “new global spaces” for these norm 
and values conflicts.189 Technologies are not spaces, but technologies enable human behav-
ior in these spaces, and states need to respect, protect, and fulfill their human rights obliga-
tions through law. Even in times of shifting media of law, states need to regulate with a view 
to certain values that are extrinsic to technology and must be imported through a control-
ling normative order.
2.4.3 Code and Protocols as Law?
On a normative micro- scale, code has been said to supplant law in cyberspace.190 But code, 
though important for the development of programs and defining in many ways the direc-
tion into which information society is heading, is not law. Code- based regulation is either 
 183 Andrew Murray, “Uses and Abuses of Cyberspace: Coming to Grips with the Present Dangers,” in Antonio 
Cassese (ed.), Realizing Utopia. The Future of International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2012), 497– 506 (497).
 184 Cf. Recommendation CM/ Rec(2014)6 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on a Guide to human 
rights for Internet users, Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 16 April 2014 at the 1197th meeting of the 
Ministers’ Deputies, https:// wcd.coe.int/ ViewDoc.jsp?id=2184807.
 185 Apart from special cases of acts taken, for instance in international waters or outer space. But even these ac-
tions are regulated under the relevant regimes, providing for the protection of these areas of common concern for 
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hailed as a tool to ensure human development and fulfillment191 or as a false trend reflecting 
techno- centrism.192 If norms are the language of rules (and rulers) in a democracy, then 
code is the language of rules (and rulers?) in a technocracy. Yet technocratic knowledge, 
though an important vector of power in developing code, does not justify, by itself, a nor-
mative impact of code— nor does the epistemic authority of the code creator. Put suc-
cinctly: legitimacy cannot be coded. Arguing that code, and not law, rules is premised upon 
a sense of technological solutionism and fueled by Sachzwang arguments. These are not 
intrinsically opposed to normative (ethical) ordering but need to be harmonized. We also 
need to be aware of the tendency to overdetermine the possible impact of coding and design 
decisions.193
If code is law,194 then it has to be explained and justified by certain values. However, the 
technocratic argument usually implies that law, and the legal order, is unnecessary for (in 
the sense that it is not normatively influential in) the process of developing new protocols. 
This view is wrong. Code is law in that it is normative. Code is not law in that it eliminates 
law as a normative measure. As a normative instrument, code therefore has to be treated as 
law and similarly legitimated— and it is.
Let us consider, for example, the RFC for a new Public Key Pinning Extension for 
HTTP, which allows “web host operators to instruct user agents (UAs) to remember (‘pin’) 
the hosts’ cryptographic identities for a given period of time” in order to “reduce the in-
cidence of man- in- the- middle attacks due to compromised Certification Authorities.”195 
International law is relevant for such a standard on many levels: it provides an argumenta-
tive and normative framework for competing values such as privacy and security. The very 
fact that an organization such as IETF develops these standards essential for the use and 
development of the internet also has to be explained and justified within the argumentative 
ambit of international law.
At the example of the limited success of the robots.txt exclusion command, Greg Elmer 
shows that some protocols (or rather the adoption or non- adoption of some protocols) can 
be political decisions in the sense that they engage issues of public policy.196 Elmer calls 
protocols therefore “distinct political artifacts, tools [ . . . ] that political actors use to sup-
plement their more traditional communication strategies.”197 But precisely by showing that 
decisions about adopting or non- adopting protocols take place within a specific matrix of 
non- technical norms, normative arrangements, and normative expectations, he confirms 
my approach. International and national law stratify the order in which decisions on pro-
tocols are made. If, in the early phase of the internet, these decisions were seemingly taken 
by technical actors without reference to other normative systems, then this— doubtful 
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a statement as it is, since even these technical actors have values which they derive from 
a value system that will, in most cases, echo the principles and purposes of international 
law— only illustrates that the governance of the internet has progressed to a point where 
protocol decisions engage public policy issues.
The argument ex technical “necessity” usually has no traction. In RFC 2826, the internet 
Architecture Board underlined that the existence of a globally unique, hierarchical public 
name space deriving from a globally unique root is inherent in the design of the DNS. 
Having a single globally unique root was therefore “a technical requirement, not a policy 
choice.”198 Alternatives, according to RFC 2826, do not exist; there is “no getting away from 
the unique root of the public DNS.” Does this mean that international law does not apply to 
the questions of managing the root server? Does defining an arrangement as a “technical re-
quirement” absolve it from being explained and justified in light of values enshrined in the 
international normative order? Every specification or arrangement that engages an issue 
of public policy needs to be explained and justified (or at the least be explainable and jus-
tifiable) according to universal values, as enshrined by international law. As the European 
Commission put it in its 2014 Communication, technical specifications must “more sys-
tematically take into account public policy concerns.” This is already important as a matter 
of principle, but particularly when “legal rights of individuals, especially their human 
rights, are clearly impacted.”199
At the same time, legislators (and more generally, actors establishing normative instru-
ments for the internet) need to be aware of standards in their function as safeguards of 
key features of a technology or an application. “Lawmakers should understand,” Richard 
S. Whitt argues, “and, where appropriate, defer to the substance and processes imbued in the 
internet’s functional design.” But this does not amount to a call for a technical “veto” over 
lawmakers, but rather a cautious suggestion to choose among the variety of legal instru-
ments the one most likely to “preserve the integrity of [the internet’s] overall design.”200
Ten years after RFC 3552 on security in coding,201 RFC 6973 of 2013 laid down “pri-
vacy considerations for internet Protocols”202 that designers “should consider in addition 
to regular security analysis.”203 Clearly, issues of communication security (confidentiality, 
data integrity, peer entity authentication) and system security engage questions of public 
policy. Protocol designers, working for example on HTML extensions, are asked to de-
scribe “the privacy properties specific to the extensions and any particular uses of the ex-
tensions that are expected and foreseen at design time.”204 Pursuant to the RFC, they have 
to keep in mind the principles of data minimization, user participation (including user 
control and preferences expression), and security (protection against surveillance, mitiga-
tion of stored data compromise).205 Two further general principles are laid down for de-
signers to consider: trade- offs and default settings. Protocol designers are asked to ensure 
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that the protocol does not make illegitimate trade- offs between competing design goals, 
such as “privacy and usability, privacy and efficiency [and] privacy and implementability.” 
Importantly, designers should make sure that the default mode or option “minimize[s] the 
amount, identifiability, and persistence of the data and identifiers exposed by the protocol 
[and] maximize the opportunity for user participation.”206 If designers choose not to use 
a pro- privacy default option, they are instructed to provide a rationale, thereby making 
privacy- friendly coding the default option.
More recently, RFC 8280 on Research into Human Rights Protocol Considerations207 pro-
vided a detailed model for considering human rights for protocol developers, providing “ques-
tions that engineers should ask themselves when developing or improving protocols if they want 
to understand their impact on human rights.” These range from issues of connectivity, privacy, 
“content agnosticism,” and security to censorship resistance, accessibility, and transparency.208
These RFCs make clear that protocols have “politics” and that the decisions that pro-
tocol developers make are similar to those that legislators make. “Design choices in code 
can be as normative as law,” Brown and Marsden write. But the next step is not abdicating 
normative responsibility to code- makers, but rather ensuring that the code reflects value 
judgments and the finality of the normative order of the internet: actors with a stake in the 
normative outcome of processes within the normative order of the internet need to make 
decisions regarding the values embedded by all normative instruments, including code.209 
Arguments for trade- offs need to be nuanced and informed (e.g. privacy and protection 
of national security). Default settings (opt- ins, opt- outs) can massively influence user be-
havior.210 This confirms that the politics of protocols needs an overarching policy that is 
explained and justified by overarching values as enshrined by law and, as protocols tran-
scend territorial boundaries, measured against the international legal order and its values, 
including the pursuance of global common interests.211
It is true that many technical necessities will constrain the way the internet is managed. 
We need one central repository of internet names and addresses, one DNS. But how the 
DNS is managed, and by whom, is not a decision to which technology dictates the answer. 
Code is agnostic when it comes to key questions of online regulation, such as who should 
be allowed to manage the critical resources of the internet that have to be safeguarded in 
the global common interest and based on what authority should management decisions be 
taken and to what end management reform implemented. Accepting that there can be only 
one authoritative root server as a technical requirement takes nothing away from the debate 
over who manages this server and how decisions on root server management are reached. 
That the importance of the stability of the DNS calls for “extremely conservative and cau-
tious management of the public root zone”212 is an argument, based on technical necessity, 
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that might caution against, say, installing a General Assembly- like institution for managing 
the root server and voting on changes by majority vote. This, however, is already a question 
that concerns “how” (and not “if”) law regulates the use and development of the internet.
We have thus established that the internet can be ruled by national and international law 
and that code is law in the sense that it is normative and therefore has to submit to (some 
of) the same tests of legitimacy as other norms with reference to certain values that are en-
shrined in (international) law. Code is also law in that it is man- made and can be based on 
biased assumptions. Code is also not law in that it does not supplant law. Rather, the rela-
tionship between code and law is more complex and law can encourage the use of code (in 
programs and algorithms) to overcome code that is not consonant with international legal 
values.
2.4.4 Algorithmic Decision- Making
For norm theorist Christoph Möllers, algorithms and normativity are mutually exclu-
sive: “a society, whose behaviour is programmed, has no place for norms.”213 This study con-
tends differently. Just as norms and code, norms and algorithms are intricately interlinked. 
Algorithms, in Tarleton Gillespie’s definition, are “encoded procedures for transforming 
input data into a desired output, based on specified calculations. The procedures name 
both a problem and the steps by which it should be solved.”214 They are usually coded “steps 
undertaken in order to solve a particular problem or accomplish a defined outcome.”215 
Using this broad definition, the normative choices in designing and applying algorithms 
become obvious. Algorithms perform important functions on the internet and are present 
in all applications and services. Their functions include prioritization (rank association ac-
cording to pre- defined criteria— e.g. search engines such as Google, social media timelines 
as used by Facebook and Twitter), classification (grouping information based on source 
data features— e.g. reputation systems like eBay, Uber, Airbnb, news scoring sites such as 
Reddit, Digg), association (determining relationships via semantics and connotation, e.g. 
predictive policing), and filtering (spam filters such as Norton, recommender systems used 
by Spotify and Netflix, and news aggregation services as present in the Facebook News 
Feed).216
Big data and algorithms can be used to positively impact bias and discrimination in 
lending, employment, higher education, and criminal justice, but can also perpetuate dis-
criminatory practices217 and amplify structural discrimination, including through predictive 
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policing.218 Algorithmic discrimination can be caused by biased input data, poorly defined 
rules that allow discrimination, lack of contextual awareness, and socio- algorithmic feedback 
loops reinforcing existing biases that are then again fed into algorithms.219 Algorithm- based 
calculation and estimates can also produce a false sense of security. Real- time data based on 
algorithmic calculations predicted a win for Hillary Clinton in the 2016 US elections.220
More generally, the design and use of algorithms can interfere with human rights.221 The 
rights to fair trial and due process can be impacted by biased use of algorithms in court 
proceedings, including through the use of reoffending “risk scores” in probation vs. jail de-
cisions. Privacy and data protection rights are impacted through the collection, processing, 
and use of vast amounts of data in online tracking algorithms.222 Freedom of expression, 
which includes the right to receive information, is interfered with when predictive algo-
rithms shape the content users see in light of prior interests or, more harmful, biased eco-
nomic incentives of third actors,223 even though the fear of “filter bubbles,” that is selective 
publics with ever more extreme views among in- group members, seems to be empirically 
overblown.224 Algorithms are also used by internet platforms to scan for problematic con-
tent, which can lead to overblocking, and to select and recommend news, which impacts 
the way broadcasters can reach and engage with their audiences.225
The right to an effective remedy can also be infringed if intermediaries using algorithms 
in removal contestation proceedings program an anti- reversal bias into them. Social rights 
are impacted when the delivery of services is premised upon algorithmic decisions which 
may, again, be biased and result in social sorting and denial of access to certain services. The 
right to free and fair elections can be impacted by algorithms that use disinformation tactics 
to shape content users see or that are employed in “fake news” or “disinformation” cam-
paigns,226 including through “social bots” that act as influencers.227
In light of the growing critique of “black box” algorithms, some approaches to hold au-
thors and operators of algorithms accountable have emerged. The EU’s new General Data 
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Protection Regulation (GDPR)228 establishes standards for data collection through algo-
rithms, including a limited right to information or “explanation.” Article 13(2)(f) EU GDPR 
forces controllers to provide data subjects, in cases where personal data is collected from 
them, with information about the existence of automated decision- making and, at least in 
cases of profiling in the sense of Article 9, “meaningful information about the logic involved, 
as well as the significance and the envisaged consequences of such processing.” Article 9 
prohibits processing of certain personal data (revealing inter alia racial or ethnic origin, 
political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs) unless the data subject has given con-
sent (Article 9(2)(a)) or the processing is necessary for reasons of substantial public interest. 
While this does not amount to a full right to explanation of the logic behind algorithms 
(which is often very difficult to present in an understandable way), it does amount to a right 
to be sufficiently informed to be able to give informed consent to data processing.
In 2016 and 2017 the notion of algorithmic accountability slowly gathered momentum. 
Engineering and computer associations understood the challenge and committed to “algo-
rithmic transparency”229 or “ethically aligned design,” underlining the need for account-
ability that can help “[prove] why a system acts in certain ways to address legal issues of 
culpability, and to avoid confusion or fear within the general public.”230 The most exten-
sive normative approach, the Principles for Accountable Algorithms (2017),231 considers ac-
countability through five principles: responsibility (redress mechanisms for adverse effects 
must be provided), explainability (concerned parties must be able to understand how algo-
rithms reach a decision), accuracy (errors need to be logged and planned for), auditability 
(third parties must be able to study and monitor the algorithm), and fairness (discrimina-
tory or unjust impacts must be avoided).232
Algorithms are not “actants,” but technological artifacts. Undesired normative conse-
quences cannot (yet) be attributed to them, but only to the natural or legal persons that 
are responsible for their development and use.233 At the same time, algorithms clearly play 
an important role as (quasi- )normative instruments within the normative order of the 
internet. Ensuring that algorithm use is consonant with the values the order expresses is 
among the more difficult challenges of internet regulation. Regulating code and algorithms 
are key elements of normative order approaches to the internet.
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2.5  Conclusions
The internet has become a vital medium of communication that mediates much of our lived 
experience and through which individuals exercise their human rights, especially through 
the enabling right to freedom of expression, including the right to seek, receive, and impart 
information and ideas of all kind, regardless of frontiers. At the same time, “the internet” is 
merely a hardware- based data- transfer capability running software based on protocols that 
ensure interconnectivity. In order to use the internet, both its public core and its “content”— 
the sites and services that make it attractive— have to be protected as must be the enabling 
normative system(s) that ensure(s) its functioning.
The internet’s public core and the servers necessary for it to function are both indis-
pensable for critical infrastructure (e.g. power grids) to work and, in themselves, critical 
(information) infrastructure. Safeguarding the internet’s integrity (its security, stability, ro-
bustness, resilience, and functionality) has become an essential goal of any normative order 
that includes internet regulation, including national, European, and international law. Any 
protection must extend to the internet’s hardware: cables, data centers, root servers, internet 
Exchange Points, and a working naming and addressing system. These are critical internet 
resources.
Protecting the internet in both its dimensions— kinetic and non- kinetic, including a pro-
tective normative framework— lies in the common interest of all states. The goals pursued 
by states within the framework of creating a people- centered, development- oriented infor-
mation society, in which international law is fully applicable, of promoting development, 
and of respecting, protecting, and enforcing human rights are clearly common interest 
goals. They cannot be reached without immunizing both the public core of the internet and 
the Möglichkeitsraum (realm of possibilities) of the internet against illegitimate state inter-
vention. This implies that states exercising jurisdiction over a “piece” of the internet (be it 
specific sites, servers, services, or users) are limited in their sovereignty by the prohibition 
of affecting negatively the pursuance of the common interest.
Before discussing, in the next chapter, how international law and internet governance 
normatively frame the internet, this chapter has identified key challenges of regulating the 
internet. Having deconstructed the foundational myth that the internet is a space free of 
laws, this chapter has shown that states have a duty to protect their citizens with regard to 
the internet (and regarding their online activities). Companies, too, have a corporate so-
cial responsibility to respect human rights within their sphere of influence, which— on the 
internet— is growing rapidly as the majority of relevant communicative acts takes place in 
private spaces. The special role of intermediaries is another challenge for regulating the 
internet. As the majority of online spaces lies in private hands, it is private law that prima 
facie frames many norm conflicts online. When states react belatedly through laws or judg-
ments, these may lead to overblocking or legal conflicts between competing jurisdictions.234
The normative actors on the internet have influenced the composition of the medium of 
law and moved it toward a more flexible geometry of normativity, including non- binding 
 234 See the evolution of the “right to be forgotten”: Years of uncertainty followed the CJEU judgment in Google 
Spain and Google (2014). They culminated in a July 19, 2017 referral decision by the French Conseil d’État, of its 
case Google Inc., n° 399922, to the CJEU to clarify the geographical reach of its 2014 ruling (delisting globally or 
only within the EU). The right to erasure (“right to be forgotten”) can now be found in Article 17 GDPR.
 
Conclusions 57
norms and principles, standards and codes, which have been influential in the development 
of the internet. This normative architecture and norm production machinery is character-
istic of the internet, as is the reliance on code and algorithms as quasi- normative tools.
In light of the hypotheses put forward in the introduction, this chapter has demonstrated 
the conceptual genealogy of norms on the internet and analyzed the categories of norms 
relevant for the establishment of the normative order. This chapter has further shown 
how non- state actors, such as technical standard- setters, develop norms through non- 
traditionally legitimated norm- making processes. Technical norms, standards, contracts— 
and European and international legal rules (here: establishing and implementing common 
interest regulation)— form a hybrid order. Importantly, the non- traditional normative 
instruments form part of a third category of norms, the normative tertium. In light of the 
lack of a general treaty regulating the normative order of the internet, this normative dis-
array makes evident the need for structural principles of the order. Their foundations will 
be developed in the next chapter.
Already at this stage of the study, the hypothesis that through norms we can apply values 
to standards and code and “renormativize” them stands as correct. Just as has happened 
with industrial norms in the last century, codes and standards are shown to be part of the 
normative order of the internet and not technical artifacts.
The key critical internet resources— internet routing, the Domain Name System, certifi-
cates and trust, and communications cables— have also been called the “public core of the 
internet” and deserve special protection.235 The hypothesis that value- based normativity must 
influence technical standard- setting to ensure, inter alia, the protection of the common in-
terest is shown to be valid. Far from being a space where only ad hoc norms develop, essential 
elements of the internet’s architecture are based on stable normative arrangements.
These include, as this chapter has shown, the stable system of unique identifiers, secure 
information interchange through routing, cable connections, working Internet Exchange 
Points, and common standards. The regulatory order of the internet oriented toward 
ensuring its integrity is therefore a CIR, but at the same time protects other CIRs, including 
kinetic ones. Many of the internet’s information interchanges are based on “gentlemen’s 
agreements,” trust or mutual interest and reliance, or private contracts. Only a few root 
servers are run by governmental institutions. The normative order of the internet has to en-
compass all these elements of the normative infrastructure: the normative instruments with 
varying degrees of normativity and different actors.
The normative infrastructure of the internet protects the internet directly and indirectly. 
To illustrate this approach, consider Principle No. 5 of the Declaration by the Committee 
of Ministers (CM) on internet governance principles,236 on the universality of the internet, 
which provides that “internet- related policies should recognize the global nature of the 
internet and the objective of universal access [and] should not adversely affect the unimpeded 
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the core and establish a principle of non- interference with the public core: “Without prejudice to their rights and 
obligations, state and non- state actors should not conduct or knowingly allow activity that intentionally and sub-
stantially damages the general availability or integrity of the public core of the Internet, and therefore the stability 
of cyberspace.” (Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace, Call to Protect the Public Core of the Internet, 
New Delhi, November 2017, https:// cyberstability.org/ wp- content/ uploads/ 2017/ 11/ call- to- protect- the- public- 
core- of- the- internet.pdf).
 236 Council of Europe, Declaration by the Committee of Ministers on Internet governance principles, adopted 
by the Committee of Ministers on 21 September 2011 at the 1121st meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, https:// wcd.
coe.int/ ViewDoc.jsp?id=1835773.
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flow of transboundary internet traffic.” This rule, if established that it has crystallized into a 
rule of international customary law, protects the internet directly in that it secures the un-
impeded transfer of data packages, which is key to its functioning.
By contrast, para. 1 of the Human Rights Council Resolution on the promotion, protec-
tion, and enjoyment of human rights on the internet (2016) affirms that “the same rights 
that people have offline must also be protected online, in particular freedom of expression, 
which is applicable regardless of frontiers and through any media of one’s choice [ . . . ].”237 
The primary normative objects here are the rights which are applicable online just as offline. 
But, indirectly, the internet’s intangible dimension of offering a space for the exercise of 
these rights is protected as well. The internet’s integrity is a structural condition of the exer-
cise of human rights,238 which are both challenged by technology239 and realized through it.
Refuting technicity as a normative argument, this chapter confirms the hypothesis that 
the technocratic preference for code over law (implying that value- based norms are unnec-
essary for the process of developing new code and protocols and other normative instru-
ments) is wrong. Code is law in that it is normative, but not law in the sense of it supplanting 
norms. Code and protocols are man- made artifacts and as building blocks of programs 
(and algorithms) they influence how people use the internet and how it develops. Simply 
put, protocols “have politics” and must be assessed and treated like other norms.
Algorithms (coded steps undertaken in a certain order to solve a problem according to pre-
programmed rules) have emerged as important objects of normative scrutiny. Their design and 
use can interfere with human rights. Used by all internet companies and in most ICTs, in eve-
rything from smart home heating systems to predictive policing and regulating hate speech on 
social media, they can have substantial discriminatory effects and externalities. This study has 
identified two normative approaches to ensure more accountability of algorithms. First, at least 
one legal document, the EU General Data Protection Regulation, forces data controllers to pro-
vide subjects with an “explanation” of the logic of the algorithm using the data. Second, notions 
of algorithmic transparency and ethically aligned design have cumulated in the publication of 
the Principles for Accountable Algorithms, which formulated demands regarding the respon-
sibility, explainability, accuracy, fairness, and auditability of algorithms.
Having shown that the internet’s order of norm is a hybrid made of national, European, 
and international law, code, and technical standards, and that it is value- based normative 
choices that, in contrast to foundational myths of the internet, influence the normative de-
velopment of the internet, the need for first structuring principles of the order becomes ev-
ident. Let us thus turn now from the new normative instruments of algorithms to the more 
traditional one of international law240 and the newer but well- established norms of internet 
governance, two key foundational orders of the internet.
 237 Human Rights Council, Resolution 32/ 13, The promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the 
Internet, UN Doc. A/ HRC/ RES/ 32/ 13 of 18 July 2016.
 238 For this argument, see in more detail 2.3.2.
 239 Cf. Giovanni Sartor, “Human Rights and Information Technologies,” in Roger Brownsword, Eloise Scotford, 
and Karen Yeung (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Law, Regulation, and Technology (Oxford: OUP, 2017), 424– 50.
 240 Though their name goes back to the eighth century Persian mathematician Al- Khwārizmī, who was lat-
inized to Algoritmi. The first international treaty apparently also stems from that region: the 4500 bc political 
treaty between the city- states of Ebla and Abarsal (now Syria) (see Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, 8th edn. 
(Oxford: OUP, 2017), 10, note 50) and the 2100 bc border agreement between the rulers of two city- states in 
Mesopotamia (see Arthur Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations (New York: Macmillan, 1947), 8.
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 Law and Governance of the Internet
3.1 Foundational Rules
As technologies progress, the need for normation— either through social norms, through 
self- regulation, through co- regulation, or through state regulation— emerges. In light of the 
internet’s and its technological predecessors’ genesis as a project of, first, the US Department 
of Defense and, then, academia and the technical community,1 this regulatory need was 
answered first by decentralized, non- binding normative approaches that were nevertheless 
very effective because of the small circle of specialized norm producers who were largely 
identical with the norm recipients.
From 1969 onwards, suggestions for standards, rules, and procedures, called “Requests 
for comments,” were sent out by members of standard- setting bodies such as the IETF.2 
They were phrased as suggestions (requesting a comment), but through the authority of 
their authors and their acceptance through “rough consensus” procedures they developed 
quasi- obligatory power.3 “Rough consensus” was based on the “dominant view” of the con-
cerned group, deduced not from volume or persistence but on the basis of a “more general 
sense of agreement.”4
It was not until 1994, when the US National Science Foundation decided to contract out 
the management of the domain name system to a private party, that a comprehensive policy 
debate on the regulation of the internet arose. States and international organizations be-
came progressively involved as normative actors. In 1996, as a reaction to this trend, John 
Perry Barlow published his Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace and called 
upon the “Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel[,] ” to 
leave cyberspace “alone.” “You are not welcome among us,” he wrote, “[y]ou have no sov-
ereignty where we gather.”5 This was empirically untrue already in 1996; it is even more so 
today. As argued above, states need to exercise their sovereignty over situations emerging 
in cyberspace and have consistently done so, albeit with varying degrees of situational and 
technological awareness, legal sense, and political sensibility.
John Perry Barlow not only questioned the sovereignty of states to regulate where the 
“digital natives” gathered,6 but generally discounted the right of states to regulate what lay 
 1 On the history of the Internet, see Wolfgang Kleinwächter, “Multi- Stakeholder Internet Governance: The Role 
of Governments,” in Wolfgang Benedek, Veronika Bauer, and Matthias C. Kettemann (eds.), Internet Governance 
and the Information Society. Global Perspectives and European Dimensions (Utrecht: Eleven, 2008), 9– 29.
 2 See the RFC (Request for Comments) series, http:// www.rfc- editor.org. On the nature of the “Requests for 
comments,” see Heinz Schulte, RFCs und Internetstandards im Überblick (Kissing: Interest- Verlag, 2004).
 3 Cf. RFC 2418— IETF Working Group Guidelines (1998), https:// tools.ietf.org/ search/ rfc2418, delineating the 
“Working Group Guidelines” and providing for the principle of “rough consensus” as a decision- making paradigm 
in actor.
 4 RFC 7282— On Consensus and Humming in the IETF (2014), https:// tools.ietf.org/ html/ rfc7282.
 5 John Perry Barlow, “A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace,” Davos, February 8, 1996, http:// www.
actlab.utexas.edu/ ~captain/ cyber.decl.indep.html.
 6 For an early use of the term “digital native,” see Marc Prensky, “Digital Natives, Digital Immigrants,” On 
The Horizon 9 (October 2001), 5; a more comprehensive study is provided in John Palfrey and Urs Gasser, Born 
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beyond their “borders.” This critique of the effectiveness of state regulation in times of glob-
alization is not original. As Gerd Winter notes, in today’s polity the state is hampered by 
borders in exercising its sovereignty effectively over issues that happen beyond them but 
impact its citizens. States have called upon the “sorcerer’s apprentice” of the global economy 
but have given up their control (“Meisterschaft”) over him. They are only needed to “assuage 
the social costs and to pacify social frustration.”7
This study makes the case that it is rather international law that is the legal framework 
regulating what lies beyond the borders of any one state, including the frame and founda-
tions for decisions related to internet- related public policy issues. It is, further, international 
law that manages the global common interest in the internet’s functionality and, through 
its norms (including e.g. a right to universal access for all), promotes both technological 
progress collectively and self- actualization individually (which also works against social 
frustration). However, as already shown in the previous chapter, the normative order of the 
internet contains national legal rules, international legal rules, and transnational normative 
arrangements. While the code and standards discussed in the previous chapter form part 
of the normative “tertium” (that is norms that do not belong clearly to either the interna-
tional or the national legal order), this section analyzes the applicable rules of international 
law and the norms of internet governance, as they relate to the internet and the protection 
of states and societies from the dangers emanating from its use and development. The hy-
pothesis tested in this chapter is that international legal rules exist that can form a founda-
tional part of the normative order of the internet and that no new “international law of the 
internet” needs to be created.
The internet was never ruled anarchically, that is through spontaneous non- centrally 
enforced ordering,8 though some elements of anarchy persist, including the focus on vol-
untariness, community- consent, and a quick, partly non- planned emergence of rules. As 
Jeremy Malcolm analyzes, anarchistic ordering of the internet would be “consistent” with 
both the internet’s principles on a technical level and “consonant” with “many of them on 
a cultural level.”9 But technical consistency and cultural consonancy (or consonancy with 
the culture of (non- )regulation formally, and materially with the (non- )regulatory purpose) 
are not enough to suppose that an anarchistic system- structure for the internet would be 
preferable. The spontaneous emergence of anarchistic structures and their fluidity make it 
difficult to provide for participation of as many actor groups as possible which are necessary 
for ensuring legitimacy. Effectiveness of rules further cannot be guaranteed in light of the 
voluntary nature of actor involvement in anarchistic structures and the spontaneous emer-
gence (or non- emergence) of norms.10
The purpose of regulating the internet (by international law) remains clear: the internet’s 
functionality is essential to areas as diverse as the international economy, the transnational 
Digital: Understanding the First Generation of Digital Natives (New York: Basic Books, 2008), http:// borndigital-
book.com.
 7 Gerd Winter, “Transnationale informelle Regulierung: Gestalt, Effekte und Rechtstaatlichkeit,” in Gralf- Peter 
Calliess (ed.), Transnationales Recht. Stand und Perspektiven (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014), 95– 112 (96– 7).
 8 Though some elements of spontaneous ordering are present in certain internet subcultures. Cf., for an over-
view of the anarchic elements of Internet Governance, Jeremy Malcolm, Multi- Stakeholder Governance and the 
Internet Governance Forum (Perth: Terminus Press, 2008), 191 et seq.
 9 Ibid., 191.
 10 Cf. Ibid. 194– 5.
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communications infrastructure, national defense, and human rights protection. But states 
alone cannot effectively regulate the internet as it transcends their territorial sovereignty 
and many of its key resources are not controlled by states. Overreaching regulatory en-
deavors by states and state- sponsored cyber- espionage, such as China’s in 2015– 2016,11 or 
information (or influence) operations, such as Russia’s in 2016– 2017,12 can endanger the 
stability and functionality of the internet (on a factual level and on a trust level13) as a whole. 
Therefore, before endeavoring to develop a normative order of the internet, the interna-
tional law of the internet and the regulatory approaches through internet governance need 
to be examined.
After clarifying the applicability of international law to the internet (3.2), the rules relating 
to the internet will be explored in section 3.3. The “softer” regulatory approach of internet 
governance, including its practice of involving all actors in order to legitimize normative 
outcomes (“multistakeholderism”), will be examined in section 3.4. Their interaction and 
mutual reinforcement will be the topic of section 3.5. Their common and individual short-
falls lead to regulatory lacunae and normative fractures. Their identification and exposition 
will begin this study’s analysis of forces of disorder, which will be the main topic of the next 
chapter (4) on the normative disorder on the internet. But first, this chapter focuses on the 
traditional orders on the internet, international law, and internet governance.
3.2 Applicability of International Law
3.2.1 From Disorganized Normativity to the “Ius Necessarium”
International law plays an important role in this study and as a foundational body of rules 
within the normative order of the internet. The military– academic history of the internet 
and the private sector- led development of key architectural elements (through government- 
financed projects and on government grants) have contributed to a state of disorganized 
normativity. Private actors exercise substantial normative influence both on the macro- 
level (by coordinating critical internet resources, for a long time on behalf of a single state 
steward (the United States of America (USA)), now on behalf of the “global multistake-
holder community,” that is all relevant actors14) and on the micro- level (by setting the terms 
of services of the private spaces where the overwhelming majority of internet users are ac-
tive and with regard to the services they use).
 11 Even though US President Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping signed a Cybersecurity Agreement 
in 2015 after the US Department of Justice indicted five Chinese Army officers for economic espionage (see 
Gary Brown and Christopher D. Yung, “Evaluating the US- China Cybersecurity Agreement,” The Diplomat, 
January 19, 2017, https:// thediplomat.com/ 2017/ 01/ evaluating- the- us- china- cybersecurity- agreement- part- 1- 
 the- us- approach- to- cyberspace).
 12 Scott Shane, “The Fake Americans Russia Created to Influence the Election,” New York Times, September 
7, 2017, https:// www.nytimes.com/ 2017/ 09/ 07/ us/ politics/ russia- facebook- twitter- election.html (describing a 
“cyberarmy of counterfeit Facebook and Twitter accounts, a legion of Russian- controlled impostors” and arguing 
that Russia turned Facebook and Twitter into “engines of deception and propaganda”).
 13 Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, The right to 
privacy in the digital age, UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 27/ 37 of 30 June 2014.
 14 ICANN, Stewardship of IANA Functions Transitions to Global Internet Community as Contract with U.S. 
Government Ends, October 1, 2016, https:// www.icann.org/ news/ announcement- 2016- 10- 01- en (announcing 
that this date marked “the transition of the coordination and management of the Internet’s unique identifiers to the 
private- sector” within a multistakeholder model of Internet governance validated by the community).
 
 
62 Law and Governance of the Internet
Over the years a body of norms and corollary normative expectations has emerged that 
constitutes one of few international orders regulating the administration and develop-
ment of an issue of common interest without a comprehensive, systematic, and planned 
international legal foundation in the form of a treaty. The normative approach to the 
internet thus varies greatly from approaches of regulating and safeguarding other issues of 
common interest, sometimes metaphorically compared to the internet such as the air, the 
sea(bed), or polar regions15 or even more technical ones such as disarmament, nuclear non- 
proliferation, postal services, international rivers, or telecommunication services— all of 
which are based on one or many international treaties with (mostly) Secretariats and (often) 
decision- making bodies.
Regulating the internet may be complex with intersecting responsibilities in different 
policy arenas lying with different actors on multiple normative levels, from ensuring the 
internet’s addressing space to safeguarding free expression online, from realizing the 
development- orientation of the information society to regulating platforms and search 
engines, from limiting the power of algorithms to fighting cybercrime.16 But the real dif-
ference, it is submitted, to other regimes lies in the intensity, depth, and breadth of trans-
formations that the internet has brought with it for all areas of human sociality. Simply put, 
traditional regimes such as the law of non- proliferation or the law of outer space may ask 
one big question (How to safeguard the world from nuclear destruction? How to ensure 
that space is not used as a military staging post?), but the regulation of the internet leads to 
many smaller questions that impact the daily lives of humans, companies, and states more 
intensively.
While, for example, the international climate regime relies on a key treaty, the United 
Nations Paris Agreement (2015), which drew from the normative success of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992), the internet has no such cen-
tral normative framework, nor is it likely to have one in the foreseeable future. This study, 
however, shows that a normative framework for the regulation and governance of the 
internet already exists, which limits state interventions,17 delineates rights and obligations 
of companies, and ensures a position for internet users. International law provides the foil 
against which the normative tensions between global and regional normative endeavors, 
binding rules and soft law arrangements, self- regulated and state- regulated spaces, and 
public and private normative orders can be resolved.
International law protects the security, stability, robustness, resilience, and functionality 
of the internet— its integrity— as a matter of common interest.18 International law helps de-
termine under which conditions rules crystallize into international legal duties and which 
remain soft law (and international legal research then needs to identify whether these 
 15 International environmental law is also often cited as an example of a regime where international legal rules 
took time to develop. Cf. Andreas Zimmermann, “International Law and ‘Cyber Space’,” ESIL Reflections 3 (2014) 
1, http:// www.esil- sedi.eu/ node/ 481,4.
 16 On cybercrime and security, see David S. Wall, “Crime, Security, and Information Communication 
Technologies: The Changing Cybersecurity Threat Landscape and Its Implications for Regulation and Policing,” in 
Roger Brownsword, Eloise Scotford, and Karen Yeung (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Law, Regulation, and Technology 
(Oxford: OUP, 2017), 1075– 96.
 17 Cf. Anne Peters, “Realizing Utopia as A Scholarly Endeavour,” EJIL 24 (2013), 533– 52 (551) (identifying a 
similar problem with regard to international law as a whole: “Because of the openness of international norms [ . . . ] 
states will tend to assert rules which are in their favour [ . . . ] or they will do what they want”. Purely positive anal-
ysis cannot help. Peters therefore counsels a normative approach, similar to the one employed here.
 18 See 2.3.
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conditions are met). International law empowers individuals by ensuring that they can ex-
ercise their human rights online and obliges them not to violate international rules prohib-
iting, for example, online calls to genocide. International law allocates duties to states (e.g. 
regarding the internet’s stability), but it also empowers them vis- à- vis internet companies 
by demonstrating their key role in safeguarding the rights of their citizens. International 
law finally obliges companies to respect international legal rules, especially in the field of 
human rights, through a long normative tradition of turning corporate social responsibility 
into duties to respect human rights,19 including rights to data protection and privacy in out-
side jurisdictions.
Early reports by international organizations already addressed the fact that the internet 
(or “cyberspace”) challenged traditional concepts of ensuring rights. An experts’ study for 
UNESCO found in 1998 that “[c] yberspace calls into question frontiers, which it bypasses, 
and the state laws, which it challenges.”20 It is true that the internet challenges national laws, 
but so do other forces such as globalization without invalidating them. In addition, it is in-
ternational law that has developed for this purpose: to provide globally equitable solutions 
for normative challenges beyond frontiers and in cases where national laws, alone and in 
their interaction, may be difficult to apply.
If a brief tangent is permitted: The question of why international law should regulate af-
fairs between nations (or, in a more modern version, international actors) is one of the more 
interesting posed by international legal philosophy because of the many possible answers.21 
According to Jellinek the reason is to be found in the “objectiven Principe”22 that the nature 
of living conditions demands legal normation based on a common “Rechtsanschauung.” 
Put differently: international law exists because it is necessary, a “ius necessarium.”23 This 
necessity of international relations to be regulated applies to the internet as well: its actors 
need an international law- based normative order that stabilizes normative expectations and 
allows for a critique of developments in light of the values enshrined by international law.
Already Immanuel Kant saw world peace as dependent on the juridification of interna-
tional relations. He, however, saw international law’s function as complementing, rather 
than evolving into, cosmopolitan law.24 Taking the last step was left to Jürgen Habermas.25 
Though we are not actually in a “global war for internet governance”26 and even if the con-
troversies between the US and Russia on internet regulation— starting at ITU’s World 
 19 Cf. Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary- General on the issue of human rights and trans-
national corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 17/ 31 of 
21 March 2011.
 20 UNESCO, Report of the Experts’ Meeting on Cyberspace Law, Monte Carlo, September 29– 30, 1998, http:// 
unesdoc.unesco.org/ images/ 0011/ 001163/ 116300e.pdf, para. 10. UNESCO, confident about its role in interna-
tional affairs, had its experts ask whether the UN General Assembly should “approve the establishment of an in-
ternational legal framework or system for cyberspace under the aegis of UNESCO” (ibid., 9). The UN General 
Assembly did not.
 21 For some of them, see the contributions in Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas, The Philosophy of 
International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2010).
 22 Georg Jellinek, Die rechtliche Natur der Staatsverträge. Ein Beitrag zur Juristischen Construction des 
Völkerrechts (Vienna: Alfred Hölder, 1880), 43.
 23 Georg Dahm, Jost Delbrück, and Rüdiger Wolfrum, Völkerrecht, Vol. I/ 3 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2002), 41, 43.
 24 See Amanda Perreau- Suassine, “Immanuel Kant on International Law,” in Samantha Besson and John 
Tasioulas, The Philosophy of International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2010), 53– 75 (72).
 25 Jürgen Habermas, “Hat die Konstitutionalisierung des Völkerrechts noch eine Chance?,” in Jürgen Habermas, 
Der gespaltene Westen. Kleine politische Schriften X (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2004), 142.
 26 Cf. Laura DeNardis, The Global War for Internet Governance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014).
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Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT) Summit in 2012 and contin-
uing into the influence over information operations in the US elections in 2016— have not 
started a new Cold War about the internet, there are substantial conflicts of interests that 
need to be resolved and regulatory challenges for actors at different levels of the interna-
tional spectrum that need to be met.
States are not able to regulate through national law a global socio- technological fa-
cility as the internet. There are four main reasons for this: first, the internet has become 
a critical infrastructural resource and critical for other critical infrastructural resources 
(as has been shown supra, in 2.2); second, the internet, and its regulation and governance 
(and constitutionalization), has itself become an issue of global common interest and the 
protection of its integrity is necessary for safeguarding other global common interests (as 
has been demonstrated, supra, in 2.3); third, the “embedded politics of technical archi-
tecture”27 do not allow for ex post qualification in light of 192 (and more) national legal 
systems— one normative system needs to establish the values to be enshrined in archi-
tecture or criticize existing architecture in light of these values; fourth, the privatization 
of internet management functions and the delegation of aspects of state tasks such as law 
enforcement to internationally active private sector entities have put states in a position 
where only coordinated international actions according to internationally accepted prin-
ciples can set necessary limits.
To recapitulate: essential internet points of control— addresses, root servers, IXPs, but 
also standards— are coordinated and managed by private entities that are not accountable 
through traditional democratic processes with a prima facie innate legitimacy- conferral 
function in the Habermasian sense.28 At the same time, protecting the security, stability, 
robustness, resilience, and functionality (thus: the integrity) of the internet lies in the global 
common interest. If a good or entity or facility is thus marked, international law is not only 
a possible but rather a necessary normative regulator.
3.2.2 Toward a Consensus
International law is thus the only normative order that can deal systemically with the va-
riety of actors relevant for the internet’s use and development. Only international law can 
coherently deal with companies and NGOs (non- governmental organizations), states, 
individuals, and international organizations on a local, regional, and global level— and al-
though the actors differ and the normative geometries are varied, what these situations have 
in common is an international (transborder) setting. Internet “controllers,” in a wide sense, 
such as ICANN and key Internet Exchange Points, social networks, and search engines, 
exercise (limited) (semi- or quasi- )public authority under conditions of internationality 
and relative normative instability, especially when private regimes and public law collide. 
We must determine the frame (especially for states) underlying the rule of these actors 
through international law. As national democratic normative processes are determined and 
 27 Ibid., 2.
 28 Jürgen Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen 
Rechtsstaats (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1992/ 1998), 369, 492. Cf. among many others, Jeffrey Flynn, “Communicative 
Power in Habermas’s Theory of Democracy,” European Journal of Political Theory (2004), 433– 54.
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overshadowed by technologist decision- making, international law is the only normative 
order that can, as a legitimate order, qualify rules on, and rules of, the internet and provide 
states with foundational principles for normative and factual action impacting the internet.
Already during the first phase of the United Nations World Summit on the Information 
Society (WSIS) in 2003, states expressed their
common desire and commitment to build a people- centred, inclusive and development- 
oriented Information Society, [  . . .  ] enabling individuals, communities and peoples to 
achieve their full potential in promoting their sustainable development and improving 
their quality of life, premised on the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations and respecting fully and upholding the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.29
The commitment in principle by states to development (MDGs), human rights (Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)), and international law (the principles and purposes 
of the UN Charter) in the process of developing and using the internet has a long pedigree.30 
But no single body of norms can be easily identified as being, by itself, able to lay the nor-
mative foundations. Yet international law has the best claim to being a foundational order. 
The 2013 Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of 
Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (GGE) built 
on the Geneva and Tunis documents by confirming that applying norms derived from “ex-
isting international law relevant to the use of ICTs by States is an essential measure to reduce 
risks to international peace, security and stability.” International law, and “in particular the 
Charter of the United Nations, is applicable and is essential to maintaining peace and sta-
bility and promoting an open, secure, peaceful and accessible ICT environment.”31
Leading studies of the GGE 2013 report agreed.32 The GGE 2013 is an important report 
because until that date some states, including powerful states with a strong and developed 
internet with local companies offering alternative services to Silicon Valley’s, had previously 
been reluctant to formally acknowledge the premise of “offline international law” being ap-
plicable to online forums. With the agreement in the 2013 report that, first, international 
law, and in particular the UN Charter, is applicable, second, it is essential for world peace, 
and third, international law is important for human development (via an enabling internet), 
a global consensus was reached,33 even though some states, such as China, adopted a very 
sovereignty- oriented interpretation.34 Building on this consensus, the 201535 report of the 
 29 WSIS, Declaration of Principles, WSIS- 03/ GENEVA/ DOC/ 4- E, 12 December 2003, para. 1 (emphasis 
added).
 30 WSIS, Tunis Commitment, WSIS- 05/ TUNIS/ DOC/ 7- E, 18 November 2005, para. 2.
 31 Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and 
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, UN Doc. A/ 68/ 98 of 24 June 2013, para. 19.
 32 See Michael N. Schmitt and Liis Vihul, “The Nature of International Law Cyber Norms,” Tallinn Paper No. 
5 (NATO CCD COE), 2014, 16; Katharina Ziolkowski, “General Principles of International Law as Applicable in 
Cyberspace,” in Katharina Ziolkowski (ed.), Peacetime Regime for State Activities in Cyberspace. International Law, 
International Relations and Diplomacy (Tallinn: NATO CCD COE Publications, 2013), 135– 84 (151– 2).
 33 Michael N. Schmitt and Liis Vihul, “The Nature of International Law Cyber Norms” (2015), https:// ccdcoe.
org/ uploads/ 2018/ 10/ Tallinn- Paper- No- 5- Schmitt- and- Vihul.pdf, 12.
 34 Cf. Adam Segal, “Chinese Cyber Diplomacy in a New Era of Uncertainty,” Hoover Institution, Aegis Paper 
Series No. 1703, June 2, 2017, https:// www.hoover.org/ research/ chinese- cyber- diplomacy- new- era- uncertainty.
 35 United Nations, Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of 
International Security, Report of the Secretary General, A/ 70/ 174 of July 22, 2015, http:// www.un.org/ ga/ search/ 
view_ doc.asp?symbol=A/ 70/ 174 (hereinafter: “GGE report (2015)”).
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GGE again confirmed that international law, the UN Charter, and international legal prin-
ciples apply to the internet,36 stating inter alia that the international community aspired to 
regulate the internet in a peaceful manner “for the common good of mankind”:37 “[t] he 
adherence by States to international law, in particular their Charter obligations, is an essen-
tial framework for their actions in their use of ICTs and to promote an open, secure, stable, 
accessible and peaceful ICT environment.”38
The appearance of a global consensus on the subject is only somewhat tampered by the 
failure of the GGE to conclude with a third consensus report in 2017. This breakdown was 
caused mainly by certain states (including China and Russia) arguing that explicitly ap-
plying the UN Charter’s provisions regarding use of force to cyberspace before technical 
means of attribution delivered more reliable results would lead to the militarization of cy-
berspace. Other states wanted to include references to the application of countermeasures 
even in situations falling below the “use of force” threshold.39 Both groups consciously 
ignored previous firm commitments in the WSIS documents, and the 2013 and 2015 GGE 
reports, which all included references to the applicability on the internet of the UN Charter, 
in fact “in particular the UN Charter.” It should be noted, however, that already in the run- 
up to the 2015 report China, Russia, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Belarus had opposed language 
favored by the US to include an explicit reference to Article 51 with its authorization of self- 
defense against armed attacks.40 Nevertheless, the 2013 and 2015 reports (which contain 
the same basic commitments to the applicability and relevance of international law for the 
internet) and the apparent consensus, in the 2017 draft, to “stabilizing measures, including 
voluntary, non- binding norms of responsible State behavior in cyberspace and confidence- 
building measures”41 are a sound basis for future normative developments and a good indi-
cation of state normative preferences, if not yet clearly their opinio iuris.
3.2.3 Old Rules or New Rules?
Andreas Zimmermann, in a brief study of international law and “cyber space” (his quota-
tion marks), argues that, as “with other novel areas of international law which have devel-
oped in the last decennials [ . . . ] only time will tell whether the international community 
of States will be able and willing to over time come up with specific and adequate rules of 
 36 Ibid., para. 26.
 37 Ibid., para. 28 (c).
 38 Ibid., para. 25.
 39 Cf. Adam Segal, “The Development of Cyber Norms at the United Nations Ends in Deadlock. Now What?” 
Council on Foreign Relations, June 29, 2017, https:// www.cfr.org/ blog/ development- cyber- norms- united- 
nations- ends- deadlock- now- what; Arun M. Sukumar, “The UN GGE Failed. Is International Law in Cyberspace 
Doomed As Well?,” Lawfare, July 4, 2017, https:// lawfareblog.com/ un- gge- failed- international- law- cyberspace- 
doomed- well; and Ann Väljataga, “Back to Square One? The Fifth UN GGE Fails to Submit a Conclusive 
Report at the UN General Assembly,” NATO CCDCOE Incyder database, https:// ccdcoe.org/ incyder- articles/ 
back- to- square- one- the- fifth- un- gge- fails- to- submit- a- conclusive- report- at- the- un- general- assembly .
 40 Eneken Tikk and Mika Kerttunen, “The Alleged Demise of the UN GGE: An Autopsy and Eulogy,” Cyber 
Policy Institute (2017), http:// cpi.ee/ wp- content/ uploads/ 2017/ 12/ 2017- Tikk- Kerttunen- Demise- of- the-  
UN- GGE- 2017- 12- 17- ET.pdf.
 41 Michele G. Markoff, Deputy Coordinator for Cyber Issues, US State Department, “Explanation of Position 
at the Conclusion of the 2016- 2017 UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Developments in the Field of 
Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security,” June 23, 2017, https:// www.state.
gov/ s/ cyberissues/ releasesandremarks/ 272175.htm.
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international law applicable to ‘cyber space’.”42 As the following sections show, there have 
been few new rule- making endeavors. Even in their absence, international lawyers have 
the “fallback position” of relying on existing (therefore not internet- specific), general (thus 
rather vague) rules of international law. But this is not a problem that is particular to the 
internet. As Zimmermann notes, “we have previously seen the very same development in 
other areas, international environmental law again being a particularly relevant example 
at hand before specific treaty regimes were established.”43 This is possible, though unlikely, 
given the current international normative climate regarding the internet.
The internet exhibits several of these unique features (including its impact on our daily 
lives, the asynchronicity of information flows and threats, non- temporality, and network 
effects), to which general rules of international law may not be normatively convincing an-
swers. Yet already GGE underlined in both reports that, taking into account “the complexity 
and unique attributes of ICTs,”44 additional international legal norms may need to be de-
veloped. Further specificities include the central role of private actors in managing both 
critical resources and communicative spaces (platforms) and the invocation of processes 
of normative deliberation that involve all relevant actors in their respective roles. The role 
and responsibilities of actors in international law, and international law more generally, are 
influenced by the development of the world in which it exists: “[T] he development of inter-
national law,” the International Court of Justice (ICJ) wrote in Reparation for Injuries, “has 
been influenced by the requirements of international life.”45 Today’s international life is a 
“life 2.0,”46 as the often- used indication of a superior version of an original idea, concept, or 
program47 (version 2.0 follows version 1.x) would make us believe.
But we do not need an “international law 2.0.” The emergence of the internet and the 
pervasiveness of ICTs in today’s societies have not fundamentally changed or challenged 
international law. Recall the WSIS documents referring to the importance of international 
law and the commitments by both GGE reports in 2013 and 2015. Applying existing and 
developing new rules in light of changing technological realities, economic developments, 
and social mores speaks to the essence of a dynamic international legal order: its ability to 
be normatively responsive with a view to a certain finality. Treaties continue to regulate state 
behavior, but now with regard to the internet. General principles of international law still 
apply, online as offline. Foundational tenets of international law, such as sovereign equality 
and territorial sovereignty, are still applicable, but they are challenged by phenomena such 
as cloud computing, anonymity online, and the difficulties of enforcing laws tied to corpo-
real phenomena in cyberspace. States have always exercised sovereignty over their territo-
ries, with small restrictions. They now do so with regard to the internet’s physical artifacts 
within their territory, such as servers with cloud computing services, and apply their laws to 
human action on the internet— be it active or passive use from the area within each state’s 
jurisdiction and control.
 42 Andreas Zimmermann, “International Law and ‘Cyber Space’,” ESIL Reflections 3 (2014) 1, http:// www.esil- 
sedi.eu/ node/ 481, 4, 6.
 43 Ibid.
 44 GGE (2015), 11.
 45 ICJ, Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion of April 11, 1949), 
ICJ Reports (1949), 174.
 46 Cf. Jason Spingarn- Koff (dir.), “Life 2.0,” documentary (100 minutes) (2010), http:// life2movie.com.
 47 Oxford Living Dictionaries, s.v. “2.0,” https:// en.oxforddictionaries.com/ definition/ 2.0.
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The internet’s physicality is often underestimated. It is tied to geography and state bor-
ders, thus falling more clearly under states’ jurisdiction to prescribe and even more clearly 
under their respective jurisdictions to enforce. Yet physical resources, such as cables, data 
centers, and Internet Exchange Points, are necessary for global connectivity. States can and 
do censor the internet, oblige internet intermediaries to delete information, divulge cus-
tomer data, or simply proceed to shut down the internet. The European Commission iden-
tified this “tension between an international internet and national jurisdictions” and called 
for more “thorough reflection on how existing rules apply on the internet.”48 Reflection and 
detection of lacunae is necessary— but the rules apply.
3.3 International Law of the Internet
3.3.1 Definition
The German equivalent of international law of the internet— Internetvölkerrecht or 
Völkerrecht des Netzes49— has been defined as “the common denominator for all rules of 
public international law pertaining to the functioning and use of the internet.”50 This study 
will adapt this definition in the following way: international law of the internet encompasses 
all (existing and emerging) rules of international law that regulate the evolution and use of 
the internet. Including a rule is an epistemic exercise in evaluative systematization.51 Rules 
can belong to different international legal regimes; and general principles of international 
law are relevant for all regimes, including an international law of the internet. The concept 
is thus narrower than internet governance, though it is determinative for it and influences 
its legitimacy, and much narrower than the concept of the normative order of the internet, 
though being foundational for it.
Any study must begin with those rules of international law applicable to all subject 
areas. These are the rules enumerated as sources of international law in Article 38 (1) of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice: (a) international conventions, (b) international 
custom, (c) general principles of law recognized by civilized nations, and— as a subsidiary 
means of establishing the law— (d) judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly 
qualified publicists of the various nations. Already the practice of the ICJ with regard to 
 48 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Region, Internet Policy and Governance. Europe’s role 
in shaping the future of Internet Governance, COM(2014) 72 final of 12 February 2014, 10.
 49 Cf. for recent use, Ingolf Pernice, “Die Verfassung der Internetgesellschaft:  Zur Rolle von Staat und 
Verfassung im Zuge der digitalen Revolution,” in Alexander Blankenagel (ed.), Den Verfassungsstaat nachdenken. 
Eine Geburtstagsgabe (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2014) 171– 208, (HIIG Discussion Paper Series No. 2017- 
03, https:// ssrn.com/ abstract=2964926) and Ingolf Pernice, “Vom Völkerrecht des Netzes zur Verfassung des 
Internets: Privacy und Digitale Sicherheit im Zeichen eines schrittweisen Paradigmenwechsels (International Law 
of the Net and the Constitution of the Internet: Privacy and Cybersecurity in the Light of a Progressive Change of 
Paradigm),” HIIG Discussion Paper Series No. 2017- 02 (2017), https:// ssrn.com/ abstract=2959257.
 50 See Robert Uerpmann- Wittzack, “Principles of International Internet Law,” German Law Journal 11 (2010), 
1245– 63, http:// www.germanlawjournal.com/ index.php?pageID=11&artID=1293, 1245. Further, see Robert 
Uerpmann- Wittzack, “Internetvölkerrecht,” Archiv des Völkerrechts 47 (2009) 3, 261– 83. See Joanna Kulesza, 
International Internet Law (London: Routledge, 2012).
 51 Cf. Matthias C. Kettemann, Völkerrecht in Zeiten des Netzes: Perspektiven auf den effektiven Schutz von Grund- 
und Menschenrechten in der Informationsgesellschaft zwischen Völkerrecht, Europarecht und Staatsrecht (Bonn/ 
Berlin: Friedrich- Ebert- Stiftung, 2015).
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general principles of law is inconsistent and difficult to systemize.52 To add another layer of 
complexity, there exists another source of international legal obligations: general principles 
of international law. These sources will now be looked at in turn.
3.3.2 International Conventions
3.3.2.1  Direct Protection
There are currently no international non- regime- specific conventions enshrining the pro-
tection of and from the internet and its key resources or establishing institutions for the 
management of the dangers for the international community from the development and 
use of the internet. Attempts to instigate the development of a Cybersecurity Treaty or of 
an “Internet United Nations” have been unsuccessful.53 Attempts to broaden the remit of 
ITU’s International Telecommunication Regulations (ITRs) in 201254 to include technolog-
ical aspects necessary for running the internet met with substantial resistance and led to a 
stalemate at ITU’s 2012 WCIT- 12 Summit in Tunis.
Sovereignty- oriented states, including Algeria, China, Egypt, Russia, Saudi Arabia, 
Sudan, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) had called for state- based mechanisms to 
manage key internet resources, such as the DNS via the reformed ITRs, and wanted to en-
shrine national oversight over certain internet segments. They suggested including lan-
guage in the reformed ITRs to the effect of giving states “equal rights to manage the internet, 
including in regard to the allotment, assignment and reclamation of internet numbering, 
naming, addressing and identification resources and to support for the operation and de-
velopment of basic internet infrastructure,” including “the sovereign right [ . . . ] to regulate 
the national internet segment.”55
In its announcement regarding the transition of US stewardship of changes in the root 
zone file and its management, the US government confirmed that it would “not accept a pro-
posal that replaces the NTIA role with a government- led or an inter- governmental organ-
ization solution.”56 This, coupled with a commitment to the transition of IANA functions 
to the “global multistakeholder community” excludes a convention- based mechanism with 
state parties agreeing on the administration of IANA functions through a treaty- organ. By 
2016, the transition had been successfully made and neither a treaty- based global alterna-
tive administration of the internet’s public core nor the creation of a dedicated organization 
like a World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) for the internet is realistically on 
the normative horizon.
 52 Rüdiger Wolfrum, “General International Law (Principles, Rules and Standards),” in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed.), 
Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (MPEPIL) (Oxford: OUP, 2008) (December 2010) [online], 
para. 20.
 53 Calling on states to develop a treaty- based international law of cybersecurity: Kubo Macak, “From Cyber 
Norms to Cyber Rules: Re- engaging States as Law- makers,” Leiden Journal of International Law (2017), 877– 99.
 54 ITU, International Telecommunication Regulations, http:// www.itu.int/ ITU- T/ itr.
 55 Russia, UAE, China, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Sudan, and Egypt, Proposal for the Work of the Conference 
[WCIT- 12], ITU Doc. DT- X of 5 December 2012, WCIT12/ 27(Rev.1)- E, § 3A.2 and 3A.3, http:// files.wcitleaks.
org/ public/ Merged%20UAE%20081212.pdf.
 56 NTIA, NTIA Announces Intent to Transition Key Internet Domain Name Functions, March 14, 2014, http:// 
www.ntia.doc.gov/ press- release/ 2014/ ntia- announces- intent- transition- key- internet- domain- name- functions.
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3.3.2.2  Indirect Protection
The internet is offered indirect protection through sectoral treaties, including chiefly in-
ternational human rights conventions. This protection also extends to protection from 
(mis)uses of the internet. Globally, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR)57 has been identified as a key instrument for indirect protection of and from the 
internet, by protecting the enabling function of the internet, as a precondition for exer-
cising rights contained therein, including especially its rights to privacy (Article 17 ICCPR) 
and free expression (Article 19 ICCPR).58 Within Europe, the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) and its guarantee of freedom of expression (Article 10 ECHR), as 
interpreted by the ECtHR, plays a special role. Both indirect approaches to protecting the 
integrity of the internet as necessary for the exercise of human rights (indirectly) rely upon 
internet access. They also protect from misuses of the internet, by excluding internet- based 
pervasive communications surveillance (privacy) and setting clear limits for online speech.
According to the Governmental Group of Experts for the second edition of the Tallinn 
Manual, this leading analysis of the applicability of international law to cyberspace confirms 
that states must not only respect human rights, but also protect them, on the internet and 
from the internet.59 Apart from conventional human rights protection, individuals enjoy 
customary international human rights protection “with respect to their cyber- related activ-
ities.”60 States need to respect, protect, and implement these rights. This implies protecting 
the public core of the internet and protecting the rights of persons under their jurisdiction 
or control (and also the states’ own critical internet resources and information and commu-
nication structures necessary for exercising all necessary state functions under the condi-
tions of the information society) from the dangers emanating from the internet.
Without access to the internet (through relevant infrastructure, including devices) or 
access to internet content people cannot realize their human rights online.61 Since 2012, 
the Human Rights Council, in its biannual resolution on promoting, protecting, and 
enjoying human rights on the internet, has called upon states to “to promote and facilitate 
access to the internet.”62 In its first resolution it relied, inter alia, on a key 2011 report by 
the then- UN Special Rapporteur for freedom of expression, Frank La Rue, who established 
internet access as a condition to exercise freedoms connected to information and com-
munication: “the internet has become a key means by which individuals can exercise their 
 57 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA Resolution 2200A (XXI), 21 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 
16) at 52, UN Doc. A/ 6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force March 23, 1976.
 58 Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, The right to 
privacy in the digital age, UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 27/ 37 of 30 June 2014.
 59 Arguing that states have largely ignored the rules contained in the Tallinn Manual: Dan Efrony and Yuval 
Shany, “A Rule Book on the Shelf? Tallinn Manual 2.0 on Cyber Operations and Subsequent State Practice,” 
Hebrew University of Jerusalem Legal Research Paper No. 18- 22, https:// papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/ papers.cfm?ab-
stract_ id=3172743.
 60 Michael N. Schmitt (ed.), Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2017), 181.
 61 Cf. Matthias C. Kettemann, Völkerrecht in Zeiten des Netzes: Perspektiven auf den effektiven Schutz von Grund- 
und Menschenrechten in der Informationsgesellschaft zwischen Völkerrecht, Europarecht und Staatsrecht (Bonn/ 
Berlin: Friedrich- Ebert- Stiftung, 2015), 30 et seq.
 62 Human Rights Council, Resolution 20/ 8, The promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the 
Internet, UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 20/ 8 of 16 July 2012; Human Rights Council, Resolution 26/ 13, The promotion, protec-
tion and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet, UN Doc. A/ HRC/ RES/ 26/ 13 of 20 June 2014; Human Rights 
Council, Resolution 32/ 13, The promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet, UN Doc. 
A/ HRC/ RES/ 32/ 13 of 18 July 2016.
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right to freedom of opinion and expression.”63 Freedom of expression is also an “enabler” 
of other rights online, including economic, social, and cultural rights, like the right to edu-
cation (using the internet to gain knowledge) or civil and political rights, such as freedom 
of assembly.64
Both dimensions of access— through infrastructure and to content— are protected by 
international law. International law also, by protecting access, protects the technolog-
ical premises of access, namely the public core of the internet and its integrity. States have 
started to implement the duty to provide internet access either by explicitly guaranteeing a 
right to access (under certain conditions) or by having a right to access, at least “in theory” 
through dogmatic construction.65 Explicit codification is not a precondition for the exist-
ence of a right. The international legal duties provide the framework within which states 
must guarantee access; within that framework they are free.66
Realizing the right to internet access in practice is also important for human develop-
ment. In the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the world’s states have committed to 
ensuring universal and affordable internet access in developing countries by 2020.67 In view 
of this, states must also act as part of their obligation under the right to development. The 
Human Rights Committee confirms this approach by writing, in its General Comment No. 
34 to Art. 19, that “[s] tates parties should take all necessary steps to foster the independence 
of these new media and to ensure access of individuals thereto.”68
Dominant technology companies have a graduated human rights responsibility in terms 
of the right of access as a prerequisite for the exercise of other human rights, which is expli-
cated in the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights:  Implementing the United 
Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework.69 In particular, they must not under-
mine access to the internet through entrepreneurial activity or contribute to it through their 
products.
Another avenue of indirect protection is freedom of expression. In its biannual resolu-
tion on human rights on the internet in 2012, 2014, and 2016, the Human Rights Council 
affirmed, with references to Articles 19 of the UDHR and the ICCPR, the special role of 
freedom of expression online:  “the same rights that people have offline must also be 
 63 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and ex-
pression, Frank La Rue, UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 17/ 27 of 16 May 2011, http:// www2.ohchr.org/ english/ bodies/ hrcoun-
cil/ docs/ 17session/ A.HRC.17.27_ en.pdf, 20.
 64 Mary Rundle and Malcolm Birdling, “Filtering and the International System: A Question of Commitment,” 
in Ronald Deibert et al. (eds.), Access Denied: The Practice and Policy of Global Internet Filtering (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2008), 73– 102.
 65 Cf. ECtHR, Yıldırım v. Turkey, judgment of December 18, 2012, application no. 3111/ 10, para. 31: “in theory” 
such a right exists in more than ten Council of Europe member states.
 66 BVerfG, 1 BvL 10/ 10; 1 BvL 2/ 11 (July 18, 2012), rec. 94; BVerfG, 1 BvL 10/ 12 (July 23, 2014), rec. 74: “Dem 
Gesetzgeber steht ein Gestaltungsspielraum zu [ . . . ]; [dabei] ist er auch durch völkerrechtliche Verpflichtungen 
gebunden” (translation by the author).
 67 United Nations General Assembly, Transforming Our World. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, 
UN Doc. A/ RES/ 70/ 1 of 21 October 2015, goal 9.c.: “Significantly increase access to information and communica-
tions technology and strive to provide universal and affordable access to the Internet in least developed countries 
by 2020.”
 68 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34, Art. 19 ICCPR, UN Doc. CCPR/ C/ GC/ 34 of 12 
September 2011, para. 15.
 69 Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary- General on the issue of human rights and transna-
tional corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 17/ 31 of 
21 March 2011, Annex.
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protected online, in particular freedom of expression, which is applicable regardless of fron-
tiers and through any media of one’s choice [ . . . ].”70
Article 19 (2) of the ICCPR guarantees that “[e] veryone shall have the right to freedom 
of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and 
ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of 
art, or through any other media of his choice.” Similarly, Article 10 (1) of the ECHR en-
shrines to everyone “the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include the freedom 
to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by 
public authority and regardless of frontiers.” States are obliged to protect freedom of expres-
sion both as a free- standing right and as an essential “enabler” of other rights through the 
internet. As former UN Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, Frank La Rue, 
wrote, “by acting as a catalyst for individuals to exercise their right to freedom of opinion 
and expression, the internet also facilitates the realisation of a range of other human rights.”71
Article 19 (2) of the ICCPR guarantees interconnection technologies with its reference 
to the protection of expression by “any [ . . . ] media of [one’s] choice.” If the internet does 
not function, most “media” will cease to work as well.72 This point is well made also by 
the Human Rights Committee, which, in the most recent General Comment on Article 19 
ICCPR, recalls the technological premises of the internet’s communication function: “[a] ny 
restrictions on the operation of websites, blogs or any other internet- based, electronic or 
other such information dissemination system, including systems to support such commu-
nication, such as internet service providers or search engines, are only permissible to the 
extent that they are compatible with paragraph 3.”73 Interfering with ISPs thus amounts to 
interfering with the right to privacy.
The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights helps understand how 
freedom of expression, as enshrined in the ECHR, can be considered to indirectly pro-
tect the integrity of the internet. According to established case law, freedom of expression 
can be considered “one of the essential foundations for a democratic society and one of the 
basic conditions for its progress and for each individual’s self- fulfillment.”74 The Strasbourg 
Court interprets the Convention “in the light of present- day conditions,”75 taking into ac-
count the specific nature of the internet, as a “modern means of imparting information,”76 
in particular because of the greater impact, accessibility, durability, and asynchronicity of 
information on the internet.77
 70 Human Rights Council, Resolution 32/ 13, The promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the 
Internet, UN Doc. A/ HRC/ RES/ 32/ 13 of 18 July 2016, para. 1 (emphasis added).
 71 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression, UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 17/ 27 of 16 May 2011, paras. 22 and 23. But the Internet also brings about new chal-
lenges to these same human rights.
 72 Molly K. Land, “Toward an International Law of the Internet,” Harvard International Law Journal, 54 (2013), 
393– 458.
 73 Cf. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34, Art. 19 ICCPR, UN Doc. CCPR/ C/ GC/ 34 of 12 
September 2011, para. 43.
 74 E.g. ECtHR, Stoll v. Switzerland, judgment of December 10, 2007, application no. 69698/ 01, para. 104 with 
further references.
 75 Ibid., para. 101.
 76 ECtHR, Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v. Switzerland, judgment of January 13, 2011, application no. 16354/ 06, 
para. 54 as endorsed by the Great Chamber judgment in para. 40.
 77 Nina Vajic and Panayotis Voyatzis, “The Internet and Freedom of Expression: A ‘Brave New World’ and the 
European Court of Human Rights’ Evolving Case Law,” in Josep Casadevall et al. (eds.), Freedom of Expression. 
Essays in Honour of Nicolas Bratza (Osterwijk: Wolf, 2012), 391– 420 (395 and 399).
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In the first of a series of cases against Turkey’s blocking of internet platforms, Yıldırım 
v.  Turkey (2012), the Court confirmed that publishing information online constitutes a 
means of exercising freedom of expression,78 and that the public had a right, under Article 
10, to receive it.79 In particular, the court held that state measures stopping access to spe-
cific sites engaged the responsibility of the state under Article 10.80 In the 2015 Cengiz and 
Others v. Turkey judgment, the Court went further and clearly committed to the impor-
tance of the internet as a forum for freedom of expression (which, again, presupposes its 
integrity). The Court’s reasoning for rejecting a Turkish ban of YouTube on the application 
of three academics underlined the importance of the internet: “[T] he internet has now be-
come one of the principal means by which individuals exercise their right to freedom to re-
ceive and impart information and ideas, providing as it does essential tools for participation 
in activities and discussions concerning political issues and issues of general interest.” The 
internet as a whole has thus become an important means to exercise freedom of expression. 
Specific sites, especially “[u]ser- generated expressive activity on the internet[,] provides an 
unprecedented platform for the exercise of freedom of expression.” This also applies to con-
suming news and disseminating information: “in the light of [the internet’s] accessibility 
and its capacity to store and communicate vast amounts of information, [it] plays an im-
portant role in enhancing the public’s access to news and facilitating the dissemination of 
information in general”81
The internet as a “principal means” (Yıldırım) to exercise freedom of expression and the 
latter right as an “essential foundation for a democratic society and one of the basic condi-
tions for its progress” (Stoll) are closely connected, and through the explicit protection of 
freedom of expression in international law, the internet’s integrity is indirectly protected.
Another normative avenue is the right to privacy.82 After the Snowden revelations of 
global mass surveillance by the so- called Five Eyes states,83 the Civil Covenant’s right to 
privacy has been a starting point for scholars making the case for a stronger protection 
of “global communication structures” (rather infrastructures)84 and a higher level of “dig-
ital security” (cybersecurity) through progressive constitutionalization (and thus increased 
protection) of the internet’s core (principles and architecture) (“Internetverfassung”).85 
This is consonant with German foreign policy: the global right to privacy in light of internet 
(mass) surveillance became an important aspect of (cyber)diplomacy culminating in a 2016 
 78 ECtHR, Yıldırım v. Turkey, judgment of December 18, 2012, application no. 3111/ 10, para. 49.
 79 Ibid., para. 50.
 80 Ibid., para. 53, with reference to Vereinigung demokratischer Soldaten Österreichs et Gubi v. Austria, judgment 
of December 19, 1994, para. 27.
 81 ECtHR, Cengiz and Others v. Turkey, judgment of December 1, 2015, applications nos. 48226/ 10 and 14027/ 
11, paras. 49 and 52.
 82 Cf. Matthias C. Kettemann, Völkerrecht in Zeiten des Netzes: Perspektiven auf den effektiven Schutz von Grund- 
und Menschenrechten in der Informationsgesellschaft zwischen Völkerrecht, Europarecht und Staatsrecht (Bonn/ 
Berlin: Friedrich- Ebert- Stiftung, 2015), 32– 40.
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Human Rights Council resolution on privacy confirming that “the same rights that people 
have offline must also be protected online, including the right to privacy.”86
The right to privacy is protected by Article 17 of the ICCPR and Article 8 of the ECHR. 
Article 8 ECHR protects an individual’s privacy, which is necessary in order to develop the 
personality freely. It has both a defensive and proactive dimension. Not only do states have 
to refrain from interfering illegitimately with privacy, they also need to ensure that other 
social actors (and other states) do not violate the privacy of individuals.87 The assessment of 
mass surveillance by the National Security Agency (NSA) is less concerned with the inter-
pretation of Article 17 (at most the question of its extraterritorial effect, which is rejected by 
the USA— in contrast to the majority opinion88) than with its practical relevance.89 Not that 
the international law of the internet is (necessarily) incomplete. Rather, the acts of the US 
and the other “Five Eyes” states as well as European states that have cooperated closely with 
them are illegal, jeopardizing the right to privacy in the internet age and the nature of the 
internet as a space of trust.90
Data transfer regimes by companies have also been viewed critically. The Court of Justice 
of the European Union (CJEU), in the Schrems case of October 6, 2015,91 invalidated the 
European Commission’s “Safe Harbour” decision and criticized the Commission for not 
ensuring that the US provide an equal level of fundamental rights protection.92 Together 
with Digital Rights Ireland,93 Google Spain and Google (the “right to be forgotten” ruling),94 
and Ryneš (private parties are bound by privacy rights as well),95 the Court has developed 
within two years comprehensive multidimensional (and only slightly expansive) jurispru-
dence on privacy and data protection with substantial extraterritorial effects.
The protection of privacy is essential for the use and development of the internet as a 
“gateway” for freedom of expression.96 Only those who feel secure can seek and receive in-
formation, form an opinion, and share it with others. Both rights are therefore closely inter-
twined and affirm each other. In this view, encryption technology and anonymity also play 
a critical role in the realization of human rights online.97 It is not the law that is incomplete. 
 86 Human Rights Council, Resolution 28/ 16, The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, UN Doc. A/ HRC/ RES/ 28/ 
16 of 1 April 2015, para. 3. See also General Assembly, Resolution 68/ 167, The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, 
UN Doc. A/ RES/ 68/ 167 of 21 January 2014.
 87 Just see Helmut Philipp Aust, Opinion of the Expert Witness Testimony, June 5, 2014, 1st Investigation 
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As the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights clearly states in a report on 
the right to privacy on the internet, state practice is the problem: “International human 
rights law provides a clear and universal framework for the promotion and protection of the 
right to privacy, including in the context of domestic and extraterritorial surveillance, the 
interception of digital communications and the collection of personal data. Nevertheless, 
many states have ignored international law: “Practices in many States have [ . . . ] revealed a 
lack of adequate national legislation and/ or enforcement, weak procedural safeguards, and 
ineffective oversight, all of which have contributed to a lack of accountability for arbitrary 
or unlawful interference in the right to privacy.”98
The Snowden revelations have “chilling effects” on the use of the internet.99 The social 
costs of mass surveillance are far higher than their returns. The weakening of encryption 
standards or the coded opening of backdoors for government agencies, especially, can have 
negative consequences for national security. The European Parliament’s Schaake report, 
adopted in September 2015, underlines the importance of privacy encryption technologies, 
including the right to encryption and the introduction of end- to- end encryption standards 
for all communications.100
Democratic societies have long been threatened by espionage and terrorism. As early as 
1978, the ECtHR held in Klass and others v. Germany that the “existence of some legislation 
granting powers of secret surveillance over the mail, post and telecommunications is, under 
exceptional conditions, necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national secu-
rity and/ or for the prevention of disorder or crime.”101
However, this does not mean that states can ignore human rights or are completely free 
in the choice of the means and the intensity of surveillance. They need to be aware that such 
laws contain the danger “[of] undermining or even destroying democracy on the ground of 
defending it. States cannot do what they want in the name of the struggle against espionage 
and terrorism.”102 The ECtHR in Shimovolos v. Russia underlined the need for “detailed 
rules on the application of secret measures of surveillance, especially as the technology 
available for use is continually becoming more sophisticated.”103
In order to strengthen the protection of privacy on the internet, states must review and 
align their national laws and policies with their human rights obligations under the ECHR 
and ICCPR (and relevant European law and, in particular, the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights (CFR)), as interpreted by the ECtHR (regarding the ECHR), Human Rights 
Committee (regarding the ICCPR), and CJEU (regarding the CFR). Normative measures to 
remedy gaps must be developed in the context of easily accessible, open, societal discussion 
processes.104
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The ECtHR has shown, in important judgments, which obligations states have with re-
gard to the protection of privacy. Particularly relevant are Weber and Saravia v. Germany, 
Klass and Others v. Germany (judicial control of surveillance measures), Bucur and Toma 
v. Romania (protection of whistleblowers), Iordachi and others v. Moldova (narrow defi-
nition of “national security” for the legitimization of interventions), and El- Masri v.  the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (extraterritorial effect of the ECHR, importance of 
democratic control of intelligence services).
Democratic control of security and intelligence services is important for the protection of 
human rights and the rule of law. The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights 
recommends that a national dialog on ways to ensure legal control be established.105 Similar 
suggestions are made by the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe.106 A lack of trust 
in a protected private sphere on the internet, as a principal means to exercise freedom of ex-
pression, undermines the central participatory rights in the information society and espe-
cially freedom of expression which, let us recall, is an essential foundation for a democratic 
society. The right to privacy creates the freedom to exercise other rights and thus indirectly 
protects the internet’s integrity as well.
The internet as a “principal means” (Yıldırım) to exercise freedom of expression and the 
latter right as an “essential foundation for a democratic society and one of the basic condi-
tions for its progress” (Stoll) are closely connected and, through the explicit protection of 
freedom of expression in international law, the internet’s integrity is indirectly protected. 
After this analysis of direct and indirect treaty- based approaches to protecting the internet’s 
integrity, let us turn to the role of custom.
3.3.3 Custom
3.3.3.1  Direct Protection
In order to establish the existence of a customary rule, traditional international law requires 
the presence of two elements: settled practice based on the belief that there is rule requiring 
it.107 This two- element approach is expressed, for example, in the ICJ’s 1969 judgment in 
the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Merits), where the Court found that “two conditions 
must be fulfilled. Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they 
must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this prac-
tice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.”108
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There is thus an objective and a subjective element to establishing a rule of custom: the 
“belief ” in the obligatory nature of carrying out (or not) a certain act is “implicit in 
the very notion of the opinio juris sive necessitatis. The States concerned must there-
fore feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation.” Finding that 
states act in a certain way, even repeatedly, does not suffice: “frequency or even habitual 
character of the acts is not in itself enough.”109 Almost twenty years later, in Military 
and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua Case (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America) (Merits), the ICJ reiterated the finding emphasizing that “for a new customary 
rule to be formed, not only must the acts concerned “amount to a settled practice” [as per 
the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases], but they must be accompanied by the opinio juris 
sive necessitatis.”110
Let us suppose a customary law rule exists that protects the internet’s integrity and pro-
tects states from misuses of the internet. It could be formulated in the following way: the 
(integrity of the) internet must be protected. Risks emanating from the internet must be 
managed according to international law. The second- order responsibility rule could be 
termed thus: state actions violating the integrity of the internet are contrary to international 
law and thus engage state responsibility, as does the lack of internet- related “risk manage-
ment.” Is there sufficient uniform (and sufficiently uniform) practice evidencing opinio 
iuris for such a customary first order norm? The answer can only be negative. Though there 
is a wealth of relevant state practice on the protection of and from the internet, it is too dif-
fuse and not of a level of consistency or normativity that we could deduce relevant opinio 
iuris from it.
Internationally, we have seen important commitments to a development- oriented, 
people- centered information society premised upon human rights and international law. 
But as the designation “commitment” suggests, this was not an exercise in codification or 
progressive development of international law. Rather, states assembled during WSIS de-
veloped a common understanding of what information society should look like: based on 
the “purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, international law and 
multilateralism, and respecting fully and upholding the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.”111 We can conclude that states agreed to pursue policies regarding the development 
of information society that would be based on the principles and purposes of the UN and on 
international law, as has also been confirmed by the reports of the Group of Governmental 
Experts in 2013 and 2015. Yet no direct independent customary protection of and from 
the internet can be deduced from (or interpreted into) these commitments. Further, the 
vagueness of national policy commitments and the lack of an irreducible normative rule 
protecting the internet is a substantial challenge when analyzing state practice regarding the 
internet.
This conclusion is only reinforced when parsing state submissions to the 
2014 “NetMundial” meeting, which is considered an important normative turning point 
of the process of internet governance. A  number of states submitted proposals under 
the rubrics “roadmaps” and “principles.” The “German Government Proposal on Global 
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internet Principles (2014),”112 for example, included, as Principle 1, a commitment to a 
“global, open and free nature of the internet as a single commons” that has to be ensured. 
It is described as “a driving force for progress towards development in its various forms in-
cluding economic growth, encouraging innovation and allowing for creativity.” Clearly, this 
can only be counted as a general policy statement. The submission’s title alone— a proposal 
on principles— is strongly indicative of its normative content amounting to being prima 
facie non- binding. Yet just as international legal scholarship has progressively distanced it-
self from the binding/ non- binding binarity,113 the commitments are still relevant to assess 
national policy preferences (if not already their opinio iuris).
Similarly, the US government submission notes that normative efforts in the past have 
included certain “goals for internet governance and policymaking” including reliance on, 
and integration of, multiple actors in normative processes rooted in “democratic values,” 
human rights protection, universal and non- discriminatory access to the internet, and the 
“promotion of the stability, security, interoperability, and functionality of the network.”114 
We see here the expression of policy preferences and goals, but not the proposition of rules. 
China resubmitted the International Code of Conduct for Information Security115 it had 
proposed, together with Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, at the UN in 2011.116 But adher-
ence to the code is “voluntary,”117 which precludes its qualification as being, in the Chinese 
and Russian opinion, a document codifying customary rules. In addition, the content of 
the code rather than offering protection for the functionality of the internet is targeted at 
ensuring state sovereignty.118
The development of principles suffers from serious normative shortcomings, including 
their lack of precision and lack of normative clarity. Committing to principles is an example 
of state practice and, in the absence of discernible opinio iuris, cannot count as custom. 
Opinio can be inferred from practice, but such practice must reach a certain level of consist-
ency and must be based on, or refer to, a certain rule (or rules).
The GGE report of 2015 included a number of “[v] oluntary, non- binding norms of re-
sponsible State behaviour” with the function to reduce risks, reflect expectations of the 
international community, and set standards, thus allowing each state to assess another’s ac-
tivities and intentions. The norms are not meant to “limit or prohibit action that is other-
wise consistent with international law,” and they thus do not set out to change international 
law.119 However, these soft law norms can crystallize into customary law through use and 
the formation of a relevant opinio iuris.120
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Summing up, there are not yet any identifiable customary rules extending to the pro-
tection of and from the internet’s integrity. Developing principles and discussing the goals 
of information society, including the internet’s integrity, in international settings can lead 
to the codification and progressive development of international law in this subject area. 
If an international treaty on the protection of and from the internet is concluded, it may 
then codify custom that has substantially crystallized. But this is well into the future. In the 
clear absence of customary rules laying formally down the protection of the (and from the) 
internet, we can only conclude that customary law cannot serve as a direct source of pro-
tection of the internet’s functionality and from (criminal or state- sponsored or tolerated) 
misuses. There are, however, a number of customary rules indirectly protecting (us from) 
the internet.
3.3.3.2  Indirect Protection
It is difficult to establish the extent to which customary rules indirectly protect the internet 
and protect society from misuses of the internet, by obliging states to exercise, inter alia, due 
diligence in preparing for threats and developing and discussing, together with other states, 
as necessary, strategies to counter them. This is because any customary rule protecting state 
infrastructure can be considered to indirectly protect the internet, as it is part of a state’s 
critical information infrastructure (and a critical information resource in itself). Yet such a 
statement would be too broad to be of much more than epistemic value. It would therefore 
make sense to briefly discuss those rules of custom that offer discernible (and not just the-
oretical) protection of and from the internet. However, the rules of customary law that are 
of interest here can also be framed as general principles of international law (often with a 
broader content). It would be artificial to formulate substantially similar norms (with an in-
direct protective dimension for the internet’s integrity) first as customary norms and then, 
again, as general principles.
In presenting the general principles of international law that bear upon the protection 
of the internet’s integrity and the protection of societies from misuses of the internet often 
caused by violations of integrity- related guarantees, this chapter will include brief discus-
sions on the principles’ character— as ius cogens norms, custom, or “just” principles. Before 
taking this step, however, the question of why the lack of identifiable custom protecting the 
internet is neither surprising nor a fundamental challenge to establishing international law 
as an order containing rules protecting the internet’s integrity and protecting societies from 
(mis)uses of the internet merits consideration.
The lack of direct custom and the small number of identifiable customary norms protect-
ing the internet should not surprise. Customary law takes time to evolve (though it need 
not per se). As the ICJ formulated in Gulf of Maine, it is “unrewarding” in a new field “to 
look to general international law to provide a readymade set of rules that can be used for 
solving any [ . . . ] problems that arise.”121 In that case the court looked specifically at norms 
regarding delimitation problems in the “new and still unconsolidated field [ . . . ] involving 
the quite recent extension of the claims of States to areas which were until yesterday zones 
of the high seas.”122
 121 ICJ, Case Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Judgment), ICJ Rep. 
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What was true for maritime delimitation problems applies to the internet. The protection 
of the internet (and the protection from negative uses of the internet, which always needs 
to be read into any norms protecting the internet) is a “new and still unconsolidated field” 
of international law and the search for a “readymade set of [customary] rules” is in vain. In 
Gulf of Maine, the ICJ counsels were seeking “a better formulation of the fundamental norm 
[ . . . ] whose existence in the legal convictions not only of the Parties to the present dispute, 
but of all States, is apparent from an examination of the realities of international legal re-
lations.” Unlike the delimitation of adjacent continental shelves at issue in Gulf of Maine, 
there is no single preexisting “fundamental norm” applicable to state behavior regarding the 
internet that can be formulated “more complete[ly] and more precise[ly].”123
How to proceed if no such fundamental norm can be found and if state practice does not 
allow for the deduction of customary rules? In Gulf of Maine, the ICJ introduced an impor-
tant distinction. It argued that customary international law
comprises a limited set of norms for ensuring the co- existence and vital co- operation of the 
members of the international community, together with a set of customary rules whose 
presence in the opinio juris of States can be tested by induction based on the analysis of a 
sufficiently extensive and convincing practice, and not by deduction from preconceived 
ideas.124
The court thus draws a distinction within customary international law between “a limited 
set of norms for ensuring the co- existence and vital co- operation of the members of the 
international community” (category 1 rules) and “customary rules whose presence in the 
opinio juris of States can be tested by induction based on the analysis of a sufficiently ex-
tensive and convincing practice, and not by deduction from preconceived ideas” (category 
2 rules). To establish the existence of a category 2 rule, we need to inductively establish the 
opinio iuris of states through extensive and convincing practice. For category 1 rules, e con-
trario, this is not necessary. Establishing this “limited set of norms ensuring co- existence 
and vital cooperation” is thus not based on opinio iuris and practice but rather, again e con-
trario, by “deduction from preconceived ideas.” The lack of opinio iuris and practice cannot 
be used as an argument against the existence of category 1 rules. Further, states cannot 
choose not to be bound by them (though they can, of course, choose not to follow them, 
thus violating international law).
Category 1 rules can be characterized as customary law rules “with a twist”:  the twist 
being that their existence can be stated (or deducted from ideas and values) and no test of 
opinio iuris needs to be made.125 This, it is submitted, assimilates category 1 rules to princi-
ples (as the normative variance of “preconceived ideas”) or, rather, makes them the binding, 
normatively more stringent, and concrete form of principles.126
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When the ICJ referred to the fundamental norm regarding the delimitation of adjacent 
continental shelves in Gulf of Maine, it made an important point. Just establishing that nei-
ther treaty nor customary law gives answers to a legal question (such as, in our case, if the 
internet’s integrity is protected) does not give rise to an epistemic non liquet. In such a sit-
uation, we can take recourse to general principles of international law, which do not only 
help pull international law together in light of normative centrifugal forces leading to frag-
mentation, but also serve as normative guidelines for the progressive development of inter-
national law. They can also help, in this instance, to delimitate state behavior regarding the 
internet and to provide protection for the internet’s integrity. Let us also recall that, to the 
extent that general principles are the normative versions of the “preconceived ideas” from 
which “norms [essential for] the co- existence and vital co- operation of the members of the 
international community” can be deduced, states neither need to “opt into” them nor can 
they “opt out” of them.127 Let us turn, therefore, to general principles of international law 
and their relevance for the protection of and from the internet.
3.3.4 General Principles of International Law
3.3.4.1  Origin
The existence of general principles of international law has been confirmed by judgments 
of international courts, state practice, and international treaties. A modern treaty provision 
referring to principles is, for example, Article 21 (1) of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (“ICC Statute”). According to this provision, the Court shall apply
[ . . . ] (b) where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and rules of interna-
tional law, including the established principles of the international law of armed conflict; 
(c) Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal 
systems of the world.
Littera (b) and (c) offer compelling evidence of a distinction drawn, by the now 138 signa-
tories and 123 state parties,128 between the “principles and rules of international law” (the 
general principles of international law) and the “general principles of law” derived from 
national laws.
Similarly, both the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) and the ICJ have 
confirmed the existence of general principles of international law in their jurisprudence. 
To give just a few examples, in the SS Lotus case, the PCIJ referred to “general principles of 
international law,”129 including sovereignty “on which this [international] law is based,”130 
and in the Factory at Chorzow case clearly saw general principles to be sources of legal obli-
gations: “To this obligation, in virtue of the general principles of international law, must 
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be added that of compensating loss sustained as the result of the seizure.”131 The ICJ also 
referred in a number of cases to “general principles of international law” (regulating termi-
nation of a treaty relationship on account of breach)132 and described the prohibition of the 
use of force as a “fundamental or cardinal principle of [international] law.”133
General principles of international law often develop from particular treaty regimes, in-
cluding notably the peace and security- related principles contained in Article 2 of the UN 
Charter.134 When principles from non- universal regimes are enshrined in documents by 
universal bodies, such as General Assembly resolutions, an important step toward their 
generalization is taken. This holds particularly for principles that were already expressed in 
universal documents in the first place, such as the Article 2 UN Charter principles. These 
have been reaffirmed in the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration,135 which was adopted 
by the General Assembly without a vote136 and codifies “basic principles of international 
law.”137 These include the non- use of (the threat of) force, the peaceful settlement of in-
ternational disputes, the non- intervention in domestic affairs, the duty of cooperation, the 
principle of equal rights and self- determination of peoples, the sovereign equality of states, 
and the principle of good faith. These principles were confirmed in regional contexts— such 
as in the 1975 Helsinki Declaration of the CSCE138— and on a universal level in the UN 
Millennium Declaration139 and the 2005 World Summit Outcome document.140
The normativity of principles diverges. They can be peremptory norms of international 
law (such as the non- use of force principle) or form, in a normatively more stringent form, 
customary law (such as the non- intervention principle). A principle can be semantically 
equal to a customary law rule without losing its status as a principle. Other principles, 
though not as such legally binding, have legally binding content and exercise normative pull 
beyond the binding core. This holds especially true for principles stemming from interna-
tional environmental law: the principle of good neighborliness, the principle of prevention, 
the principle of sustainable development, and the precautionary principle.141 For the first 
 131 PCIJ, The Factory At Chorzow (Claim for Indemnity), judgment on the merits (1928) PCIJ Rep. Series A, No 
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three, Wolfrum argues that they have metamorphosized from regime- centric principles to 
general principles:142 the principle of sustainable development has developed, according to 
him, from a principle dedicated to managing only renewable resources, “but now it is being 
used to govern non- renewable resources, too.”143
Insofar as this development has taken place, principles can bridge fragmentation trends 
and act as normative unifiers. They can take in (that is: scholars and courts can interpret 
them in the light of) new normative developments and are, “due to their abstractness,”144 
important mechanisms to ensure the progressive development of international law. The 
GGE, in its 2015 report, identified the commitment by States to certain key principles of the 
Charter and other international law as centrally important. These principles are
 – sovereign equality;
 – the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that inter-
national peace and security and justice are not endangered;
 – refraining in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the ter-
ritorial integrity or political independence of any State [ . . . ];
 – respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; and
 – non- intervention in the internal affairs of other States.145
Some of these principles, such as respect for human rights, have been discussed in this 
study. The other principles will now be looked at in turn.
3.3.4.2  Principle of Sovereign Equality
Article 2 (1) of the UN Charter confirms that all states enjoy sovereign equality, thus con-
firming that states are both sovereign and, in that sovereignty, legally equal to all other 
states. Sovereignty is both a norm of international law and a source of international legal 
norms, has customary value, and is of peremptory character. Sovereignty is a “pivotal prin-
ciple” of modern international law.146 The respect of states for each other’s territorial sov-
ereignty is, per the ICJ in the Corfu Channel Case, “an essential foundation of international 
relations.”147 Having a normative and empirical dimension,148 sovereignty denotes both 
“supreme authority” and “ultimate power” within and over a territory. Or, as was formu-
lated in the Island of Palmas arbitral award, “[s] overeignty [ . . . ] signifies independence. 
Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein, to the ex-
clusion of any other State, the functions of a State.”149 This approach also applies to “cyber-
space” in the sense of the cyberspatial realm of activity of natural and legal persons tied to 
a territory, to a portion of the globe.150 An internet user sitting at a desk in Germany and 
 142 Cf. Wolfrum (2010), para. 51.
 143 Ibid., para. 62.
 144 Ibid., para. 60.
 145 GGE report (2015), 26 (bullet points added).
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commenting in German as a user of a US social network site on a video by a US citizen, 
stored on a US server, is still “in” Germany though his activities decidedly have an interna-
tional dimension. In this case, the US and Germany, based on their sovereignty, can plau-
sibly exercise jurisdiction. They are sovereign and equal in their basic claim to do so.
Sovereignty knows restrictions, as already Judge Anzilotti held in his dissent in Customs 
Regime.151 States only lose their independence if they cease to “exercise within [their] own 
territory the summa potestas or sovereignty.” Accepting restrictions on their sovereignty, 
Anzilotti states, does not “affect [a state’s] independence, provided that the State does not 
thereby deprive itself of its organic powers.” It is only natural in an increasingly interde-
pendent international order that states enter into relations with each other and submit to 
obligations. But withdrawing from the international system and cutting a state off the in-
creasingly thickly woven fabric of international obligations may lead to the unwelcome 
status of a rogue state.152 Rather than ensuring “more” sovereignty (with sovereignty under-
stood as power flowing from membership and thus Mitspracherecht in the global commu-
nity of states), this process would diminish it.153 To graduated degrees, any withdrawal from 
international obligations and systems, such as Brexit or President Trump’s non- submission 
to the Paris Agreement, only prima facie increases sovereignty (understood tradition-
ally as doing what pleases). Not submitting to international regimes has substantial costs 
in terms of sovereignty reduction154 in times of the international law of cooperation, not 
coordination.155
Sovereignty today protects chiefly the domaine réservé as is confirmed by the principles 
of non- intervention of Article 2 (7) and the non- use of force rule of Article 2 (4) of the UN 
Charter. However, the concept of what a domain reserve is has substantially altered over 
the years. The progressive pursuance of common interest issues in international settings 
through common organizations, the even stronger supranational regionalization, and the 
underlying economic and financial interdependencies have reduced the importance of sov-
ereignty as a defensive concept. States still benefit from sovereignty, but only if and insofar 
as they exercise their sovereign rights with a view to the progressively codified purposes of 
the international order.
Already in 1992, former UN Secretary- General Boutros Boutros- Ghali wrote in his 
Agenda for Peace that “[t] he time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty [ . . . ] has passed 
[and that] its theory was never matched by reality.”156 Sovereignty never meant that states 
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were free to deal with their citizens as they chose.157 Sovereignty is progressively disaggre-
gated and new concepts of sovereignty imply obligations (such as the responsibility to pro-
tect) rather than defensive rights.158 In light of the regulatory challenges, states have chosen, 
with graduations, to transfer some sovereignty in the form of public authority or even nor-
mative power with direct effect to supranational organizations, international organizations, 
or private norm- setters.159 This transfer of sovereignty fragments on the international level 
presupposes the emergence of adequate normative structures.160
Upon the urging of sovereignty- oriented states, the GGE, in its 2015 report, highlighted 
twice the importance of sovereignty for information and communication technologies. The 
group identified “as of central importance the commitments of States” to sovereign equality, 
as the first principles of the Charter and other international law to be singled out (para. 26). 
Again, in paragraph 28 (b), the group confirmed that when using ICTs, states must observe, 
“among other principles of international law, State sovereignty [and] sovereign equality 
[ . . . ].”
It can be correctly observed that territorial sovereignty in the sense of jurisdiction ratione 
loci and personae is challenged by the ubiquity of the internet and the technological realities 
of how data packages are routed through networks and the cloud. Yet as far as the internet 
has kinetic resources, these still fall under the jurisdiction of a sovereign state exercising 
territorial sovereignty. With regard to cyber infrastructure, persons, and cyber activities 
within its territory, states enjoy “internal sovereignty” subject only to “international legal 
obligations.”161 This applies to the physical layer, the logical layer (a state may demand cryp-
tographic protocols, electronic signatures, and encryption), and the social layer (regulating 
activities of those on its territory).162 However, to the degree that we accept that protecting 
the internet’s integrity lies in the global common interest, states can no longer exercise their 
jurisdiction without considering their duties vis- à- vis the international community (viz. 
“subject to international legal obligations”).163
According to Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, this right (of controlling access to and 
egress from a state’s territory) “seems to also apply to all forms of communication.”164 This 
approach ignores the realities of how data is routed through networks. Once a state is con-
nected to the global internet backbone, data may be routed through a variety of ways and it 
cannot be safely said whether or not a specific transmission will travel through a territory 
or not. Heintschel von Heinegg argues that just because kinetic resources form part of the 
 157 Cf. Wolfgang Benedek and Matthias C. Kettemann, “Menschliche Sicherheit und Menschenrechte,” in 
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 158 Cf. Abram Chayes and Antonia H. Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory 
Agreements (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 4, 26.
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global internet, territorial sovereignty over resources lying with a state’s jurisdiction must be 
largely discounted.165 Yet accepting that states exercise territorial sovereignty over kinetic 
resources does not contradict the acceptance of certain obligations with regard to the way 
they can exercise this sovereignty. Article 19 UDHR assures everyone the right to freedom 
of opinion and expression including the freedom to “seek, receive and impart information 
and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers” (emphasis added). Giving states a 
right to control data flows would run counter to this human rights- based commitment.
The sovereignty principle thus protects kinetic infrastructure located within a state from 
activities attributable to other states that would amount to exercises of state jurisdiction. 
But not every impact on kinetic infrastructure by another state amounts to violations of 
sovereignty.166 Just as with the non- intervention principle, the sovereignty principle pre-
cludes other states from launching, for example, information operations within other coun-
tries. Yet the principle of territorial sovereignty is rather used by sovereignty- oriented states 
to assume more oversight (and control) over national dimensions of internet infrastructure 
(e.g. Russia’s and China’s calls to control over a “national internet segment”). The principle 
of sovereign equality, as it is used in this interpretation, rather threatens the internet’s in-
tegrity than protect it. A case in point is the International Code of Conduct for Information 
Security167 proposed by China together with Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan at the UN 
in 2011168 and resubmitted to the 2014 NetMundial meeting. It envisages tighter control 
of the state vis- à- vis kinetic and non- kinetic internet resources “within” a state’s territory, 
including websites targeting nationals of that state, data stored in that state, and data flows 
running through that state.169
Similarly, the Russian submission to NetMundial highlighted that in certain areas “States 
have the exclusive authority and responsibility.” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Russian Federation identified the “absence of international legal norms developed under 
the aegis of the UN, establishing common and obligatory rules of internet governance for 
the governments and other interested parties to implement” as one of the internet’s “[k] ey 
problems.” As a solution, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs suggested that “states must 
preserve their sovereign right to regulate their telecommunications.” States “have to be 
able to regulate their national internet segments” and must have an “equal right to govern” 
the internet, including “allocation, assignment and withdrawing numbering [resources,] 
names, addressing and identification of the internet, operation support and development of 
primary internet infrastructure.”170 This is clear evidence of a call for more national control 
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over international management functions regarding key internet naming and numbering 
resources.
Other states, such as India, submitted notably different arguments to NetMundial, which 
evidence a more nuanced conception of sovereignty vis- à- vis the internet. India argued that 
the “internet is a shared resource and a global commons available to public” and that only 
“[p] olicy authority for internet- related public policy issues is the sovereign right of states.”171 
Mexico did not speak of sovereignty, but pointed to the “special role of governments in 
areas such as national security and critical infrastructure stability,” which implied that they 
“should be active participants in [the] multi[- ]stakeholder process.”172 The French gov-
ernment distinguished between a commitment to multistakeholder approaches regarding 
internet governance and those normative arenas where states play a role through domestic 
legislation. “In areas such as cybersecurity, intellectual property, privacy, consumer protec-
tion, child protection or taxation, [ . . . ] governments clearly dominate the process, although 
not to the exclusion of other stakeholders.”173 This evidences a nuanced understanding of 
sovereignty that can be termed cooperative or shared sovereignty.
How differently traditionally important states such as France approach the development 
of international legal arrangements bearing upon the internet can be seen from the French 
government’s suggestion to rely, in the formulation of internet- related policy, on the “basic 
principle of subsidiarity [ . . . ] whereby any internet governance issue ought to be handled 
by the smallest body capable of addressing that issue effectively.”174 This is a far cry from the 
Russian statement that governments must “preserve their sovereign right to regulate their 
telecommunications.”
Understanding sovereignty as a right to control exclusively both the architecture and 
the content of the “national internet segment” can endanger the integrity of the internet. 
Having sovereign uncoordinated decision- making over almost 200 national internet “seg-
ments” is likely to lead to substantial technological problems in light of the necessity of cen-
trally managing key naming and addressing resources, and ensuring human rights- based 
standards globally. “National internets,” as pursued by states such as China, through mas-
sive filtering programs currently work because they are not completely divorced from the 
global internet. If control over naming and addressing resources were nationalized, the sta-
bility of the internet’s core architecture would not be enhanced.
3.3.4.3  Non- Use of (the Threat of) Force
Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force in international rela-
tions: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” The prohibition of the use of 
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force is a customary law rule, a peremptory norm of international law, and, as the ICJ ruled 
in the Nicaragua case, a “fundamental or cardinal principle of [international] law.”175 (The 
prohibition of the threat itself seems not to have reached ius cogens status.176) Both the use 
of force and the threat itself are illegal; the threat being illegal if the “use of force contem-
plated would be illegal.”177 Employing force goes substantially beyond bringing economic 
or political pressure to bear on another state— which might violate the non- intervention 
principle, but would not amount to a violation of the non- use of force rule. For Oliver Dörr, 
force in the context of Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter can only include “armed or mili-
tary force.”178 Yet not only the direct employment of armed force is prohibited. As the ICJ 
confirmed in Nicaragua179 and Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic 
Republic of the Congo v. Uganda),180 supporting private actors that then commit violence in 
the territory of another state can violate the non- use of force rule.
Applied to the internet, any “cyber operation constituting a threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or that is in any other manner 
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, is unlawful.”181 The application of the 
non- use of force rule to cyber attacks has been controversially debated, with most schol-
ars agreeing on an effects- based approach, thus admitting that certain cyber attacks can 
amount to an armed attack if they surpass a certain threshold of intensity and cause sub-
stantial kinetic damage.182 Rule 69 (Definition of the use of force) of the Tallinn Manual 
2.0 defines a cyber operation as a use of force “when its scale and effects are comparable to 
non- cyber operations rising to the level of a use of force.”183 A cyberattack can be unlawful 
even if it does not rise to the level of use of force. It could then be qualified as an illicit inter-
vention. The Tallinn Manual 2.0 suggests a number of criteria to measure whether an action 
amounts to use of force, including: severity, immediacy, directness, invasiveness, measura-
bility of effects, military character, state involvement, and presumptive legality.184
On the other hand, not all uses of force may amount to an “armed attack,” triggering 
the right to self- defense.185 What interests here is not primarily whether the non- use of 
force rule applies to internet- mediated attacks (it does, even though the GGE report in 2017 
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failed to reach a consensus on the question of “how” exactly it should be applied186), but 
rather whether the rule offers protection for the internet and from internet- based attacks. 
This is clearly the case. The prohibition of (the threat of) force protects national physical 
elements of the internet’s functionality just as it does other aspects of critical (information) 
infrastructure and enjoins states from using the internet to conduct an operation in viola-
tion of the principle.
3.3.4.4  Non- Intervention in Domestic Affairs
The customary law rule regarding non- intervention in internal affairs reflects the cus-
tomary expression of the non- intervention principle.187 As by the 1970 Friendly Relations 
Declaration, no state may intervene “directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the 
internal or external affairs of any other State.” Both “armed intervention and all other forms 
of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its po-
litical, economic and cultural elements, are in violation of international law.” This implies 
each state’s “inalienable right to choose its political, economic, social and cultural systems, 
without interference in any form by another State.” As the ICJ found in the Nicaragua case, 
non- intervention only protects a state with regard to “matters in which each State is per-
mitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide freely. One of these is the choice of 
a political, economic, social and cultural system, and the formulation of foreign policy.”188
Non- intervention therefore only extends to the domain réservé of a state, which is quickly 
diminishing in times of increased international cooperation and progressive codification 
of international law. As soon as a normative field is “internationalized” through state com-
mitments to the international community, calling that state to order and reminding it of 
its duties is no longer interference or intervention, but rather the international legal right 
(and often duty) of other states. With regard to certain issues of international law, namely 
the management of common areas and the regulation of issues of common interest of the 
international community, states cannot argue that criticism of domestic policies violates the 
non- intervention principle as they are not free under international law to set their own pol-
icies in these arenas. The non- intervention rule protects internet integrity by way of its con-
tent. The 2015– 2017 information operations of Russia against the US in the run- up to the 
US presidential elections and thereafter189 can be judged in light of the non- intervention 
principle as being “interferences” against the “political, economic and cultural elements” of 
the US, as per the Friendly Relations Declaration.
The Tallinn Manual 2.0 confirms, in Rule 66, the prohibition of interventions by cyber 
means: “A State may not intervene, including by cyber means, in the internal or external 
affairs of another State.”190 This also includes intervention by non- cyber means in internal 
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What?,” Council on Foreign Relations, June 29, 2017, https:// www.cfr.org/ blog/ development- cyber-norms-  
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 187 Philip Kunig, “Prohibition of Intervention,” in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (MPEPIL) (Oxford: OUP, 2008) (2008) [online], para. 2.
 188 ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua Case (Nicaragua v. United States of America) 
(Merits), ICJ Rep. (1986), para. 205.
 189 See Keir Giles, “Countering Russian Information Operations in the Age of Social Media,” Council on 
Foreign Relations, November 21, 2017, https:// www.cfr.org/ report/ countering- russian- information-operations- 
 age- social- media.
 190 Michael N. Schmitt (ed.), Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations 
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affairs pertaining to the internet, such as exerting pressure to compel a state to adopt certain 
internet- related legislation. The domain reserve of states includes the political and social 
system and their organization. Thus any coercive action by cyber means to alter the social 
or governmental structure is prohibited. Interventions need not be oriented toward State 
infrastructure (e.g. government website) but must be “designed to undermine the State’s au-
thority over the domain réservé.”191 Cyber interventions need not produce kinetic effects to 
be coercive; it is the goal of the attack (coercion) that counts. Interferences below the coer-
cion threshold (including persuasion, criticism, public diplomacy, and propaganda such as 
online ads or social media postings) are not coercive in nature and therefore not prohibited 
under the non- intervention principle.
The GGE 2015 report, in its section on “norms, rules and principles for the responsible 
behaviour of States,” recalls that states should not knowingly allow their territory to be 
used for internationally wrongful acts (thus including possible interventions), that states 
should not conduct or knowingly support ICT activity contrary to its obligations under 
international law (including interventions), and that states should take appropriate meas-
ures against interventions by other states by protecting their critical infrastructure from 
ICT threats with a view to creating a global culture of cybersecurity.192 As a particular 
intervention- related norm, the GGE report introduces the norm that states should not 
conduct or knowingly support activity to harm “the information systems of the authorized 
emergency response teams” of other states or use their own teams to engage in “malicious 
international activity.”193
3.3.4.5  Duty of Cooperation
In the above- cited 1984 Gulf of Maine case, the ICJ distinguished a “limited set of norms for 
ensuring the co- existence and vital co- operation of the members of the international com-
munity” from other customary rules whose existence in the opinio iuris could be inductively 
inferred from practice. The ICJ thus considers among the most important rules of interna-
tional law those ensuring “vital co- operation.” Can we deduce from this that a general duty 
of “vital co- operation” between states exists, distinguishable from a duty to cooperate that 
would need to be deduced from opinio iuris and practice? Can cooperation with a view to 
ensuring the integrity of the internet be established as a “vital” duty or does it concern non- 
vital issues of cooperation?
There is no intrinsic value in “cooperating” as cooperation, as Rüdiger Wolfrum reminds 
us, can also be “co- operation to start a war of aggression.”194 But used in the context of a 
normatively deeper international order— thus in the sense of the international law of co-
operation between all actors as contrasted with an international order merely focused on 
the coexistence of states— cooperation must be understood as international legal persons 
striving together to increase “the social welfare of the world community” with a “distribu-
tive effect.”195 Article 1 (1) and (3) of the UN Charter already commits the organization and 
its members to effective cooperation, with the latter provision declaring it a purpose of the 
 191 Ibid., 315.
 192 GGE report (2015), para. 13(c), (f), and (g).
 193 Ibid., para. 13(k).
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organization: “[to] achieve international co- operation in solving international problems of 
an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character [ . . . ].” Article 11 (1) of the UN 
Charter allows the General Assembly to consider “the general principles of co- operation 
in the maintenance of international peace and security.” Chapter IX of the Charter is spe-
cifically dedicated to “international economic and social cooperation,” with Article 56 con-
taining a pledge by all members “to take joint and separate action in co- operation with the 
Organization for the achievement of the purposes of Article 55,” including “creation of con-
ditions of stability and well- being,” development, and human rights. There is not, however, a 
formal general legal obligation to cooperate.
Following Wolfrum, the recognition of such an obligation would have three conse-
quences for international law: it would have to be normatively reoriented toward promoting 
certain communal values (to be achieved through cooperation) (e.g. through the “human-
ization” of international law196); the management of “common international spaces” would 
be a “common concern for all States;”197 and the significance of international organizations 
would increase.198 All three elements are visible in international law. This principle has cog-
nizable normative content with relevance for the internet (and for the protection of states 
from dangers emanating from the internet) in three constellations:  cooperation within 
thematically specific fields, namely science and technology; cooperation within (regional) 
political arrangements; and cooperation with regard to managing common spaces199 and 
issues in the global interest.
First, a duty of cooperation in the fields of science and technology has been submitted as 
Principle 4 of the Friendly Relations Declaration, in which states committed to cooperate in 
the fields of science and technology. Second, regionally, the obligation to cooperate has been 
confirmed in regional political arrangements, such as the 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the 
Conference for Security and Co- operation in Europe,200 which confirms that “participating 
States will develop their co- operation with one another and with all States in all fields [with 
the goal of] improve[ing] the well- being of peoples and contribut[ing] to the fulfilment of 
their aspirations.” Third, as Wolfrum notes, “recent international agreements for the use of 
common spaces and concerning issues in the interest of the international community” are 
evidence of a normatively stronger cooperation principle.201 Cooperation regarding inno-
vative technologies, in regional arrangements, and with regard to shared spaces and global 
interest issues is based on the conviction that certain common goals cannot be achieved 
through uncoordinated action of individual states, but are premised upon cooperation.202
Two reasons thus exist for accepting international obligations regarding the protection 
of and from the internet. States are normatively constrained in the way they manage na-
tional kinetic and non- kinetic infrastructure and develop and apply the normative frame-
work, nationally, regionally, and internationally, related to the integrity of the internet. 
 196 Cf. Theodor Meron, Humanization of International Law (Amsterdam: Brill, 2014).
 197 Wolfgang Benedek, Koen De Feyter, Matthias C. Kettemann, and Christina Voigtde, “Introduction,” in 
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 198 See Wolfrum (2010), paras. 10– 12.
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 200 Final Act of the Conference for Security and Co- operation in Europe (adopted August 1, 1975).
 201 Wolfrum (2010), para. 25.
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These are, first, the heightened cooperation obligations regarding the areas of science and 
technology— the internet, being a network of networks that grew out of scientific cooper-
ation, is based on technology and furthers both science and technology— and, second, the 
cooperation obligations in relation to the management of common spaces and regarding is-
sues of international common interest. There is thus an obligation to cooperate with regard 
to safeguarding the integrity of the internet.
Similarly, the GGE report of 2015 highlighted the importance of cooperation. It rec-
ommended setting confidence- building measures to strengthen international peace and 
security, which would increase interstate cooperation, transparency, predictability, and 
stability.203 In particular, states should seek to “facilitate cross- border cooperation to ad-
dress critical infrastructure vulnerabilities” and transcend national borders by, for example, 
introducing confidence- building measures to strengthen cooperation on a bilateral, subre-
gional, regional, and multilateral basis.204 The report dedicates a whole section to “interna-
tional cooperation and assistance in ICT security and capacity- building” and, in paragraph 
19, recalls that “international cooperation and assistance can play an essential role in en-
abling States to secure ICTs and ensure their peaceful use.” In light of the development of 
the internet, and dangers to society posed by it, international law can be considered to have 
evolved to a point where the principle of cooperation includes a duty to cross- border coop-
eration to address critical infrastructure vulnerabilities transcending national borders.
3.3.4.6  Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes
As defined by the PCIJ in the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case, a dispute is a “dis-
agreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests between two 
persons”205 or other international legal entities. It needs to be international in character or 
at least have not only incidental international implications to fall within the ambit of inter-
national law. The rule of peaceful settlement of international disputes limits the sovereignty 
of the involved parties by committing them to settle their disagreement without recourse 
to force. Insofar it refines the prohibition of the (threat or) use of force in international re-
lations. Settling disputes by peaceful means is one of the principles of the United Nations. 
According to Article 2 (3), all members commit to settling their “international disputes by 
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not 
endangered.” Chapter VI of the UN Charter is specifically entitled “pacific settlement of 
disputes” and formalizes, in Article 33 (1), the duty of the parties to any dispute likely to 
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security to “first of all, seek a solution 
by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to 
regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.” Once dis-
putes rise to a certain level— endangering international peace and security— they can give 
rise to situations of individual self- defense (Article 52 of the UN Charter) or collective self- 
defense pursuant to chapter VII.
Outside of extreme situations, the peaceful settlement of international disputes “has be-
come the general rule.”206 The ICJ recognized it as a “principle of customary International 
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law”207 and it has been considered a peremptory norm of international law.208 The con-
crete obligation is to enter into settlements, in good faith,209 not to achieve specific results— 
however, the status quo of a “frozen” conflict must not endanger international peace and 
security, which brings chapter VII of the UN Charter to bear upon it. The duty to settle 
disputes peacefully has been reiterated by the international community in the 1970 Friendly 
Relations Declaration210 and the 2000 United Nations Millennium Declaration.211
The younger an international legal regime is, the fewer institutionalized means to 
solve conflicts peacefully exist. The progressive institutionalization of dispute settlement 
mechanisms can therefore be roughly equated with normative progress within a regime. 
This holds true for the internet as well. In light of the recent evolution of first governance 
structures regarding the internet, the importance for some states of exerting control over 
“national internet segments” and the fluidity of the management of certain key internet re-
sources, disputes are more likely than in certain traditional international regimes. Coupled 
with an absence of formal settlement procedures, the obligation to settle international dis-
putes peacefully, though it applies, is difficult to implement.
There is no direct protection of internet integrity through the obligation to peaceful set-
tlement of disputes. Insofar as the normative development of the protection of the internet’s 
functionality gives rise to international disputes, however, the obligation to peacefully settle 
these indirectly protects the internet and other critical infrastructure. It also safeguards us 
from threats emanating from disputes over the use and development of the internet. Though 
there have not yet been any formal international developments regarding the pacific settle-
ment rule (such as the installation of an international arbiter), some disputes between states 
have already been normatively solved through international law. After the indictment by 
the US Department of Justice of five Chinese Army officers for economic espionage, then- 
US President Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping signed a Cybersecurity Agreement 
in 2015. Though the dispute does not seem to have been “settled,”212 the use of an interna-
tional legal instrument is encouraging.
3.3.4.7  Principle of Equal Rights and Self- Determination of Peoples
Art 1 (2) of the UN Charter declares developing “friendly relations among nations based on 
respect for the principle of equal rights and self- determination of peoples” as one of the pur-
poses of the organization. Article 55 also refers to the principle, as does implicitly Article 73 
UN Charter. The 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 
and Peoples of the General Assembly213 confirmed it and the 1970 Friendly Relations 
Declaration214 found a nuanced formulation in its Principle 5: “all peoples have the right 
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freely to determine, without external interference, their political status and to pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development, and every State has the duty to respect this 
right in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.” Further, Common Article 1 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the ICCPR 
confirms the “right [of all peoples] of self- determination” and prescribes that all peoples 
may, “for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without preju-
dice to any obligations arising out of international economic co- operation, based upon the 
principle of mutual benefit, and international law.”
Though the ICJ has by now accepted that self- determination is a right,215 the extent 
and content of self- determination remains much discussed. Daniel Thürer and Thomas 
Burri argue that, rather than querying into the concrete normative content of the right, 
it is better to understand self- determination as a flexible principle underlying “the 
whole international order” and informing the “development of international law” more 
broadly.216 Both the Kosovo case217 and the Russian intervention in Crimea and the sub-
sequent referendum218 have shown that the international debate on self- determination is 
highly politicized.
The right to self- determination is not directly linked to the internet, though the internet 
can be used as a tool in the fight for self- determination and against it. One can therefore 
make the claim that the development potential lying in the management of local internet 
resources according to national political preferences can be considered as part of the “nat-
ural wealth and resources” of a country that the country can “for their own ends [ . . . ] 
freely dispose of ” (as per Article 1 (2) ICCPR and ICESCR). The claim is tenuous and yet 
there have been cases where internet- related resources were linked to questions of self- 
determination in the limited sense of self- determinate disposal of the management duties 
regarding them.
The case of delegation, dereliction of managerial duties, and subsequent redelegation of 
Pitcairn Island’s .pn TLD took five years to resolve. After “[a] ll residents of Pitcairn Island, 
other than the administrative contact and his wife,” who had received .pn management 
rights, signed a petition requesting redelegation, which was endorsed by both the Pitcairn 
Island Council (the local government) and the UK government (administering the territo-
ry’s affairs), IANA proceeded to redelegate the TLD.219 Yet the line to be drawn from cases 
such as this to a more general protection of the national dimension of the internet’s integrity 
remains thin.
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3.3.4.8  Principle of Good Faith
Article 2 (2) of the UN Charter obliges member states to fulfill “in good faith the obligations 
assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.” Similarly, the Friendly Relations 
Declaration underlines that states have the duty to fulfill “in good faith the obligations as-
sumed by it in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, [ . . . ] under the generally 
recognized principles and rules of international law [and] under international agreements 
valid under the generally recognized principles and rules of international law.” Good faith 
is a key principle applicable to the relationship between nations and is important for treaty 
interpretation.220 Beyond pointing to preexisting international legal commitments, which 
are to be exercised in good faith, the principle does not have an internet- specific content.
3.3.4.9  No Harm Principle (Principle of Good Neighborliness)
This no harm principle has roots in the UN Charter, with Article 74 (in the context of non- 
self- governing territories) referring to the “general principle of good- neighbourliness, due 
account being taken of the interests and well- being of the rest of the world, in social, eco-
nomic, and commercial matters.” Further, the ICJ in the 1949 Corfu Channel Case referred 
to the “general and well- recognized principle [], namely: [ . . . ] every State’s obligation not 
to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.”221 
Sometimes expressed in the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, the no harm prin-
ciple limits how a state can use its territory: not in a way that its neighbors are harmed. The 
duty not to cause transboundary (especially environmental) harm is connected to the equal 
sovereignty of states. Yet neighboring states, just as neighbors generally, must “tolerate cer-
tain interferences— a duty that is coextensive with the neighbouring State’s right to use its 
territory.”222
In light of the interdependence of states and the relative unimportance of actual neigh-
borliness with regard to the technological realities of ICTs, the concept of what a neigh-
boring state is must be interpreted broadly in the sense of an effects- based approach.223 
The no harm principle applies to states with regard to any state they can, in effect, harm. 
This is in line with Article 2 (c) of the International Law Commission (ILC) Draft Articles 
on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities (2001) that defines 
“transboundary harm” as harm caused by one state to another “whether or not the States 
concerned share a common border.”224
The no harm principle has normative roots in the Trail Smelter225 and Lac Lanoux226 ar-
bitration proceedings. The normative content of the no- harm- rule has been formulated, in 
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Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration of 1972227 and Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration 
of 1992,228 as such: states have a duty “to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or 
control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits 
of national jurisdiction.” The duty not to cause transboundary harm has crystallized into a 
rule of customary law on the basis of substantial practice,229 including international con-
ventions evidencing the rule, such as Article 194 (2) of the 1982 United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 (UNCLOS)230 and, regionally, Article 20 (1) of 
the ASEAN (Association of East Asian Nations) Agreement on the Conservation of Nature 
and Natural Resources of 1985.231
In 1996, the ICJ confirmed the duty of states not to cause transboundary environmental 
harm in the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion.232 The Court 
recognized that “the environment is under daily threat,” it was no “abstraction but rep-
resents the living space, the quality of life and the very health of human beings, including 
generations unborn.” Therefore, it found, the “existence of the general obligation of States 
to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of 
other States or of areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of international 
law relating to the environment.” The no harm principle thus applies not only to states but 
also, at least in the environmental context, to areas beyond national control but whose pro-
tection is in the common interest. Meeting both of these criteria, the Court’s arguments in 
the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion can therefore be extended to the internet, as can the 
no harm principle.
No state may allow its territory to be used in a way that violates the rights of other states. 
This is echoed by the GGE in its 2015 report, which recalled, among the norms and stan-
dards, that “[s] tates should not knowingly allow their territory to be used for internationally 
wrongful acts” and that they “should also respond to appropriate requests to mitigate mali-
cious ICT activity aimed at the critical infrastructure of another State emanating from their 
territory, taking into account due regard for sovereignty.”233 The territory of a state, such as 
servers located territorially in a state, can be used to commandeer and steer bot networks 
used in cybercrime activities or even cyberattacks with or without terrorist purposes. If 
a state has the duty not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the 
rights of other states, then it must take preventive measures to stop such use. Recognizing 
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this, states have a positive obligation to provide for a secure cyber infrastructure that ensures 
that no cyberattacks stemming from their territory can cause damage to other states.234 This 
also indirectly protects the integrity of the internet insofar as preventive measures against 
criminal exploits of security gaps in national cyber- infrastructure installations can be used 
to conduct denial- of- service attacks that can endanger the internet’s stability.
3.3.4.10  Principle of Prevention and Due Diligence
Scholars differ as to whether the preventive principle has a due diligence dimension or 
whether “States’ due diligence obligations” are broadened “even towards the environment of 
the global commons” through the no harm principle.235 Similarly, the normative relation-
ships between the good neighborliness principle, the no harm principle, the sic utere tuo 
maxim, and the principles of prevention and due diligence are difficult to pin down.236 For 
Jutta Brunnée, it is the concept of good neighborliness “that gives rise to related procedural 
duties, such as those of notification and consultation in relation to transboundary harm.”237
Arguably, the no harm principle encompasses the sic utere tuo maxim and contains a 
preventive dimension that is concretized by due diligence obligations.238 That the no harm 
principle has a preventive dimension can already be read into the ICJ’s arguments in the 
Tehran Hostage Case, where the Court concluded that Iranian authorities had been required 
to take “appropriate steps” to prevent violations of international law.239 Similarly, Article 
3 of the ILC Draft Articles on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous 
Activities (2001)240 obliges states to take “all appropriate measures to prevent significant 
transboundary harm or at any event to minimize the risk thereof.” These preventive obli-
gations are substantial and include risk assessment (Article 7), notification and informa-
tion including transmitting “available technical [ . . . ] information” (Article 8), consultation 
on preventive measures (Article 9), exchange of information during hazardous activity 
(Article 12), information to the public (Article 13), contingency plans for responding to 
emergencies (Article 16), and notification of an emergency (Article 17). Prevention thus 
presupposes positive activities. The normative substance of the principle of prevention is 
substantiated by and translated into due diligence obligations.
As Timo Koivurova writes, “due diligence has developed mostly in the field of trans-
boundary physical harm, but there are also other branches of international law [ . . . ] that 
contain similar primary norms, norms requiring States to take diligent steps to achieve a 
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certain result.”241 Due diligence duties have also become relevant in the fight against ter-
rorism and its financing.242 Interestingly, the concept of due diligence first evolved in re-
lation to the responsibility of a state for private actors requiring them to take “preventive 
measures [. . . .] in its sphere of exclusive control when international law was breached by 
private persons.”243
Today, however, due diligence is not connected to activities of private actors. In interna-
tional law the notion “due diligence” is usually replaced by “all appropriate” or “all neces-
sary measures.” Article 7 (1) of the Convention on the Law of the Non- Navigational Uses 
of International Watercourses244 contains, for instance, a duty for watercourse states “in 
utilizing an international watercourse in their territories [to] take all appropriate meas-
ures to prevent the causing of significant harm to other watercourse States.” In an earlier 
version the rapporteur, Mr. Robert Rosenstock, had still proposed a wording using due 
diligence: “Watercourse States shall exercise due diligence to utilize an international water-
course in such a way as not to cause significant harm to other watercourse States [ . . . ].”245 
Similarly, Article 194 (2) of UNCLOS246 obliges states to take “all measures necessary to 
ensure that activities under their jurisdiction or control are so conducted as not to cause 
damage by pollution to other States and their environment.”
Neither the principle of prevention nor due diligence obligations directly protects the 
internet. However, the principle of prevention and internet- related due diligence obliga-
tions can have a substantial indirect impact on the internet’s integrity. The indirect impact 
of the no harm principle protects the internet’s integrity by forcing states to suppress il-
legal cybercrime activities on its territory and any actions that threaten the integrity of the 
internet. This duty has a clear preventive character. States have “an affirmative duty to prevent 
cyberattacks from their territory against other states,” which encompasses further preven-
tive duties, including “passing stringent criminal laws, conducting vigorous investigations, 
prosecuting attackers, and, during the investigation and prosecution, cooperating with the 
victim- states of cyberattacks that originated from within their borders.”247 Similar duties 
exist with regard to terrorism and its financing.248 What engages the state duty to pre-
vent attacks, apart from the abstract preventive duties, is knowledge of such activity— 
but presumptive knowledge suffices.249
The Tallinn Manual 2.0 contains rule 6 on due diligence, which obliges states to “exercise 
due diligence in not allowing its territory or cyber infrastructure under its governmental 
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 243 Timo Koivurova, “Due Diligence,” in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International 
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control, to be used for cyber operations that affect the rights of, and produce serious adverse 
consequences for, other States.”250 The reference in the GGE 2013 and 2015 reports (states 
“should” engage in due diligence)251 was overly cautious and does not reflect lex lata.252 The 
due diligence duty also extends extraterritorially in cases of military occupation or when 
governmental cyber infrastructure is located abroad.253 Rule 7 of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 
prescribes how states should comply with the due diligence principle: they need to take 
“all measures feasible in the circumstances” to end the cyber operation (coming from their 
territory) that affects other states’ rights or has serious adverse consequences for them.254 
This does not imply a duty to prevent the operation, which would be an unreasonable inter-
pretation of due diligence and, most likely, violate human rights commitments, as it would 
necessitate substantial filtering.255
Due diligence approaches refine the obligations of states especially in the areas of cy-
bercrime, cybersecurity, and capacity- building. The GGE in its 2015 report also devotes 
substantial space to due diligence obligations in the wider sense. Though there is no inter-
nationally agreed catalog of due diligence obligations indirectly protecting the integrity of 
the internet, central ones, based on the consensus report and prior commitments mainly in 
the UN framework, may be said to include:
 – that governments and other actors enhance the security of ICT systems and develop 
cybersecurity strategies that include, as a priority, the protection of critical informa-
tion infrastructures;256
 – that states acknowledge the challenge of attribution in case of ICT incidents before 
envisaging consequences;257
 – that states consider how best to set up information interchanges regarding the prose-
cution of terrorist and criminal uses of ICTs;258
 – that states support other states when their critical infrastructure is subject to malicious 
ICT acts and mitigate malicious ICT activity emanating from their territory;259
 – that states, in cooperation with the private sector, ensure that the integrity of the 
supply chain is intact so that end users can have confidence in the security of ICT 
products;260 and
 – that states should support responsible reporting of ICT vulnerabilities.261
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Less normatively settled than due diligence obligations are voluntary confidence- building 
measures that, though not yet part of due diligence obligations of states, normatively set 
the frame for emerging duties262 and contribute to international peace and security by 
increasing cooperation, transparency, predictability, and stability.263 They include:
 – identifying points of contact for serious ICT incidents;
 – developing mechanisms for interstate confidence- building;
 – encouraging transparency by e.g. sharing national views on national and transnational 
threats and best practices;
 – publishing national views of categories of infrastructure considered critical;
 – facilitating cross- border cooperation to address critical infrastructure vulnerabilities, 
including developing a repository of national laws, and mechanisms for consultations 
on protection of ICT- enabled critical infrastructure and on addressing ICT- related 
requests;264
 – strengthening cooperative mechanisms between agencies responsible for ICT security 
incidents and malicious ICT use;
 – establishing national computer emergency response/ cybersecurity incident response 
teams.265
Though going beyond existing due diligence obligations, we see the normative trajectory, es-
pecially when comparing these to the ILC Draft Articles on the Prevention of Transboundary 
Harm from Hazardous Activities (2001), which contain similar provisions— on transmit-
ting “available technical [ . . . ] information” (Article 9), on consultation on preventive meas-
ures (Article 13), on contingency plans for responding to emergencies (Article 16), and on 
the notification of an emergency (Article 17), to name but a few.
Beyond existing due diligence obligations, we also find capacity- building measures, 
which further elucidate the normative trajectory of the preventive principle coupled with 
the duties flowing from the principle of sustainable development. Recognizing that some 
states may lack the capacity to protect their ICT networks, states agreed in the GGE report 
to provide assistance to build ICT security capacities as “essential for international security, 
by improving the capacity of States for cooperation and collective action.”266 Building on 
General Assembly Resolution 64/ 211, “Creation of a global culture of cybersecurity and 
taking stock of national efforts to protect critical information infrastructures,”267 states are 
encouraged to, inter alia, assist in providing access to technologies essential for ICT secu-
rity and facilitate cross- border cooperation to address critical infrastructure vulnerabilities 
transcending national borders.268
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Due diligence obligations, coupled with further reaching good practices and with a view 
to increasing the protection of critical national information infrastructures, became a topic 
of the global community as early as the 2000s with two General Assembly resolutions on in-
ternational and national efforts to combat criminal misuses of information technologies,269 
and, following a broader approach to infrastructure protection, two Resolutions, in 2002– 
2003, on creating a global culture of cybersecurity.270
The follow- up 2010 General Assembly Resolution 64/ 211 on the global culture of cyber-
security expressly notes the importance of critical information infrastructures and the 
integrity of the information they carry, the importance of supporting national efforts by 
international collaboration, the “increasing contribution made by networked information 
technologies to many of the essential functions of daily life, commerce and the provision 
of goods and services, research, innovation and entrepreneurship, and [..] the free flow of 
information.” The Resolution also includes a “voluntary self- assessment tool for national 
efforts to protect critical information infrastructures.” Though voluntary, it is part of the 
increasingly densely woven fabric of international legal norms and normative expectations 
regarding the internet and can help clarify which obligations states have under the due dil-
igence principle.
3.3.4.11  Principle of Sustainable Development
Though at least one notable author has stated that there can be “little doubt that the concept 
of ‘sustainable development’ has entered into the corpus of international customary law,”271 
it is a general principle of international law and arguably more than just a “crucial political 
precept.”272 Conventions, such as the UN Convention on Biological Diversity,273 enshrine 
it and even the ICJ, in the case of the Gabčikovo- Nagymaros Project of 1997,274 referred to 
the “concept of sustainable development,” which expressed the need to “reconcile economic 
development with protection of the environment.” Judge Weeramantry, in his separate 
opinion, referred to sustainable development as a “principle with normative value” and an 
“integral part of modern international law [ . . . ] clearly of the utmost importance, both in 
this case and more generally.” The principle helps, according to Judge Weeramantry, to hold 
the balance even between environmental and developmental considerations and rests “on 
a basis of worldwide acceptance.”275 The concrete normative content of the principle, how-
ever, is difficult to establish.
The principle of sustainable development does not protect the internet directly. Yet the 
internet is essential for achieving the goals outlined in the UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development.276 The document identifies the building of resilient infrastructure, the 
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promotion of inclusive and sustainable industrialization, and the fostering of innovation 
as essential for sustainable development277 and includes a commitment, in Target 9.c, to 
“[s] ignificantly increase access to information and communications technology and strive 
to provide universal and affordable access to the internet in least developed countries by 
2020.” This study has also earlier identified the clear links between the internet and develop-
ment, as do UN documents on a regular basis. The 2010 General Assembly Resolution on 
the global culture of cybersecurity, for example, reaffirms “the need to harness the poten-
tial of information and communications technologies to promote the achievement of the 
internationally agreed development goals.”278 In this reading, the principle of sustainable 
development does not serve to protect the internet. Rather, information and communica-
tion technologies, and their development, “serve” to reach development goals, and their 
development- oriented use is essential for sustainable development.
3.3.5 Normative Acculturation
In the previous section we have seen how the integrity of the internet is protected and threats 
emanating from the internet and from its misuse are curtailed by international treaties, 
custom, and general principles of international law. The analysis has shown that there are 
currently no international universal conventions that protect the internet and its resources. 
Similarly, in light of the difficulties of establishing custom, it is no surprise that there has not 
yet emerged a customary rule directly protecting the integrity of the internet. Indirect pro-
tection can be found in existing customary law norms that protect territorial sovereignty 
and national critical infrastructure. These also protect the internet’s integrity. National ki-
netic resources of the internet, such as Internet Exchange Points, form part of such infra-
structure. But this protection is too indirect to be of much more than epistemic value.
This is not surprising as the extent and meaning of general principles of international law 
only crystallize over time and, being “general” principles, their normative content is not tai-
lored to any specific situation. However, a substantial number of general principles protect 
the internet indirectly or directly. At this point the different categories of norms in the wider 
context of due diligence should be noted: norms, standards, principles for responsible state 
behavior, as per the GGE report (2015), such as the important principle of due diligence, 
and confidence- building and capacity- building measures. This normative “acculturation” 
is an important phenomenon, which will also be of interest when discussing the normative 
order of the internet ( chapter 6).
The international law of the internet is a foundational order, containing key international 
standards for state behavior with regard to the internet. Some standards limit what states 
can do online, such as ius cogens norms forbidding interventions. Some empower states, 
but the majority of norms will have to be qualified as formally non- binding, yet as impor-
tant parts of an increasingly intricate and normatively graduated ordering structure or nor-
mative order— and they can only be properly understood and evaluated, contested, and 
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revised in that context. Together, the principles provide for more nuanced protection of the 
internet’s integrity and from dangers emanating from (mis)uses of the internet than states 
may think. They also provide a frame in which internet governance approaches take place, 
the “practice” of regulating the internet.
3.4 Internet Governance
3.4.1 Introduction
Internet governance is a complex process. Scholars speak of an “internet governmentality 
paradox”279 and an “internet governance oxymoron.”280 Yet internet governance is neither 
paradox nor oxymoron, though paradoxa and oxymora are present in the regulation of the 
internet and its actors. Internet governance, as governance generally, is complex and con-
sists of multiple layers and normative actors. In 2004, Karl Auerbach suggested that there 
were actually five different aspects of “the internet” that needed to be governed separately— 
that were thus issues of internet governance. These were
First, a system of IP address allocation [ . . . ]. Second, a system of inter- carrier/ inter- ISP 
traffic exchange [ . . . ]. Third, a system to allocate protocol numbers and other similar iden-
tifiers [ . . . ]. Fourth, the responsible and accountable operation of the upper layers of the 
DNS hierarchy including oversight, on behalf of the community of internet users, of a suite 
of Domain Name System (DNS) root servers. Fifth, the management of the DNS root zone 
file. [ . . . ]281
Most of these tasks are today within the remit of ICANN. If internet governance was really 
only governance of the internet’s critical resources, then it would be much less controversial 
and difficult to normatively frame than it is. However, this narrow notion of internet gov-
ernance does not reflect the governance challenges to which the internet exposes societies. 
It is true that the IP address allocation needs a regulatory frame and that the DNS root zone 
file needs to be managed in a way that is, if not democratically legitimate in the absence of 
global legitimacy- conferring decision- making procedures and oversight institutions, then 
at least accountable to the global multistakeholder community— as is the current setup.282 
Yet internet governance has become a much broader notion.
Visualizations of the ecosystem of internet governance have often relied on layered 
approaches including a social layer, a content layer, a logical- technical layer, and an in-
frastructure layer.283 Others have preferred to speak of five “baskets” of internet gov-
ernance issues:  infrastructure and standardization, legal, economic, development, and 
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sociocultural.284 Both approaches have in common the wish to stratify vertically or hori-
zontally the issues internet governance debates engage.285
In the context of this study, internet governance is important as a second foundational 
order of the internet, one that translates into practice the norms and normative expecta-
tions of the first order, international law. Delineating the two is difficult at the edges. A pro- 
capacity- building norm is, as a normative predecessor of a due diligence norm, part of 
international law. At the same time, capacity- building is a key factor within the social and 
infrastructure layers (or the sociocultural and development basket) of internet governance. 
It is not so much the clear delineation of legal and governance- related norms and practices 
that interest here, but rather governance as the practice of the participants in the normative 
order of the internet.
3.4.2 Concept
Internet governance is the steering and shaping, the coordinating and integrating of rules 
and normative expectations regarding the development of the internet. It has been defined 
by the UN- backed Working Group on internet governance as
the development and application by Governments, the private sector and civil society, in 
their respective roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, decision- making procedures, and 
programmes that shape the evolution and use of the internet.286
It becomes apparent that both on the level of actors— “governments, the private sector and 
civil society, in their respective roles”— and on the level of normative forms— “principles, 
norms, rules, decision- making procedures, and programmes”— internet governance is a 
multilayered process. It has been described as the internet’s “multi- layer multi- player mech-
anism of coordination and collaboration.”287 Briefly put, internet governance refers both to 
the evolution and implementation of ICTs necessary to keep the internet functional and to 
the decision- making on, contestation of, and implementation of substantive policies (and 
norms) around these technologies.288
Internet governance impacts the arrangements of technical architecture, which is, how-
ever, largely undisputed.289 It governs internet control points as sites of global conflict, with 
states progressively trying to re- nationalize oversight over “national internet segments” 
and thus contributing to fragmentation.290 A  key problem lies in the (lack of) internet 
governance (decision- making) infrastructure, which is informal and ad hoc and offers no 
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democratic proceduralization and legitimacy- conferral systems. Finally, the privatization 
of the internet in the sense that private spaces fulfill a central role as loci for discourse on 
issues of public interest has led to conflicts between states, companies, and users on the nor-
mative control over the internet and to normative disorder.291
3.4.3 Actors
Internet governance relies on the integration of all relevant actors in a process termed mul-
tistakeholderism. Examples of this (but often without explicitly referring to the notion) are 
present in many regimes, ranging from sustainable development292 and international peace-
building293 to fighting transnational terrorism and organized crime,294 from setting stan-
dards for accounting (International Accounting Standards Board) and securities (IOSCO) 
to corporate social responsibility (UN Global Compact) and fighting health- related crises 
(Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, Global Alliance for Vaccines and 
Immunization). Within the internet governance regime, however, the approach is applied 
most consistently.295
Taken together, the focus on the constituent actors in internet governance thus neces-
sitates normative cooperation from five actors with diverging roles: (1) states, who enjoy 
“[p] olicy authority for internet- related public policy issues” as a sovereign right; (2) the pri-
vate sector, enjoying an “important role in the development of the internet, both in the tech-
nical and economic fields;” (3) civil society, playing “an important role on internet matters, 
especially at community level;” (4) intergovernmental organizations, having a “facilitating 
role in the coordination of internet- related public policy issues;” and (5) international or-
ganizations, filling an important function “in the development of internet- related technical 
standards and relevant policies.”296 As intergovernmental organizations and international 
organizations are constituted by states (though with an independent international legal per-
sonality), this study can use a simplified and three- part model of involved actors that in-
cludes states, the private sector, and civil society.
Integrating, as a matter of principle, all actors has, by now, become an accepted feature 
of internet governance,297 even though the practice of integrating multiple actors is beset 
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by problems of capture of actors298 and has structural limits.299 Apart from very few un-
successful normative outliers favoring “multilateral” approaches,300 normative commit-
ments on internet governance continue to reiterate their support of a multistakeholder 
model, namely one involving all relevant actors in their respective roles. However, just as 
with ICANN’s commitment to accountability toward the “global stakeholder community,” 
commitments to “multistakeholderism” often seem to replace meaningful commitments 
to the actual integration of all actors in their relevant roles. Calls for multistakeholderism 
are often combined with the impetus of artificially creating a form of global democracy. In 
this light, integrating all actors must always fall short of the goal of “multistakeholderists.” 
Problematic as the concept is, international organizations, including within the UN system, 
have consistently committed to the concept in the context of internet regulation.
The most recent 2018 Human Rights Council resolution on human rights on the internet, 
just like the previous ones of 2012, 2014 and 2016, stressed the importance of a comprehen-
sive human rights- based approach to expanding access to an open and accessible internet, 
“nurtured by multi- stakeholder participation.” It further considered “the key importance” of 
engagement by states “with all relevant stakeholders, including civil society, private sector, the 
technical community and academia, in promoting and protecting human rights and funda-
mental freedoms online.”301 Indeed, states have the dual obligation to respect international 
human rights and to protect the human rights of individuals from abuse by third parties.302
The General Assembly, in its resolutions on the global culture of cybersecurity, highlighted 
that each actor has a responsibility “in a manner appropriate to their roles” and that the “mul-
tistakeholder model” of internet governance, realized in this case in the annual Internet 
Governance Forum, is essential “[to discuss] public policy issues related to key elements of 
internet governance in order to foster sustainability, robustness, security, stability and develo-
pment of the internet.”303
Even though ICANN’s attempts to engage with issues outside of its technical remit, 
such as the promotion of democracy, have been criticized,304 ICANN is the first private 
entity borne out of a non- formal, non- statal, decentralized, and non- international (or 
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international law- based) process to manage resources in the global common interest. 
ICANN has committed itself to including all relevant actors at all possible normative steps 
of any process, even though the practice suffers from functional deficits and problems of 
capture of the employed processes by powerful actors, states, companies, or individuals of 
high standing within the community exercising epistemic authority.
It is a serious error on the part of ICANN to simply commit to “multistakeholderism” and 
support the participation, through funds and programs, of selected members of the “multi-
stakeholder community,” especially from less developed regions. Reiterations of the notion 
and good- will gestures do not equal fairness in outcome. During the transition to ICANN 
of the NTIA’s role with regard to the coordination of the internet’s domain name system, the 
NTIA demanded, inter alia, that the new model must enjoy broad community support and 
“[s] upport and enhance the multistakeholder model” without defining either “community 
support” or the “multistakeholder model.”305 Though ICANN’s proposal remained unclear 
on the model of actor participation employed, the identification of the global “community,” 
or the level of its support, the IANA Stewardship Transition Proposal was accepted. Thus 
the “global multistakeholder community” is legally established as an actor within the ac-
countability architecture for the management of the internet’s public core, including its 
naming and addressing system.306
3.4.4 Evolution
3.4.4.1  Early Internet Governance Approaches
Already in the 1970s and 1980s, the US Federal Communication Commission supported 
the emergence of a free market in information services, through dismantling the AT&T 
monopoly and distinguishing traditional telecommunications and value- added telecom-
munication services, such as the transmission of data through networks (the technology 
at the basis of what is now the internet). It was this combination of “a competitive telecom-
munication infrastructure with the separation and deregulation of value- added informa-
tion services”307 that was important for the internet to develop. Indeed, these two policies 
together created an “ideal platform for the unrestricted spread of the global internet.”308 
Therefore, the history of the internet is also a history of state (de)regulation and thus of ac-
tive normative state involvement.
This normative involvement continued. As the usage practices of the internet complexi-
fied and the technology was progressively commercialized and politicized, states started to 
apply existing laws to internet- related cases (e.g. private law to online contracts) and, where 
necessary, created new laws (e.g. cybercrime statutes since nulla poena sine lege excluded 
analogies in criminal law). Yet the emergence of an internet governance framework took 
longer.
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Unlike many suppose, the internet’s critical resources have always been regulated.309 
The internet’s technological predecessors, such as ARPAnet, relied on the non- legal but 
no less effective instruments of informal coordination based on rough consensus among 
academics310 as well as other early users. Decisions on top- level domains were made by 
individuals who used technical expertise to formulate what they saw as common sense 
approaches. When internet pioneer Jon Postel sought to find combinations of letters to 
denote states, he adopted the International Organization for Standardization’s ISO- 3166 
standard of country codes.311 This solution seems sensible, but was taken by a single 
person whose legitimacy, as a scientist, was merely epistemic but not democratic, though 
it seems that Jon Postel tried hard to increase legitimacy by having different (mainly tech-
nical, business, and academic) stakeholders, who were also primarily epistemically le-
gitimate, confirm their agreement.312 The decision itself can be described as rationally 
legitimate, since it makes sense. But if such a decision was to be taken in the same way 
today, the relevant actors— states, civil society, and the private sector— would strongly dis-
agree for the reason of not having been consulted. This normative expectation is based on 
two decades of internet governance313 and intensive global debates on the evolution of a 
legitimate global policy framework.314 Early approaches to regulating the internet’s key 
resources therefore worked well because the technical community committed to ensuring 
the key architectural principles of the internet was small enough to take largely consensual 
decisions efficiently and shared a common regulatory culture. The US government played 
a “largely hands- off role”315 and the internet had not yet become a global and national 
public policy issue.
It was the critique of the privatization of the management of the DNS and its conferral to 
Networks Solutions, Inc. that substantially dynamized internet governance and led to calls 
for the transformation of the processes of managing CIRs by “internationalizing and diver-
sifying the structures of political control and accountability.”316 In 1998, as a result of this 
“DNS war,” the US committed to transitioning IANA functional management to a private 
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sector entity.317 Thus, the Internet Corporation of Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) 
was created to take over key coordination and management tasks for the internet: the coor-
dination of the internet domain names and of the address assignments, including the man-
agement of the root servers.318
The move to create ICANN (and task it with the IANA functions) effectively stopped 
efforts by the ITU and WIPO for a domain name administration system. The ICANN 
Statement of Policy by the US Department of Commerce expressly stated that “neither na-
tional governments acting as sovereigns nor intergovernmental organizations acting as 
representatives of governments should participate in management of internet names and 
addresses.”319 To alleviate concerns by other states for a continued monopolization of the 
management of the internet’s key resources, US authorities agreed to set up a Governmental 
Advisory Committee (GAC) within ICANN through which states could provide non- 
binding advice to the ICANN Board. Over 130 governments and more than thirty interna-
tional organizations are represented in the GAC.
Soon after ICANN’s creation, ITU officials started to promote a broader debate on gov-
ernance issues in the information society.320 In 2001, after preparation in ITU conferences, 
the UN General Assembly, “[recognizing] the pivotal role of the United Nations system in 
promoting development, in particular with respect to access to and transfer of technology 
[ . . . ] through partnerships with all relevant stakeholders,”321 embraced the organization 
of the two- tiered World Summit on the Information Society in 2003 (Geneva) and 2005 
(Tunis).
Under the patronage of the UN Secretary- General and with the ITU taking the lead, the 
WSIS meetings— including an extensive preparatory phase— allowed states to voice their 
criticism of ICANN, based mainly on the conviction that they should exercise more control 
over internet- related policy matters, insofar as “national aspects” of the internet, such as 
ccTLDs, national namespaces, and allocation of IP addresses to companies and registrars 
within the country were concerned. The US and private sector interests defended the status 
quo. The preparatory phase of WSIS also saw the emergence of coordinated civil society ac-
tivism and mobilization.
At WSIS, no concrete agreement on governance reform was reached, but the 11,000 
participants, including fifty heads of state or their representatives, 100 ministers from 
175 countries (in Geneva) and 19,000 participants, including fifty heads of state or their 
representatives and 200 ministers from 174 countries (in Tunis),322 adopted four key 
documents that contain fundamental commitments regarding the purpose of internet 
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governance: building a people- centered, development- oriented information society, based 
on international law and the UN Charter.323
3.4.4.2  First Normative Commitments
Before WSIS, no real debate had taken place regarding the role of states in internet gov-
ernance beyond general criticism of the US dominance. Yet as heterogeneous civil society 
and private sector emerged and partially consolidated (a process facilitated by the internet 
and ICTs324), they challenged not only, and not primarily, the role of the US regarding key 
internet resources, but the role of states in regulating behavior online within their jurisdic-
tion. Dutton and Peltu argued, “[p] eople do not seek to govern the internet or the informa-
tion society as such, but aim to achieve more immediate and focused objectives.”325 While 
this may be empirically true, the broader governance questions of the internet are connected 
to governments’ regulatory approaches online. Establishing the normative parameters of 
governance on the internet means— to a certain degree— establishing them for the govern-
ance of the internet.
Coming to WSIS, the US set out to defend its view that it was the only one who should 
hold a controlling role regarding the internet’s critical resources. This oversight position 
vis- à- vis ICANN was at that time enshrined through three instruments: the IANA contract 
with ICANN, the Memorandum of Understanding/ Joint Project Agreement between the 
DOC and ICANN, and the contract between the DOC and Verisign, Inc. regarding the 
managing of the root zone. During the WSIS process the US was adamant that it would 
“maintain its historic role in authorizing changes or modifications to the authoritative root 
zone file.” This commitment to the “effective and efficient operation of the DNS” was made 
in the 2005 U.S. Principles on the internet’s Domain Name and Addressing System.326 But in 
these Principles, the US for the first time acknowledged that other governments had “legit-
imate concerns” in terms of both public policy and sovereignty with regard to its manage-
ment of their ccTLD.327
This position is reflected in the Geneva outcome documents. In the Geneva Declaration 
of Principles, states agree that the “international management of the internet” (emphasis 
added; viz. not its governance) should be “multilateral, transparent and democratic, with 
the full involvement of governments, the private sector, civil society and international or-
ganizations.”328 The full involvement of all actors makes the distinction between multilat-
eral and multistakeholder one without immediately obvious difference. But the Declaration 
still envisaged a special role for states: “Policy authority for internet- related public policy 
 323 WSIS, Declaration of Principles, WSIS- 03/ GENEVA/ DOC/ 4- E, 12 December 2003; WSIS, Geneva Plan 
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issues is the sovereign right of States. They have rights and responsibilities for international 
internet- related public policy issues.”329 The reference to the “multilateral” management of 
the internet and the reference to the “full involvement” of governments and other actors are 
critiques of the special role of the US. But the role of non- state actors and their potential in-
fluence on public policy questions of internet governance remained unclear.
To remedy this, the Geneva Plan of Action, the second document of the WSIS’ first phase, 
called for the creation of a Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG), which was 
tasked with delineating public policy issues relevant to internet governance, developing an 
understanding of the roles and responsibilities of different actors, and defining the concept 
of internet governance.330 It was WGIG that drafted the most widely accepted definition of 
internet governance as
the development and application by Governments, the private sector and civil society, in 
their respective roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, decision- making procedures, and 
programmes that shape the evolution and use of the internet.331
WGIG also identified five— controversial— public policy areas relevant to internet govern-
ance (critical internet resources, spam/ network security, cybercrime, intellectual property 
rights/ trade, and development) and assessed the adequacy of existing governance arrange-
ments. It painted a dismal picture. There was no appropriate “global internet governance 
mechanism” to resolve the lack of a formal relationship between the root server operators 
and the uneven distribution of interconnection costs for ISPs in developing countries; there 
was a “lack of multilateral mechanisms” ensuring network stability and security of internet 
infrastructure services and applications; there were no “efficient tools and mechanisms” 
states could use to prevent and prosecute cybercrime; there was no unified, coordinated 
approach to fighting spam and not even a consensus on how to define spam; and there were 
“significant barriers” to multistakeholder participation in governance mechanisms because 
of a lack of “transparency, openness and participatory processes.” WGIG also raised human 
rights concerns: for reasons of security or fighting crime, measures were being taken that led 
to violations of the right to freedom of expression. In light of the NSA scandal and the dis-
covery of the “Five Eyes” surveillance architecture, the 2005 warning that there was a “lack 
of national legislation and enforceable global standards for privacy and data- protection 
rights over the internet”332 sounds clairvoyant.
Regarding the key public policy question— whether any one state should control the 
internet— WGIG clearly came out against US oversight: “No single Government should 
have a pre- eminent role in relation to international internet governance.” Governance of the 
internet should be “multilateral, transparent and democratic, with the full involvement of 
Governments, the private sector, civil society and international organizations [ . . . ] within 
their respective roles.”333
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WGIG also developed four models for alternative internet governance institutions that 
were to be present in the background of many of the following debates. These included the 
creation of an International Internet Council (IIC) to take over ICANN’s IANA compe-
tencies, the enhancement of the role of the GAC, the creation of a Global Internet Council 
(GIC) taking over the supervisory function of the DOC and that of the GAC, and the crea-
tion of a Global Internet Policy Council (GIPC), a World Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers (WICANN), and a Global Internet Governance Forum (GIGF).334
Most of the Tunis phase of WSIS was impacted both by the US Principles asserting sover-
eignty over the root zone file and the WGIG report with its determination that “[n] o single 
government” should be preeminent in the fulfillment of the internet governance function. 
Though political tensions were high in Tunis, states managed to adopt two documents. 
The Tunis Commitment and the Tunis Agenda for the Information Society affirm much 
of the principles elaborated in Geneva. The Tunis Agenda describes internet governance 
as an “essential element for a people- centred, inclusive, development- oriented and non- 
discriminatory Information Society.”335 Though the US managed to include language con-
firming “existing arrangements for internet governance,” which were effective in making 
the internet the “highly robust, dynamic and geographically diverse medium that it is 
today,”336 the Agenda rejects a US- led model: “all governments should have an equal role 
and responsibility for international internet governance and for ensuring the stability, secu-
rity and continuity of the internet.”337
The four WSIS outcome documents contain foundational principles for internet govern-
ance. Key among them is the affirmation of states, as per the Tunis Commitment, of their 
goal of a “people- centred, inclusive and development- oriented Information Society.”338 
This society should be premised on the “purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations, international law and multilateralism, and respecting fully and upholding 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights”339— and especially freedom of expression 
and the free flow of information, ideas, and knowledge as “essential for the Information 
Society.”340 States affirmed the importance for individuals “to achieve their full potential 
and to attain the internationally agreed development goals and objectives, including the 
Millennium Development Goals.”341 The Commitment also confirms the “universality, in-
divisibility, interdependence and interrelation of all human rights and fundamental free-
doms, including the right to development, as enshrined in the Vienna Declaration” and 
underlines the interdependence of democracy, sustainable development, respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, and good governance at all levels. In “international as in 
national affairs” relating to internet governance, states “resolve[d] to strengthen respect for 
the rule of law.”342
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Toward the end of the WSIS process, it became clear to the involved actors that Geneva 
and Tunis were only the starting points of the debate. Since no agreement could be reached 
on the creation of a new international organization with responsibilities for internet gov-
ernance or international oversight over ICANN (none of the models proposed by WGIG 
garnered substantial support), states agreed to keep the communicative channels open by 
asking the UN Secretary- General to create an “Internet Governance Forum” (IGF) as an 
“open and inclusive process.” The IGF was mandated, inter alia, to “[d] iscuss public policy 
issues related to key elements of internet governance in order to foster the sustainability, ro-
bustness, security, stability and development of the internet,” to “[i]dentify emerging issues, 
[ . . . ] and, where appropriate, make recommendations,” and to “promote and assess, on an 
ongoing basis, the embodiment of WSIS principles in internet governance processes.”343 
The key elements here are that the IGF is constituted as an ongoing process, rather than a 
single event, that it should ensure that internet governance processes reflect the principles 
agreed in WSIS, and that it has rights to make recommendations, a role it has not fulfilled.
3.4.5 Internet Governance Forum Process
The Internet Governance Forum, convened by the Secretary- General of the United Nations, 
is a unique annual meeting involving all interested actors. It now includes a broad array of 
intersessional activities, such as thematic Dynamic Coalitions, and a platform for discus-
sion on public policy issues regarding the internet, its use, and development.344 These ac-
tivities cultivate norm adherence through acculturation: norms that are developed by the 
actors in these open processes have great adherence pull, through self- identification as the 
norm- giver and subsequent norm propagation.
Since 2006, annual IGFs haven taken place in all regions of the world. As by their man-
date, they do not possess any decision- making power. They are forums involving all actors, 
but little more effective at (or formally legitimated for) the creation of new rules than a 
standard non- normative conference.345 They differ, however, from traditional international 
(diplomatic) conferences in that they allow and encourage multistakeholder access. Without 
solving the foundational problem of including all relevant actors— namely its inability to 
reflect the “full complexity of the actors and their interplay of objectives and motives that 
shape choices about the internet”346— IGFs still enable the participation by all on a formally 
equal footing. Especially to non- state actors, accustomed to being shut out of important 
deliberations in international conferences, the advances of the IGF setup were perceived 
as “a major conceptual innovation.”347 This perception as a new means of international 
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diplomacy overshadowed critique targeted at the limited normative progress and the failure 
to follow through on all aspects of the mandate, including giving recommendations.
However, including non- state actors in international deliberations is not a new phe-
nomenon. NGOs have had substantial input in international normative processes in the 
past, notably during the issue shaping of international criminal law leading up to the crea-
tion of the International Criminal Court (ICC),348 the elaboration of the ICC Statute itself, 
and the running of the ICC.349 What was novel in the IGF was its premise: discussions on 
the governance of an issue in the international common interest should be conducted on 
an equal footing by all actors’ groups. In that, it also had a crucial stabilizing function re-
garding the normative expectation of how norms with relevance for internet governance 
are developed— to the extent that other actors, such as standardization organizations or en-
gineering task forces, have started to adopt processes to similarly legitimize the norms they 
develop.350
Formally, IGFs show how issues of common interest can be discussed in multistake-
holder settings. They enshrine discursive practices and allow for the consolidation and reaf-
firmation of civil society policy networks. They allow for the airing of new ideas and are, as 
far as states are involved, an important example of public multilateral diplomacy. The added 
value of the IGFs are its agenda- setting function, the consolidation of critical issues, its an-
nual return which ensures that internet governance issues are put on the table regularly, 
the link the meetings provide to WSIS and the WSIS principles, and its function as a place 
to consolidate international networks of civil society actors. These include the so- called 
Dynamic Coalitions, which coalesce around a certain topic and continue to work outside 
IGF sessions. One example is the Internet Rights and Principles (IRP) Coalition, which has 
produced two normative documents on principles and rights for the internet.351
The creation of the IGF has thus led to an institutionalization of the dialog on internet 
governance with subject- area IGFs (such as the Youth IGF), regional IGFs (African IGF, 
Arab IGF, European IGF (EuroDIG)), and national IGFs (from Australia and Kenya to 
Russia and the UK). The numbers of participants vary from IGF to IGF, but have been be-
tween 1,000 (Athens 2006), 1,500 (Bali 2013), and 2,000 (Geneva 2017). IGFs also allow 
for remote participation, thus enabling the participation by non- present actors (1,700 in 
Geneva 2017).352
There are, however, obvious disadvantages to using the IGF. States who wish to be seen to 
adhere to the concept of integrating multiple actors while not actually supporting any solu-
tions coming out of “multistakeholder- led” processes might want to support governance 
decoys “deliberately designed to pre- empt governance.”353 Again, the mere commitment to 
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formal multistakeholderism (through similar speaking times for state and civil society rep-
resentatives, for example) seems to be a stand- in for more nuanced integration on an equal 
footing of different actors.
Dimitrov, who developed the concept of governance decoys with a view to the UN forest 
regime, saw a “conceptual disconnection between institutions and governance” and the 
United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF) as the “institutional excuse of government for 
not having an international forest policy.”354 Can a similar case be made against the IGF? 
The IGF is not a decoy for states to avoid being criticized for not having an internet govern-
ance policy. Rather, it evidences the fact that states have no coherent internet policy and that 
all actors still cannot agree on key internet governance principles. The very things that make 
the IGF a unique forum of public diplomacy make norm- development hard. It can (and 
by its mandate should) develop not binding norms but rather recommendations (which it 
has not successfully done). It cannot create international law. It cannot exemplify custom 
(though certain acts of participating states might be so construed).
Dimitrov argues that the UNFF is “singular” in that it was “deliberately designed not to 
deliver any policy output at all, and that all participating states wanted this.”355 This opens 
up an important distinction. The IGF was not created to not deliver any policy output, but 
rather not to be a decision- making forum. Identification of “emerging issues,” the making of 
recommendations, and the promotion of the “embodiment of WSIS principles in internet 
governance processes,” as WSIS outcome documents charged the IGF with doing,356 are 
clearly policy- oriented tasks. They are simply not normative in the classic understanding 
of international conferences adopting international norms. As Gunter Pleuger has shown 
though, developing norms is not a necessity for international deliberations to have norma-
tive impact.357
If a comparison to an entity clearly relevant for the development of international law 
was sought, IGFs could be linked to regime- specific preparatory forums (think tanks) of 
the International Law Commission with the task of identifying, aggregating, and articu-
lating issues of internet governance. Thus, IGFs are rather a practice within the emerging 
normative order of the internet, where expectations of participants are reinforced through 
discursive practices, networks essential for governance are created and strengthened, and 
thematic coalitions coalesce. This does not mean IGFs are unimportant— either factu-
ally or normatively. The General Assembly, in a 2012 resolution on ICTs for development, 
underscored the importance it attached to IGFs by stressing that all developing countries, in 
particular the least developed countries, needed to participate “in all Internet Governance 
Forum meetings” and needed support to that end.358
Ever since the first IGF, there have been suggestions regarding its reform. Key recom-
mendations include a more carefully tailored thematic approach on key policy questions 
and mutual reinforcement of discussions between the global and regional IGFs; the ability 
 354 Ibid., 18.
 355 Ibid., 20.
 356 WSIS, Tunis Agenda for The Information Society, WSIS- 05/ TUNIS/ DOC/ 6(Rev. 1)- E of 18 November 2005, 
para. 72.
 357 Cf. Gunter Pleuger, “Die normativen Wirkungen multilateralen Verhaltens,” in Andreas Fahrmeier (ed.), 
Rechtfertigungsnarrative. Zur Begründung normativer Ordnungen durch Erzählen (Frankfurt/ New York: Campus 
2013), 89– 99.
 358 The UN General Assembly, Resolution 67/ 195 of 21 December 2012, Information and communications 
technologies for development, UN Doc. A/ RES/ 67/ 195 of 5 February 2013, para. 19.
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to deliberate online and the increased capacity to sustain work programs between meetings; 
a more substantial management structure; more funding for a bureau of the IGF; and gen-
erally a more stable funding mechanism.359 Yet in the absence of a change in mandate, the 
IGFs “practice” remains outside of traditional international law- making processes. We also 
see, however, that in aggregate the selection of topics and the articulation of concerns can 
have a normative dimension as they stabilize normative expectation and may give rise to 
normative processes outside the conference setting.
Internet governance is still a young international field. In order to increase the norma-
tivity of governance arrangements and mechanisms and to translate normative practices 
into international law, internet governance may go the way of climate governance. Early 
climate diplomacy depended less on states and more on civil society and academia,360 
and states only later emerged, by necessity, as key players within the debate on the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change and the later Paris Agreement.
3.4.6 Politicization
In the year after the end of the WSIS process and the first IGF, 2006, the US Department of 
Commerce (DOC) reacted to international critique of the unilateral oversight of the DNS 
by reassessing its links to ICANN. ICANN and the DOC adopted a new Memorandum of 
Understanding that gave more independence to ICANN, but still allowed the US govern-
ment to retain ultimate control.361 The DOC’s underlying policy objective of “transitioning 
the technical coordination of the DNS to the private sector in a manner that promotes sta-
bility and security, competition, bottom- up coordination, and representation”362 was tested 
a year later in the .xxx case.
The question behind the .xxx case was whether ICANN should admit a new TLD (.xxx), 
sponsored by a private company, ICM Registry, in face of DOC and GAC expressions of 
discomfort, motivated by concerns for morality (the TLD was supposed to cater to the adult 
entertainment industry). After first allowing the new TLD, the ICANN Board reconsid-
ered.363 De facto vetoing a new TLD, whose admittance was within ICANN’s “core tech-
nical mission,” put into question whether the US “oversight” was really only targeted at 
ensuring the stability of the underlying DNS of the internet.364 The arbitration confirming 
the violation lasted until 2010. In the declaration, the panel held that the policy change was 
“not consistent with the application of neutral, objective and fair documented policy”365 
 359 IRP Coaliton “bestbits” (Jeremy Malcolm), Submission to IGF on themes and formats for the 2014 meeting, 
http:// bestbits.net/ igf- 2014- submission. Cf. also Reflections from APC on the IGF 2013 and recommendations for 
the IGF 2014, February 19, 2014, http:// www.apc.org/ en/ node/ 18977.
 360 Cf. Lorraine Elliott, “Climate Diplomacy,” in Andrew F. Cooper, Jorge Heine, and Ramesh Tahkur (eds.), The 
Oxford Handbook on Modern Diplomacy (Oxford: OUP, 2013), 840– 55 (842).
 361 Memorandum of Understanding/ Joint Project Agreement between the US Department of Commerce and 
ICANN, September 29, 2006, http:// www.icann.org/ en/ about/ agreements/ mou- jpa/ jpa- 29sep06- en.pdf.
 362 Ibid., 1.
 363 Cf. Milton Mueller, Networks and States: The Global Politics of Internet Governance (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
2010), 71– 3.
 364 Cf. NTIA, U.S. Principles on the Internet’s Domain Name and Addressing System, June 30, 2005, http:// www.
ntia.doc.gov/ other- publication/ 2005/ us- principles- internets- domain- name- and- addressing- system.
 365 International Centre for Dispute Resolution, ICM Registry, LLC v. ICANN, ICDR Case No. 50 117 T 00224 
08, Independent Review Panel Declaration (2010), https:// www.icann.org/ en/ news/ irp/ icm- v- icann, 70.
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and could be traced back to ICANN’s receipt of two letters by the Assistant Secretary for 
Communications and Information of the US Department of Commerce and the Chairman 
of the GAC.366
The panel367 held 2– 1 that ICANN was “charged with acting consistently with rele-
vant principles of international law, including the general principles of law recognized as 
a source of international law,”368 and specifically the principle of good faith. This finding 
relied on Article 4 of ICANN’s Articles of Incorporation, which obliges ICANN to carry 
out its activities “in conformity with the relevant principles of international law and appli-
cable international conventions and local law.”369 ICM Registries relied on the reference 
to international legal principles to introduce the notion of “good faith” which ICANN was 
supposed to have violated (as the panel confirmed).370 ICANN’s denial to admit .xxx to the 
domain space showed that the argument of ICANN being merely a technical actor, imple-
menting technical standards without a view to moral questions, was insincere and that gov-
ernments (especially the US) were willing and able (though not through binding action) to 
enforce their offline values (objection to pornography) to online surroundings.
The case also shows how governance and international legal questions are intertwined 
when it comes to regulating the internet and its key resources and that ICANN, as well as its 
critics, use international legal arguments to frame the responsibilities of the organization. 
The previously confirmed hypothesis that the normative order of the internet encompasses 
international legal rules, national legal rules, and transnational normative arrangements is 
again given substance by cases such as this that show how norms of different “affiliation,” 
pedigree, and bindingness are applied in concert and without clearly defined hierarchical 
relationships.
In reaction to criticism of its handling of the .xxx case, the US continued to implement 
its policy of privatizing ICANN’s IANA functions. In 2009, ICANN and the Department 
of Commerce concluded the Affirmation of Commitments (AOC) that supplanted the Joint 
Project Agreement, one of the three ties between the DOC and ICANN.371 With the IANA 
contract still in place at that time,372 the Affirmation of Commitments nominally increased 
ICANN’s independence by including a (rather weak) accountability framework.373 In the 
 366 Ibid., 14.
 367 Consisting of former president of the International Court of Justice, Stephen M. Schwebel, as Chair, the 
former president of the London Court of International Arbitration and the World Bank Administrative Tribunal, 
Jan Paulsson, and Dickran M. Tevrizian, a US federal judge for the Central District of California.
 368 International Centre for Dispute Resolution, ICM Registry, LLC v. ICANN, ICDR Case No. 50 117 T 00224 
08, Independent Review Panel Declaration (2010), https:// www.icann.org/ en/ news/ irp/ icm- v- icann, 64.
 369 Articles of Incorporation of Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, November 21, 1998, 
http:// www.icann.org/ en/ about/ governance/ articles, Art. 4.
 370 International Centre for Dispute Resolution, ICM Registry, LLC v. ICANN, ICDR Case No. 50 117 T 00224 
08, Independent Review Panel Declaration (2010), https:// www.icann.org/ en/ news/ irp/ icm- v- icann, 54: ICANN 
disagreed, arguing that it was not bound, as a private party, to international law in a dispute between private enti-
ties located in one country. The issue was not decided by the panel, which argued that good faith as a principle was 
present in all— international and national— legal orders.
 371 Affirmation of Commitments by the United States Department of Commerce and the Internet Corporation 
for Assigned Names and Numbers, September 30, 2009, https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/affirmation-of- 
commitments-2009-09-30-en.
 372 Cf. A. Michael Froomkin, “Almost Free: An Analysis of ICANN”s “Affirmation of Commitments”“, Journal of 
Telecommunications and High Technology Law 9 (2011), 187– 233.
 373 Cf. Milton Mueller, Networks and States:  The Global Politics of Internet Governance (Cambridge:  MIT 
Press, 2010), 249– 50. But see, for a more positive take, Mawaki Chango, “Accountability in Private Global 
Governance: ICANN and Civil Society,” in Jan Aart Scholte (ed.), Building Global Democracy?: Civil Society and 
Accountable Global Governance (Cambridge: CUP, 2011), 267– 88 (270– 1).
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AOC, the NTIA also committed to “a multi- stakeholder, private- sector- led, bottom- up 
policy development model for DNS technical coordination.”374
From 2010 onwards, responsibility for internet governance seemed to move from tech-
nical entities to foreign policy makers. China and Russian authorities argued, in 2010 
and 2011, for a stronger “internationalization” (read: nationalization) of the internet,375 
and then- US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton started a foreign policy initiative tailored 
around the concept of “internet freedom,” an open and secure internet based on human 
rights and dignity.376
Further, in 2010, ICANN introduced the first internationalized domain names in 
Arabic and Chinese, thus opening the ccTLDs for top- level domains in non- Latin- based 
local scripts.377 In light of this first successful attempt at internationalizing the names 
and numbering system, and the stronger infusion of internet governance in foreign 
policy, the Council of Europe (CoE), the Association of Progressive Communications 
(APC), and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) published, 
in 2010, a Code of Good Practice on Information, Participation and Transparency in 
Internet Governance378 that called for sharing information and increasing transparency 
in internet governance processes. It was less a compilation of internet governance prin-
ciples and more a meta- compilation of how to reach these principles, but also a pre-
figuration of the year 2011, which would be determinative for the future of internet 
governance.
3.4.7 Taxonomy of Internet Governance
The commitments to integrating all actors in normative processes notwithstanding, 
there is considerable uncertainty about what exactly this entails in practice. There is 
no single accepted model of including all actors in governance- related processes on the 
internet; it is therefore a misnomer to speak of “the multistakeholder model for internet 
governance.”379 Commitments to such a model are more evidence of a common intel-
lectual heritage of the speakers or of a shared impetus to create an artificial semblance 
 374 AOC (2009), para. 4. DOC also confirmed the relevance of (global) public interest: “[a] private coordinating 
process, the outcomes of which reflect the public interest, is best able to flexibly meet the changing needs of the 
Internet and of Internet users” (emphasis added).
 375 Cf. People’s Republic of China, State Council, The Internet in China, June 8, 2010, http:// www.china.org.
cn/ government/ whitepaper/ node_ 7093508.htm, sect. I:  “China holds that the role of the UN should be given 
full scope in international Internet administration. China supports the establishment of an authoritative and just 
international Internet administration organization under the UN system through democratic procedures on a 
worldwide scale.”
 376 Cf. US Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, Internet Freedom Fact Sheet, February 15, 2011, http:// 
www.state.gov/ r/ pa/ prs/ ps/ 2011/ 02/ 156623.htm.
 377 ICANN, Internationalized Domain Names, http:// www.icann.org/ en/ resources/ idn. See, further, the imple-
mentation plan for IDNs: ICANN, Final Implementation Plan for IDN ccTLD Fast Track Process, November 5, 
2013, http:// www.icann.org/ en/ resources/ idn/ fast- track/ idn- cctld- implementation- plan- 05nov13- en.pdf.
 378 Council of Europe/ APC/ UNECE, Code of Good Practice on Information, Participation & Transparency in 
Internet Governance, https:// www.apc.org/ en/ system/ files/ COGP_ IG_ Version_ 1.1_ June2010_ EN.pdf.
 379 Mark Raymond and Laura DeNardis, “Multi- stakeholderism:  Anatomy of an Inchoate Global 
Institution,” Centre for International Governance Innovation Paper Series No. 41, September 2016, https:// 
www.cigionline.org/ sites/ default/ files/ gcig_ no.41web.pdf (also as Mark Raymond and Laura DeNardis, 
“Multistakeholderism: Anatomy of an Inchoate Global Institution,” International Theory 7 (2015) 3, 572– 616 (9)).
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of global democracy in small formats. Various tasks within the internet’s regulatory 
field are fulfilled by different actors within normative structures by adopting norma-
tive instruments of varied bindingness. Similar to the distributed architecture of the 
internet (with root servers around the world to ensure stability and reduce lag), the gov-
ernance tasks are also distributed between normative layers (local- national- regional- 
supranational- international) and actors, actor groups, and institutions. The functional 
areas of internet governance can be used to disaggregate the responsibilities to be dis-
tributed among internet governance actors: control of critical internet resources, setting 
internet standards, access and interconnection coordination, cybersecurity governance, 
information intermediation, and enforcement of intellectual property rights, to give just 
a few examples.380
One level of granularity higher, the variety of tasks within the functional areas illus-
trates both the difference between governance- oriented and international law- based ap-
proaches. International law has little to say (beyond providing a general distribution of 
responsibilities) about, for example, app mediation (including the rules on monetization 
within app stores), but a lot about assessing governmental requests for content removal 
(consider issues of sovereignty, extraterritoriality, fundamental rights). Internet govern-
ance, as a concept, appears more holistic because it encompasses the whole gamut of 
internet regulation(s). This makes governance- oriented analysis of normative dynamics 
useful but may lead to normative overcrowding in the sense that a non- manageable 
plethora of standards and principles is developed with governance processes that are 
not tied to existing or crystallizing international legal duties. In this sense, international 
law is a normative anchor for developments in internet governance processes. All these 
normatively relevant processes and outcomes form part of the hybrid normative order 
of the internet.
The normative instruments used in internet governance are defined as “shared princi-
ples, norms, rules, decision- making procedures, and programs that shape the evolution 
and use of the internet.”381 Shared principles have evolved into an important normative 
instrument in internet governance. They are well suited to unite the diverging normative 
trajectories of enabling economic progress, providing for security and ensuring human 
rights. From 2011 onwards, different states and groups of states, international and inter-
governmental organizations, and non- state actors published declarations of principles (or 
“compact” or “strategy”).382 Though non- binding, these principles have orientative value, 
can be considered “rational reconstructions” of legal discourse,383 and exert normative in-
fluence on actors. Due to their variety, they are also an element of normative disorder be-
tween layers.384
 380 Cf. ibid., 10– 11.
 381 Report of the Working Group on Internet Governance (2005), http:// www.wgig.org/ docs/ WGIGREPORT.
pdf.
 382 For an overview, see Rolf H. Weber, Principles for Governing the Internet a Comparative Analysis 
(Paris:  UNESCO, 2015), http:// unesdoc.unesco.org/ images/ 0023/ 002344/ 234435e.pdf and the declarations of 
principles quoted in notes 765 to 775 therein.
 383 Matthias Goldmann, “Principles in International Law as Rational Reconstructions. A Taxonomy,” November 
13, 2013, https:// ssrn.com/ abstract=2442027.
 384 See 4.2.2.
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Norms and rules are largely synonymous, but this study will focus on “norms.”385 
Some instruments— procedures and programs— do not prescribe (actual) behavior of 
social actors within the normative order. Others, such as principles, are the “produc-
tion of conceptual abstractions.”386 However, all these instruments are nevertheless 
normative in that they guide the normative orientation of the internet’s order (princi-
ples), influence the evolution of norms (procedures), or shape user behavior (programs). 
Programs are written in code and contain algorithms.387 Algorithms, especially, can be 
unpacked in order to discover their normative content. A key hypothesis of this study is 
that the normative order as presented here is based on an inclusive concept of norma-
tivity that extends to all instruments of governance alike and does not exclude “tech-
nical” artifacts, such as lines of code or algorithms.388 They all form part of the internet’s 
normative order.
3.4.8 Principle Hype
The year 2011 saw the emergence of three related phenomena that foreshadowed much of the 
internet governance debate today: first, the debate on state duties toward the internet intensi-
fied. On January 28, 2011, on instruction by the Mubarrak regime, Egyptian ISPs withdrew 
the Border Gateway Protocols (BGPs), thus effectively shutting the country off the internet.389 
A similar internet shutdown occurred before the intervention in March 2011 in Libya.390
Second, the discussion on the role of human rights online intensified. The UN Special 
Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, Frank La Rue, published his influential report on 
the overwhelming importance of freedom of expression online, as an essential “enabler” of 
the exercise of other rights through the internet: “by acting as a catalyst for individuals to 
exercise their right to freedom of opinion and expression, the internet also facilitates the re-
alization of a range of other human rights.”391
Third and most importantly, 2011 proved to be the year of the “internet principle hype.”392 
It was an interesting example of international institutional psychology, normative peer pres-
sure, and norm diffusion that different actors felt, at the same time, that internet governance 
merited more than a general commitment to principles, as had been achieved in WSIS, but a 
more detailed principled approach. Developing principles for internet governance is a nor-
mative endeavor that tells a lot about the norm producers and their intentions, especially in 
a critical and comparative perspective. By publishing principles, different actors publicize 
 385 See 1.2.3.
 386 Matthias Goldmann, “Principles in International Law as Rational Reconstructions. A Taxonomy,” November 
13, 2013, https:// ssrn.com/ abstract=2442027.
 387 Jeremy Malcolm, Multi- Stakeholder Governance and the Internet Governance Forum (Perth: Terminus Press, 
2008), 138.
 388 See 2.4.3.
 389 Cf. James Cowie, “Egypt Leaves the Internet,” January 28, 2011, http:// www.renesys.com/ blog/ 2011/ 01/ 
egypt- leaves- the- internet.shtml.
 390 Cf. Matthias C. Kettemann, “Das Internet  als internationales Schutzgut:  Entwicklungsperspektiven des 
Internetvölkerrechts anlässlich des Arabischen Frühlings,” ZaöRV 72 (2012), 469– 82 (470).
 391 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression, Frank La Rue, UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 17/ 27 of 26 April 2011.
 392 Wolfgang Kleinwächter, “Internet Principle Hype: How Softlaw is Used to Regulate the Internet”, dotnxt, 
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their normative expectations and assert not only which rules could apply but also which 
should apply. In that, the principles— their divergences and convergences— inform us about 
actors’ views on certain rules of the internet, some of which can develop or have developed 
into binding international law.
To name but a few:393 US President Barack Obama proposed an International Strategy for 
Cyberspace;394 Brazil, India, and South Africa— on behalf of the Group of 77— proposed 
to launch a new intergovernmental working group on internet governance;395 and China, 
Russia and two Asian nations proposed an International Code of Conduct for Information 
Security396 (which China still considered important enough to submit to the 2014 
NetMundial meeting in Brazil397). International organizations developed governance 
concepts as well. UNESCO published a Code of Ethics for the Information Society,398 the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) adopted a Declaration on 
Pluralism and Internet Governance,399 and OECD developed a Communiqué on Principles 
for Internet Policy Making.400 The Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers adopted a 
well- received Declaration on Internet Governance Principles.401 The Vice- President of the 
European Commission, Neelie Kroes, presented an Internet Compact402 and non- state ac-
tors, such as the Internet Rights and Principles Coalition, published collections of human 
rights online— in the Coalition’s case, the Charter for Internet Rights and Principles.403 The 
political importance of developing principles for internet governance also trickled up (in 
an interesting reversal of more traditional trickle- down diplomacy) to traditional meet-
ings between powerful states. The G8 (Group of 8) Summit of Deauville adopted a Renewed 
Commitment for Freedom and Democracy404 with implications for the internet and the 
 393 For a more complete overview, see Rolf H. Weber, Realizing a New Global Cyberspace Framework 
(Zurich: Schulthess, 2016), 147.
 394 US President Barack Obama proposed 10 principles in his strategy paper in May 2011, see President 
of the United States of America, International Strategy for Cyberspace. Prosperity, Security and Openness in a 
Networked World, May 2011, http:// www.whitehouse.gov/ sites/ default/ files/ rss_ viewer/ international_ strateby_ 
for_ cyberspace.pdf, 10.
 395 India, Brazil, and South Africa— on behalf of the Group of 77— proposed to launch a new “inter- 
governmental working group [to] be established under the UN Commission on Science and Technology for 
Development,” IBSA Joint Statement, Open consultations on Enhanced Cooperation, New York, December 14, 
2010, http:// www.un.int/ india/ 2010/ IBSA%20STATEMENT.pdf.
 396 Letter dated 12 September 2011 from the Permanent Representatives of China, the Russian Federation, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary- General, UN Doc. A/ 66/ 359 of 14 
September 2011, http:// blog.internetgovernance.org/ pdf/ UN- infosec- code.pdf.
 397 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, International Code of Conduct for Information 
Security, submission to NetMundial, http:// content.netmundial.br/ contribution/ international- code- of- conduct- 
for- information- security/ 67.
 398 UNESCO, Code of Ethics for the Information Society, proposed by the Intergovernmental Council of the 
Information for All Programme (IFAP), 36 C/ 49, October 10, 2011, http:// goo.gl/ nZ0lk.
 399 OSCE, 8th South Caucasus Media Conference, Declaration:  Pluralism and Internet governance, Tbilisi, 
Georgia, October 20– 21, 2011, http:// www.osce.org/ fom/ 84371.
 400 OECD Communiqué on Principles for Internet Policy Making, OECD High Level Meeting: The Internet 
Economy: Generating Innovation and Growth, June 28– 29, 2011, Paris, http:// www.oecd.org/ dataoecd/ 40/ 21/ 
48289796.pdf.
 401 Council of Europe, Declaration by the Committee of Ministers on Internet governance principles, adopted 
on September 21, 2011, http:// goo.gl/ RxDWs.
 402 Vice- President of the European Commission Neelie Kroes, Internet Compact, http:// blogs.ec.europa.eu/ 
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 403 Cf. Internet Rights and Principles Coalition, 10 Internet Rights and Principles, http:// internetrightsandprin-
ciples.org.
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World Economic Forum (WEF) adopted a Code of Conduct for Government Leaders405 that 
bears upon internet policymaking. Most collections of principles gravitate to certain topics. 
These include access and openness, freedom of expression, privacy, ethics more generally, 
participation by all relevant actors, gender equality, sustainable development and cul-
tural diversity, science, and education— with diverging emphasis according to normative 
preferences.406
Attempts to reorient normative processes toward international organizations by the ITU, 
which was in the process of passing new International Telecommunication Regulations407 to 
be adopted in 2012 in Dubai at the World Conference on International Telecommunications 
(WCIT- 12), met with strong resistance.408 In the negotiation process, a number of 
sovereignty- oriented states, such as Russia and China, but also India, Brazil, and South 
Africa, tried to reassert national control over some aspects of internet governance, namely 
the “national internet segment,” by extending the reach of ITU norms to other aspects of ICT 
management. They suggested including into the purview of the ITRs parts of what has been 
described in this study as the internet’s public core. This attempted nationalization by way 
of a multilateral “internationalization” in ITU was met with the strong opposition of almost 
half of ITU’s member states, which led to a stalemate at the Summit.409
The progressive mainstreaming of the concept of globalization of internet governance 
is also illustrated by two resolutions, seven years apart, by the US Congress and the House 
of Representatives, respectively, regarding the US approach to internet policy. Shortly be-
fore the Tunis phase of WSIS, in the 2005 resolution Expressing the sense of the Congress 
regarding oversight of the internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers,410 the 
US legislature cautioned that “internet governance discussions in the World Summit 
should focus on the real threats to the internet’s growth and stability, and not recommend 
changes to the current regime of domain name and addressing system management and 
coordination on political grounds unrelated to any technical need.” According to para-
graph 2, changes to the root zone server and the oversight system were unnecessary: “the 
authoritative root zone server should remain physically located in the United States and 
the Secretary of Commerce should maintain oversight of ICANN.” The resolution was 
adopted unanimously.
3.4.9 Critique
Presenting existing issues raised in internet governance reform processes is important for 
this study because the reform process identifies normative dissonances between the values 
the actors have committed themselves to, including international law, human rights, and 
 405 World Economic Forum, Code of Conduct for Government Leaders (2011), http:// www3.weforum.org/ 
docs/ WEF_ GAC_ InformedSocieties_ CodeConductGovernmentLeaders_ Summary_ 2012.pdf.
 406 Cf. Rolf H. Weber, Realizing a New Global Cyberspace Framework (Zurich: Schulthess, 2016), 147, 23– 74.
 407 ITU, International Telecommunication Regulations (ITRs), http:// www.itu.int/ ITU- T/ itr.
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International Telecommunication Regulations,” ASIL Insights 17 (2013) 6, https:// www.asil.org/ insights/ volume/ 
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development, as per the WSIS outcome documents, and the status quo. But the standards 
and architecture of internet governance were seen very critically by actors. Summarizing 
their criticism of internet governance, the following main points of critique emerge:
 – first, the continued oversight by the US over critical internet resources (before the 
IANA transition in 2016);
 – second, the failure to harness the internet’s potential for development based on a con-
viction that the current setup entrenches the interests of the North and marginalizes 
the Global South and that the promise of WSIS remains unfulfilled;
 – third, the lack of legitimate processes for developing internet governance. The IGF is 
seen as having underperformed, and commitments to the normatively flexible notion 
of “multistakeholderism” are used as a fig leaf for stasis and for the lack of a coherent 
vision of normative progress on the internet and in the many institutions and commis-
sions working in parallel on its development;
 – fourth, the power of the private sector (internet content provider and internet service 
providers) without clear lines of legitimacy and accountability; and
 – fifth, the renationalization/ resovereignization of the internet characterized by a na-
tionalization of oversight over global public policy issues of the internet, state- led ini-
tiatives on sectorial issues, such as cybersecurity, cybercrime, and cyber- warfare, that 
are insufficiently reflective of other actors, and the recurring argument of sovereignty 
over the “national internet segment.”411
There have been a number of suggestions on the best means to ensure inclusive, transparent, 
accountable, and effective internet governance processes that operationalize existing com-
mitments, are stable enough to ensure the internet’s functionality, and are flexible enough to 
deal with upcoming challenges. These include:
 – the creation of a UN Committee of fifty members with a mandate over public policy 
issues of the internet and oversight of the technical bodies;412
 – a Multistakeholder Internet Policy Council under the auspices of or attached to the 
IGF, made up of equal numbers of representatives from all actor groups to discuss is-
sues forwarded to it by IGF plenaries and to agree by rough consensus mechanisms on 
non- binding recommendations;413
 411 Cf. ECOSOC, Report of the Working Group on Improvements to the Internet Governance Forum, A67/ 65- 
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governmental stakeholders, see bestbits (Jeremy Malcolm), Internet Governance: proposals for reform, with con-
tributions from Access, Article 19, CDT, CTS/ FGV, GPD, Internet Democracy Project (2014); IT for Change 
India, A Development Agenda in Internet Governance Outlining Global Public Policy Issues and Exploring 
New Institutional Options, April 2012, http:// www.itforchange.net/ sites/ default/ files/ ITfC/ %20%20Dev%20
agenda%20in%20IG%20200412.pdf; Avri Doria, “The IETF as a model for the IGF,” http:// www.intgovforum.
org/ contributions/ IETF- as- model.pdf.
 412 Centre for Internet and Society, India’s Statement Proposing UN Committee for Internet- Related Policy, 
October 26, 2011, http:// cis- india.org/ internet- governance/ blog/ india- statement- un- cirp.
 413 Jeremy Malcolm, My proposal to the CSTD Working Group on Enhanced Cooperation (2011), http:// 
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 – a coordinating body under the CSTD to identify issues and appropriate institutions to 
deal with them in a distributed multistakeholder process;414
 – self- forming multistakeholder issue processes to suggest non- binding solutions to spe-
cific questions of public policy on the internet.
None of these approaches has come close to being used. Even applying permissive cri-
teria of inclusivity, transparency, accountability, and effectiveness, all models have se-
rious shortcomings. A single body with overall control of the internet would be very 
powerful and its decisions highly controversial. Only firm international legal founda-
tions would allow for such a body to function effectively, but this would not guarantee 
its legitimacy. The other suggestions, while more inclusive, suffer from serious doubts 
as to their effectiveness. Non- binding resolutions and soft law are important normative 
instruments,415 but certain public policy questions can— under current international 
law— be very difficult to resolve outside of traditional regimes dominated by states as the 
(continued) repositories of legitimate international policy approaches through demo-
cratic processes.
3.4.10 Reform
Other reform proposals focus directly on key institutions of the current internet infrastruc-
ture. The IGF could take up the role of observatory with a reporting duty to the interna-
tional community; a space for adopting messages to all actors; or a watchdog for actors with 
critical issues through an international internet policy review similar to the Human Rights 
Council’s Universal Periodic Review process, in which all states undergo a peer- based 
human rights assessment at regular intervals.416 But implementing any of these suggestions 
would demand a substantial revision of the role of the IGF. Instituting a UPR- like process 
would necessitate an international agreement. The majority of states are, at the present stage 
of international legal development, unable or unwilling to submit to a formalized policy re-
view at the hand of (also) non- state actors.
What unites the models is the importance of achieving a greater sense of clarity as to who 
discusses internet- related public policy questions. The centralization of issue- unspecific 
decision- making power is highly problematic from both a policy and a pragmatic perspec-
tive. However, leaving decision- making structures on public policy issues uninstitution-
alized risks nationalization through sovereignty- oriented states. The key challenge thus 
seems to lie in establishing whether there can be one model of governance of the internet 
with an entity including all relevant actors with clearer responsibilities for public policy 
questions and ad hoc issue- specific working groups.
 414 Anja Kovacs, “A Third Way? Proposal for a Decentralised, Multistakeholder Global Internet Governance 
Involving All Stakeholders” (2011) http:// internetdemocracy.in.
 415 Rolf H. Weber, “Overcoming the Hard Law/ Soft Law Dichotomy in Times of (Financial) Crises,” Journal of 
Governance and Regulation 1 (2012), 8– 14.
 416 Cf. Wolfgang Kleinwächter, “Towards an Improvement of the IGF. Eight Proposals for an Enhanced 
Role of the IGF,” March 14, 2011, http:// www.unctad.info/ upload/ CSTD- IGF/ Contributions/ M1/ Wolfgang_ 
Kleinwachter.pdf.
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In order to remedy critique of its lack of accountability to any institution but the US 
government, ICANN, in early 2014, published reports by two panels on its future out-
lining vectors for reform. The first panel, dedicated to parsing and improving ICANN’s 
role within the internet ecosystem, concluded that reliance on all actors should be 
“elaborated and reinforced.”417 All actors, including ICANN, had “a shared or entangled 
responsibility for the stewardship of the common internet infrastructure.”418 Therefore, 
ICANN was to globalize, but not internationalize:  “Countries are stakeholders, to be 
sure, but the structure of ICANN and its associated or related institutions are now and 
should become increasingly global or regional in scope.”419 The root zone manage-
ment should be consolidated and simplified and agreement should be reached on an 
accountability mechanism, which is “broadly accepted as being in the global public 
interest.”420 Generally, the report underlines the importance of increasing accounta-
bility and enmeshing ICANN in a “web of affirmations of commitments,” tailored to its 
responsibilities.421
The second strategy panel, on “multistakeholder innovation,” highlighted the im-
portance of making ICANN more effective (transparent, smart, cost- effective) and le-
gitimate:  “[a] nyone must [  . . .  ] have easy and equitable access to participate in the 
process of shaping the policies and standards of the internet that ICANN helps facili-
tate.”422 One avenue proposed to increase ICANN legitimacy is including subsidiarity 
approaches and leaving issues that can be administered at a less- centralized level to 
other entities, those “best equipped and most competent” to handle them. The reports 
of both panels pointed the way to the adoption, in 2016, of the IANA transition, which 
allowed ICANN to change its bylaws in a way that represents more accountability to 
the global actor community. The transition has alleviated all concerns regarding the US 
dominance over the internet’s public core and has immunized ICANN against critique 
in this regard.
In February 2014, the European Commission presented a Communication on Europe’s 
role in shaping the future of internet governance423 to guide EU institutions through 
the internet governance debates. As the surveillance revelations had raised doubts as to 
the “stewardship of the US,”424 the Commission suggested creating a clear timeline for the 
globalization of ICANN and the IANA functions, strengthening the IGF, creating a set of 
 417 Vinton G. Cerf et  al., “ICANN’s Role in the Internet Governance Ecosystem,” Report of the ICANN 
Strategy Panel, February 20, 2014, http:// www.icann.org/ en/ about/ planning/ strategic- engagement/ governance- 
ecosystem/ report- 20feb14- en.pdf, 4 (emphasis added).
 418 Ibid., 5 (emphasis added).
 419 Ibid., 8– 10.
 420 Suggestion on / 1net listserv by George Sadowsky, January 22, 2014 “[discuss] Problem definition 1, version 
5”, http:// 1net- mail.1net.org/ pipermail/ discuss/ 2014- January/ 001400.html, as cited in Vint Cerf, Patrick Ryan, 
and Max Senges, “Internet Governance is our Shared Responsibility,” I/ S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the 
Information Society 10 (2014) 1, 53.
 421 Cerf, Ryan, and Senges (2014), 23– 5.
 422 GovLab/ ICANN Strategy Panel on Multistakeholder Innovation, The Quest for a 21st Century ICANN. 
A Blueprint, January 30, 2014, http:// www.icann.org/ en/ about/ planning/ strategic- engagement/ multistakeholder- 
innovation/ quest- blueprint- 30jan14- en.pdf, 3.
 423 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Internet Policy and Governance. Europe’s 
role in shaping the future of Internet Governance, COM(2014) 72/ 4, http:// ec.europa.eu/ information_ society/ 
newsroom/ cf/ dae/ document.cfm?doc_ id=4453.
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principles of internet governance, and globalizing decision- making on the coordination of 
domain names and IP addresses “to safeguard the stability, security and resilience of the 
internet.”425 The Communication by the Commission firmly commits it to transparent, in-
clusive, and accountable multistakeholder processes426 and a
genuine multistakeholder model where the necessary inter- governmental discussions are 
anchored in a multistakeholder context in the full understanding that the internet is built 
and maintained by a variety of stakeholders, as well as governments; where decisions are 
taken on the basis of principles of good governance, including transparency, accounta-
bility, and inclusiveness of all relevant stakeholders [ . . . ] with a globalized [ICANN] and 
[IANA].427
Both calls for reform and the proliferation of principles led to the most normative basis 
for the global internet governance ecosystem today, the NETmundial Multistakeholder 
Statement, agreed upon at the conclusion of the Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the 
Future of Internet Governance (2014).428 The document first identifies a set of common 
principles and values contributing to an “inclusive, multistakeholder, effective, legitimate, 
and evolving internet governance framework and recognized that the internet is a global 
resource which should be managed in the public interest.”429
These principles include: human rights and shared values, including freedom of ex-
pression, privacy, and accessibility; the protection of intermediaries through liability 
limitations; a commitment to culture and linguistic diversity; the protection of a unified 
and unfragmented space (the internet should remain the “globally coherent, intercon-
nected, stable, unfragmented, scalable and accessible network- of- networks”); security, 
stability, and resilience of the internet; open and distributed architecture; an enabling 
environment for innovation and creativity; and Internet Governance Process princi-
ples that define how internet governance should be practiced, namely through demo-
cratic multistakeholder processes ensuring the meaningful and accountable participation 
of all actors, processes that are open, participative, consensus- driven, transparent and 
accountable, inclusive, and equitable. Institutions and processes connected with the 
internet should be inclusive and open to all. Technically, internet governance should be 
carried out through a distributed, decentralized, and multistakeholder ecosystem using 
collaborative approaches and open standards (these should be promoted, informed by 
expertise and “rough consensus”).
These principles influence the normative orientation of current internet governance 
debates by providing a foil against which reform proposals can be measured. They also 
show how governance norms transcend the binarity of legal vs. illegal and provide for a 
more nuanced normative approach. Principles and commitments, though not imme-
diately implementable, are nonetheless normatively interesting as they contain implicit 
 425 Ibid., 2.
 426 Ibid., 5.
 427 Ibid., 2.
 428 NetMundial Multistakeholder Statement, Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet 
Governance, April 24, 2014, http:// netmundial.br/ wp- content/ uploads/ 2014/ 04/ NETmundial- Multistakeholder- 
Document.pdf.
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assumptions about the character of the internet, which, in turn, allows drawing conclusions 
as to the finality of the online order in light of the view of the norm entrepreneur.
3.5 Order on the Internet?
States are not able to regulate through national law alone the network of networks as a 
multilayered socio- technological facility. The internet has become a critical infrastruc-
tural resource and essential for other critical infrastructural resources; its regulation and 
governance (and constitutionalization) has become an issue of global common interest, 
and the protection of its integrity is necessary for safeguarding other global common 
interests. As hypothesized, the normative order of the internet encompasses international 
legal rules, national legal rules, and transnational normative arrangements.
International law thus plays a key role in the regulation of the internet as one of its 
foundational orders. The hypothesis of a hybrid order is thus correct, as is the hypoth-
esis that no new and independent international law of the internet needs to be devel-
oped. As this study has shown, early regulatory approaches to the internet were already 
committed to an international law- based order of the internet:  a “people- centred, in-
clusive and development- oriented Information Society [ . . . ] premised on the purposes 
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and respecting fully and upholding 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”430 The purposes and principles of the UN 
Charter are foundational elements of the international legal order, some of them having 
ius cogens character. The 2015 GGE report also confirmed that international law, in-
cluding the UN Charter and international legal principles, apply fully to the internet.431 
Indeed, the international community aspires to regulate the internet in a peaceful manner 
“for the common good of mankind.”432
The additional hypothesis that there is no need for the creation of a new international 
law of the internet is also proven correct through the previous substance- oriented analysis 
of international legal rules applicable to the internet. International law is the ius necessar-
ium of the internet. It is only international law that can successfully protect global common 
interests: the integrity of the internet’s public core lies in the global common interest as does 
the mitigation of dangers stemming from misuses of the internet.
As this chapter has also shown, there are no international conventions pertaining to 
the internet, but its foundations are protected indirectly through the enabling dimen-
sion of human rights treaties. As the International Group of Experts for the Tallinn 
Manual 2.0 confirmed, states must not only respect human rights but also protect them. 
Individuals enjoy “customary international human rights protection with respect to 
their cyber- related activities.” States need to ensure the respect for these rights.433 Of 
particular importance are the right to privacy, freedom of expression, and the over-
arching right to internet access.
 430 WSIS, Declaration of Principles, WSIS- 03/ GENEVA/ DOC/ 4- E, 12 December 2003, para. 1.
 431 GGE report (2015), para. 26.
 432 Ibid., para. 28 (c).
 433 Michael N. Schmitt (ed.), Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2017), 181.
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This chapter has also analyzed the protection of the internet (and our protection from the 
internet) by customary international law. There are no customary rules that directly pro-
tect internet integrity, but important general principles of international law offer indirect 
protection for (and from) the internet. This is not surprising as the international law of the 
internet is still a relatively new field and, as the ICJ noted in Gulf of Maine, it may be unre-
warding to look for a “readymade set of rules” in newly emerged regulatory arenas.434
However, general principles of international law offer substantial protection of the 
internet and from its (mis)uses. Not all of these principles have already reached the status of 
custom, though some are even considered ius cogens. In aggregate, they provide substantial 
protection for the internet’s integrity and, conversely, protect states (and individuals) from 
attacks by cyber means. General principles can guide codification and progressive develop-
ment of international law; the ones this study has analyzed include Non- Use of (the Threat 
of) Force, Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes, Non- Intervention in Domestic 
Affairs, Duty of Cooperation, Principle of Equal Rights and Self- Determination of Peoples, 
Principle of Sovereign Equality, No Harm Principle (Principle of Good Neighborliness), 
Principle of Good Faith, Principle of Prevention and Due Diligence, and the Principle of 
Sustainable Development.
This chapter has also served as an introduction into the notion of internet governance, its 
actors, its instruments (including a taxonomy of internet governance), its history (including 
the internet governance process), and more recent developments, namely its politicization 
and the normative trend of establishing principles. Internet governance— the development 
and application by states, the private sector, and civil society, in their respective roles, of 
norms and procedures shaping the evolution and use of the internet— is the second foun-
dational order of the internet. The norms developed within the normative processes of 
internet governance are part of the category of transnational regulatory arrangements, 
which form— as has been hypothesized— an element of the normative order of the internet, 
which is thus substantialized as a hybrid order.
Internet governance has a much broader ambit than international law in that it focuses 
less on norms and more on responsibilities of actors for different aspects of the governance 
of the internet. Internet governance tends to normatively frame, in a non- binary (legal/ 
illegal) logic, with varying, flexible normativity, the “softer” topics of internet regulation 
such as accountability in contrast to traditional (international) legal approaches focusing 
on, for example, international cooperation to fight cybercrime. Principles such as due dil-
igence and initiatives for internet- related capacity- building blur the differences and con-
sequently have foundations in both orders. This also makes the deep connection between 
law and governance of the internet clear and further confirms that both— international law 
and governance- related norms forming part of the normative tertium— are intrinsic parts 
of the normative order of the internet. While specific international legal principles, such as 
non- intervention, sovereignty, and due diligence, are particularly important, governance- 
related good practices are still part of the normative order of the internet.
Internet governance processes suffer from vague language, repeated normative mantras 
(“multistakeholderism”), and intellectual paucity, as principles developed within internet 
governance processes tend to draw from only a few sources (such as the outcome docu-
ments of the WSIS process and the 2014 NetMundial meeting). They nevertheless matter 
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because they produce norms and legitimize procedures in which these norms are devel-
oped. Norms developed in internet governance processes are part of the hybrid normative 
order of the internet. Many of the norms of internet governance fall under the category 
of the normative “tertium” as unique to the international normative order of the internet 
and belonging neither to national nor to international law. As transnational regulatory 
arrangements they need to be legitimated through either their genesis or the results they 
produce. As this study will show below, these processes of integration of tertium norms in 
national legal orders are complex but, designed along the lines of previous integrations of 
technical standards, such as DIN norms (the standards of German industry, or Deutsche 
Industrienormen), are functional and legitimate.
Just as elaborating and accepting internet governance mechanisms are important 
examples of state practice, new legal instruments, including court decisions, can strongly 
influence governance decisions and processes. A case in point is the Global Commission 
on the Stability of Cyberspace, a commission charged with refining internet governance 
to ensure a stable internet. The Commission, in late 2017, proposed a norm to specifically 
protect the public core of the internet and establish a principle of non- interference with 
it:  “Without prejudice to their rights and obligations, state and non- state actors should 
not conduct or knowingly allow activity that intentionally and substantially damages the 
general availability or integrity of the public core of the internet, and therefore the stability 
of cyberspace.”435 This is obviously a more precise formulation of the non- interference prin-
ciple, oriented toward the public core of the internet, whose protection lies in the common 
interest. As states are enjoined, by customary international law, from damaging infrastruc-
ture essential for ensuring internet integrity (because its protection lies in the common in-
terest), the norm does not include a new duty but rather puts an existing one into sharper 
focus and thus promotes norm- conforming behavior.
Summing up, we see that states have sovereignty over their territories and all layers of the 
internet within them. International law applies fully to their activities.436 Internet govern-
ance includes them as important actors within a matrix of other actors in the development 
and application of norms, standards, and processes regarding the internet. They can coordi-
nate via traditional international treaties but are limited by stronger legitimacy demands of 
international internet- related norms than in establishing non- internet- related regimes.437 
Technical organizations continue to play an essential role in the managing of the internet’s 
architecture and its core resources and their cooperation— largely informal or at most regu-
lated by private law— will not change in the foreseeable future.
The practical relevance of internet governance norms for the order of the internet lies, 
finally, also in the observation that on the internet the question of legality/ illegality is often 
a false dichotomy. While international law traditionally focused on the binarity legal/ illegal, 
governance norms allow for the conceptualization and critique of regimes of responsibility. 
 435 Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace, Call to Protect the Public Core of the Internet, New 
Delhi, November 2017, https:// cyberstability.org/ wp- content/ uploads/ 2017/ 11/ call- to- protect- the- public- core- 
of- the- internet.pdf.
 436 States, individually, begin to express their opinio iuris on this, after having contributed to similar endeavours 
internationally, such as in the framework of the GGE. Just see UK Attorney General Jeremy Wright, Speech: Cyber 
and International Law in the 21st Century, May 23, 2018, https:// www.gov.uk/ government/ speeches/ cyber- and- 
international- law- in- the- 21st- century (setting out the UK’s position on applying international law to cyberspace).
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In light of the dynamic nature of the internet, this variable normativity is a key character-
istic of normative evolution.
Yet in light of the multitude of political and legal questions the internet faces, even com-
bining the two regimes of “law” and “governance” leaves substantial regulatory holes and 
normative fractures.438 Though law and governance of the internet are enmeshed, these 
fractures readily appear in a critical view of the internet’s order. This study calls this trend the 
“normative disorder on the internet.” In the following chapter, forces of normative disorder 
will be identified, examples analyzed, and the state of disorder on the internet assessed.
 438 This study understands a “fracture,” as opposed to regulatory holes/ lacunae, to be present in a case of legal 
uncertainty because of conflicts of laws or regulatory orders or cases of strong contestation of a norm.
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 Normative Disorder on the Internet
4.1 Dynamics of Disorder
As has been both hypothesized and established, the activities of actors on the internet are 
regulated by national law, international law, and transnational normative arrangements. 
However, as with any system of laws (and governance), conflicts emerge. Within states, gov-
erned by the rule of law, they are usually solved by courts as “managers” of legal conflicts. If 
they “solve” a conflict in violation of social mores, a backlash may follow,1 after which gov-
ernments may become involved to pacify the conflict by way of legislation.2 Societies based 
on the rule of law usually accept court decisions as stabilizing forces pulling together soci-
eties toward constitutional values. Such fundamental, stabilizing institutions are missing 
on the internet. “Institutions” (rather: norm producers) that do exist are non- formalized 
and may act primarily in their own self- interest, such as companies. When judges do apply 
the law, it may solve a particular conflict but create others or lead to uncertainty. Judgments 
from different jurisdictions may also conflict. These normative stressors, in aggregate, lead 
to a state of normative disorder.
In a first step, section 4.2 will establish the forces and factors responsible for normative 
disorder online. It will differentiate between four normative dimensions of disorder: froth 
(4.2.1), friction (4.2.2), fractures (4.2.3), and fragmentation (4.3). Normative froth is the ex-
plosion of norms pertaining to the internet (or subfields relevant for the internet’s function-
ality). These norms may have no clear hierarchy, be of diverging normative character, and 
be authored by different norm- makers (with very different intents). They are like the froth 
(bubbles) on top of a bath: difficult to firmly grasp (define) and obfuscating the water below 
(in this simile: the deeper issues of internet regulation). Normative frictions are conflicts of 
(private and public) norms or judgments. These may happen, for example, when different 
legal systems or systems of social ordering collide, when courts from different jurisdictions 
apply diverging rules to factually similar cases, or when equally applicable national laws 
collide. When normative frictions multiply, normative fractures may appear. Fractures are 
the faultlines within the international law of the internet and internet governance processes. 
Their existence points to a larger issue with the coherence of the order, a fundamental con-
flict that influences substantially how the internet is used and developed.
The importance of this section lies in the subsequent analysis of these factors of disorder 
within fragmentation processes. This study posits that, because of disordering forces, a 
 1 On societal backlash faced with judicial approaches to solving social conflicts in the fields of desegregation 
and sexual equality: Michael J. Klarman, Brown v. Board of Education and the Civil Rights Movement (Oxford: OUP, 
2007) and Michael J. Klarman, From the Closet to the Altar: Courts, Backlash and the Struggle for Same- Sex Marriage 
(Oxford: OUP, 2012).
 2 Matthias C. Kettemann, “How to Implement Controversial Court Decisions:  International Constitutional 
Lessons from Brown v. Board of Education for the Austrian Cases on Topographical Signs in Carinthia,” Vienna 
Online Journal on International Constitutional Law 4 (2010) 4, 590– 623.
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certain fragmentation of the internet and its order in technical, political, and legal terms is 
under way. This fragmentation cuts across both the internet’s normative layers and its ac-
tors. In aggregate, the dimensions of fragmentation discussed amount to a serious threat to 
the coherence of the rules pertaining to the online order.
If existing dynamics of disorder are not normatively countered by countervailing 
coherence- promoting forces, fragmentation takes place. Fragmentation is corrosive to 
the common purpose of the normative order. It questions the conception of the internet 
as a universal network and unfragmented space. Safeguarding the universal character of 
the internet motivates approaches to “defragment” the internet. These find a firm technical 
footing in the technical invariants of the internet. (4.4)
This chapter will thus test the dual hypothesis that centrifugal forces contribute to the 
emergence of normative redundancies, real conflicts of norms, substantial structural prob-
lems, and the political, commercial, and technological fragmentation of the internet; but 
further, that technical invariants exercise a technical defragmentation pull which the law 
(through the normative turn discussed in the following chapter) reifies.
4.2 Dimensions of Disorder
4.2.1 Normative Froth
One dimension of disorder on the internet is the multiplication of non- hierarchical norms 
or normative expectations pertaining to a specific regulatory aim. This study calls this 
normative froth.
The key example of normative froth is the publication by various organizations, institu-
tions, states, and non- state actors of internet (governance) principles, mainly between 2011 
and 2013.3 Analyzing them shows how normative froth is an important factor of normative 
disorder online.
4.2.1.1  WSIS Principles
Principles have been an influential normative tool in internet regulation since the four 
WSIS outcome documents.4 The outcome documents merit scrutiny because they are still 
today important state commitments regarding the goals of the information society and 
internet governance as the process of realizing them. They are still routinely cited by actors 
and are conceptually comparable, in their importance for the field of internet governance, 
to the role of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 for the field of human 
rights. In both historic constellations, states wanted to ensure certain standards that had 
been endangered or broken previously. The scale, of course, was vastly different: the success 
of the UDHR can be explained against the foil of the outrages upon human dignity of World 
 3 More than sixty are collected here: UNESCO, International and regional instruments relevant to the areas 
of access, freedom of expression, privacy and ethics (2018), https:// en.unesco.org/ international_ and_ regional_ 
instruments.
 4 WSIS, Declaration of Principles, WSIS- 03/ GENEVA/ DOC/ 4- E, 12 December 2003; WSIS, Geneva Plan of 
Action, WSIS- 03/ GENEVA/ DOC/ 5- E, 12 December 2003; WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society, 
WSIS- 05/ TUNIS/ DOC/ 6(Rev. 1)- E, 18 November 2005; WSIS, Tunis Commitment, WSIS- 05/ TUNIS/ DOC/ 7- E, 
18 November 2005.
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War II. WSIS can be understood as an international response to the previous unilateral pri-
vatization by the US of address space and root server management through the foundation 
of ICANN.
In the Geneva Declaration of Principles, states affirmed a common vision for informa-
tion society. It should be “people- centred, inclusive and development- oriented.” The pro-
cess toward this information society would be “premised on the purposes and principles 
of the Charter of the United Nations and respecting fully and upholding the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.”5 The development- orientation of the process of building 
an information society (a process of which internet governance is an important part) was 
reiterated in paragraph 2. States reaffirm “the universality, indivisibility, interdependence 
and interrelation of all human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right to de-
velopment, as enshrined in the Vienna Declaration [and Programme of Action of the World 
Conference on Human Rights 19936].” States also reaffirm that democracy, sustainable de-
velopment, human rights, and good governance “at all levels” are interdependent and mutu-
ally reinforcing. Human rights inform rule of law, and states resolve to “strengthen respect 
for the rule of law in international as in national affairs.”7
In the 2005 Tunis Commitment8 states reaffirmed their desire and commitment to build 
a “people- centred, inclusive and development- oriented Information Society” that is pre-
mised upon the UN Charter, international law, and multilateralism, upholding the UDHR. 
The goal was for people “to achieve their full potential and to attain the internationally 
agreed development goals and objectives, including the Millennium Development Goals.”9
Moving away from commitments to development and human rights, para. 6 of the 
Geneva Declaration confirms that states “rededicate [themselves] to upholding the prin-
ciple of the sovereign equality of all States.” The exact role of governments and other actors is 
described in paragraph 20: In the process toward “[b] uilding a people- centred Information 
Society” all actors have “an important role and responsibility,” which extends from the 
“development of the Information Society” to, “as appropriate, [ . . . ] decision- making pro-
cesses.” States describe the internet as a “global facility available to the public.” Its regulation 
therefore constitutes “a core issue of the Information Society agenda.”10 This process should 
be “multilateral, transparent and democratic, with the full involvement of governments, the 
private sector, civil society and international organizations.” The goals of internet manage-
ment should be “equitable distribution of resources, [ . . . ] access for all and [ . . . ] a stable 
and secure functioning of the internet, taking into account multilingualism.”11
The first clear distribution of governance tasks between actors, which would be con-
firmed in essence during the Tunis Phase of WSIS, was laid down in paragraph 49 of the 
Geneva Declaration. The paragraph does not refer to “governance,” but rather to internet 
“management,” and describes it as encompassing “technical and public policy issues.” In it, 
“all stakeholders and relevant intergovernmental and international organizations” should 
be involved. Between the actors— states, private sector, civil society— and organizations 
 5 WSIS, Declaration of Principles, WSIS- 03/ GENEVA/ DOC/ 4- E, 12 December 2003, para. 1.
 6 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights in 
Vienna on June 25, 1993, http:// www.ohchr.org/ en/ professionalinterest/ pages/ vienna.aspx.
 7 WSIS, Declaration of Principles, WSIS- 03/ GENEVA/ DOC/ 4- E, 12 December 2003, para. 3.
 8 WSIS, Tunis Commitment, WSIS- 05/ TUNIS/ DOC/ 7- E, 18 November 2005, para. 2.
 9 Ibid., para. 3.
 10 WSIS, Geneva Declaration of Principles, WSIS- 03/ GENEVA/ DOC/ 4- E, 12 December 2003, para. 48.
 11 Ibid.
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through which states act as well responsibility for different tasks is clearly distributed. This 
was highly controversial and still is. The Geneva Declaration is state- centric in its approach 
and lays down that
 a) Policy authority for internet- related public policy issues is the sovereign right of States. 
They have rights and responsibilities for international internet- related public policy 
issues;
 b) The private sector has had and should continue to have an important role in the devel-
opment of the internet, both in the technical and economic fields;
 c) Civil society has also played an important role on internet matters, especially at com-
munity level, and should continue to play such a role;
 d) Intergovernmental organizations have had and should continue to have a facilitating 
role in the coordination of internet- related public policy issues;
 e) International organizations have also had and should continue to have an important 
role in the development of internet- related technical standards and relevant policies.12
The Tunis Agenda reaffirmed the principles enunciated in Geneva and described the 
internet as a “global facility available to the public.” Therefore “its governance should con-
stitute a core issue of the Information Society agenda.” Such “international management” 
of the internet should be “multilateral, transparent and democratic, with the full involve-
ment of governments, the private sector, civil society and international organizations.”13 
We note how, within one paragraph, the Agenda switches from internet “governance” to 
“international management.” Usually “management” in the WSIS documents refers to tech-
nical aspects, not policy- oriented ones. In paragraph 31, states recognize the importance 
of “internet governance”: “carried out according to the Geneva principles, [internet gov-
ernance] is an essential element for a people- centred, inclusive, development- oriented and 
non- discriminatory Information Society.” States committed themselves, again, to the “sta-
bility and security of the internet as a global facility and to ensuring the requisite legitimacy 
of its governance, based on the full participation of all actors, from both developed and 
developing countries, within their respective roles and responsibilities.”14 Para. 35 of the 
Tunis Agenda reiterates para. 49 of the Geneva Declaration, relating to the role of actors in 
“internet management.”
During governance processes, no state should play a domineering role: “all governments 
should have an equal role and responsibility for international internet governance and for 
ensuring the stability, security and continuity of the internet.” In formulating public policy, 
they have to consult with all actors.15 The goal of cooperation in such a process should be to 
develop “globally- applicable principles on public policy issues associated with the coordi-
nation and management of critical internet resources.”16
The first two principles visible in WSIS are the meta- principles that new principles on 
public policy issues associated with managing critical internet resources are necessary and 
 12 Ibid., para. 49.
 13 WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society, WSIS- 05/ TUNIS/ DOC/ 6(Rev. 1)- E, 18 November 2005, 
para. 29.
 14 Ibid., para. 31.
 15 Ibid., para. 68.
 16 Ibid., para. 70.
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that they need to be globally applicable (let us call them reform principle and globality prin-
ciple). The other WSIS principles can be classified into three broad categories: structural, 
procedural, and substantive principles.
The following structural (i.e. fundamental) principles can be deduced: the internet is a global 
facility available to the public (universality principle) and existing arrangements for internet 
governance have worked effectively (status quo principle). The internet itself is, ideally, highly 
robust, dynamic, and geographically diverse (robustness principle) and the security and stability 
of the internet must be maintained (“don’t mess with a running system” principle, a variation of 
the status quo principle). It can further be argued that the clear commitment to the purposes 
and principles of the UN Charter and international law and the UDHR also allow for the inclu-
sion of an international law principle and a human rights principle at the structural level.
Among the procedural principles, we find that all governments should have an equal role 
and responsibility for international internet governance and for ensuring the stability, secu-
rity, and continuity of the internet and that, in formulating policy, they must consult with all 
actors (equality principle, sovereignty principle, and multistakeholder principle). Further, the 
goal of legitimacy of internet governance can only be reached if there is “full participation 
of all stakeholders, from both developed and developing countries, within their respective 
roles and responsibilities” (differentiated responsibility principle). Management (and this is 
true for governance as well) must be “multilateral, transparent and democratic” (transpar-
ency and democratic legitimacy principle) “with the full involvement of governments, the 
private sector, civil society and international organizations within their respective roles” 
(with policy authority for internet- related public policy issues remaining a right of states) 
(public policy priority principle).
Among the substantive principles we find important values of the international com-
munity:  that the information society must be people- centered, inclusive, and non- 
discriminatory (inclusiveness principle); that it must allow people to share information to 
achieve their full potential and to attain the internationally agreed development goals and 
objectives, including the MDGs (human development principle); that it must be premised 
upon purposes and principles of the UN Charter and international law and the UDHR (in-
ternational law principle and human rights principle); that it must be democratic and illus-
trative of good governance and the rule of law nationally and internationally (rule of law 
and good governance principle); and that it promotes an enabling environment for innova-
tion, competition, and investment (market principle).
The internet itself as a global facility needs to be stable, safe, and secure. A further impor-
tant value confirmed by WSIS is the commitment by states to the inclusion of other actors in 
the processes leading toward norms relevant for the use and development of the internet. In 
this reading, the legitimacy of norms related to the internet can only be assured when there 
is meaningful participation of all actors in transparent, democratic, inclusive processes. Yet 
the WSIS principles are state- centered in their assignment of roles. They are sovereignty- 
oriented and characterized by the commitment by states present at WSIS to the primacy of 
states in the development of internet- related (governance) norms and follow the traditional 
international law approach to give states responsibility for the development of norms rele-
vant for the use of the internet. Yet the broad majority of states supports the development of 
internet- related public policy by governments with all relevant actors.17
 17 Ibid., para. 68.
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The WSIS principles are a reflection of a period in the evolution of internet governance 
when an attempt was made to combine the sovereignty justification paradigm and the justi-
fication paradigm regarding the inclusion of all relevant actors: the intergovernmental and 
the multi- actor model of normativity on the internet. It is because of this dialectic that we 
see diverging commitments: to reform and to stasis; to human rights and human devel-
opment but with a public policy reservation for states; to policy authority for states while 
technical and operational responsibilities remain with the private sector actors and are ar-
tificially separated from public policy questions; to multistakeholderism, but also only to a 
weak statement of the “important role [civil society] has played.”
4.2.1.2  New Principles
It is this dialectic of competing narratives and paradigms that is reflected in the internet 
governance principles developed between 2011 and 2015 that could draw legitimacy from 
competing parts of WSIS outcome documents. In all, the WSIS commitments were a con-
servative starting point for the normative development of native internet governance prin-
ciples. Some of the WSIS principles are demonstrably at odds with each other; the roles of 
non- state actors are described in little detail.18 Yet this does not detract from their value 
as important waypoints in the process of normative stratification of the internet. Over 
the years, they have substantially influenced the evolution of other internet governance 
principles.
This process of developing new internet governance principles was largely duplicative, a 
key element of normative froth- making. The principles themselves overlap to a large degree, 
as much as 80 percent with regard to topics connected to internet freedom, for example.19 
This can be seen as a confirmation of common commitments and a positive element in the 
identification of principles that seem in consonance with the community’s normative ex-
pectations. But the collections of principles, and this is also determinative of froth, evidence 
dinstinctly diverging approaches that are reflective of the relevant normative bias of the au-
thor, i.e. the “vision” of the internet the author(s) adhere(s) to or the narrative or paradigm of 
internet governance they seek to promote. After presenting a selection of them20 in Table 4.2,21 
the study will stratify the principles to illustrate the problems associated with this normative 
froth. Structuring the principles is essential to visualizing the demands by actors on the nor-
mative frame of the internet. Ordering them allows us to see commonalities and trends. At 
a first stage, they can be arranged according to the paradigms they exemplify (including a 
“human rights paradigm” that exemplifies less a general governance approach and more an 
 18 This has led to calls to abolish “stakeholder ‘roles’ ” and allow for the participation of all individuals on an 
“equal status” (cf. Milton L. Mueller, “The need to abolish stakeholder ‘roles’,” Submission to NetMundial (2014), 
http:// content.netmundial.br/ contribution/ the- need- to- abolish- stakeholder- roles/ 80). This, of course, is in con-
flict with the traditional allocation of roles and responsibilities to international actors.
 19 Jeonghyun Baak and Carolina Rossini, Issue Comparison of Major Declarations on Internet Freedom (2013), 
http:// bestbits.net/ issue- comparison- of- major- declarations- on- internet- freedom.
 20 For a fuller picture with more than fifty sets of principles (including declarations and conference out-
comes containing principles), see Rolf H. Weber, Principles for governing the Internet. A  comparative analysis 
(Paris: UNESCO Publishing, 2015), http:// unesdoc.unesco.org/ images/ 0023/ 002344/ 234435e.pdf.
 21 During the preparation of the 2014 NetMundial Summit in Brazil, which tasked itself with developing further 
internet governance principles, stakeholders self- identified key declarations on Internet governance principles. 
I have adapted this list which does not contain all declarations, but the most important ones. This is, naturally, also 
a normative selection. Cf. NetMundial, Links to internet governance principles (2014), http:// content.netmundial.
br/ internet- governance- principles.
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advocacy focus) (Table 4.2) and according to their authors (Table 4.3). In a second step, the 
principles themselves will be analyzed according to their normative orientation: structural, 
procedural, or substantive (Table 4.4).
The following principles vary greatly in their normative approach, their authors (from 
Presidents to international organizations, from civil society actors to clubs of powerful states), 
and their form (from speeches to declarations to “paradigms”). What they have in common, 
however, is that their creators wished to influence the normative development of the internet, 
its governance, and regulation. They thus tell us a lot about the normative expectations of dif-
ferent actors, and their overlap, as we will soon see, is as telling as are the differences.
Table 4.1 shows that within a short time frame the number of published internet gov-
ernance principle declarations has grown substantially. Rather than evidencing a common 
Table 4.1 Selected Collections of Internet Governance Principles 2005– 2013
 – US Principles on the Internet’s Domain Name and Addressing System (2005)a
 – APC Internet Rights Charter (2006)b
 – CGI.br Principles for the Governance and Use of the Internet (2009)c
 – European Parliament resolution, Internet governance: the next steps (2010)d
 – APC/ CoE/ UNECE, Code of Good Practice on Information, Participation and Transparency in 
Internet Governance (2010)e
 – OECD, Communiqué on Principles for Internet Policy Making (2011)f
 – European Commission, Internet Compact (2011)g
 – UNESCO, Code of Ethics for the Information Society (2011)h
 – OSCE, Declaration on Pluralism and Internet Governance (2011)i
 – Internet Rights and Principles Coalition, Charter of Internet Rights and Principles (2011) and 10 
Internet Rights and Principles (2012)j
 – G8 (Deauville Summit), Renewed Commitment for Freedom and Democracy (2011)k
 – Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Declaration on Internet Governance Principles (2011)l
 – China/ Russia et al., International Code of Conduct for Information Security (2011)m
 – WEF, Code of Conduct for Government Leaders (2011)n
 – US International Strategy for Cyberspace (2011)o
 – UN/ OAS/ OSCE/ ACHPR, International Mechanisms for Promoting Freedom of Expression, 
Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and the Internet (2011)p
 – Human Rights Council, Resolution 20/ 8, The promotion, protection and enjoyment of human 
rights on the Internet (2012)q
 – OpenStand Principles (2013)r
 – IETF/ IAB/ W3C/ ICANN et al., Montevideo Statement on the Future of Internet Cooperation (2013)s
 – Global Network Initiative, Principles on Freedom of Expression and Privacy (2013)t
 – Adam Smith Institute, Internet Freedom. A Free Market Digital Manifesto (2013)u
 – Brazilian President Rousseff ’s Principles, Address to the General Assembly (2013)v
 – Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt’s Principles, Speech at the Seoul Conference on Cyberspace 
(2013)w
 – International Principles on the Application of Human Rights to Communications Surveillance 
(2013)x
 – Community Informatics, An Internet for the Common Good— Engagement, Empowerment, 
and Justice for All (2013)y
a NTIA, U.S. Principles on the Internet’s Domain Name and Addressing System, June 30, 2005, http:// www.ntia.
doc.gov/ other- publication/ 2005/ us- principles- internets- domain- name- and- addressing- system.
b APC Internet Rights Charter (2006), http:// www.apc.org/ en/ node/ 5677.
c CGI.br Principles for the Governance and Use of the Internet (2009), http:// www.cgi.br/ english/ regulations/ 
resolution2009- 003.htm.
d European Parliament resolution of 15 June 2010, Internet governance: the next steps, (2009/ 2229(INI)), https:// 
eur- lex.europa.eu/ legal- content/ EN/ TXT/ ?uri=CELEX%3A52010IP0208.
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e APC/ CoE/ UNECE, Code of Good Practice on Information, Participation and Transparency in Internet 
Governance (2010), http:// www.apc.org/ en/ system/ files/ COGP_ IG_ Version_ 1.1_ June2010_ EN.pdf.
f OECD Communiqué on Principles for Internet Policy Making, OECD High Level Meeting:  The Internet 
Economy: Generating Innovation and Growth, June 28– 29, 2011, Paris, http:// www.oecd.org/ dataoecd/ 40/ 21/ 
48289796.pdf.
g Vice- President of the European Commission Neelie Kroes, Internet Compact, http:// blogs.ec.europa.eu/ neelie- 
kroes/ i- propose- a- compact- for- the- internet/ #more- 671.
h UNESCO, Code of Ethics for the Information Society, proposed by the Intergovernmental Council of the 
Information for All Programme (IFAP), 36 C/ 49, October 10, 2011, http:// goo.gl/ nZ0lk
I OSCE, 8th South Caucasus Media Conference, Declaration: Pluralism and Internet governance, Tbilisi, Georgia, 
October 20– 21, 2011, http:// www.osce.org/ fom/ 84371.
j Cf. Internet Rights and Principles Coalition, 10 Internet Rights and Principles, http:// internetrightsandprinci-
ples.org.
k G8, Declaration, Renewed Commitment for Freedom and Democracy, G8 Summit of Deauville, May 26– 27, 2011, 
http:// www.g20- g8.com/ g8- g20/ g8/ english/ live/ news/ renewed- commitment- for- freedom- and- democracy.1314.html.
l Council of Europe, Declaration by the Committee of Ministers on Internet Governance Principles, adopted on 21 
September 2011 at the 1121st meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, https:// wcd.coe.int/ ViewDoc.jsp?id=1835773.
m Letter dated 12 September 2011 from the Permanent Representatives of China, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, 
and Uzbekistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary- General, UN Doc. A/ 66/ 359 of 14 September 
2011, https:// documents- dds- ny.un.org/ doc/ UNDOC/ GEN/ N11/ 496/ 56/ PDF/ N1149656.pdf?OpenElement.
n World Economic Forum, Code of Conduct for Government Leaders (2011), http:// www3.weforum.org/ docs/ 
WEF_ GAC_ InformedSocieties_ CodeConductGovernmentLeaders_ Summary_ 2012.pdf.
o US President Barack Obama proposed ten principles in his strategy paper in May 2011, see President of the 
United States of America, International Strategy for Cyberspace. Prosperity, Security and Openness in a 
Networked World, May 2011, http:// www.whitehouse.gov/ sites/ default/ files/ rss_ viewer/ international_ strategy_ 
for_ cyberspace.pdf, 10.
p UN/ OAS/ OSCE/ ACHPR, International Mechanisms for Promoting Freedom of Expression, Joint Declaration 
on Freedom of Expression and the Internet (2011), https:// www.osce.org/ fom/ 78309.
q Human Rights Council, Resolution 20/ 8, The promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the 
Internet, UN Doc. A/ HRC/ RES/ 20/ 8 of 5 July 2012, http:// ap.ohchr.org/ documents/ dpage_ e.aspx?si=A/ HRC/ 
RES/ 20/ 8. The resolution is identical, in terms of “principles” discussed here, to the resolutions of 2014 and 2016.
r OpenStand, A Global Community for Open Innovation, http:// open- stand.org/ principles.
s Montevideo Statement on the Future of Internet Cooperation, October 7, 2013, http:// www.icann.org/ en/ news/ 
announcements/ announcement- 07oct13- en.htm.
t Global Network Initiative, Principles on Freedom of Expression and Privacy, http:// www.globalnetworkinitiative.
org/ principles/ index.php.
u Adam Smith Institute, Internet Freedom. A Free Market Digital Manifesto (2013), http:// www.adamsmith.org/ 
research/ reports/ internet- freedom- a- free- market- digital- manifesto.
v Statement by President Dilma Rousseff, President of Brazil to the UN General Assembly, September 24, 2013, 
http:// gadebate.un.org/ sites/ default/ files/ gastatements/ 68/ BR_ en.pdf.
w Speech by Carl Bildt, Foreign Minister of Sweden, Seoul Conference on Cyberspace 2013, http:// www.govern-
ment.se/ sb/ d/ 17281/ a/ 226592.
x Necessary and Proportionate, International Principles on the Application of Human Rights to Communications 
Surveillance (2013), https:// en.necessaryandproportionate.org/ text.
y Community Informatics Research Network (2013), An Internet for the Common Good— Engagement, 
Empowerment, and Justice for All, http:// cirn.wikispaces.com/ An+Internet+for+the+Common+Good+-  
+Engagement%2C+Empowerment%2C+and+Justice+for+All.
commitment or reifying shared normative expectations, their normative divergence leads 
to disorder. Early documents, such as the U.S. Principles on the Internet’s Domain and 
Addressing System of 2005, did not contain new proposals but rather sought to legitimize 
the status quo. Later declarations, however, often focused on specific issues connected to the 
principles’ authors, such as human rights.
An early example of meta- principles, that is principles targeted at establishing the nor-
mative frame within which to develop further internet governance principles (e.g. through 
describing the processes wherein they can be developed), is illustrated by the APC and two 
international organizations, Council of Europe and UNECE, in their common adoption 
of the Code of Good Practice on Information, Participation and Transparency in Internet 
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Governance. Also in Europe, the European Parliament expressed, in its 2010 resolution, 
that internet governance should be exercised “in the common interest.”22 Exactly how this 
common interest can be defined was the issue underlying the “principle hype” of 2011 when 
some ten declarations were adopted. They are called “compact,” “code,” “declaration,” “com-
mitment,” “code of conduct,” and “strategy” and show a broad variety of normative prefer-
ences. It is interesting to see how the normative imperative to adopt a statement vis- à- vis the 
future of internet governance developed a momentum independent of the real changes that 
were envisaged at the time in forums as different as UNESCO, OSCE, OECD, the European 
Commission, G8, US, China, and Russia— a clear case of normative international peer pres-
sure, another key element of froth, unexplainable norm growth unrelated to a regulatory 
need growing with the same speed.
The documents have different preconceptions of what governance questions of the 
internet are, which public policy questions need to be addressed, and what role the dif-
ferent actors should play. They lack— another characteristic of normative froth— a 
common focus. A first attempt at stratification can be made by assigning the documents to 
the justification narrative/ paradigm that they reflect and follow (Table 4.2), even though it 
must be cautioned that some can be considered to be reflective of more than one paradigm.
Table 4.2 Selected Internet Principles Ordered According to Leading Paradigm
Sovereignty Paradigm Regulation- Through- 
Code/ Standards 
Paradigm
Multistakeholder 
Paradigm
Human Rights- Based 
Approach
China/ Russia et al., 
International Code 
of Conduct for 
Information Security 
(2011)
OpenStand Principles 
(2013)
CGI.br Principles for 
the Governance and 
Use of the Internet 
(2009)
APC Internet Rights 
Charter (2006)
Qualified sovereignty 
paradigm
WEF, Code of Conduct 
for Government 
Leaders (2011)
IETF/ IAB/ W3C/ 
ICANN et al., 
Montevideo Statement 
on the Future of 
Internet Cooperation 
(2013)
APC/ CoE/ UNECE, 
Code of Good Practice 
on Information, 
Participation and 
Transparency in 
Internet Governance 
(2010)
Charter of Internet 
Rights and Principles 
(2011) and 10 Internet 
Rights and Principles 
(2012)
US Principles on the 
Internet’s Domain 
Name and Addressing 
System (2005)
Global Network 
Initiative, Principles on 
Freedom of Expression 
and Privacy (2013)
Council of Europe, 
Committee of 
Ministers, Declaration 
on Internet Governance 
Principles (2011)
UNESCO, Code 
of Ethics for the 
Information Society 
(2011)
OECD, Communiqué 
on Principles for 
Internet Policy Making 
(2011)
Adam Smith Institute, 
Internet Freedom. 
A Free Market Digital 
Manifesto (2013)
European Parliament 
resolution (2010)
UN/ OAS/ OSCE/ 
ACHPR, Joint 
Declaration on 
Freedom of Expression 
and the Internet (2011)
 22 European Parliament resolution of 15 June 2010, Internet governance: the next steps, (2009/ 2229(INI)), http:// 
www.europarl.europa.eu/ sides/ getDoc.do?pubRef=- // EP// TEXT+TA+P7- TA- 2010- 0208+0+DOC+XML+V0// EN.
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As has previously been discussed, only very few states demand control over the national 
internet segment and follow the “sovereignty paradigm” in their internet governance poli-
cies. The International Code for Information Security, proposed by China, Russia, Tajikistan, 
and Uzbekistan, is not so much a governance proposal for the internet as a template for non- 
governance, because under the sovereignty paradigm states see no need for international 
internet approaches. They underline national control over important aspects of the internet’s 
infrastructure and call for cooperation between states in “curbing the dissemination of infor-
mation that incites terrorism, secessionism or extremism or that undermines other countries’ 
political, economic and social stability, as well as their spiritual and cultural environment.”23 
The majority of states and international organizations, however, adhere to the qualified sov-
ereignty paradigm, accepting that some aspects of the internet need to be controlled by states, 
but that important oversight functions should not be administered by states individually.
The declarations adhering to the regulation- through- code/ standards paradigm differ 
conceptually from those following (qualified) sovereignty paradigms in that they focus 
on the normative importance of code and standards, such as the OpenStand Principles. 
Developed by the internet’s leading technical organizations, the standards- based approach 
focuses on ensuring cooperation between standards organizations, with each respecting the 
autonomy, integrity, processes, and intellectual property rights of the other organizations, 
Sovereignty Paradigm Regulation- Through- 
Code/ Standards 
Paradigm
Multistakeholder 
Paradigm
Human Rights- Based 
Approach
European Commission 
(Neelie Kroes), 
Internet Compact 
(2011)
Human Rights Council, 
Resolution 20/ 8, The 
promotion, protection 
and enjoyment of 
human rights on the 
Internet (2012)
G8 (Deauville 
Summit), Renewed 
Commitment 
for Freedom and 
Democracy (2011)
Rousseff Principles 
(2013)
International Principles 
on the Application 
of Human Rights to 
Communications 
Surveillance (2013)
US, International 
Strategy for 
Cyberspace (2011)
Carl Bildt’s Principles 
(2013)
Community 
Informatics, An Internet 
for the Common 
Good— Engagement, 
Empowerment, and 
Justice for All (2013)
OSCE, Declaration on 
Pluralism and Internet 
Governance (2011)
 23 Letter dated 12 September 2011 from the Permanent Representatives of China, the Russian Federation, 
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary- General, UN Doc. A/ 66/ 359 of 14 
September 2011, http:// blog.internetgovernance.org/ pdf/ UN- infosec- code.pdf.
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as fundamental for the integrity of the internet. Alternative declarations focus on the 
forces of the internet “market,” such as the Free Market Digital Manifesto. The Montevideo 
Statement on the Future of Internet Cooperation is different in that the authors specifically 
wished to delineate the issues facing the “future of the Internet” and presented themselves as 
“the leaders of organizations responsible for coordination of the Internet’s technical infra-
structure globally”24— and therefore responsible for the “grand design.”
The most strongly represented paradigm is the multistakeholder paradigm. This is because 
it has been, at least since WSIS, the most accepted approach to developing norms regarding 
the use and development of the internet. It is also easy to refer to it without committing to 
substantial rules. A classic example of such a collection of principles is the Council of Europe 
Committee of Ministers’ Declaration on Internet Governance Principles (2011).25 The docu-
ment includes commitments to human rights and the rule of law, multistakeholder governance 
arrangements, and the equal and full participation of all actors. The declaration also discusses 
the responsibilities of states and the empowerment of internet users and contains a commit-
ment to the universality of the internet and its integrity (security, stability, robustness, and re-
silience). It also contains commitments to basic technical foundations of the way the internet 
is run: decentralized management, architectural principles (open standards, interoperability, 
end- to- end nature), and the open network. The declaration thus combines technical, archi-
tectural, legal, and aspirational elements— which form an interesting normative mesh but are 
difficult to parse, in their individual impact. The normativity of the declaration, as of others, 
suffers from the lack of clarity regarding the character of the principles expressed.
Finally, a number of principle declarations follow a human rights- based approach. They 
argue that ensuring internet governance must be premised upon human rights (e.g. APC 
Internet Rights Charter) or include general governance principles in a document focused 
principally on human rights (e.g. the IRP Charter of Internet Rights and Principles). The 
IRP Charter26 is the most comprehensive document on internet- related human rights and 
principles to date. A condensed version highlights eight rights and rights- related princi-
ples (universality of human rights; right to access; network neutrality; internet as a space 
of human rights; freedom of expression; rights to life, liberty, and security online; right to 
privacy online; cultural and linguistic diversity) and two general principles: open standards 
ensuring interoperability and inclusion; and rights- based, transparent, multilateral opera-
tion and governance of the internet, “based on principles of openness, inclusive participa-
tion and accountability as prescribed by law.”27 The human rights- based approach has some 
merit because human rights are an important vehicle for governance issues. Where human 
rights are violated (e.g. through pervasive internet surveillance), the assumption is strong 
that governance reform is needed, and normative changes have to be implemented.
Let us now consider the authors of the declarations (Table 4.3), who can be categorized 
according to the three traditional actor groups— states, civil society, private sector (and 
technical organizations)— and (for purposes of clarity in this table) international organiza-
tions as a distinct formation of coordinated state action.
 24 Montevideo Statement on the Future of Internet Cooperation, October 7, 2013, http:// www.icann.org/ en/ 
news/ announcements/ announcement- 07oct13- en.htm 1.
 25 Council of Europe, Declaration by the Committee of Ministers on Internet Governance Principles, 
adopted on 21 September 2011 at the 1121st meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, https:// wcd.coe.int/ ViewDoc.
jsp?id=1835773.
 26 IRP, Charter on Human Rights and Principles for the Internet, http:// internetrightsandprinciples.org/ site/ charter.
 27 Ibid., Principle No. 10.
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Table 4.3 Selected Internet Principles Ordered According to Author
States International 
Organizations
Technical 
Organizations and 
Private Sector
Civil Society
US Principles 
on the Internet’s 
Domain Name and 
Addressing System 
(2005)
UNESCO, Code of Ethics 
for the Information Society
OpenStand Principles 
(2013)
APC Internet Rights 
Charter (2006)
China/ Russia 
et al., International 
Code of Conduct 
for Information 
Security (2011)
APC/ CoE/ UNECE, Code 
of Good Practice on 
Information, Participation 
and Transparency in 
Internet Governance (2010)
IETF/ IAB/ W3C/ 
ICANN et al., 
Montevideo Statement 
on the Future of 
Internet Cooperation 
(2013)
CGI.br Principles 
for the Governance 
and Use of the 
Internet (2009)
US International 
Strategy for 
Cyberspace (2011)
Council of Europe, 
Committee of Ministers, 
Declaration on Internet 
Governance Principles 
(2011)
Global Network 
Initiative, Principles on 
Freedom of Expression 
and Privacy
Charter of 
Internet Rights 
and Principles 
(2011) and 10 
Internet Rights and 
Principles (2012)
WEF, Code of 
Conduct for 
Government 
Leaders (2011)
European Parliament 
resolution (2010)
Adam Smith Institute, 
Internet Freedom. 
A Free Market Digital 
Manifesto (2013)
Community 
Informatics, An 
Internet for the 
Common Good— 
Engagement, 
Empowerment, and 
Justice for All (2013)
G8 (Deauville 
Summit), Renewed 
Commitment 
for Freedom and 
Democracy (2011)
European Commission 
(Neelie Kroes), Internet 
Compact (2011)
International 
Principles on the 
Application of 
Human Rights to 
Communications 
Surveillance (2013)
Carl Bildt’s 
Principles (2013)
UN/ OAS/ OSCE/ ACHPR, 
Joint Declaration on 
Freedom of Expression and 
the Internet (2011)
Rousseff Principles 
(2013)
OSCE, Declaration on 
Pluralism and Internet 
Governance (2011)
OECD, Communiqué on 
Principles for Internet 
Policy Making (2011)
Human Rights Council, 
Resolution 20/ 8, The 
promotion, protection and 
enjoyment of human rights 
on the Internet (2012)
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Civil society and international organizations have developed most principles while states 
and the technical standard- setters lag behind.28 This can be readily explained. Developing 
new principles suggests that existing arrangements are dissatisfactory. In existing arrange-
ments standard- setting technical bodies are solely (with some US oversight that has now 
transitioned to the ethereal “global multistakeholder community”) responsible for both the 
day- to- day management of the internet and for managing its key resources. They— until 
recently— had no reason to change the status quo. It was only after the surveillance revela-
tions that a document such as the Montevideo Statement was published, in which technical 
organizations called for a globalization of ICANN and IANA functions with very similar 
language to the European Commission in its 2014 Communication.
States were reluctant to get involved through principles, as they are normative vehicles 
that lend themselves to diverse interpretations. Until 2013, only the US on the one side and 
China and Russia on the other side had developed clear policy visions. The US wanted to 
develop legitimacy narratives for retaining the status quo. China and Russia wished to exer-
cise sovereign control over “their” parts of the internet. Only after the Snowden revelations 
did states such as Brazil, Sweden, and Germany unilaterally suggest governance reform. 
Yet states also act through international organizations and it is in that form that they have 
most often publicized their approaches to principles. Organizations that were most active 
include the Council of Europe, the EU, OSCE, and the UN (through UNESCO and the 
Human Rights Council (HRC)). There is a noticeable predominance of organizations with a 
European membership and organizations with a focus on human rights. Indeed, the human 
“rightsization” (Vermenschenrechtlichung) of the internet governance discourse can be 
traced back to the primacy of human rights in the principles discussions. This is not without 
its problems when attempting to frame the debate in larger governance questions.
Let us now look at the principles themselves. In a study of eighteen declarations, in-
cluding those presented in the tables above, two researchers have identified twenty- two “is-
sues” discussed in the principles.29 When adapted and incorporated in the three groups of 
principles identified earlier— relating to structure (the basic architecture), procedure (how 
to adapt the structure), and substance (which values should influence the normative evolu-
tion)— the following picture showing the normative principle froth emerges (see Table 4.4).
Basic commitments to structural principles figure in many of the declarations that are 
not dedicated exclusively to human rights and most prominently in the ones of technical 
entities. These declarations also underline the importance of architecture- based principles 
of the internet: network stability, neutrality and integrity, and technical standards. Among 
the process- related commitments, we often find references to the importance of partic-
ipation and norm- development and application by all relevant actors and the different 
roles of actors. Later declarations, and especially those from civil society, tend to ignore 
the WSIS concept of diverging “roles” because of its focus on states. Even more seldom 
 28 This is confirmed by the more extensive list contained in Rolf H. Weber, “Legal Interoperability as a Tool 
for Combatting Fragmentation,” Global Commission on Internet Governance Paper Series No. 4 (2014), https:// 
www.cigionline.org/ sites/ default/ files/ gcig_ paper_ no4.pdf and UNESCO, International and regional instruments 
relevant to the areas of access, freedom of expression, privacy and ethics (2018), http:// www.unesco.org/ new/ en/ 
principlesgoverningInternet.
 29 Jeonghyun Baak and Carolina Rossini, Issue Comparison of Major Declarations on Internet Freedom (2013), 
http:// bestbits.net/ issue- comparison- of- major- declarations- on- internet- freedom.
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do we find more precise prefiguration of what the process to reform internet governance 
should look like. Substance- related principles, by contrast, figure prominently in all dec-
larations. They often contain both a commitment to human rights protection and then go 
on to discuss the relevance of selected human rights. Among the rights, the right to access 
(sometimes also seen as a foundational right), privacy, and freedom of expression are often 
highlighted. This echoes the clear language of the WSIS outcome documents but does not 
carry the normative debate further.
It is also difficult to establish whether common ground exists between many declar-
ations as actors use different language for similar concepts, a further characteristic of 
normative froth. When civil society declarations speak of human development, private 
sector declarations talk about economic progress. Private sector- led initiatives often 
refer to “user empowerment,” but “user”- led (that is civil society- led) principle collec-
tions do not, the one exception being the Declaration by the Committee of Ministers 
on internet governance principles, which understands user empowerment in terms of 
human rights and participation rights in global governance discussions. This suggests 
a preference on the part of companies to self- identify as the agent (who empowers the 
user) and reflects a certain bias but is not substantially different from a commitment 
to access to the internet as an enabler of human rights (and thus a legal- institutional 
“empowerer” as well).
4.2.1.3  Degrees of Normativity
As expected, the type of author (or institutional sponsor) demonstrably influences the con-
tent and form of the principles. Private sector- led initiatives tend to focus on human rights 
and often disregard the importance of structural and procedural principles. Standard- 
setting bodies give short shrift to substantial, e.g. human rights- related, principles. 
International organizations prefer broad statements and highlight the importance of states, 
Table 4.4 Selected Internet Governance Issues Represented in the Declarations
Related to Structure Related to Process Related to Substance
Commitment to UN Charter and 
international human rights law
Participation and 
multistakeholder governance
Access
Network stability Role of companies, 
governments, and civil society
Diversity
Network neutrality Transparency Human development and 
economic progress
Open standards and 
interoperability
Substantive human rights 
(generally, and specifically, freedom 
of expression and privacy)
Procedural human rights (due 
process, legal remedies)
Protection of vulnerable groups 
(children, minorities)
User empowerment
Rule of law
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but often lack substance and are reluctant to provide templates for internet governance re-
form. Yet the main issue to take with principles is a more fundamental one. They contribute, 
through the variety, to normative disorder on the internet and, individually, suffer from 
normative deficits related to the varying levels of normativity.30
An overview of the Council of Europe Declaration on Internet Governance Principles31 
illustrates the different levels of normativity that principles, even those from an established 
international organization, can take (Table 4.5).
 30 For the evolution of normativity, see Matthias Lutz- Bachmann, “The Concept of the Normativity of Law: ‘Ius 
gentium’ in the Writings of Francisco Suárez and Thomas Aquinas,” in Thilo Marauhn and Heinhard Steiger (eds.), 
Universality and Continuity in International Law (The Hague: Eleven, 2011), 235– 47.
 31 Council of Europe, Declaration by the Committee of Ministers on Internet Governance Principles, 
adopted on 21 September 2011 at the 1121st meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, https:// wcd.coe.int/ ViewDoc.
jsp?id=1835773.
Table 4.5 Assessment of the Normative Character of the Council of Europe Internet 
Governance Principles (2011)
Principle Character
1. Human rights, democracy and the rule of law
Internet governance arrangements must ensure the 
protection of all fundamental rights and freedoms [ . . . ]
[States] must also ensure full respect for democracy and the 
rule of law and should promote sustainable development. 
[ . . . ]
They should be aware of developments leading to the 
enhancement of, as well as threats to, fundamental rights 
and freedoms, and fully participate in efforts aimed at 
recognizing newly emerging rights.
Restatement of international law
Restatement of international law, 
but with a policy dimension
Policy statement
2. Multi- stakeholder governance
The development and implementation of internet 
governance arrangements should ensure, in an open, 
transparent and accountable manner, the full participation 
of governments, the private sector, civil society, the technical 
community and users, taking into account their specific 
roles and responsibilities. [ . . . ]
Policy statement
3. Responsibilities of states
States have rights and responsibilities with regard to 
international internet- related public policy issues. [/ ] In the 
exercise of their sovereignty rights, states should, subject to 
international law, refrain from any action that would directly 
or indirectly harm persons or entities outside of their 
territorial jurisdiction.
Furthermore, any national decision or action amounting 
to a restriction of fundamental rights should comply with 
international obligations. [ . . . ]
Restatement of international law
Restatement of international law
4. Empowerment of internet users
Users should be fully empowered to exercise their 
fundamental rights and freedoms, [ . . . ] in particular in 
governance mechanisms and in the development of Internet- 
related public policy, in full confidence and freedom.
Policy statement
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Table 4.5 Continued
Principle Character
5. Universality of the internet
Internet- related policies should recognize the global nature 
of the internet and the objective of universal access.
They should not adversely affect the unimpeded flow of 
transboundary internet traffic.
Policy statement
Emerging International legal 
principle
6. Integrity of the internet
The security, stability, robustness and resilience of the 
internet as well as its ability to evolve should be the key 
objectives of internet governance. [ . . . ]
Policy statement
7. Decentralised management
The decentralised nature of the responsibility for the day- to- 
day management of the internet should be preserved.
The bodies responsible for the technical and management 
aspects of the internet, as well as the private sector, should 
retain their leading role in technical and operational matters. 
[ . . . ]
Architectural principle
Architectural principle and policy 
statement
8. Architectural principles
The open standards and the interoperability of the internet 
as well as its end- to- end nature should be preserved. [ . . . ]
There should be no unreasonable barriers to entry for new 
users or legitimate uses of the internet. [ . . . ]
Architectural principle
Policy statement
9. Open network
Users should have the greatest possible access to internet- 
based content, applications and services of their choice [..].
Traffic management measures which have an impact on the 
enjoyment of fundamental rights and freedoms [ . . . ] must 
meet the requirements of international law on the protection 
of freedom of expression and access to information, and the 
right to respect for private life
Architectural principle
Restatement of international law
10. Cultural and linguistic diversity
Preserving cultural and linguistic diversity and fostering 
the development of local content, regardless of language or 
script, should be key objectives of internet- related policy and 
international co- operation, as well as in the development of 
new technologies.
Policy statement based on 
international human rights law
We see a variation of restatements of international law and certain “architectural” princi-
ples of the internet and a number of policy statements, often based on international human 
rights law. Even clear- sounding restatements of international law— that “internet govern-
ance arrangements must ensure the protection of all fundamental rights and freedoms”— 
are clouded by references to ensuring “full respect for democracy and the rule of law” and 
the “promot[ion] of sustainable development.” From the principles alone, one cannot estab-
lish what exactly the Council of Europe means by establishing internet governance arrange-
ments that ensure the full respect for democracy. It leaves open what democracy may mean 
in the context of internet governance arrangements that are— at least as far as the manage-
ment of critical internet resources is concerned— not developed in (national) democratic or 
international (accountable) processes.
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Even the latest compilation of principles, the NetMundial Principles,32 did not manage 
to achieve a substantial normative pull. Participants agreed on a “set of common princi-
ples and important values that contribute for an inclusive, multistakeholder, effective, le-
gitimate, and evolving internet governance framework.” They included human rights and 
shared values, the protection of intermediaries, the protection of culture and linguistic di-
versity, the stability of the internet as a unified and unfragmented space (globally coherent, 
interconnected, stable, unfragmented, scalable, and accessible), the security, stability, and 
resilience of the internet, open and distributed architecture, an enabling environment for 
sustainable innovation and creativity, open standards, and Internet Governance Process 
Principles (democratic multistakeholder processes, open, participative, consensus driven 
governance, transparent decision- making, checks- and- balances, inclusive institutions, dis-
tributed, decentralized ecosystem of governance, collaborative and cooperative approaches, 
meaningful participation, access and low barriers, future- oriented and technology- neutral 
policies for internet access).
Parsing the principles, we see again a normative amalgamation of exhortative statements 
(“internet should continue to be an [  . . .  ] unfragmented [  . . .  ] network- of- networks”), 
sweeping statements of law (“internet governance must respect, protect and promote cul-
tural and linguistic diversity in all its forms”) and muddled ones (“Governments have [ . . . ] 
accountability for the protection of human rights”), and explanatory statements (“[e] nter-
prise and investment in infrastructure are essential components of an enabling environ-
ment”).33 Given this, it is unsurprising that the “NetMundial Process,” an attempt to use its 
principles as a key normative commitment to internet governance, has not succeeded.
Internet governance principles, and even UN- led studies on how international law ap-
plies to the ICT environment,34 suffer from the amalgamation of architectural principles, 
policy statements, hortatory statements, and restatements of (possible) legal rules and 
from serious defects in terms of clarity by including, in a single document, notions such as 
norms, rules, non- binding norms, common understandings, shared expectations, or prin-
ciples for state behavior. Within this normative multitude, normative froth emerges. But in 
their aggregate, principles and the other normative sources stabilize expectations. They do 
so especially when they overlap. In the areas where they do, the stabilization of the norma-
tive expectation is strongest. When a principle is an outlier, its normative pull is especially 
weak. Principles that are reiterated over time in different declarations grow in strength and 
are stabilized.
4.2.1.4   Consequences
The reliance on principles is detrimental to the development of international norms bearing 
upon the internet and ensuring its integrity. There is, put simply, too little law in internet gov-
ernance and too little normativity in the principles. There is a dissonance between the per-
ceived importance of formulating new principles and their actual impact: the normativity 
 32 Based on the NetMundial, Multistakeholder StatementNetMundial, Global Multistakeholder Meeting on 
the Future of Internet Governance, April 23– 24, 2014, São Paulo, Brazil, http:// netmundial.br/ netmundial- 
multistakeholder- statement.
 33 Ibid.
 34 United Nations, Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of 
International Security, Report of the Secretary General, A/ 70/ 174 of July 22, 2015, http:// www.un.org/ ga/ search/ 
view_ doc.asp?symbol=A/ 70/ 174 (hereinafter: “GGE report (2015)”). On its normative vagueness, see 4.2.3.2.
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of the factual (the architectural set- up and the relations between non- state actors including, 
for the internet’s public core, the global accountability regime with mainly non- state and 
technical actors and, for much of the other resources, national legal systems) is greater than 
the facticity of the (semi)normative, i.e. the principles. They are created and promoted as 
representing new “principled” approaches to internet governance, but their normative im-
pact is very limited. The value added of each further declaration of internet governance 
principles, which evidence a certain normative path dependency, declines, if they do not re-
iterate and let crystallize the same principles. Summing up, there are four key problems with 
the principles as tools for the normative development of internet governance.
First, there is a lack of a coherent vision and agreed finality for internet governance. The 
principles reflect competing visions of “institutional trajectories”35 for internet governance. 
As Mark Raymond and Gordon Smith argue, only sovereignty- oriented states have devel-
oped a strategic vision of internet governance based on national oversight.36 Other actors 
have failed to develop and present strategic counter- visions beyond the usual commitments 
to a human rights- based, development- oriented information society. Second, even with re-
gard to shared goals, different actors will use different language, thus clouding the issue. 
Third, since internet governance principles are not situated within a Kelsenian system of 
norms, it is difficult to determine which principles are more powerful than others. Discourse 
analysis may help, but also has its limits. The pouvoir constituant cannot become pouvoir 
constitué without a (semblance of a) constitutional process. The principles themselves de-
fine different pouvoirs constituants and express diverging opinions on the legitimate archi-
tecture of the process of ruling the internet. The reputation of the authoring entity plays an 
important role in establishing the “compliance pull” of a principle, but so does the adher-
ence of the principle to the perceived international order of the internet and the coherence 
to other governance norms. Fourth, principles contribute to stabilizing normative expecta-
tions and reify legitimacy narratives by actor groups but have no distinct legal content. They 
are often amalgams of technical preferences, policy statements, or restatements of law (as 
interpreted by the authoring entity). They can thus mostly not be measured against stan-
dards of international law.
Taken together, the internet governance principles have led to the emergence of norma-
tive froth, which this study identifies as an element of disorder of the internet, because it 
obfuscates the real legal issues. Most of the different principles are not, however, in active 
conflict with another. Yet these conflicts exist and persist and give rise to normative friction.
4.2.2 Normative Friction
4.2.2.1   Problem
Normative friction is understood here to mean conflicts between norms or their applica-
tion that are more serious than the mere uncoordinated, non- hierarchical coexistence of 
 35 Michèle Rioux, “Competing Institutional Trajectories for Global Regulation— Internet in a Fragmented 
World,” in Roxana Radu, Jean- Marie Chenou, and Rolf H. Weber (eds.), The Evolution of Global Internet 
Governance. Principles and Policies in the Making (Zurich: Schulthess, 2014), 37– 56.
 36 Cf. Mark Raymond and Gordon Smith, “Reimaging the Internet: The Need for a High- level Strategic Vision 
for Internet Governance, 2015– 2020,” CIGI Internet Governance Paper Series No. 1 (2013), http:// www.cigion-
line.org/ sites/ default/ files/ no1_ 4.pdf , 16.
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duplicative norms (froth) and less serious than substantial, identifiable rifts within the on-
line order (fractures). Normative friction can happen, for example, when national courts 
diverge in their rulings on matters that are substantially similar across borders or when the 
laws of states diverge so that applying one state’s laws to online settings leads to conflicts 
with another state’s laws. Examples of normative friction, an element of the normative dis-
order of the internet, also emerge in the implementation by intermediaries of their terms 
of service and community guidelines, regulating their private corporate discourse sphere 
when countering countervailing public interests, such as protection against hate speech, 
enforced through laws and courts. Among the many examples, a selected few will serve to 
illustrate the problem of friction.
4.2.2.2   Intermediaries
Internet intermediaries play an important role on the internet. They connect users to the 
internet, process information and data, host user- generated content, enable searches, index 
content, facilitate the sale of goods, and enable payments and other transactions.37 This 
study identifies the regulation of intermediaries, their self- regulation and the regulatory 
conflicts that emerge between these two normative approaches as examples of normative 
friction:  there are not too many rules, but the existing rules sometimes contradict each 
other and lead to legal uncertainty.38
Intermediaries affect issues of social interest. They provide the communicative spaces 
necessary for the articulation and aggregation of opinions essential for democratic pro-
cesses. Discussions take place under the terms of service of the intermediary. This “internet 
governance by contract”39 is an important source of friction as terms of service tend not to 
be essential normative tools to regulate behavior in the offline world, which takes place— to 
a large degree— either in public spaces (e.g. demonstrations) or in spaces owned/ controlled 
by ourselves (e.g. our homes and offices), in which we can self- moderate our communica-
tion (by deciding what to speak about, not by having an intermediary decide that discussing 
certain, especially controversial, topics leads to an account or post deletion or suspension).
Social interactions and information and communication flows essential for the crea-
tion of a public sphere take place in privately owned and governed spaces where, prima 
facie, the terms of service of intermediaries apply. Often the interests between customer/ 
user and company/ intermediary diverge. Then conflicts arise that are repeatedly expressed 
in legal disputes. Frictions can also emerge between the terms of service themselves and 
national legislation, in particular since globally active intermediaries are subjected to al-
most two hundred different legal orders. These can contain prohibitions on holocaust de-
nial (Austria, Germany, France), on criticizing Atatürk (Turkey), on criticizing the ruling 
monarch (Thailand)— which then need to be measured against the global human rights 
canon. A recurrent theme is the question of whether restrictions on the right to freedom of 
 37 Cf. Council of Europe, Recommendation CM/ Rec(2018)2 of the Committee of Ministers to member states 
on the roles and responsibilities of internet intermediaries (2018) (“Recommendation on Internet intermedi-
aries”), preambular para. 6.
 38 This section draws from Matthias C. Kettemann, “Hassrede und Katzenbilder:  Wie können im globalen 
Netz nationale Gesetze respektiert werden?” in Lorena Jaume- Palasí, Julia Pohle, and Matthias Spielkamp (eds.), 
Digitalpolitik. Eine Einführung (Berlin: Wikimedia, 2017).
 39 Lee A. Bygrave, Internet Governance by Contract (Oxford: OUP, 2015).
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expression are allowed or even required— for example, when it comes to content prohibited 
under international law.
Frictions also emerge when intermediaries are subjected to traditional media regimes 
ill- suited to their function in (information) society. The question of where exactly the line 
between media companies (which are usually responsible for content) and intermediaries 
(which enjoy, as a general rule, a liability exception) should be drawn is difficult to answer. 
Rather, a graduated approach, taking into account concrete functions of intermediaries 
within the intermediary’s field of activities, should be used.40
States have a duty, flowing from sovereignty, to ensure to everyone within their jurisdic-
tion or control all human rights. This applies to states’ relationships with intermediaries 
as well. It is a continuing source of normative friction that states fail to protect persons 
under their jurisdiction or control from intermediaries, and that they then find antisocial 
behavior is present online that may even threaten democratic processes or constitution-
ally protected human rights, subsequently call for tighter self- regulation or, failing that, 
for regulated self- regulation or supranational international regulation, and, as a last step, 
pass intrusive national laws. These steps have been evident, for instance, in government 
approaches to regulating hate speech, such as in Germany, including attempts at interme-
diary self- regulation through the EU’s Code of Conduct on illegal online hate speech41 and, 
eventually, the Network Enforcement Act,42 against which serious constitutional law- based 
arguments can be brought to bear.43
Pursuant to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, intermediaries 
have an independent obligation to respect human rights, a “corporate responsibility to pro-
tect” that is independent of the state’s duty to safeguard human rights. States, as per the most 
 40 On the graduated approach, see already Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation CM/ 
Rec(2011)7 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on a new notion of media, September 21, 2011 (rec-
ommending that “all actors— whether new or traditional— who operate within the media ecosystem should be 
offered a policy framework which guarantees an appropriate level of protection and provides a clear indication of 
their duties and responsibilities in line with Council of Europe standards.” Any policy response should be “grad-
uated and differentiated according to the part that media services play in content production and dissemination 
processes” (emphasis added). To these ends, the document recommends that member states “have regard to [the 
media actors’] specific functions in the media process and their potential impact and significance in ensuring or 
enhancing good governance in democratic society.”
 41 European Commission, European Commission and IT Companies announce Code of Conduct on illegal on-
line hate speech, May 31, 2016, http:// europa.eu/ rapid/ press- release_ IP- 16- 1937_ en.htm (including the following 
“public commitments” with “[the] IT Companies, taking the lead on countering the spread of illegal hate speech 
online”:
 - The IT Companies to have in place clear and effective processes to review notifications regarding il-
legal hate speech on their services so they can remove or disable access to such content. The IT com-
panies to have in place Rules or Community Guidelines clarifying that they prohibit the promotion of 
incitement to violence and hateful conduct. [ . . . ]
 - Upon receipt of a valid removal notification, the IT Companies to review such requests against their 
rules and community guidelines and where necessary national laws transposing the Framework 
Decision 2008/ 913/ JHA, with dedicated teams reviewing requests.
 - The IT Companies to review the majority of valid notifications for removal of illegal hate speech in less 
than 24 hours and remove or disable access to such content, if necessary.
 42 Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Rechtsdurchsetzung in sozialen Netzwerken (Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz – 
NetzDG), Federal Gazette 2017 Part I No. 61, September 7, 2017.
 43 Wolfgang Schulz, “Regulating Intermediaries to Protect Privacy Online – the Case of the German NetzDG,” 
HIIG Discussion Paper Series 2018- 01, https:// www.hiig.de/ publication/ regulating- intermediaries- to- protect- 
privacy- online- the- case- of- the- german- netzdg. See further the references contained in Alexander Peukert, 
“Gewährleistung der Meinungs- und Informationsfreiheit in sozialen Netzwerken. Vorschlag der Ergänzung des 
NetzDG um sog. Put- Back- Verfahren,” MMR (2018), 572, note 2.
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recent General Comment of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on 
state obligations in the context of business activities (2017), have “to respect, to protect and 
to fulfill”44 human rights. The obligation to protect includes a “positive duty to adopt a legal 
framework requiring business entities to exercise human rights due diligence in order to 
identify, prevent and mitigate the risks of violations of Covenant rights.”45
This is echoed in the 2018 Council of Europe Recommendation on roles and responsibil-
ities of internet intermediaries, which confirms that
Member States have the obligation to refrain from violating the right to freedom of expres-
sion and other human rights in the digital environment. They also have a positive obliga-
tion to protect human rights and to create a safe and enabling environment for everyone 
to participate in public debate [...]. This positive obligation to ensure the exercise and en-
joyment of rights and freedoms includes, due to the horizontal effects of human rights, the 
protection of individuals from actions of private parties by ensuring compliance with rele-
vant legislative and regulatory frameworks.46
States are thus obliged to provide a legal framework that ensures meaningful protection of 
all from the actions of private parties. In order to understand the impact of the activities of 
companies on human rights, transparency is necessary. Therefore human rights obligations 
of companies under the Ruggie Framework are often implemented through transparency 
reports, increased control of subcontractors along the supply chain, and Human Rights 
Impact Assessments.47 While committing to human rights- based principles would seem 
like a strategy to avoid friction (in light of their presumed global reach), the terms of service 
of intermediaries and national laws are increasingly in conflict. The role of intermediaries 
will be discussed in more detail below;48 to name just one example here: the territorial ap-
plication of national judgments protecting national interpretations of human rights com-
mitments is challenging.
Google has been engaged in proceedings in France against the French data protection 
authority CNIL (Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés) and its claims 
that the right to be forgotten (established by the CJEU in its Google Spain case as a limited 
right to be delisted from a search engine’s results when the information meets certain cri-
teria of e.g. irrelevance49) should be implemented globally with regard to French delisting 
requests.50 By 2017, some 800,000 URLs (Uniform Resource Locators) had been removed. 
The French data protection authority CNIL, however, ordered Google to remove URLs 
 44 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 24 on State obligations under 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the context of business activities, UN Doc. 
E/ C.12/ GC/ 24 of 10 August 2017, para. 10.
 45 Ibid., para. 16.
 46 Council of Europe, Recommendation CM/ Rec(2018)2 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the 
roles and responsibilities of internet intermediaries (2018) (“Recommendation on Internet intermediaries”), PP 6.
 47 Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary- General on the issue of human rights and transna-
tional corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 17/ 31 of 
21 March 2011.
 48 See 7.5.2.
 49 CJEU, C- 131/ 12, Google Spain und Google, judgment of May 13, 2014.
 50 Peter Fleischer, “Reflecting on the Right to be Forgotten,” December 9, 2016, https:// blog.google/ topics/ 
google- europe/ reflecting- right- be- forgotten.
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globally, for users from Australia (google.com.au) to Zambia (google.co.zm). Applying this 
regional ruling globally would be very problematic because of potential reciprocal expecta-
tions from non- democratic countries regarding content they wish to suppress (e.g. demo-
cratic reform). This is a clear example of normative friction, where national laws and terms 
of service are in conflict. In 2017, the French Conseil d’État, France’s highest court, asked 
the CJEU for a ruling.51 Thus it becomes apparent that national rulings that force national 
norms on companies’ operations outside the territory of that state are a source of normative 
friction.
4.2.2.3  Public and Private Spaces
Another large source of normative friction is the application to private spaces of the rules 
(and normative expectations) developed for and formed in public spaces. A criterion for 
the difference between private and public spaces, in light of the role of intermediaries that 
is of interest here, can be found in the decision of the ECtHR, in the case of Appleby and 
Others v. United Kingdom.52 In this case, political activists had complained that the operator 
of a shopping mall prevented them from distributing leaflets and collecting signatures in 
the mall. The judges rejected the claims of the activists, reasoning that they could advertise 
their concerns outside or communicate via local media. Conversely, it follows from this rea-
soning: if a discourse important for the community outside of privately constituted spaces 
can actually no longer take place successfully, a normative intervention into the privately 
governed area (be it a shopping mall or a communication platform operated by an internet 
intermediary) seems not only legitimate but necessary.
Are malls less “public” than airports? This was the question the judges of the German 
Federal Constitutional Court were faced with in the Fraport decision.53 The case concerned 
the question of whether gathering signatures, conducting opinion polls, and organizing 
demonstrations in Frankfurt Airport could be banned by the airport’s (private) operating 
company. A central concept in the ruling is that of the “public forum,” which is character-
ized by the fact that it allows for the pursuance of “a variety of different activities and con-
cerns and thus creates a versatile and open communication.” From such a public forum, 
according to the Karlsruhe judges, the “political debate in the form of collective expression 
of opinion through meetings cannot be kept out.”54 This is a source of friction between the 
normative approaches by different actors. The question whether the internet has evolved 
into a privately run, semi- public forum like the mall in Appleby or a public “institution,” as 
an essential transport facility run privately, like the airport in the Fraport decision, will be 
discussed in the context of the presentation of the normative order.55
 51 See referral of the case to the CJEU, French Conseil d’État, Google Inc., n° 399922, decision of July 19, 2017, 
with the following questions “Le ‘droit au déréférencement’ [ . . . ] doit- il être interprété en ce sens que l’exploitant 
d’un moteur de recherche est tenu, lorsqu’il fait droit à une demande de déréférencement, d’opérer ce déréférence-
ment sur l’ensemble des noms de domaine de son moteur de telle sorte que les liens litigieux n’apparaissent plus 
quel que soit le lieu à partir duquel la recherche lancée sur le nom du demandeur est effectuée, y compris hors du 
champ d’application territorial de la directive du 24 octobre 1995?” and, should the first questions be answered in 
the negative, should Google Spain be interpreted to mean rather that search engine operators need to delete links 
in all EU member states or only in the home state of the applicant; and finally, whether geolocation and IP address 
filtering should be used to suppress search results in the home state of the applicant or all EU member states.
 52 ECtHR, Appleby and Others v. United Kingdom (May 6, 2003), application no. 44306/ 98.
 53 BVerfG, judgement of February 22, 2011, 1 BvR 699/ 06, Fraport.
 54 Ibid.
 55 See  chapter 6.
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4.2.2.4  Technical Norm- Setting Cyberwar
Apart from the power asymmetry and the informal or inter partes instruments used be-
tween technical actors, the normative processes in standard- setting bodies give rise to is-
sues of accountability and transparency; this causes normative friction. Participation in 
technocratic gatherings demands arcane specialized knowledge which is usually produced 
and reproduced in elite institutions; lack thereof is a very effective entry barrier. IETF de-
velops important standards, protocols, and architecture to solve operational and technical 
problems of the internet, but its legitimacy does not come from elections or democratic 
processes. It describes itself as a “loosely self- organized group of people who contribute 
to the engineering and evolution of internet technologies.”56 That self- organized “collec-
tion[s] of happenings”57 develop and implement essential standards on the management 
of critical internet resources is one of the characteristics of the internet and its order, set 
at the intersection of technology and normativity. When standards and laws, traditionally 
legitimated through national democratic processes, collide, friction arises. This is especially 
problematic when laws are “overruled” by standards. These situations can lead to legitimacy 
paradoxa: what if a (not democratically legitimated) standard offers a higher level of privacy 
protection than a (democratically legitimated) national or regional norm?
Progressively, standards organizations have developed simulacra of legitimacy conferral 
by proceduralizing legitimacy and discourse settings that appear to follow a technologist in-
terpretation of the Habermasian approach: broad membership, active support for members 
from non- Western countries to participate in meetings, efforts to “educate” new members, 
same formal rights to participate for everyone.
Technical standards proposed by IETF are published in a series called Request for 
Comments (RFCs), which are publicly available and were first published in 1969.58 The nor-
mative impact of RFCs is based on community acceptance and premised upon the authority 
of the sender and the technical logic of the proposal. The influential RFC 2418 laid down 
that “[w] orking groups make decisions through a ‘rough consensus’ process.” For an IETF 
consensus to be established not all participants have to agree.59 In general, we read in RFC 
2418, “the dominant view of the working group shall prevail,” with “dominance” to be de-
termined on a “general sense of agreement.”60 This approach is difficult to reconcile with 
traditional international legal concepts of consent (of states and internationally relevant ac-
tors) but is common in international diplomacy. Rough consensus is similar to “adoption 
without a vote,” a practice often used in UN meetings when a resolution is broadly accepted 
but would probably not be unanimous. After reaching a rough consensus, the suggested 
new standard is published as a “proposed standard” in a six- month pilot phase. After posi-
tive impact has been proven twice, the standard can then become a “draft standard” and be 
recommended for global use. Then the internet community uses the standard (or not) as 
 56 Paul Hoffman (ed.), The Tao of IETF: A Novice’s Guide to the Internet Engineering Task Force (2012), https:// 
www.ietf.org/ tao.html.
 57 Ibid.
 58 IETF, Request for Comments (RFC), http:// www.ietf.org/ rfc.html.
 59 Cf. Gralf- Peter Calliess and Peer Zumbansen, Rough Consensus and Running Code. A Theory of Transnational 
Private Law (Oxford/ Portland, OR: Hart, 2012), 135 (pointing to three dimensions of a rough consensus: a social 
dimension (near unanimity), a substantial dimension (shared opinion regarding the common core), and a tem-
poral dimension (interim character of the standard with potential for improvement at a later stage).
 60 Cf. the influential RFC 2418: S. Bradner (ed.), RFC 2418, Working Group Guidelines, September 1998, http:// 
tools.ietf.org/ html/ rfc2418#section- 3.3, 3.3.
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it enters its recognition phase. Only after use has become widespread, the standard will be-
come binding.61
Technical standard- setters have realized that both the standards they develop and the 
process in which they are developed need to meet certain minimum criteria of openness 
and accountability. An example of such a commitment to certain principles in the de-
velopment of standards is the OpenStand initiative by influential internet technical or-
ganizations.62 The five principles described as fundamental for a “modern paradigm” for 
standards are: cooperation between standards organizations with each one respecting “the 
autonomy, integrity, processes, and intellectual property rules of the others”; adherence to 
five key principles in the process of standards developments (due process, broad consensus, 
transparency, balance, openness); collective empowerment (by striving for standards that 
are chosen and defined “based on technical merit, as judged by the contributed expertise 
of each participant,” that ensure “interoperability, scalability, stability, and resiliency,” en-
hance competition and innovation, and “contribute to the creation of global communities, 
benefiting humanity”); availability; and voluntary adoption (“success is determined by the 
market”).63 The values and policy choices expressed in the OpenStand paradigm are not ar-
bitrary. Rather, they can be traced back to international legal commitments regarding the 
fundamental values and finality of the information society and are an attempt to reduce 
friction.
4.2.2.5   Consequences
From the effective fight against hate speech to the application of private or public norms in 
online settings, from standards to privacy protection across jurisdictions and between ac-
tors, legal conflicts and normative frictions persist. This is not a new trend,64 as is evidenced 
by a number of well- known lawsuits involving online speech, from LICRA v. Yahoo!,65 to 
the Twitter user Paul Chambers, whose joke (that he would “blow the airport sky high!!” 
if the weather- related closure did not end) resulted in a conviction of making statements 
of a menacing character, with the High Court of the United Kingdom finally overturning 
the judgment,66 to French cases forcing social media companies to identify authors of anti- 
Semitic messages67 or organizers of neo- Nazi groups.
Normative frictions emerge especially when otherwise legitimate rules produce dispro-
portionate interferences. Blacklists of sites are a case in point, such as the one used by the 
UK Internet Watch Foundation (IWF), with its hotline against illegal content. In December 
2008, for instance, IWF blacklisted the image of a child on the 1976 album by the German 
 61 Gralf- Peter Calliess and Peer Zumbansen, Rough Consensus and Running Code. A Theory of Transnational 
Private Law (Oxford/ Portland, OR: Hart, 2012), 135– 6.
 62 Open Stand, A Global Community for Open Innovation (2013), http:// open- stand.org/ principles.
 63 Ibid.
 64 See Wolfgang Benedek and Matthias C. Kettemann, Freedom of Expression on the Internet (Strasbourg: Council 
of Europe, 2014), 118– 23.
 65 Tribunal de Grande Instance Paris, Ligue contre le racisme et l’antisémitisme et Union des étudiants juifs de 
France c. Yahoo! Inc. et Société Yahoo! France (LICRA v. Yahoo!), May 22, 2000. See also the US “follow- up”: United 
States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, 433 F.3d 1199, Yahoo! Inc. v. LICRA and UEJF, January 12, 2006 (Sup. Ct. 
denied certiorari).
 66 Owen Bowcott, “Twitter Joke Trial:  Paul Chambers Wins High Court Appeal Against Conviction,” The 
Guardian, July 27, 2012, www.guardian.co.uk/ law/ 2012/ jul/ 27/ twitter- joke- trial- high- court.
 67 Cyrus Farivar, “Twitter Must Identify Racist, Anti- Semitic Posters, French Court Says,” CNN, http:// edition.
cnn.com/ 2013/ 01/ 24/ tech/ social- media/ twitter- racist- posts- france/ index.html.
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band Scorpions. As a result of the inclusion of the address on the blacklist, the majority of 
UK internet users were no longer able to access the content and were no longer able to edit 
Wikipedia pages.68 If “unremedied” by normative interventions or changes in the sociopo-
litical sphere, normative frictions can widen into normative fractures.
4.2.3 Normative Fractures
4.2.3.1   Problem
Unlike normative froth and normative frictions, normative fractures are evidence of larger 
structural problems that the law and governance regimes of the internet are confronted 
with. Among the fractures present in the normative order of the internet, we find those be-
tween international law and non- international legal norms (such as non- binding internet 
standards), between universal and particular (sovereignty- oriented) normative approaches 
by states, and between the necessity to trust the internet and political developments, in-
cluding massive online surveillance practices that destabilize trust.
4.2.3.2  International Law and Other Norms
Among the key fractures are those between the traditional legal and the non- legal 
“dominion.” In Louis Henkin’s famous words: “almost all nations observe almost all princi-
ples of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time.”69 But how 
do states react to standards that do not amount to principles of international law or interna-
tional legal rules which do not oblige them to act in a certain way? Can we diagnose a fracture 
between international law and the other norms influential for internet law and governance?
States are obliged to ensure that they and the internet companies active on their terri-
tory respect human rights. They also have extraterritorial obligations, which extend to eco-
nomic, social, and cultural rights.70 It is impossible to conceptualize these without recourse 
to international law. Not only should the normative order of the internet be founded on the 
principles of international law, indeed it has to be if the goal of the international community 
regarding the future development of the information society should be met. International 
law is the only internationally agreed normative system providing vectors for the evolution 
of the legitimate normative order.
But there is a fracture between legal rules of international law and other bodies of norms 
that influence the use and evolution of the internet. DeNardis reminds us that internet gov-
ernance is enacted also through “technical design decisions, private corporate policies, 
global institutions and national laws and policies.”71 Even within international law, there 
is little clarity as to which “norms” are actually binding on states and which are soft law 
norms that may nevertheless be both orientative and influential.72 The approach of the GGE 
 68 BBC, “Scorpions Censored,” August 12, 2008, www.bbc.co.uk/ 6music/ news/ 20081208_ scorpians.shtml.
 69 Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave, 2nd edn. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 47.
 70 See the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 24 on State obligations 
under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the context of business activities, 
UN Doc. E/ C.12/ GC/ 24 of 10 August 2017.
 71 Laura DeNardis, The Global War for Internet Governance, 2nd edn. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 23.
 72 See, for an early approach to soft law, Christine M. Chinkin, “The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and 
Change in International Law,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 38 (1989) 4, 850– 66.
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report 2015 is similarly muddled. In just one paragraph the consensus report refers to the 
challenges of determining how “norms, rules and principles can apply to State conduct of 
ICT- related activities,” the objective of identifying further “voluntary, non- binding norms 
for responsible State behaviour” and “strengthen[ing] common understandings to increase 
stability and security in the global ICT environment.”73 The report does not clearly distin-
guish between norms, rules, principles, non- binding norms, common understandings, and 
“existing international norms and commitments.”74
The report does offer a definition of its notion of norms as “reflect[ing] the expectations 
of the international community, set[ting] standards for responsible State behaviour and 
allow[ing] the international community to assess the activities and intentions of States,”75 
but this does not square with the tentatively worded “recommendations for consideration by 
States for voluntary, non- binding norms, rules or principles of responsible behaviour of States.” 
Either a norm reflects existing expectations, or it should help them crystallize. Confidence- 
building measures, though voluntary, can be considered to be (partially) encompassed by due 
diligence obligations of states. Further, the report includes existing norms of international law 
(“international law [being] an essential framework for [state] actions in their use of ICTs and 
to promote an open, secure, stable accessible and peaceful ICT environment”76) by referring 
to “principles of the Charter and other international law” and naming six of them
 – state sovereignty;77
 – sovereign equality;
 – settlement of international disputes by peaceful means;
 – non- intervention in the internal affairs of other States;
 – prohibition of the threat or use of force; and
 – respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.78
4.2.3.3  Universality and Subsidiarity
Over time a fracture has emerged in the international regulation of the internet between 
states supporting the current model of including, at least in principle, all relevant actors in 
normative processes on the internet and pursuing, at least by and large, common interests, 
including internet integrity, and those states aiming for the internationalization of more 
sovereignty- oriented internet politics.79
Sovereignty- oriented states, such as Algeria, China, Egypt, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, 
and UAE, have argued, for instance during ITU’s WCIT- 12 conference, for state- focused 
mechanisms to manage key internet resources, such as the DNS— thus establishing “con-
trol over the internet” through the ITU.80 In a leaked submission to the ITU conference 
 73 GGE report (2015), para. 9.
 74 Ibid., para. 11.
 75 Ibid., para. 10.
 76 Ibid., para. 25.
 77 Ibid., para. 27.
 78 Ibid., para. 26.
 79 Matthias C. Kettemann, Völkerrecht in Zeiten des Netzes:  Perspektiven auf den effektiven Schutz von 
Grund- und Menschenrechten in der Informationsgesellschaft zwischen Völkerrecht, Europarecht und Staatsrecht 
(Bonn: Friedrich- Ebert- Siftung, 2015), http:// library.fes.de/ pdf- files/ akademie/ 12068.pdf, 53 et seq.
 80 Russia, UAE, China, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Sudan, and Egypt, Proposal for the Work of the Conference 
[WCIT- 12], ITU Doc. DT- X of 5 December 2012, WCIT12/ 27(Rev.1)- E, § 3A.2 and 3A.3, http:// files.wcitleaks.
org/ public/ Merged%20UAE%20081212.pdf.
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(which ultimately failed to come to an agreement), these states suggested including para-
graphs in the reformed treaty that would allow ITU member states “equal rights to manage 
the internet, including in regard to the allotment, assignment and reclamation of internet 
numbering, naming, addressing and identification resources and to support for the oper-
ation and development of basic internet infrastructure” [and] “the sovereign right to es-
tablish and implement public policy, including international policy, on matters of internet 
governance, and to regulate the national internet segment, as well as the activities within 
their territory of operating agencies providing internet access or carrying internet traffic.”81 
Though it is difficult to understand the content of a “sovereign right to implement [ . . . ] in-
ternational policy [ . . . ] on matters of internet governance” in light of the non- exclusive sov-
ereignty inherent in the very notion of international policy, it was the notion of a “national 
internet segment” that attracted most criticism.
In a white paper outlining the Chinese approach82 to the internet, the People’s 
Republic of China’s State Council argued that “the role of the UN should be given full 
scope in international internet administration.” An “authoritative and just interna-
tional internet administration organization” should be installed under UN auspices. 
Through it, all countries should be able to participate “in the administration of the fun-
damental international resources of the internet, and a multilateral and transparent al-
location system should be established on the basis of the current management mode.”83 
Section III of the white paper also says, apparently without irony, that “Chinese citizens 
fully enjoy freedom of speech on the internet.”84 This claim is inaccurate in light of in-
ternational human rights standards,85 but serves to illustrate the dissonance between 
the self- declared accordance with international internet principles of national internet 
policies, especially the ones oriented toward ensuring or based on sovereignty, and the 
tenets of the normative order of the internet, including integrity of the internet and its 
universality.
As sovereignty- oriented states such as Russia and China progressively feel that the cur-
rent universal approach to internet regulation is not reflective of their values and inter-
ests, they have started building alternate institutions and developing alternative normative 
vehicles, while formally referring to multistakeholderism. These initiatives include polit-
ical alignment among BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) on 
internet policy86 and the organization by China of the annual (Wuzhen) “World Internet 
Conferences.”
At the Wuzhen Conference in 2016, President Xi noted that China would “work with 
the international community for the common welfare for all people [and] uphold the con-
cept of cyberspace sovereignty and to make the global cyberspace governance system fairer 
 81 Ibid.
 82 For an analysis of Chinese internet governance approaches, see Gianluigi Negro, “Chinese Internet 
Governance— Some Domestic and Foreign Issues,” in Roxana Radu, Jean- Marie Chenou, and Rolf H. Weber 
(eds.), The Evolution of Global Internet Governance. Principles and Policies in the Making (Zurich:  Schulthess, 
2014), 141– 56.
 83 People’s Republic of China, State Council, The Internet in China, June 8, 2010, http:// www.china.org.cn/ gov-
ernment/ whitepaper/ node_ 7093508.htm, sect. I.
 84 Ibid., sect. 3.
 85 Cf. Rebecca MacKinnon, Consent of the Networked. The Worldwide Struggle for Internet Freedom 
(New York: Basic Books, 2012), 133– 9 (recounting Yahoo’s complicity in human rights violations in China).
 86 Cf. Tim Stevens, “BRICS Vision for International Information Security” (2015), http:// thesigers.com/ anal-
ysis/ 2015/ 7/ 3/ brics- set- out- vision- for- international- information- security.
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and more reasonable.”87 Reasonable changes in cyberspace governance coupled with a ref-
erence to sovereignty tend to lead normative developments away from universality.88 This 
assessment rests, inter alia, on the foundations of the Chinese organizer’s “Report on World 
Internet Development 2017,” in which Chinese authorities reiterated their conviction that 
“[n] o cyberspace hegemony is allowed, neither is single domination or only a few countries’ 
decision.” (sic)89 It should be noted though that hegemonic tendencies, which are not pre-
sent in the internet governance system to the extent that China seems to claim (though they 
are with regard to certain aspects of cybersecurity), do not even constitute, per se, a viola-
tion of international law.90
Further anti- universal initiatives from among BRICS countries include important 
communications- related aspects of China’s “Belt & Road” initiative. China has launched 
satellites allowing its Beidou Navigation Satellite System (BNS)91 to establish itself as a 
rival to the US’ Global Positioning System (GPS), Russia’s Globalnaya Navigatsionnaya 
Sputnikovaya Sistema (GLONASS), and Europe’s Global Navigation Satellite System 
(GALILEO) with stations in countries in Asia and beyond and internet- related services 
provided through Chinese- run satellites.92
A final example is Russia’s building of an alternate root for itself and its allies.93 Such a 
root would serve, according to the Russian Federation’s Security Council, as “independent 
internet infrastructure for BRICS nations, which would continue to work in the event of 
global internet malfunctions.” In effect, as the Security Council put it, “параллельный и
нтернет,”94 a parallel internet. According to the minutes of the Security Council meeting, 
“Western countries,” in particular the “US and some European countries,” were “run[ning] 
the internet” and thus had the “opportunity to organize cyber attacks and conduct informa-
tion wars [ . . . ] threatening the security of Russia.”95
Threats to internet universality can also come from the application of the subsidiarity 
principle, which has been successfully established in regional integration law and can be 
applied with gradation also in international law. In principle, it should be the case that 
 87 Xinhua, “President Xi Stresses Int’l Cooperation in Cyberspace Governance,” November 17, 2016, http:// 
www.wuzhenwic.org/ 2016- 11/ 17/ c_ 61495.htm.
 88 But seeing limited convergences between European and Chinese approaches to the rule of law in cyber-
space: Zhixiong Huang and Kubo Mačák, “Towards the International Rule of Law in Cyberspace: Contrasting 
Chinese and Western Approaches,” Chinese Journal of International Law 16 (2017), 271, https:// ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2979896.
 89 World Internet Conference (4th WIC, Wuzhen Summit), Report on World Internet Development 2017, 
http:// www.wuzhenwic.org/ download/ ReportonWorldInternetDevelopment2017overview.pdf.
 90 Nico Krisch, “International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the Shaping of the International 
Legal Order,” EJIL (2005), 369– 408.
 91 Tristan Kenderdine, “Coordinating China’s Satellite Constellations. a New Era in the Space Race 
Begins,” Asia & the Pacific Policy Society, APPS Policy Forum, July 20, 2017, https:// www.policyforum.net/ 
coordinating- chinas- satellite- constellations.
 92 Saadia M. Pekkanen, “China’s Ambitions Fly High: ‘One Belt, One Road’ To Extend Into Space,” Forbes.com, 
May 26, 2017, https:// www.forbes.com/ sites/ saadiampekkanen/ 2017/ 05/ 26/ chinas- ambitions- fly- high- one- belt- 
one- road- to- extend- into- space/ #48bfb10d4c0c.
 93 As cited by Eli Noam, “Russia Orders Alternate Root Internet System,” Net Policy News, December 15, 2017, 
http:// netpolicynews.com/ index.php/ component/ content/ article/ 89- r/ 941- russia- orders- alternate- internet- system.
 94 Afisha Daily, “Альтернативный интернет из России: что это такое и чем он нам грозит,” November 30, 2017, 
https:// daily.afisha.ru/ technology/ 7543- alternativnyy- internet- iz- rossii- chto- eto- takoe- i- chem- on- nam- grozit.
 95 Ibid.:  “В протоколе заседания Совета безопасности [  . . .  ] говорится, что у «западных стран» 
появилась возможности устраивать кибератаки и вести информационные войны. Это угрожает 
безопасности России. На заседании решили, что интернетом сегодня управляют США и некоторые европ
ейские страны.”
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regulation is carried out at the level of the people closest to the citizen, unless there are 
good reasons (global need for harmonization, necessity of universal technical solutions) 
that global rules are preferable. The disadvantage of subsidiary standardization, of course, 
lies in the promotion of different normative approaches that can only be reconciled with 
effort. This contradicts the global, interoperational nature of information and communi-
cation technologies that are just crossing borders. Therefore, and to avoid substantial frac-
tures, a strong responsive component must always be implemented in orders incorporating 
the subsidiarity principle.96
4.2.3.4  Territoriality and Reterritorialization
Fractures have appeared in the internet’s order in relation to those actors favoring territory- 
based solutions and those relying on a normative approach sans géographie. (Re)territorial-
ization (the attempt to tie the internet, its servers, data flows, or users to a specific country) 
is a fracturing force in the online order.
Critics of state- focused approaches to law and governance of the internet question the 
effectiveness of central regulation in comparison to decentralized, naturally developing pri-
vate legal regimes.97 But states can regulate the internet with great effect.98 A study on the 
effect of the German Grundgesetz on the internet diagnoses few deficits in the legal and 
constitutional framework, as long as the facts are “purely national.”99 The constitutional 
system of values was “incorporated into the social- ethical principles of German society” 
so that rule of law and peaceful relations between individuals (Rechtsfrieden), both offline 
and online, are assured. As soon as cases, however, go beyond the borders of one state (in 
this case: Germany), fundamental rights positions become more difficult to ensure. In these 
cases (and they have become an important part in times of international communication 
flows) the individual “cannot rely on the state’s guarantee of their fundamental rights.”100
This is problematic because internet users cannot always distinguish between national 
constellations of facts and those transcending borders due to the ubiquity of the internet. 
How can users know which servers and which clouds101 their data is stored on and retrieved 
from? How could they understand and predict how the data packets of an email find their 
way to the recipient? It is precisely the decentralization of the internet and the end user- to- 
end user conception that makes it difficult to geographically pinpoint actions and attribu-
tion of responsibilities to private and public actors.102
 96 Cf. Lars Viellechner, Transnationalisierung des Rechts (Weilerswist: Velbrück, 2013), 265 et seq.
 97 Gerd Winter, “Transnationale informelle Regulierung: Gestalt, Effekte und Rechtsstaatlichkeit,” in Gralf- 
Peter Calliess (ed.), Transnationales Recht. Stand und Perspektiven (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014), 95– 112, (96).
 98 Cf. Kettemann (2015), 53 et seq.
 99 Utz Schliesky, Christian Hoffmann, Anika D. Luch, Sönke E. Schulz, and Kim Corinna Borchers, 
Schutzpflichten und Drittwirkung im Internet. Das Grundgesetz im digitalen Zeitalter (Baden- Baden:  Nomos, 
2014), 146.
 100 Ibid., 147.
 101 Notably, cloud- based storage solutions are not, as the notion of “cloud” would seem to indicate, without ter-
ritorial anchor. Data has to be stored physically on servers in buildings.
 102 See David Bethlehem, “The End of Geography:  The Changing Nature of the International System and 
the Challenge to International Law,” EJIL 25 (2014) 1, 9– 24. But see the critique of David S. Koller and Carl 
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to International Law: A Reply to Daniel Bethlehem,” EJIL 25 (2014) 1, 31– 4.
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Of course, this does not mean that territoriality becomes irrelevant as an international 
legal principle with regard to jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce on the internet.103 
Recall the commitment by the Group of Governmental Experts in its 2015 report to sov-
ereignty: “State sovereignty and international norms and principles that flow from sover-
eignty apply to the conduct by States of ICT- related activities and to their jurisdiction over 
ICT infrastructure within their territory.”104 States continue to have jurisdiction over those 
parts of the internet, physical and non- kinetic, that are located within their territory. Only 
the options for action by the state (and thus also its obligations) are restricted.105 Schliesky 
et al. correctly state that the “control capacity” of nation states is limited in times of glob-
alization. They issue the apt warning that whoever benefits from “globalization, from the 
increasing interconnectedness of services based on ubiquity and independence from space 
and time constraints, must realize in return that they cannot claim protection of the state in 
the same way as in purely national situations.”106
However, the fact that the nation- state cannot effectively safeguard all fundamental rights 
positions does not yet immunize the legal systems relevant to the internet against criticism. 
Though the fractures persist, there are concrete avenues of redress, including clarifying the 
reach of the obligation of states to ensure human rights (which encompasses third- party 
effects of fundamental rights) (via, e.g., the legal framework of the law on terms of service 
(here: §§ 307 et seq. of the German Civil Code ( BGB))).
Can the territorialization fracture be overcome? The case can be made that some territo-
rialization is a positive development. Local storage can lead to a higher level of protection 
of citizen data and is certainly needed in the area of public authority activities. However, 
duplicating commercial non- native services is not effective (at least not at a public expense) 
and would not be appropriate in view of the ubiquity of the internet.
4.2.3.5   Cyberwar
An important fracture in the international order of the internet lies in the approach to cy-
berwar. During the 2017 GGE discussions, states started to build on commitments from 
the 2013 and 2015 reports, especially with reference to the applicability of international law 
to the internet, the importance of the Charter, and key international legal principles, such 
as territorial sovereignty, non- intervention, and due diligence.107 Recall that the 2015 re-
port stated that the international community aspired to regulate the internet in a peaceful 
manner “for the common good of mankind”:108 “[t] he adherence by States to international 
law, in particular their Charter obligations, is an essential framework for their actions 
 103 Just see Christian Walter, “Cyber Security als Herausforderung für das Völkerrecht,” JZ 14/ 2015, 685– 93 
(691ff).
 104 GGE report (2015), para. 27.
 105 See the decision BVerfG, 16.12.1980 - 2 BvR 419/ 80, Hess, BVerfGE 55, 349 et seq. The German Federal 
Constitutional Court argues that involving other countries in factual constellations can lead to problems with 
ensuring fundamental rights, because “foreign policy and international law” might set limits to the process.
 106 Utz Schliesky, Christian Hoffmann, Anika D. Luch, Sönke E. Schulz, and Kim Corinna Borchers, 
Schutzpflichten und Drittwirkung im Internet. Das Grundgesetz im digitalen Zeitalter (Baden- Baden:  Nomos, 
2014), 181. “[W] er die Vorteile der Globalisierung, der zunehmenden Vernetzung, der auf Ubiquität sowie 
Raum- und Zeitunabhängigkeit basierenden Dienste nutzt, muss sich im Gegenzug vergegenwärtigen, dass er 
nicht in gleicher Weise Schutz des Staates beanspruchen kann wie in rein nationalen Sachverhalten” (translation 
by the author).
 107 GGE report (2015).
 108 Ibid., para. 28 (c).
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in their use of ICTs and to promote an open, secure, stable, accessible and peaceful ICT 
environment.”109
However, when it came to discussing the applicability of the UN Charter to the internet, 
in particular Chapter VII with its references to “use of force” (allowing for Chapter VII sit-
uation findings by the Security Council) and “armed attack” (triggering self- defense), states 
disagreed. Sovereignty- oriented states that were also criticized in the past for having con-
doned or even organized cyberattacks against foreign targets argued that applying the UN 
Charter’s provisions regarding use of force to cyberspace before technical means of attribu-
tion delivered more reliable results would lead to the militarization of cyberspace.110 This 
approach seems to be a backtracking exercise in light of international commitments, both in 
the WSIS documents and in the 2013 and 2015 GGE reports, which all included references 
to the applicability on the internet of the UN Charter, in fact “in particular the UN Charter.” 
Though it should be noted that, already in the run- up to the 2015 report, China, Russia, 
Pakistan, Malaysia, and Belarus had opposed language favored by the US to include an ex-
plicit reference to Article 51 with its authorization of self- defense against armed attacks, the 
norm was contained implicitly in any case by reference to the UN Charter.111
4.2.3.6   Trust
An important fracture has opened in the realm of trust in internet integrity. States need 
to seriously address the issue of what action they can take quickly to restore confidence in 
the integrity of the internet, which has been substantially endangered through the revela-
tions of pervasive data collection schemes by the Five Eyes states and their massive surveil-
lance systems (Snowden revelations). In its proposal for a new social contract, the Global 
Commission on Internet Governance, a study group on the future of internet regulation, 
focused its efforts on linking privacy and security. States needed to act: to better safeguard 
privacy; to subject every surveillance to a strict necessity and proportionality test; to guar-
antee transparency in monitoring measures and legal remedies; to protect online data and 
to sensitize consumers; to raise confidence in big data solutions; to strengthen private com-
munications; not to introduce backdoors to private data; to highlight good practices in the 
field of cybersecurity; and to work together against dangers emanating from cyberspace.112
In the aftermath of the Snowden revelations, the United Nations HRC expressed “serious 
concern” in its recent resolution on the right to privacy in the digital age because of the 
“negative impact that surveillance and/ or interception of communications, including extra-
territorial surveillance and/ or interception of communications, as well as the collection of 
 109 Ibid., para. 25.
 110 Cf. Adam Segal, “The Development of Cyber Norms at the United Nations Ends in Deadlock. Now What?” 
Council on Foreign Relations, June 29, 2017, https:// www.cfr.org/ blog/ development- cyber- norms- united- nations- 
ends- deadlock- now- what; Arun M. Sukumar, “The UN GGE Failed. Is International Law in Cyberspace Doomed 
As Well?,” Lawfare, July 4, 2017, https:// lawfareblog.com/ un- gge- failed- international- law- cyberspace- doomed- 
well; and Ann Väljataga, “Back to Square One? The Fifth UN GGE Fails to Submit a Conclusive Report at the 
UN General Assembly,” NATO CCDCOE Incyder database, https:// ccdcoe.org/ back- square- one- fifth- un- gge- 
submit- conclusive- report- un- general- assembly.html.
 111 Eneken Tikk and Mika Kerttunen, “The Alleged Demise of the UN GGE:  An Autopsy and Eulogy,” 
Cyber Policy Institute (2017), http:// cpi.ee/ wp- content/ uploads/ 2017/ 12/ 2017- Tikk- Kerttunen- Demise- of-  
the- UN- GGE- 2017- 12- 17- ET.pdf.
 112 Statement by the Global Commission on Internet Governance, Toward a Social Compact for Digital 
Privacy and Security, Wednesday, April 15, 2015, https:// www.ourinternet.org/ publication/ toward- a- social-  
compact- for- digital- privacy- and- security.
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personal data, in particular when carried out on a mass scale, may have on the exercise and 
enjoyment of human rights.”113 The internet as such needs to be protected and we need pro-
tection from dangers through misuse of the internet.
The necessary protection must be oriented toward the structure of the system. This is 
a point that had already been made in 2008 by the German Bundesverfassungsgericht 
(BVerfG),114 which developed a new fundamental right to fill the protective gap left by fun-
damental rights regarding the integrity of information systems. The Court found that the 
“general right of personality” manifested itself also as a “fundamental right to the guarantee 
of the integrity and confidentiality of information technology systems.” Interferences with 
this right may be justified for preventive purposes or for criminal prosecution but must be 
based on law that is constitutional and proportionate. Therefore any secret infiltration of an 
information technology system needs to meet strict criteria, including indications of con-
crete danger for a legal value of paramount importance, such as the body, life, and freedom 
of the person or goods of the general public that, when threatened, impact the foundations 
or the existence of the state or the foundations of human existence.115 The Court did not, 
however, develop this right further in its jurisprudence.
The Snowden revelations have “chilling effects” on the use of the internet and our un-
derstanding of the internet as a technology to bring about positive social change toward an 
information society based on human rights.116 The social costs of mass surveillance are far 
higher than their returns. The weakening of encryption standards or the coded opening of 
backdoors for government agencies, especially, can have negative consequences for national 
security. The European Parliament’s Schaake report, adopted in September 2015, under-
lines the importance of privacy encryption technologies, including the right to encryption 
and the introduction of end- to- end encryption standards for all communications.117
Democratic societies have long been threatened by espionage and terrorism.118 Already 
in 1978, the ECtHR ruled in Klass and others v. Germany that the “existence of some legisla-
tion granting powers of secret surveillance over the mail, post and telecommunications is, 
under exceptional conditions, necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security and/ or for the prevention of disorder or crime.”119 However, this does not mean 
that states could ignore human rights or be completely free in the choice of their means and 
the intensity of surveillance: aware that such laws contain the danger “[of] undermining 
or even destroying democracy on the ground of defending it ‘states could not do what they 
wanted’ in the name of the struggle against espionage and terrorism.”120 In Shimovolos 
v. Russia, the Court underscored the necessity of “detailed rules on the application of secret 
 113 Human Rights Council, Resolution 28/ 16, The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, A/ HRC/ RES/ 28/ 16 of 1 
April 2015.
 114 BVerfG, judgment of the First Senate of February 27, 2008, 1 BvR 370/ 07, BVerfGE 120, 274– 350 (“Das allge-
meine Persönlichkeitsrecht (Art. 2 Abs. 1 i.V.m. Art. 1 Abs. 1 GG) umfasst das Grundrecht auf Gewährleistung der 
Vertraulichkeit und Integrität informationstechnischer Systeme.”)
 115 Ibid.
 116 European Parliament, Report on human rights and technology: the impact of intrusion and surveillance sys-
tems on human rights in third countries (2014/ 2232(INI)), Committee on Foreign Affairs Rapporteur: Marietje 
Schaake, June 3, 2015, para. 3.
 117 Ibid., paras. 61– 2.
 118 Tom Sorell and John Guelke, “Liberal Democratic Regulation and Technological Advance,” in Roger 
Brownsword, Eloise Scotford, and Karen Yeung (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Law, Regulation, and Technology 
(Oxford: OUP, 2017), 90– 112.
 119 ECtHR, Klass and Others v. Germany, no. 5029/ 71 of September 6, 1978, para. 48.
 120 Ibid., para. 49.
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measures of surveillance, especially as the technology available for use is continually be-
coming more sophisticated.”121
In order to strengthen the protection of privacy on the internet, states must align their 
national laws and policies with their human rights obligations under the ECHR and ICCPR 
(and relevant European primary law and, in particular, the Charter of Fundamental Rights), 
as interpreted by the ECtHR, Human Rights Committee, and European Court of Justice 
(ECJ), respectively. Normative measures to remedy gaps must be developed in the context 
of easily accessible, open, societal discussion processes. Any law that enables data collection 
must be measured against recognized human rights criteria (such as specificity and pur-
pose). The conditions under which collected data may be searched by means of selectors 
must be discussed publicly. Selectors must be published to ensure non- discriminatory ap-
plication. The use of selectors that can be assigned to specific persons must pass even higher 
protective barriers.
Democratic control of security and intelligence services is important for the protec-
tion of human rights and the rule of law. The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human 
Rights recommends that a national dialog be held on ways to ensure the control of law.122 
Similar demands are formulated by the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe.123 
To sum up, the protection of the right to privacy is central to the further development of a 
development- oriented and human- centered information society. A lack of trust in a pro-
tected private sphere undermines the central participatory rights in the information society 
with the freedom of communication. The right to privacy creates the freedom to exercise 
all other rights. The historic struggle for a state- free sphere of the private sphere, which has 
historically been central to the development of human rights, must be placed at the center of 
efforts to protect human rights on the internet in order to extend the right to an “entrepre-
neurial” sphere.
In more detail, the principles that should be applied to a human rights- sensitive sur-
veillance of internet communication have been laid out in the International Principles on 
the Application of Human Rights to Communications Surveillance (May 2014).124 These 
in turn show what normative potential non- state actors could have as standard aggregators 
and standards promoters.
The central regulatory objective of international law must be to guarantee the integrity 
of the internet as a resource in the global public interest and to protect global society from 
dangers emanating from the (mis)use of the internet. In the words of the 2015 GGE report, 
“[a] n open, secure, stable, accessible and peaceful ICT environment is essential for all [..] to 
reduce risks to international peace and security. [ . . . ] ICTs provide immense opportunities 
 121 ECtHR, Shimovolos v. Russia, judgment of January 28, 2011, application no. 30194/ 09, para. 68.
 122 Council of Europe, Commissioner for Human Rights, Democratic and Effective Oversight of National 
Security Services (May 2015), https:// book.coe.int/ en/ commissioner- for- human- rights/ 6682- pdf- democratic- 
and- effective- oversight- of- national- security- services.html, para. 18.
 123 European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Update of the 2007 Report on 
the Democratic Oversight of the Security Services and Report on the Democratic Oversight of Signals Intelligence 
Agencies, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 102nd Plenary Session (March 20– 21, 2015), http:// www.coe.
int/ t/ dghl/ standardsetting/ media/ Conf- FoE- 2015/ Venice%20Commission_ Study%20No%20719_ 2013.pdf, 
Study No. 719/ 2013, CDL- AD(2015)006.
 124 International Principles on the Application of Human Rights to Communications Surveillance, Final 
Version (May 2014), https:// necessaryandproportionate.org/ text.
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for social and economic development and continue to grow in importance for the interna-
tional community.”125
Many aspects of societal life are globally networked in the sense that their premises or 
conditions, under which situations are justified, contested, changed, and justified again, 
are influenced by international law. Therefore, even in primarily national cases, effective 
protection of fundamental rights is supported by appropriate protection through inter-
national law.126 However, this does not mean that new rules have to be passed. Proposals 
such as those of Joseph Cannataci, the newly appointed Special Rapporteur on the right 
to privacy (a new “Geneva Convention” on the protection of data and the prevention 
of massive internet communications surveillance)127 and that of German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel (calling for a “Global Privacy Agreement Modeled on the Kyoto Protocol 
for climate protection”) may be useful but are not viable.128 There are already suffi-
cient standards that limit the surveillance power of states, but these need to be better 
implemented.
Discussions about a fundamental right to encryption, which have been given an im-
petus in view of the German pioneering position by the fundamental right to IT secu-
rity,129 must be accelerated and led internationally. A right to encryption is an outflow of 
the right to privacy.130 In view of the systemic monitoring of internet communication, 
a fundamental right both to encryption and to the choice of the encryption method is 
important: as a kind of “right of digital self- defense.”131 The knowledge of being able to 
communicate in a protected manner can increase the interest in participation in the inter-
net’s normative processes. States must— in the negative effect of the right to encryption— 
not try to incorporate “back doors” in encryption technologies or dissuade citizens from 
their use. Special access to states should not be allowed without compelling reasons: “It 
is a seemingly universal position among technologists that there is no special access that 
can be made available only to government authorities [ . . . ]. In the contemporary techno-
logical environment, intentionally compromising encryption, even for arguably legitimate 
purposes, weakens everyone’s security online.”132
The protection of encryption technology and its increased use are important safe-
guards for privacy and with it the precondition for exercising freedom of expression. 
Both are thus important foundations for the realization of democratic participation 
perspectives.
 125 GGE report 2015, paras. 2– 3.
 126 See Wolfgang Hoffmann- Riem, “Freiheitsschutz in den globalen Kommunikationsinfrastrukturen,” JZ 69 
(2014) 2, 53– 63, (62).
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says- new- un- privacy- chief (“British surveillance oversight [is] ‘a joke’; [ . . . ] the situation is worse than anything 
George Orwell could have foreseen”).
 128 FAZ, “Spähaffäre: Merkel regt globales Datenschutz- Abkommen an,” July 20, 2015 http:// www.faz.net/ aktu-
ell/ politik/ spaehaffaere- merkel- regt- globales- datenschutz- abkommen- an- 12288963.html.
 129 Julia Gerhards, (Grund- )Recht auf Verschlüsselung? (Frankfurt am Main: Nomos, 2010).
 130 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and 
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4.2.3.7  Regime Deficiencies
Another fracture in the broader sense can be diagnosed when it comes to regime deficien-
cies. Every legal system is in flux and constantly adapt to new circumstances. For example, 
changing conceptions of social morality create incremental pressure for norms to evolve. 
The formation of social will and the legal order are therefore communicating vessels with 
a delaying factor.133 The decisive question is therefore in which way the regime is deficient 
and what the comparative vector is: a possible alternative regime or an ideal legal system?
In the case of the online order, the only meaningful answer can be: deficient in compar-
ison to a legal system designed to meet the objectives of the international community for 
the information society. Legislative deficits therefore exist in regulation and implementa-
tion when the normative order of the internet does not reach these goals legitimately and 
effectively. Simply put, a normative order that contains fractures is deficient.
The concept of the unity of the legal system in the sense of the exclusive validity of laws 
legitimized by the people (and no norms beyond that) is a fiction.134 The legality (but perhaps 
not the rule of law135) paradigm created with the modern constitutional state is challenged by 
globalization and the relativization of territoriality by information and communication tech-
nologies.136 That does not mean that the state ceases to matter: “Virtual space does not mean 
[...] the end of the sovereign constitutional state.”137 The state— through the legislature, the 
executive, and above all the judiciary— must remember its central functions and protect its 
citizens, without violating their rights, in an increasingly challenging “regulatory mosaic.”138 
Another complicating factor is the emergence on the internet of spontaneous, decentral-
ized, private legal regimes in which neither traditional nor charismatic and not even regu-
larly rationally legitimated actors and institutions exercise international public authority.139 
In view of the large number of actors involved and the decreasing relevance of borders on the 
internet, it is also a challenge to identify the “appropriate” normative level— global, regional, 
national— for standardizing certain internet- related issues. In fact, not one level is regularly 
affected, and all three levels could legitimately be subject to a standardization interest. This is 
illustrated by the example of the local storage requirement for user data.140
 133 When courts are too quick for changing social mores, social unrest can be the result. Cf. Matthias C. 
Kettemann, “How to Implement Controversial Court Decisions:  International Constitutional Lessons from 
Brown v. Board of Education for the Austrian Cases on Topographical Signs in Carinthia,” Vienna Online Journal 
on International Constitutional Law 4 (2010) 4, 590– 623.
 134 Klaus Günther, “Normativer Rechtspluralismus— Eine Kritik,” Normative Orders Working Paper 3/ 2014 
(2014), http:// publikationen.ub.uni- frankfurt.de/ files/ 34664/ Guenther_ Normativer+Rechtspluralismus.pdf, 1.
 135 Cf. Armin von Bogdandy, “Prinzipien von Staat, supranationalen und internationalen Organisationen,” § 232 
(275– 304), in Josef Isensee, Paul Kirchhof, et al. (eds.), Handbuch des Staatsrechts, Band XI: Internationale Bezüge, 
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 136 Lars Viellechner, Transnationalisierung des Rechts (Weilerswist: Velbrück, 2013), 99.
 137 Hobe, Stephan, “Cyberspace— der virtuelle Raum,” in Josef Isensee, Paul Kirchhof, et al. (eds.), Handbuch des 
Staatsrechts, Band XI: Internationale Bezüge, 3rd edn. (2013), § 271, Rn. 44.
 138 Wolfgang Hoffmann- Riem, “Freiheitsschutz in den globalen Kommunikationsinfrastrukturen,” 69 JZ 2/ 
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On September 1, 2015, a new Russian law came into force, which includes a data lo-
calization rule: data related to Russian citizens must be stored on servers in Russia. The 
Russian Data Protection Agency, Roskomnadzor, needs to be informed where the data is 
physically located.141 Here, state law seems to supplant international legal protection of 
free internet communication and the freedom of the internet as a global communication 
infrastructure.142
At the European level, in the Schrems case, the CJEU stated that the level of data protec-
tion in other states must be “reasonable” (i.e. “equal in substance” to the Union if a transfer 
of European users’ data were to be allowed). Equivalence is subsequently substantiated by 
the CJEU with reference to European data protection law (emphasizing at the same time 
that the level of protection need not be identical).143 In doing so, the CJEU continued its ex-
pansive data protection jurisprudence, setting uniform (“adequate”) protection standards 
for “European” data, whether in Europe or as an export. If this ensures a comprehensive, 
multidimensional protection of fundamental rights, however, it is urgent to fill the gap with 
rules. The data protection principles and the high standard of protection used by the CJEU 
cannot be directly applied to national situations (see Art. 51 (1) GRC). Furthermore, there 
is no basis in European law for the assessment of member states’ data access regulations, 
such as the German “Article 10 Law,” regarding their respective conformity with funda-
mental rights.
This is a contradiction that needs to be resolved if the EU wants to remain credible as an 
advocate of high data protection standards. Together with the consequences of the verdict 
at that time for the negotiations on international treaties touching upon the protection of 
data in international trade, this example shows the connectedness of legal systems and the 
dangers of allowing fractures to persist. If fractures are strong enough, they can, alone or in 
aggregate, develop forces leading to fragmentation.
4.3 Fragmentation
4.3.1 Forces of Fragmentation
Given the different character of norms present in the regulation of the internet, both legal 
norms and governance- related norms, the lack of a hierarchical normative structure spe-
cific to the internet leads to a situation of normative flux.144 The relationship between norms 
on the internet needs to be judged according to criteria that are not immediately obvious, 
as they are in Kelsenian- style national systems of hierarchically ordered norms. Apart from 
certain key norms, such as the principle of sovereignty, the position of most more- detailed 
norms within the normative order of the internet (which this study will present in detail in 
 141 Michael Malloy and Pavel Arievich, “Russia’s Data Localization Requirement Will Take Effect September 1,” 
Data Protection, Privacy and Security Alert (US), July 8, 2015, https:// www.dlapiper.com/ en/ us/ insights/ publicca-
tions/ 2015/ 07/ russia- data- localization- requirement.
 142 Critically, Daniel Joyce, “Internet Freedom and Human Rights,” EJIL 26 (2015) 2, 493– 514. See also on data 
localization as an aspect of governmental fragmentation, 4.3.
 143 CJEU, C‐362/ 14, Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner, judgment of October 6, 2015.
 144 Kevin Werbach, “The Centripetal Network: How the Internet Holds Itself Together, and the Forces Tearing It 
Apart,” University of California, Davis Law Review (2008) 42, 343– 412 (seeing multidimensional “balkanization” 
trends).
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 chapter 6) has to be negotiated and is tied to the narrative(s) that inhabits the nomos (as the 
“norm- total” of the internet) and depends inter alia on the consistency of the norm with 
other norms of the order and the consonancy of the norm with the purpose of the order.
This is a key difference between the norms pertaining to the internet and general norms 
of international law (or of national law). Both are, whether in a naturalist or a positivist 
analysis, firmly placed within a hierarchical system of admittedly various complexities.145 
Hierarchies have advantages. They decomplexify relations between norms and actors. 
They enable the foreseeable production of norms within the system and their contestation. 
Norms can be overruled (or at least delegitimized) by contrary higher norms. Within the 
normative order of the internet, however, production and contestation take place in a more 
flexible and much less predictable way. Already this allows the preliminary conclusion that 
the online order is more likely to fragment than national legal systems.
In the previous section, this study presented selected examples of normative froth, fric-
tion, and fractures. This section discusses the question whether or not fragmentation of the 
online order has taken place or is taking place and what evidence is marshaled for such frag-
mentation in the interconnected economic, technical, and legal dimensions. If fragmenta-
tion is perceived within the online order, arguments for the establishment of a normative 
order of the internet are imbued with greater urgency, given the common interests at stake 
in the protection of and from the internet.
Just as societal cohesion is impacted by technological advancements, technology- related 
regulation itself is prone to fragmentation.146 In a study of regulatory approaches in the 
time of the Industrial Revolution, Miloš Vec identified a “fragmentation of the normative” 
that was caused by two main factors: that experts did not yet know enough about the tech-
nology to be regulated and the impetus not to normatively frame too early (and thus limit) 
technical- scientific developments.147 Both factors are present in the normative instruments 
pertaining to the protection of the internet and relevant for the protection of the interna-
tional community and its members from the internet. However, the internet today is much 
more regulated than technology in the industrial revolution148 and fragmentation has to be 
discussed on a technological, political, and legal- diplomatic level.
Fragmentation is present in many societal sectors relevant under a public law perspec-
tive.149 Indra Spiecker gen. Döhmann identifies digitalization (alongside globalization) 
as a key driver of (societal and legal) fragmentation.150 She points to the changing role of 
internet intermediaries as agents of fragmentation based on distinction inferable from the 
 145 See Martti Koskenniemi, “Hierarchy in International Law: A Sketch,” EJIL 8 (1997), 571– 2.
 146 On the role of technology in societal processes of order and regulation, see Christian Katzenbach, Die Regeln 
digitaler Kommunikation: Governance zwischen Norm, Diskurs und Technik (Berlin: Springer VS, 2017), 236– 53.
 147 Cf. Miloš Vec, Recht und Normierung in der Industriellen Revolution: neue Strukturen der Normsetzung in 
Völkerrecht, staatlicher Gesetzgebung und gesellschaftlicher Selbstnormierung (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 
2006), 206.
 148 But see instructively on nuanced regulated self- regulation in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth cen-
tury, Peter Collin, Privat- staatliche Regelungsstrukturen im Frühen Industrie- und Sozialstaat (Berlin/ Boston: De 
Gruyter, 2016) (showing, for example, how “verbandsinterne technische Standards” developed “Bindungswirkung” 
through “staatliche Aufwertungsakte,” 114).
 149 Cf. the contributions by Indra Spiecker gen. Döhmann, Stefan Magen, Andreas Kley, Stephan Kirste, Stefan 
Griller, Uwe Kischel, Olivier Jouanjan, and Franz Reimer on Fragmentierungen (fragmentations) in public interna-
tional and national public law, constitutional and administrative law, in VVDStRL 77 (2018).
 150 Indra Spiecker gen. Döhmann, “Kontexte der Demokratie:  Parteien— Medien— Sozialstrukturen,” 
VVDStRL 77 (2018), 9– 56 (36).
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data collected to the detriment of a mediated public sphere with a common discourse 
base.151
Fragmentation is also an important conceptual concern for the international legal order, 
as it contradicts the premise of international law’s universality.152 The 2006 International 
Law Commission’s (ILC) report on fragmentation of international law already pointed to 
the “deepening complexity of late modern societies, tolerance and encouragement of con-
flicting traditions and social objectives within national societies, and the needs of technical 
specialization” that have, in aggregate, “undermined [ . . . ] the homogeneity of the nation- 
State” with the law of late modern states today, emerging from “several quasi- autonomous 
normative sources, both internal and external.” This has destabilized the coherence of na-
tional law based on the constitution, but has been mostly counterbalanced by the “contex-
tual responsiveness and functionality of the emerging (moderate) pluralism.”153 Within 
international law, however, no single central “constitutional” order ensuring responsiveness 
and implementing pluralism exists: “no homogenous, hierarchical meta- system is realisti-
cally available to do away with such problems.”154 With demands of coherence and univer-
sality, on the one hand, and pluralism, on the other, pulling international law in different 
directions, the consideration of regime collisions and of collision regimes (regimes dealing 
with the collision of regimes, including conflict- of- laws regimes) becomes increasingly 
important.
Fragmentation is thus not a surprising development in complexifying normative or-
ders (especially) without a strong constitutional center, such as international law, and 
even more so the online order. It can take different characters: actual or potential, in-
tentional or unintended, deep and structural or superficial, and positive, negative, or 
neutral with a view to universality.155 While the internet’s technical premise is intercon-
nection through shared protocols, recent times have seen the (re)emergence of propri-
etary systems, especially in connection with the internet of things (IoT) and in relation 
to the mobile internet where apps that are often platform- specific mediate the online 
experience.156
In aggregate, there are substantial challenges to the universality of the internet that have 
affected the development of the internet measurably.157 Together with normative froth, fric-
tions, and fractures identified earlier, important normative forces are pulling the internet 
into diverging directions. But is fragmentation fatal to the theories of online order, pre-
sented in  chapter 5, and the prospect, explained in more detail in  chapter 6, of a coherent 
normative order of the internet that is based, inter alia, on its universality and integrity? 
 151 Ibid.
 152 Alfred Verdross and Bruno Simma, Universelles Völkerrecht. Theorie und Praxis (reprint of the 3rd edn.) 
(Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1984/ 2010).
 153 ILC, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of 
International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, 13 April 2006, A/ CN.4/ L.682, 
para. 493.
 154 Ibid. (emphasis in the original).
 155 Cf. William J. Drake, Vinton G. Cerf, and Wolfgang Kleinwächter, “Internet Fragmentation: An Overview,” 
World Economic Forum, Future of the Internet Initiative White Paper, January 2016, 4.
 156 Ibid., 3.
 157 Sarah Box, “Openness and Fragmentation: Toward Measuring the Economic Effects,” GCIG Papers Series No. 36 
(2016), http:// www.cigionline.org/ publications/ internet- openness- and- fragmentation- toward- measuringeconomic- 
effects.
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While this is not the case, fragmentation tendencies teach us a lot about existing challenges 
to the normative status quo.
Before considering the dimensions of fragmentation, let us assess universality- oriented 
forces within the “layers” of the internet (see table 4.6). Depending on the technological 
focus, there are usually four of them, ranging from the physical infrastructure and logical 
resources (including IP addresses) (with a third transport layer sometimes included, some-
times differentiated from the logical resources) to application(s) and content/ transactions 
(data). A legal layer (national law, international law) can be added specifically, but is some-
times integrated into other layers.
On the physical layer, the conclusion is easy that the internet is not yet universal, as half 
the world’s population still has no internet access. Even those users that have access have 
different online experiences, given diverging bandwidth strength and “last mile” connec-
tion technology (in extremis: modem vs. fiber). Further, not more than half of the world’s 
countries have major Internet Exchange Points (IXPs), which serve as interconnectors of 
the networks and ensure quick data traffic throughput.158
On the network/ logical resources layer we find that the transition to newer, longer domain 
names (necessary for the growing need for IP addresses in the internet of things) has not yet 
been completely implemented. Currently, the address space is non- uniform as addresses 
based on IPv4 (shorter addresses) coexist with the 128 bits long IPv6 addresses (of which 2128 
are possible). Even given this non- uniformity on both the physical layer and the network layer, 
fragmentation tendencies do not seem to be strongly present. Yet at the application and con-
tent layers (or application, content, and transaction layers), fragmentation can be observed. 
These fragmentation tendencies can be mapped onto three connected dominions of internet 
regulation: technological fragmentation, commercial fragmentation, and politics/ law- driven 
fragmentation.159 Selected types or classes of fragmentation can be seen in table 4.7.
 158 Cf. Laura DeNardis, “One Internet:  An Evidentiary Basis for Policy Making on Internet Universality and 
Fragmentation,” CIGI/ Chatham House, Global Commission on Internet Governance Paper Series No. 38 (2016), 4 et seq.
 159 William J. Drake, Vinton G. Cerf, and Wolfgang Kleinwächter, “Internet Fragmentation:  An Overview,” 
World Economic Forum, Future of the Internet Initiative White Paper, January 2016, 14– 16 and 20 et seq.
Table 4.6 Internet Layers
DeNardis (2016)a Drake/ Cerf/ Kleinwächter (2016)b
1. Physical Infrastructure Layer 1. Physical/ Link Layer
2. Logical Resources Layer 2. Network/ IP Layer
integrated in (2) 3. Transport Layer
3. Application and Content Layer 4. Application Layer
integrated in (3) 5. Content and Transactions Layer
4. Legal Layer integrated passim, especially in (5)
a Laura DeNardis, “One Internet:  An Evidentiary Basis for Policy Making on Internet Universality and 
Fragmentation,” CIGI/ Chatham House, Global Commission on Internet Governance Paper Series No. 38 
(2016), 4.
b William J. Drake, Vinton G. Cerf, and Wolfgang Kleinwächter, “Internet Fragmentation: An Overview,” World 
Economic Forum, Future of the Internet Initiative White Paper, January 2016, 14.
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Table 4.7 Selected Types of Fragmentationa
Fragmentation Character
Network address translation failures Technical
IPv4 and IPv6 incompatibility and the dual- stack requirement Technical
Routing corruption Technical
Firewall protections Technical
Virtual private network isolation and blocking Technical
The Onion Router (TOR) server network and the “dark web” Technical
Technical errors with the Internationalized Domain Name System Technical
Blocking of new gTLDs Technical
Private name servers and the split- horizon DNS Technical
Segmented Wi- Fi services in private/ public spaces Technical
Significant alternate DNS roots Technical
Certificate authorities producing false certificates Technical
Potential changes in interconnection agreements Commercial
Proprietary technical standards impeding interoperability in the IoT Commercial
Discriminatory departures from network neutrality Commercial
Walled gardens Commercial
Geo- blocking of content Commercial
Content blocks for the purpose of IP protection Commercial
Filtering and blocking websites/ services Governmental
Attacks on information resources offering undesired contents Governmental
Digital protectionism Governmental
Centralizing and terminating international interconnection Governmental
Attacks on national networks and key assets Governmental
Local data processing and/ or retention requirements Governmental
Architectural or routing changes to keep data flows within a territory Governmental
Prohibitions on the transborder movement of certain categories of data Governmental
Strategies for “national internet segments” or “cybersovereignty” Governmental
International frameworks intended to legitimize restrictive practices Governmental
a Adapted from Laura DeNardis, “One Internet: An Evidentiary Basis for Policy Making on Internet Universality 
and Fragmentation,” CIGI/ Chatham House, Global Commission on Internet Governance Paper Series No. 38 
(2016), 4– 6. 
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4.3.2 Technical Fragmentation
Technical fragmentation relates to impediments to the full interoperability of the under-
lying internet infrastructure.160 Apart from the fragmentation produced by the migration 
from the IPv4 to the IPv6 address space, as just discussed, a possible source of technical 
fragmentation is the corruption of global routing data by the border routers of each auton-
omous system (network). Firewalls can be used to “fragment” the internet, but do so in a 
positive way, as they shield, for instance, children from certain content. They can, however, 
be misused by states and repurposed as censorship tools. Virtual private networks (VPNs), 
The Onion Router (TOR) server network, and “dark web” users are consciously decoupling 
from the global internet, thus supporting its fragmentation.
If Internationalized Domain Names (IDNs), such as domain names in Cyrillic161 or 
Arabic162 script, are not implemented correctly, technical fragmentation may occur.163 
Similarly, the prevalence of new gTLDs, including controversial ones such as .xxx,164 may 
incentivize technical blocking and thus fragmentation. Coerced DNS lookups, usually used 
by Wi- Fi networks in airports, hotels, and public spaces, are also a form of fragmentation as 
the DNS lookup (the query to resolve, e.g., www.spiegel.de) is redirected to the log- in site. 
A more serious threat to internet universality lies in the (remote) possibility of a significant 
alternate DNS root.165
4.3.3 Commercial Fragmentation
Commercial fragmentation refers to business practices constraining or preventing internet 
universality. Companies, for instance, have incentives to organize markets and spaces in a 
way that favor their business practices, thus contributing to fragmented online spaces. They 
have further incentives to “lock in” customers to their commercial software, based on the 
belief that their software will become the “de facto standard.”166 This trend seems particu-
larly prevalent in the relatively newly emerged internet of things, which still has few globally 
accepted interoperability standards, thus motivating companies to use siloed approaches.
Unlike services such as the World Wide Web, a number of mobile applications allow 
users to interact (and extract their data) only via APIs, application programming inter-
faces, that are based on proprietary software, thus allowing interconnections and universal 
 160 Cf. Ibid., 4.
 161 With the Cyrillic country code TLD “.рф” only accepting Cyricllic subdomain applications. Cf. Stéphane Van 
Gelder, “The Rise of Cyrillic Domain Names,” CircleID, June 3, 2013, http:// www.circleid.com/ posts/ 20130603_ 
the_ rise_ of_ cyrillic_ domain_ names.
 162 Cf., for instance, Saudi Network Information Center, Guideline Rules for Writing Arabic IDNs under the 
IDN ccTLD (.2010) (السعودية), http:// www.nic.sa/ en/ view/ writing_ arabic_ idn_ guideline.
 163 Considering the multitude of IDNs, this is not trivial. Currently, the following internationalized ccTLD 
exist: .中国 and .中國 (Zhōngguó, China), .مصر (maṣr, Egypt), .한국 (hangūk,̚ South Korea), .香港 (Hongkong), 
 ,as- saʿūdīya) السعودية. ,(filasṭīn, Palestine), .рф (RF, Russia) فلسطين. ,(al- urdunn, Jordan) الردن. ,(īrān, Iran) ایران.
Saudi Arabia), .台灣 and .台湾 (Taiwan), .تونس (tūnis, Tunisia), .امارات (imārāt, UAE).
 164 See 3.4.6.
 165 This section is based onWilliam J. Drake, Vinton G. Cerf, and Wolfgang Kleinwächter, “Internet 
Fragmentation: An Overview,” World Economic Forum, Future of the Internet Initiative White Paper, January 
2016, 20 et seq.
 166 Patrik Fältström, “Market- Driven Challenges to Open Internet Standards,” GCIG Papers Series No. 33 
(2016), http:// www.cigionline.org/ publications/ marketdriven- challenges- open- internet- standards, 7.
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sharing only under the conditions of the companies’ terms of service. Today, a lot of data is 
tied to certain platforms or operating systems and needs “curation and mediation” by the 
platform in order to be communicated, if at all, outside and shared. Sometimes the reasons 
are based on security, such as with certain financial applications,167 but the majority of non- 
interoperability decisions are based on market strategy.168
Companies have also introduced products and followed strategies that run counter to the 
idea of universal access by creating “digital enclosures.” When entering emerging markets, 
some internet companies, including Facebook, have used an approach called “zero- rating,” 
which allows free (or very cheap) access to a fraction of the internet, namely through 
the service of the company offering “free” access. Users cannot enter the internet proper 
through a browser, but can only navigate within an application or service, such as Facebook, 
and use the “parts” of the internet included by the company within its service.
Similarly, companies attempt to bind customers ever closer to their services by attractiv-
izing staying within their “walled gardens,”169 where it is not the open web that is used as a 
platform to convey content but rather semi- closed or closed platforms (or apps) running on 
de facto non- negotiable terms of service. The higher the investment of a person in the crea-
tion and curation of their “digital persona” (with friends, chat histories, pictures), the more 
difficult will it be (in terms of individual psychology) to leave the platform (as there are, 
currently, few portability rights for data/ content running on proprietary software, unlike 
cross- border streaming services170). But having a “growing share of digital life retreat be-
hind companies’ walled gardens”171, within algorithmically constructed “filter bubbles,”172 
runs counter to the internet’s role as, recalling the ECtHR in Cengiz, “one of the principal 
means by which individuals exercise their right to freedom to receive and impart informa-
tion and ideas.”173
Selected companies have also practically engaged in, and supported as matter of policy, 
non- neutral treatment of internet content, in violation of the principle of network neu-
trality. If they depart in discriminatory ways from the principle or attempt to disadvantage 
users seeking to access services from other internet service providers, companies can de 
facto fragment the internet in the form of the mediated user experience.174
Further commercial fragmentation is caused by the use of geo- targeting— allowing com-
panies to make increasingly detailed choices about what to offer users based on geograph-
ical location— and geo- blocking of content. Geo- blocking requirements may be imposed 
 167 James Kaplan and Kayvaun Rowshankish, “Addressing the Impact of Data Location Regulation in 
Financial Services,” GCIG Paper Series No. 14 (2015), http:// www.ourinternet.org/ publication/ addressing-  
the- impact- ofdata- location- regulation- in- financial- services.
 168 Cf. Laura DeNardis, “One Internet: An Evidentiary Basis for Policy Making on Internet Universality and 
Fragmentation,” CIGI/ Chatham House, Global Commission on Internet Governance Paper Series No. 38 
(2016), 5.
 169 Ibid., 2.
 170 Regulation (EU) 2017/ 1128 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on cross- border 
portability of online content services in the internal market, OJ L 168, 30 June 2017, 1– 11.
 171 William J. Drake, Vinton G. Cerf, and Wolfgang Kleinwächter, “Internet Fragmentation:  An Overview,” 
World Economic Forum, Future of the Internet Initiative White Paper, January 2016, 56.
 172 Eli Pariser, The Filter Bubble: How the New Personalized Web Is Changing What We Read and How We Think 
(New York: Penguin, 2012).
 173 ECtHR, Cengiz and Others v. Turkey, judgment of December 1, 2015, application nos. 48226/ 10 and 14027/ 
11, paras. 49 and 52.
 174 William J. Drake, Vinton G. Cerf, and Wolfgang Kleinwächter, “Internet Fragmentation:  An Overview,” 
World Economic Forum, Future of the Internet Initiative White Paper, January 2016, 53.
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by companies because of national legislation or global (especially intellectual property- 
related) rights management issues. But it can also be unjustified, as the EU Commission 
found in adopting legislative instruments to end geo- blocking by 2018 for all sales of goods 
without physical delivery, sale of electronically supplied services, and sale of services pro-
vided in a specific physical location,175 thus reducing internet fragmentation within the 
EU’s Digital Single Market. Similarly, the end of roaming charges within the EU176 and the 
cross- border portability of online content services in the internal market are regulatory 
steps to counter commercial fragmentation.
4.3.4 Governmental Fragmentation
Political- legal, or governmental, fragmentation refers to policies, laws, and judgments that 
impact the internet’s universality or borderless nature by preventing “certain uses of the 
internet to create, distribute, or access information resources.”177 Factors of fragmentation 
in politico- legal terms include filtering and blocking websites, social networks, or other re-
sources offering undesired content. While states that interfere with freedom of expression 
(provided that these interferences are based on law) follow a legitimate aim and are propor-
tionate to the aim pursued, overbroad blocking orders, such as Turkey’s blocking of internet 
platforms in Yıldırım v. Turkey (2012)178 and Cengiz and Others v. Turkey (2015), clearly show 
the limits of states’ abilities to fragment the global internet by creating a national “criticism- 
free” zone. As a “principal means by which individuals exercise their right to freedom to 
receive and impart information and ideas, providing as it does essential tools for participa-
tion in activities and discussions concerning political issues and issues of general interest,”179 
the internet and its universal information and communication interchange function are pro-
tected through states’ duties to respect, protect, and fulfill human rights (obligations).
Further fragmentation can occur by judgments leading to specific internet sub- regimes 
within regional/ national jurisdictions (in casu Europe: e.g. the Delfi, MTE and Pihl cases 
by the ECtHR, establishing a regime of targeted monitoring duties for certain intermedi-
aries;180 the CJEU’s Google Spain case regarding the right to be forgotten;181 and the in-
ternational data traffic regime declared illegal by the CJEU in its Schrems case182). The 
prevalence of regimes may lead, some have feared, to a legal fracturing of the internet.183 
 175 Cf. European Commission, Digital Single Market: EU Negotiators Agreed to End Unjustified Geoblocking, 
November 20, 2017, http:// europa.eu/ rapid/ press- release_ IP- 17- 4781_ en.htm.
 176 European Commission, Roaming Charges End in the EU, June 15, 2017, https:// ec.europa.eu/ digital- single- 
market/ en/ news/ 15- june- roaming- charges- end- eu.
 177 Cf. William J. Drake, Vinton G. Cerf, and Wolfgang Kleinwächter, “Internet Fragmentation: An Overview,” 
World Economic Forum, Future of the Internet Initiative White Paper, January 2016, 4.
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Jurisdiction and Regulations,” GCIG Paper Series No. 10 (2015), http:// www.ourinternet.org/ publication/ 
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The cross- border data flows characteristic of the internet and the bordered nature of states, 
and thus the limited nature of their jurisdiction, are in conflict.
A further example of governmental fragmentation (connected though to com-
mercial interests) is digital protectionism limiting the access of one state’s users to 
the platform by another state.184 Cyber operations might also lead to fragmentation. 
These include forbidden attacks on national networks and the termination of interna-
tional interconnections by channeling them through an increasingly small number of 
thus more easily controlled gateways. The internet shutdown in Libya was so easy for 
the Ghaddafi regime to accomplish because one gateway managed all international 
traffic.185
Applying national laws to data flows can lead to fragmentation.186 This can happen 
through routing changes to keep data flows artificially within a jurisdiction, by including 
geographic limitations for data, such as national data storage requirements, or the prohibi-
tion of transborder channeling of certain sensitive categories of data.187 Indeed, increasing 
attempts to localize data and establish state control over “national internet segments” have 
led a number of authors to identify political fragmentation as a serious concern for the 
internet.188 States attempt to impose national rules on the internet and subjugate activi-
ties perceived as relevant for their interest to their national jurisdictions, a process that has 
been called “alignment.”189 There is a tension between the internet’s universality and the 
attempted alignment by (some) states of (some of) their laws and jurisdiction pertaining 
to the internet within their borders. Arguably, alignment- motivated fragmentation (that is 
chiefly political fragmentation) is an attractive proposition for all states. Based on its duty to 
safeguard fundamental rights for persons within its territory or under its control, applying 
laws to the internet “within the territory” seems both an international right based on terri-
torial sovereignty and a constitutional duty of the state. However, as “irresistible” as align-
ment may seem, resovereignization is “impossible for states fully to achieve” because of the 
“inherent clash between alignment and the economic efficiencies and capabilities of digital 
technology.”190
Further fragmentation can be caused by attempts to construct “national internet seg-
ments” or reterritorialize the internet. States should not misread the Group of Governmental 
Experts 2015 commitment to the importance of state sovereignty in applying laws and exer-
cising jurisdiction because the group also included references to “international norms and 
principles that flow from sovereignty,” which need to apply to the conduct by states of ICT- 
related activities and to their jurisdiction over ICT infrastructure within their territory.191
 184 Cf. William J. Drake, Vinton G. Cerf, and Wolfgang Kleinwächter, “Internet Fragmentation: An Overview,” 
World Economic Forum, Future of the Internet Initiative White Paper, January 2016, 36.
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4.4 Defragmentation
4.4.1 Technical Predisposition
Defragmentation is originally a term from computer science referring to the organization of the 
contents of storage devices within the smallest possible number of neighboring storage spaces.192 
Within the present context “defragmentation” means countervailing forces to the policies and 
practices of fragmentations described in the previous section. The tension between these forces 
and alignments is normative in that norms are produced by different norm- makers and of different 
normative character to allay these tensions. These normative processes are not perfect, as we have 
seen in sections 4.1 and 4.2. Examples of normative froth, normative frictions, and normative frac-
tures persist. Alignment itself, if unchecked, can lead to fragmentation of the online order. But the 
fragmentation of the internet is not an insurmountable problem in theory or practice.193
There are intrinsic defragmentation forces within the internet. Though some forms of 
fragmentation are present on the internet today, its technical characteristics are powerful 
forces against fragmentation, once it reaches a certain level. Simply put, the added value of 
information and communication flows over the internet is lost once the networks fragment. 
It is in this vein that the Internet Society has defined certain characteristics of the internet as 
its “invariant properties” or “invariants.”194
4.4.2 Internet Invariants
These “internet invariants” include the internet’s global reach and integrity in that any end-
point of the internet can address any other endpoint as long as global addressing services 
are guaranteed. The internet is a general purpose network that does not, on principle, dis-
criminate against any specific kind of content. It supports permissionless innovation by an-
yone and is accessible to anyone, both actively (by e.g. adding a server) and passively. It is 
based on interoperability through open standards for technologies and mutual agreement 
between network operators, inspired by a “spirit of collaboration.” The internet is not de-
fined by any specific technology (the generalized functionality of technology should be kept 
unrestricted) and there are no permanent favorites.195
Analyzing previously described fragmentation trends in light of these invariants, we see 
that they offer an important buffer. Again, if these invariant properties of the internet are 
degraded, the advantages for governments (through alignment) and companies (through 
“walled gardens” or corporate internet ecosystems) greatly diminish. Thus the internet can 
be considered to have embedded self- protective qualities, a normative autoimmune reac-
tion. That these qualities do not work the other way, safeguarding government, businesses, 
 192 Tim Fisher, “What is Fragmentation and Defragmentation,” Lifewire, April 6, 2017, https:// www.lifewire.
com/ what- is- fragmentation- defragmentation- 2625884.
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and civil society from dangers emanating from the internet, makes the need for a normative 
order of the internet essential. Such an order must conceptualize and legitimize regulatory 
powers pertaining to the network of networks.
Returning to the invariants: attempts by companies to entrench themselves as “favorites” 
by siloing users through proprietary technology and by restricting its generalized function-
ality exist but have limits once the disadvantages of “zero- rated” internet access is realized 
through access alternatives in developing states and the disadvantages of non- migration 
of data out of closed applications become evident. With regard to governmental fragmen-
tation, an alignment (in the sense described above of the attempt to align internet- based 
information and communication flows with national jurisdiction) functions (without so-
cial costs) up to the point of harming the global reach invariant. The Chinese Firewall, for 
instance, is an example of a technological fragmentation that violates, to a certain degree, 
the global reach invariant (Chinese users simply cannot reach certain international news-
paper websites.)196 However, Chinese authorities seem to realize that they need to ensure 
a “buffer” so that the internet inside China remains vibrant for its citizens,197 and ensures 
a certain level of global reach.198 Even China cannot “eviscerate the value of the internet 
by building walls around their pieces of the internet (and fight a never- ending, expensive 
battle to keep those walls from being eroded or circumvented).”199 This illustrates the anti- 
fragmentation forces that necessarily inhere in fragmentation policies.
Forced normative defragmentation does not lend itself to positive results. As the experi-
ence with developing new ITRs within the ITU during WCIT- 12200 and the backlash against 
harmonizing treaties such as the Anti- Couterfeiting Trade Agreement201 have shown, legal 
harmonization is often based on an international minimum consensus which is more illib-
eral than the chaotic status quo: “legal harmonization [tends] toward repressive informa-
tion policies.”202 Rather, issue- based governance networks203 and legal interoperability,204 
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based on a clearer understanding of the law of conflict- of- laws, are usable tools to combat 
fragmentation.
4.5 Conclusions
This chapter was dedicated to identifying the countervailing forces to the project of 
establishing a normative order of the internet. Every legal system (and even non- legal 
systems) has certain chaotic tendencies in the sense that order is (usually) artificial and 
chaos the state of nature. While forces of disorder within traditional legal systems are 
tamed by formal institutions (national law) or decentralized control (international law), 
no norm- producing and - enforcing institutions exist for the global internet. This is a 
threat to the project of ordering the internet, which is premised upon commitments to 
a common normative goal. Three dimensions of disorder (froth, friction, fractures) and 
an overarching force of disorder (fragmentation) have been identified and discussed in 
this chapter.
Normative froth can be identified when a number of different norms are applicable to 
similar situations without clear indications that one norm is preferred. A classic example 
of normative froth on the internet is the internet principle hype. While early collections of 
principles contained clear commitments to central regulatory goals, such as information 
society premised upon international law, different groups of actors started to develop new 
principles that, rather than seeking to increase through reiteration the normative pull of 
existing principles, provided for variation on the normative content motivated by partic-
ular sectoral interests. In only eighteen declarations, twenty- two issues were normatively 
framed, but without references to previously agreed language or sensitivity to the liquidifi-
cation of commitments by their variation.
Normative frictions are more serious norm conflicts that go beyond the non- hierarchical 
coexistence of duplicative norms (froth), but do not yet cause, even in aggregate, a rift 
within the online order (fractures). Examples of normative friction abound as national 
courts often diverge in their judgments on factually similar issues, which leads to jurisdic-
tional conflicts— as the aftermath of the foundational LICRA v. Yahoo!205 case amply dem-
onstrates. Issues of normative friction emerge especially when comparing and applying the 
normative responses by national legal orders to the challenge of regulating intermediaries. 
Frictions can stem from direct legal conflicts (with one judicial body ordering a different 
outcome than the next) or from substantial conflicts between the preferences of states and 
companies or individuals and companies. One example discussed in the chapter is the treat-
ment of intermediary liability, another one the frictions regarding the rules applicable to 
public and private spaces in online settings. A further example would be the demands by 
authorities to gain access to the sensitive information of customers in the framework of 
fighting crime with the friction lying in the company’s primordial interest in keeping that 
information secure. Summing up, frictions emerge especially when otherwise legitimate 
rules produce disproportionate interferences.
 205 Tribunal de Grande Instance Paris, Ligue contre le racisme et l’antisémitisme et Union des étudiants juifs de 
France c. Yahoo! Inc. et Société Yahoo! France (LICRA v. Yahoo!), May 22, 2000. See also the US “follow- up”: United 
States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, 433 F.3d 1199, Yahoo! Inc. v. LICRA and UEJF, January 12, 2006 (Sup. Ct. 
denied certiorari).
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Normative fractures, as presented here, evidence a larger problem of rule on the internet. They 
refer to substantial conflicts that can lead to disorder. Among the examples discussed in this 
chapter we find fractures resulting from the application of international law- based rules and non- 
international law rules, including soft law standards. Even the GGE, which set out to clarify the 
application of international law on the internet during two cycles of analysis, fails to distinguish, 
in its 2015 report, between norms, rules, principles, understandings, and existing commitments.
A further fracture has emerged between universal and particular (sovereignty- oriented, 
anti- universal) normative approaches by states. Sovereignty- oriented states, such as 
Algeria, China, Egypt, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and UAE, argue for more governmental 
control of the internet, nationalize telecommunications providers, provide for data locali-
zation laws, and apply strong penalties to online dissent (or filter dissenting speech). This 
approach is often coupled with general references to the normative tropes of internet gov-
ernance, including “multistakeholderism.” This shows, again, the malleability of the concept 
to the point where it can no longer be used to denote the effective and legitimacy- conferring 
integration of all relevant actors in their respective roles. Often coupled to sovereignty- 
oriented normative approaches to the internet are territory- based solutions, including data 
localization rules or profit nationalization decrees for globally active internet companies.
A substantial fracture has also emerged regarding the treatment of cyberwar in the nor-
mative order of the internet. While references to the UN Charter being a foundational 
document have been present in the normative ordering of the internet for a long time, the 
concrete references, in Chapter VII, to the “use of force” (allowing for Chapter VII situation 
findings by the Security Council) and “armed attack” (triggering self- defense) have been 
contested. Sovereignty- oriented states, including those accused in the past of having com-
mitted offensive cyberattacks, argue against applying the Charter before attribution tech-
niques become more reliable.206
Finally, a fracture has appeared when it comes to trust in internet integrity because of 
massive online surveillance practices that destabilize trust relationships. While surveil-
lance, even secret surveillance, is necessary in a democratic society under specific circum-
stances, the practices of many states, including chiefly the “Five Eyes” and Germany, have 
been in violation of international rules. The ECtHR has shown in important judgments 
which obligations states have with regard to the protection of privacy. These include Weber 
and Saravia v. Germany, Klass and Others v. Germany (judges must review surveillance 
measures), Bucur and Toma v. Romania (whistleblowers are to be protected), Iordachi and 
others v. Moldova (when legitimizing an interference, “national security” must be inter-
preted narrowly) and El- Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (the ECHR can 
have extraterritorial impact; necessity to control security services).
More recently, in Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom (2018), the Court 
inter alia declared illegal parts of the former British law allowing for online surveillance,207 
 206 Cf. Adam Segal, “The Development of Cyber Norms at the United Nations Ends in Deadlock. Now What?” 
Council on Foreign Relations, June 29, 2017, https:// www.cfr.org/ blog/ development- cyber- norms- united- nations- 
ends- deadlock- now- what; Arun M. Sukumar, “The UN GGE Failed. Is International Law in Cyberspace Doomed 
As Well?” Lawfare, July 4, 2017, https:// lawfareblog.com/ un- gge- failed- international- law- cyberspace- doomed- 
well; and Ann Väljataga, “Back to Square One? The Fifth UN GGE Fails to Submit a Conclusive Report at the 
UN General Assembly,” NATO CCDCOE Incyder database, https:// ccdcoe.org/ back- square- one- fifth- un- gge- 
submit- conclusive- report- un- general- assembly.html.
 207 ECtHR, Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom, judgment of September 13, 2018, application 
nos. 58170/ 13, 62322/ 14, and 24960/ 15.
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in particular the bulk interception regime (which violated Article 8 ECHR because of insuf-
ficient oversight structures) and the regime for obtaining communications data from com-
munications service providers.
Finally, section 4.3 discussed the challenge that fragmentation poses to the international 
order of the internet. Arguing that just as societal cohesion is impacted by technological 
advancements, technology- related regulation itself can fragment. Indra Spiecker gen. 
Döhmann, for instance, identifies digitalization (alongside globalization) as a key driver of 
fragmentation. This section identified three key arenas of fragmentation: technical, com-
mercial, and legal.
 Technical fragmentation impedes the full interoperability of the underlying internet 
infrastructure. Commercial fragmentation is caused by business practices constraining 
or preventing internet universality, such as “enclosures” by companies that try to “lock in” 
their customers by making data extraction very difficult and using single profiles across 
platforms. Political- legal, or governmental, fragmentation includes policies, laws, and judg-
ments that impact the internet’s universality or borderless nature by inhibiting free internet 
use through, e.g., filters. But even cases that increase human rights protection can lead to 
fragmentation by introducing specific internet sub- regimes within regional/ national juris-
dictions (such as through the Delfi, MTE, and Pihl cases, by the ECtHR establishing a re-
gime of targeted monitoring duties for certain intermediaries).208
This chapter’s leading hypothesis is tested and validated: though centrifugal forces con-
tribute to the emergence of normative redundancies, conflicts of norms, and structural 
fractures as well as fragmentation, countervailing technical forces (the internet invariants) 
exist. They are the foundation of a technical defragmentation pull which the law— through 
the normative turn— realizes through norms.
On a different normative level, the ILC’s Fragmentation Report came to a similar con-
clusion, arguing that “increasing attention will have to be given to the collision of norms 
and regimes and the rules, methods and techniques for dealing with such collisions.”209 In 
particular, the report counseled paying more attention to the role of the Vienna Convention 
on the Laws of Treaties as a basis for an “International law of conflicts” and “attention to the 
notion and operations of ‘regimes’.”210
Interoperability theory211 and jurisdiction- based conflict- of- laws approaches212 provide 
some answers for the online order of how a law of conflicts for the internet may look. But 
it is the notion and operation of regimes that is most interesting here. The report identi-
fies three kinds of regimes, including “special sets of rules and principles on the admin-
istration of a determined problem” and “special branches of international law with their 
own principles, institutions and teleology.”213 The internet is probably too multifaceted to 
 208 ECtHR, Delfi AS v.  Estonia (June 16, 2015), application No. 64569/ 09; ECtHR, MTE and Index.hu ZRT 
v. Hungary (February 2, 2016), application No. 22947/ 13; ECtHR (3rd section), Pihl v. Sweden (February 7, 2017), 
application No. 74742/ 14.
 209 ILC, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of 
International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, 13 April 2006, A/ CN.4/ L.682, 
249 (emphasis removed).
 210 Ibid.
 211 See 5.3.3.
 212 See 5.3.4.
 213 ILC, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of 
International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, 13 April 2006, A/ CN.4/ 
L.682, 252.
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be considered amenable to being administered as a “determined problem.” Rather, it could 
be considered a regime in the sense of a special branch of (not only) international law. As 
shown above, the online order has its own principles and purpose (teleology); it does not yet 
have proper institutions beyond informal networks, non- governmental structures, and ad 
hoc structures with a formal presence by different actors. But it could be argued that institu-
tions are supplanted by the unique structure of normative development and decentralized 
enforcement, depending on the relevant norm; and that norms within the normative exer-
cise compliance- pull even without institutions.
The Fragmentation Report argues that a regime may function outside of treaties “in more 
broadly ‘cultural’ ways.”214 Regimes may also have non- governmental participants and 
“represent non- governmental interests in a fashion that might influence their interpreta-
tion and operation.” The modus operandi may be different from treaty regimes: “[o] ften 
regimes operate on the basis of administrative coordination and ‘mutual supportiveness,’ 
the point of which is to seek regime- optimal outcomes.”215 Much of what Rapporteur Martti 
Koskenniemi asks the Commission to consider can be read as a programmatic statement as 
to the next steps into the elaboration, by this study, of a normative order the internet,216 in 
particular
 – The manner of the autonomous operation of regimes [including] formation and op-
eration of internal regime- hierarchies, the principles of interpretation applicable to 
regime- instruments, the specific types of rules or institutions needed to enable the co-
herent operation of regimes [ . . . ];
 – The role of general (public) international law in regimes, including in the solution of in-
terpretative conflicts and providing for responsibility for any violation of regime- rules. 
The relations of public and private law, including soft law and other non- binding instru-
ments in such regimes [ . . . ];
 – [ . . . ] Any study of regime- rules should take into account such contrast in the normative 
power of particular regime- rules;
 – The conditions and consequences of regime failure [ . . . ];
 – The whole complex of inter- regime relations [ . . . ];
 – The settlement of disputes within regimes [and] settlement of disputes across regimes. 
[ . . . ]217
While the normative order of the internet is more than merely a regime of international 
law in the sense of the ILC Fragmentation Report, it still needs a firm theoretical foun-
dation. In Koskenniemi’s terms, deconstructing hierarchies is a device to better under-
stand international law: “It [reveals] hidden priorities and principles of political value.”218 
Similarly, constructing quasi- hierarchies, where they do not formally exist, allows us, as 
an exercise in critical reconstruction,219 to develop theories about the normative order 
 214 Ibid.
 215 Ibid.
 216 See  chapter 6.
 217 ILC, Fragmentation of International Law:  Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of 
International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, 13 April 2006, A/ CN.4/ L.682, 253.
 218 Martti Koskenniemi, “Hierarchy in International Law: A Sketch,” EJIL 8 (1997), 571– 2 (582).
 219 Cf. Caroline Fehl, “Navigating Norm Complexity. A Shared Research Agenda for Diverse Constructivist 
Perspectives,” August 2018, PRIF Working Paper No. 41 (Frankfurt: HSFK, 2018).
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with a view to finding its priorities and principles and discovering how they influence 
the order.
Just as the “reversal of hierarchies is a liberating experience,”220 the establishment of flex-
ible hierarchies of norms (or orders of norms, normative orders) can be a stabilizing one 
and thus also a liberating experience— freeing actors from normative uncertainty. This re-
construction of a normative order necessitates an understanding of transnational theories 
of order and, in particular, a firm foundation in theoretical attempts to undergird an online 
order. This exercise will be conducted in the subsequent  chapter 5.
 220 Ibid., with references to it being “just possibly the only way in which law can be an art of the just,” as suggested 
by Jacques Derrida. Of course, Derrida is in line with Thomas S. Kuhn. Hierarchies are very much like ruling par-
adigms; Koskenniemi’s “flux” is Kuhn’s “paradigm change,” though it will be difficult to argue that law has become 
just at any one point, with both hierarchies in flux and paradigms being overthrown by scientific revolutions.
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5
 Theorizing Order(s) on the Internet
5.1  Introduction
This study develops the foundations of normative order of the internet. Such a normative 
order is complex, as it must be able to integrate norms at at least three different levels (na-
tional, regional, international), of two types (privately and publicly authored), of substan-
tially different character (from ius cogens to soft law), and provide standards to measure 
norms as to their technical consistency and legal- cultural consonancy with the order’s 
purpose. Such a normative order must therefore rest on firm theoretical foundations, es-
pecially when its ontology is dynamic. The underlying theoretical foundations can only 
be established analytically and reflectively relative to (1) existing theoretical approaches 
(theories and concepts) to (international) ordering and authority in transnational con-
stellations and (2) theories of law, or concepts within these theories, for the information or 
network(ed) society. This is attempted in the present chapter. While fully acknowledging 
that the selected theoretical approaches are only a selection of theories on order, important 
elements of the more influential approaches relevant for the establishment of the norma-
tive order of the internet, as understood in this research, are discussed and contextualized 
in the following.
This study will take a novel approach in that it will not discuss general theories of order 
and identify their argumentative hold on the approach followed here. Rather, the following 
section (5.2) will identify selected imports from different theories going, by and large, from 
the more general theory to the more specific one. The approaches discussed first include 
general theories such as systems theory and poststructuralism, but also (in a presentation 
reflective more of the equality of the power of ideas than a theory’s position in the market 
of theories) more targeted concepts within larger theories, seeking to explain aspects of 
public (dis)order, such as international public authority and principles theory, transna-
tionalism, legal hybridity, and multinormativity. These sectoral orders are of interest here, 
in particular as they relate to the normative order of the internet and can inform, in aggre-
gate, the process of refining the theoretical frame of the theory of the normative order of 
the internet.1
Section 5.3 will focus on theories of online order and concepts related to phenomena of 
online order. Most of the theories are not conceptualized as holistic theories of order online. 
Some theorists only look at specific phenomena within, what this study terms, the norma-
tive order of the internet or use a phenomenological perspective attempting to explain, jus-
tify, or contest aspects of online order(ing): cases in point are infrastructuralization theory’s 
 1 It should also be stated at the outset that the choice, exposition, and analysis of the theories below is highly se-
lective. Space only permits a narrow treatment of those aspects of the theories that can be considered particularly 
useful in the context of this research. This study will therefore engage theories and their authors only on a narrow 
scope with a conscious focus on epistemological considerations.
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focus on the internet’s tangible technological core and kinetic interconnection resources 
or interoperability theory’s focus on the importance of interoperability of programs and de-
vices, for instance. The notion of “theory” is used rather loosely here and does not imply 
affiliation to a theoretical school or a theoretical supra- or infrastructure.
No single comprehensive theory of online order exists to date. This is why section 5.4 
pulls together key elements, insights, and considerations of the theories discussed in pre-
vious sections in an attempt to provide a theoretical foundation for the normative order of 
the internet presented in  chapter 6. This ensures a comprehensive exposition and analysis 
of the theoretical underpinnings of the normative order of the internet. This is necessary 
because the internet is neither a space without laws nor is it (or should it be) a space without 
legal theory. Section 5.5 contains conclusions.
5.2 Legal Theory and the Digital Condition
5.2.1 Epistemology of Computer Culture
Legal theory has adapted to the epistemology of computer culture and provides a meaningful 
horizontal hypertext for the normative order of the internet.
Already in the late 1980s, Karl- Heinz Ladeur could argue that the use of computers— even 
then— had fragmented the foundations of traditional positive systems of law: new narra-
tive frames of modernity and of modern law were necessary.2 Similarly, Thomas Vesting 
identifies a shift in culture to one “dominated by the computer [ . . . ] in particular through 
the new hypertext structure of the internet,” which renders the “uniform form of system-
atic book- centred knowledge, the normative framework narratives of modernity, natural 
and social philosophy and the legal- positivist system [ . . . ] progressively anachronistic.”3 
Vesting understands culture as having an “orientative function for the way individuals live 
their lives and for the reproduction of institutions and rules”4 (without supposing the con-
sistency and systematicity of all cultural phenomena). The rise of a “universal network of 
digital media”5 enables and determines our understanding of legal culture as network cul-
ture, implying new narratives, new narrativized orders (of knowledge, including judicial 
knowledge production, dissemination and consumption6) and a new networked, “rela-
tional” individual at its center.
 2 Karl- Heinz Ladeur, “Computerkultur und Evolution der Methodendiskussion in der Rechtswissenschaft,” 
ARSP 74 (1988), 218ff, 222.
 3 Thomas Vesting, Die Medien des Rechts. Computernetzwerke (Weilerswist:  Velbrück, 2015), 83– 4 (notes 
omitted): “Die Einheitsform des systematischen Buchwissens, auf der sowohl die normative ‘Rahmenerzählung’ 
der Moderne, die Natur- und Sozialphilosophie, als auch das rechtspositivistische System beruhten, wird in einer 
vom Computer dominierten Kultur [ . . . ]— insbesondere durch die neuartige Hypertextstruktur des Internets— 
zunehmend anachronistisch” (translation by the author).
 4 Vesting, Die Medien des Rechts. Computernetzwerke (2015), 130: “Ordnet man der Kultur [ . . . ] orientierung-
sleistende Funktionen für die Lebensführung des Einzelnen und die Reproduktion von Institutionen und Regeln 
zu, so ist damit keineswegs die Behauptung der Konsistenz und Systematizität aller kulturellen Phänomene ver-
bunden” (translation by the author).
 5 Vesting, Die Medien des Rechts. Computernetzwerke (2015), 7:  “[Es ist] der Aufstieg eines weltweiten 
Verbundes aus digitalen Medien, der den Verständnishorizont der Rechtskultur als Netzwerkkultur ermöglicht 
und bestimmt” (translation by the author).
 6 Thomas Vesting, Rechtstheorie, 2nd edn. (Munich: Beck, 2015), 180.
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A newly networked order may seem to need a new legal theory. Legal philosophers have 
reacted to the technical- normative instantiation variously described as computer culture 
(Vesting7) or computerization (Ladeur8), including and characterized by the emergence 
of lex digitalis (Fischer- Lescano/ Teubner9) in order to remain normatively relevant as an 
Ordnungsidee (“idea of order”10). Legal theory has to adapt itself to the epistemology of 
computer culture, including its cognitive dimension as a self- learning and evolving system 
without clear central authority,11 the broadening of the normative vocabulary, and the in-
volved actors. This has consequences.
Already Luhmann noted that incorporating cognitive mechanisms into the nor-
mative structure of law seems to further the “development of a world society”12 based 
on multiple foundations. “[R] eality is no longer structurally tied to one foundation,” 
Vesting argues, identifying the rise of “computer culture” as the transitional point 
to a new “post- ontological, post- metaphysical and post- modern epistemological sit-
uation.”13 Reality- producing instruments, including knowledge production mech-
anisms, are networked, making knowledge out of existing knowledge,14 norms out 
of norms.
It is in this process of dynamic normativity that legal theory has to intervene by providing 
a “horizontal hypertext.”15 The notion of “hypertext” is more apt than Vesting’s brief refer-
ence to it may lead readers to believe.16 Hypertext— in the context of the internet— is “text 
which is not constrained to be linear.”17 It can combine natural (linear) language text with 
interactive or dynamic displays and contain links to other texts. Theory as hypertext thus 
flows in and out of practice (the linear text in this simile), influences practice, and allows for 
its confirmation and contestation. Hypertext on the internet, just as legal theory, is difficult 
to describe meaningfully in abstract, just as theories are best observed in operation. Writing 
in 1987, Jeffrey Conklin explained that “[j] ust as a description of electronic spreadsheets 
will not get across the real elegance of that tool, [describing hypertext] can only hint at [its] 
potentials. In fact, one must work in current hypertext environments [ . . . ] for the collection 
of features to coalesce into a useful tool.”18
 7 Vesting, Die Medien des Rechts. Computernetzwerke (2015).
 8 Karl- Heinz Ladeur, Die Textualität des Rechts. Zur poststrukturalistischen Kritik des Rechts 
(Weilerswist: Velbrück, 2016), 308.
 9 Andreas Fischer- Lescano and Gunther Teubner, Regime- Kollisionen. Zur Fragmentierung des globalen Rechts 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2006), 44.
 10 Vesting, Die Medien des Rechts. Computernetzwerke (2015), 83– 4.
 11 Ibid.
 12 Niklas Luhmann, Rechtssoziologie, 4th edn. (Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2008), 340f: “Dieser 
Einbau kognitiver Mechanismen in die an sich normative Struktur des Rechts scheint der Entwicklung einer 
Weltgesellschaft zu entsprechen” (translation by author).
 13 Vesting, Die Medien des Rechts. Computernetzwerke (2015), 84:  “Die neue Computerkultur leitet den 
Übergang in eine neuartige postontologische, post- metphysische und postmoderne epistemologische Situation 
ein, in der man sich die Wirklichkeit nicht mehr als eine fest in einem einzigen Fundament verankerte Struktur 
denken kann” (notes omitted, translation by the author).
 14 Ibid.
 15 Ibid., 181.
 16 When considering hypertext, one should not forget that the most commonly used data transfer protocol on 
the application layer of the internet is the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP). Cf., for the current standardized 
version HTTP/ 2, IETF, Hypertext Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/ 2), RFC 7540 of 15 May 2015, https:// tools.
ietf.org/ html/ rfc7540. The more secure version is the HTTPS. Compared to HTTP/ 1.1, HTTP/ 2 provides for opti-
mized transport for HTTP semantics, including better flow control, prioritization, and server push (ibid.).
 17 W3C, What is HyperText, https:// www.w3.org/ WhatIs.html.
 18 See already Jeffrey Conklin, “Hypertext: An Introduction and Survey,” Computer 20 (1987), 17– 41 (17– 18), 
http:// www.ics.uci.edu/ ~andre/ informatics223s2009/ conklin.pdf.
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This is, as this study submits, important for two reasons: first, theory’s chief import is 
being a “useful tool” to shape practice, in the present case to explain and justify the emer-
gence of the normative order of the internet and its integration into national normative 
orders; second, this chapter is based on the approach that, once described and analyzed, 
features from different theories will coalesce “into a useful tool.” For these processes, the-
ories, and concepts that have been tested in the purgatories of academic discourses are es-
sential: “As societal change quickens, legal theory has to provide legal practice with a varied 
pool of ideas, including possible alternative developments.”19 These need to be sufficiently 
detailed to be practically and dogmatically relevant and useful. This is exactly what the pre-
sent chapter attempts to provide: filling the “pool of ideas” by describing a number of con-
nected theories and developing paths for practice to follow.
5.2.2 Binary Operations Under Uncertainty
The legal system (like the internet) is based on binary operators, is multi- layered, and operates 
under conditions of uncertainty and contingency. As the network of interconnected networks 
and the network of interconnected laws are similar, similar normative interventions can be 
made at the level of modulating the operators, the logics of interactions, and the practices of 
the respective “operating” system.
Niklas Luhmann and, later, Gunther Teubner saw law as a functionally differentiated sub-
system of society. For Luhmann, law’s productivity lies in generalizations allowing the coor-
dination of an increasingly complex sociality or societal reality. Law’s function to him was 
the contrafactual stabilization of expectations in a world of contingency, where alternative 
possibilities are rampant.20 Later, Christoph Möllers would term a similar approach the pos-
sibility of norms and develop a normative practice transcending morality and causality: to 
him norms are significants and evaluators of a certain future in that they allow us to dis-
tance ourselves from these possible futures: in the practice of norms we can disassociate 
ourselves from the practice of norms.21
To Luhmann, the legal system is made up of “communications,” which are special be-
cause they (unlike other communications) are based on the binarity of legality/ illegality. 
This binarity is encoded: “society’s law realizes itself through reference to code— and not via 
a (however hypothetical or categorical, sensible or factual) rule of origin.”22 This binarity 
allows Luhmann to identify a positive value— law/ Recht— and a negative value— illegality/ 
Unrecht. If a societal communication, by framing itself in the positive/ negative Recht/ 
Unrecht code, demands recognition as legal, it becomes part of the legal system, which 
is thus operatively closed or autopoietic.23 Operative closure (autopoiesis) means that 
legal systems are made up of, and only use, legal communications with encoded binarity 
to communicate, thus relying on their own network of operations/ operators to establish 
 19 Vesting, Rechtstheorie (2015), 181.
 20 Niklas Luhmann, Kontingenz und Recht (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2013).
 21 Christoph Möllers, Die Möglichkeit der Normen (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2016), 442.
 22 Niklas Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1993), 55.
 23 Gunther Teubner, Recht als autopoietisches System (Suhrkamp: Frankfurt am Main, 1989),  chapter 3.
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operations/ to operate. The legal order (and society through it) reproduces itself.24 As such, 
autopoiesis, as a concept, is not far away from automated blockchain- based applications, 
based on communal ledgers, where each new entry is based on and changes the whole 
blockchain.25 Blockchain applications, including the challenging distributed ledger curren-
cies, like BitCoin, are from a systems theoretical view as autopoietic as Luhmann’s legal 
system— with many of the similar advantages (cohesiveness of a grand design; indepen-
dence from other theories/ systems) and problems (technical oversophistication;26 practical 
overhype27) as a consequence.
The strong conceptual similarities of systems theory and computer programming 
are notable and encompass semantics. Building on this realization, Thomas Vesting as-
similates Luhmann’s (and Teubner’s) autopoietic system to the emergence of “computer 
culture” and its epistemological conditions. Among the key similarities he finds are the 
operation, by Luhmann’s legal system just as by computers, through a binary code (Recht/ 
Unrecht vs. 0s and 1s) and the system set- up: the networked nature of the legal system 
and the internet itself. The inclusion of known unknowns (Nicht- Wissen) and the opera-
tion under uncertainty and in recognition of the contingency or regime operators/ oper-
ations have constitutive functions with Luhmann and with regard to the technical (and 
normative) dimensions of internet system administration. Legal positivism, by contrast, 
favors the untenable hypothesis of a knowable order without lacunae.28 Similarities not-
withstanding, it can be doubted with Vesting whether Luhmann’s approach is actually tai-
lored to the challenges of the internet and whether systems theory can offer substantial 
intellectual import for online order, especially with a view to systems theory’s silence on 
the functional logic of networks.
Luhmann’s approach to law as an autopoietic system is prima facie open to the changed 
epistemological conditions of “computer culture,”29 even if it is not— as much of systems 
theory— nuanced enough in its treatment of the functional logic of computers and net-
works as media of historic change of societies, including heterarchical conceptions of order 
in networks. Especially Luhmann’s treatment of the discursive network within and of the 
legal systems as an invariant property— the autopoiesis— is problematic in light of the dy-
namic flexibility and changing environment characteristic of network society.30 As Vesting 
puts it, the categories of the autopoietic system only apply in specific temporal linearity: a 
“specific media environment.”31
 24 Gralf- Peter Calliess, “Systemtheorie,” in Sonja Buckel, Ralph Christensen, and Andreas Fischer- Lescano 
(eds.), Neue Theorien des Rechts, 2nd edn. (Stuttgart: Lucius&Lucius, 2009), 53– 71 (55).
 25 Cf. Julie Maupin, “Mapping the Global Legal Landscape of Blockchain and Other Distributed 
Ledger Technologies,” CIGI Paper No. 149, October 13, 2017, https:// www.cigionline.org/ publications/ 
mapping- global- legal- landscape- blockchain- and- other- distributed- ledger- technologies.
 26 Gideon Greenspan, “Avoiding the Pointless Blockchain Project,” MultiChain (2015), http:// www.multichain.
com/ blog/ 2015/ 11/ avoiding- pointless- blockchain- project (showing use- by- use that blockchains are usually un-
necessary and offering as alternatives “regular file storage, [ . . . ] a centralized database, [ . . . ] master- slave database 
replication [and] multiple databases to which users can subscribe”).
 27 Karl Wüst and Arthur Gervais, “Do You Need a Blockchain,” International Association for Cryptologic 
Research, Working Paper 375 (2017), https:// eprint.iacr.org/ 2017/ 375.pdf.
 28 Vesting, Rechtstheorie (2015), 84, note 137.
 29 Niklas Luhmann, “Die Codierung des Rechtssystems,” Rechtstheorie 17 (1986), 171 et seq. (176).
 30 Cf. the critique by Vesting, Rechtstheorie (2015), 86– 8.
 31 Ibid., 89: “alle Kategorien der Rechtstheorie [entfalten] ihre volle Gültigkeit nur in einer bestimmten his-
torischen Epoche und nur in einem bestimmten medialen environment” (translation by the author).
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5.2.3 Liquid Law and Networked Regimes
Computerization leads to new “liquid” forms of law and necessitates new networked regimes 
with effective regime- internal self- reflection and self- optimization processes.
Karl- Heinz Ladeur has developed fundamental rights approaches based on non- subject- 
related constitutional theories. This is helpful as a theoretical offer, as it enables us— for a 
while— to ignore the challenges of conceptualizing demoi on the multiple normative layers 
(national, regional, international) and within the transnational functional sections of the 
internet (such as the internet of things) relevant for the legitimation of online ordering. 
Describing the postmodern condition as characterized by uncertainty, necessitating a 
forward- looking law,32 Ladeur asserts that the knowledge structure of law is in flux. To him, 
a dynamic network of information exchange must take the place of general laws.33 He diag-
noses that the break or fracture in the evolution of the law caused by computers has to be 
reconstructed with the help of a logic of intra- and interorganisatorial networks.34 Arguing 
that technical systems are only partially controlled by explicit rules, Ladeur finds it difficult 
to normatively accept the loose connection between functions of regulation and regulatory 
means in structuralism:35 technology’s materialist logic is not characterized by a strategic- 
instrumental functionality, but by “operative regimes” with their embedded intelligibility 
schemes.36
Computers and computer networks demand legal forms reactive to social change. 
Programs encode and encourage learning by monitoring. This leads Ladeur to identify the 
emergence of a “liquid law.”37 For Ladeur this means that conflicts are no longer solved— as 
in positivist hard law- based regimes— by courts and judges and by references to knowable 
law, but rather by “procedural forms that allow problem description and solving in a liq-
uefied [read: more dynamic] context.”38 Ladeur’s example is the “completely unstructured 
cooperation between [. . .] programmers.”39 The cooperation is not quite as unstructured as 
he may believe in light of the demands of project management in highly competitive fields. 
Literature on computer programming project management abounds.40 Indeed, the norma-
tive order of the internet is, as this study shows passim, less liquefied than Ladeur suggests. 
For Ladeur, liquefied contexts demand informal norms. As formal (positivist, hard) norms 
 32 Karl- Heinz Ladeur, Cyber Courts:  Private Rechtsprechung in den neuen Medien, Kursbuch 177 
(Hamburg: Murmann, 2014).
 33 Matthias Kronenberger, “Theorien der radikalen Fragmentierung,” in Sonja Buckel, Ralph Christensen, and 
Andreas Fischer- Lescano (eds.), Neue Theorien des Rechts, 2nd edn. (Stuttgart: Lucius&Lucius, 2009), 229– 52 
(244– 5).
 34 Karl- Heinz Ladeur, Der Staat gegen die Gesellschaft (Tübingen: Mohr, 2006), 296.
 35 Karl- Heinz Ladeur, Die Textualität des Rechts. Zur poststrukturalistischen Kritik des Rechts (Weilerswist: 
Velbrück, 2016), 188.
 36 Ibid., citing Gilbert Simondon, “About Technical Mentality,” Revue philosophique de la France et de l’étranger 
131 (2006), 343.
 37 Karl- Heinz Ladeur, Die Textualität des Rechts. Zur poststrukturalistischen Kritik des Rechts (Weilerswist: 
Velbrück, 2016), 306.
 38 Ibid.
 39 Ibid.
 40 Just see Andrew Stellman and Jennifer Greene, Applied Software Project Management (Boston, 
MA:  O’Reilly, 2005) and Adolfo Villafiorita, Introduction to Software Project Management (Boca Raton, 
FL: CRCPress, 2016).
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can no longer regulate (most) behavior, new norms are generated and applied in processes 
of “pragmatic governance.”41
This pragmatic approach can realize itself in a debate of normative expectations.42 But 
pragmatic approaches often suffer from an absence of orientation, or normative “red lines.” 
Variously reiterated commitments by states and other relevant actors on the internet to a 
human rights- based, development- oriented information society, based on the UDHR and 
upholding fully international law and the principles and purposes of the UN Charter, seem 
to allow some doubts as to how pragmatic (read in Ladeur’s sense here as “non- principled”) 
norms regulating the internet really are. The growing breadth and depth of norms within its 
normative order, as will be shown in the next chapter, have led to a solidification and stabili-
zation of Ladeur’s liquefied contexts.
In Ladeur’s internet, the law as a stable order is supplanted by an aggregate of opera-
tions that contextualize the formation of orders. Can we speak, Ladeur asks, of an emer-
ging “Recht der Dinge,” a law of (the connected) things? In the internet of things such a 
notion makes much sense. Indeed, a law of the things already exists— it is the law applicable 
to these things. It is not, as Ladeur seems to imply, an independent system of law where 
the connected things (like smart fridges, home management systems, and smart cars) start 
adjudicating conflicts among themselves, but smart things take decisions (albeit based 
on human- made code and algorithms with some encoded self- learning capabilities) on a 
daily basis.
Ladeur’s concept further differentiates:  Computerisierung/ Computerization43 has 
shattered law’s traditional approach to power over and through definitions such as 
rules, exceptions, and public/ private sphere. Therefore, new “control projects of the 
law” appear necessary. Ladeur calls for “new network- ready reflective procedures and 
regimes,” which are “functionally equivalent to powers of reflection embedded in [tra-
ditional, positivist] legal systems.”44 These new rules are characterized by new forms 
of hybridization between public and private spheres, collective and individual legal 
reforms.
Ladeur’s new law for the computerized age is further different in that norms and 
normative concepts are not created ex ante but rather in real time next to (or with 
little reflection after) operations. This reading of hybrid fluidity of the normative 
condition is premised upon a system in which purpose and means are no longer hi-
erarchically ordered but connected on a more intricate level.45 These newly emerging 
orders oscillate between information technology- based operations (influencing the 
emergence of norms/ “coding”) and social coding (influencing “operations”) on the 
internet.46
 41 Karl- Heinz Ladeur, Die Textualität des Rechts. Zur poststrukturalistischen Kritik des Rechts (Weilerswist: 
Velbrück, 2016), 307.
 42 Christian Katzenbach, Die Regeln digitaler Kommunikation: Governance zwischen Norm, Diskurs und Technik 
(Berlin: Springer VS, 2017), 280– 91.
 43 Karl- Heinz Ladeur, Die Textualität des Rechts. Zur poststrukturalistischen Kritik des Rechts (Weilerswist: 
Velbrück, 2016), 308.
 44 Ibid., 309.
 45 Ibid.
 46 Ibid., 310.
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5.2.4 Dehierarchization and Heterarchy
Network culture has destabilized the normative hierarchy in legal orders. This has led to a 
dehierarchization of norms and to the progressive recognition of a heterarchy of sources of 
law. Transitioning towards a Weltrecht (as idea, not fact), theory helps divorce normative 
ordering from national boundaries.
Systems theory explains, without justifying, the transition of law from a hierarchical- 
deductive problem horizon to a heterarchic process of case- by- case normative solutionism. 
On the internet, the law is in flux and traditional inductive and deductive reasoning takes 
a step behind the demands of “dynamic, recursive and horizontal internetworking of [nor-
mative] operations” as a justification of the law.47 Indeed, justifications (for norms and nor-
mative orders) are productive, as Rudolf Wiethölter reminds us: any Rechtfertigung is also a 
“Recht- Fertigung,”48 a making (Fertigung) of the law (Recht). By justifying (the application 
of) a norm, the legal community “makes” it. In Wiethölter’s reading, each application is 
thus— at least partly— an act of creation.
This creation takes place in a disordered setting since in information society sources of 
law are no longer contained in the Stufenbau of Kelsen’s ideal order. Rather, the study of 
the sources of law needs to consider new kinds of normative operations on the internet. As 
Vesting writes, “the law of computer culture shatters the concept of norm hierarchy. [. . .] 
This is why the state- centred hierarchy of legal sources needs to be either substantially mod-
ified or even given up completely.”49
In particular, decentralized and privatized norm production, including that of codes, 
principles, and terms of service, is necessary for solving regulatory challenges in multilay-
ered normative settings.50 National law sets limits to private ordering. Courts may declare 
some private norms, such as terms of service, to be in violation of national or regional law, 
thus contributing to legal certainty and demonstrating the stability of the national legal 
form.51 The result of the approach is nevertheless interesting: the historically grounded state 
monopoly on legislation is challenged in a legislative contest and the state- centered hier-
archization of sources of law supplanted by a heterarchy of sources. The singularity of the 
authority of the state is progressively enlarged by the “fluid, nameless authority of dispersed 
horizontal movements.” Instead of a Grundnorm, we experience (when it comes to norms 
online) Normen ohne Grund (und Ende), which through finding them are “founded” as 
norms. This is, in a different setting, what Stanley Cavell describes as “finding as founding,” 
 47 Vesting, Rechtstheorie (2015), 80.
 48 Rudolf Wiethölter, “Recht- Fertigungen eines Gesellschaftsrechts,” in Christian Joerges and Gunther Teubner 
(eds.), Rechtsverfassungsrecht. Recht- Fertigung zwischen Privatrechtsdogmatik und Gesellschaftstheorie (Baden- 
Baden: Nomos, 2003), 13 et seq.
 49 Vesting, Rechtstheorie (2015), 111– 12.
 50 Ibid.
 51 Just compare the previously discussed cases of Google Spain (CJEU, case C- 131/ 12, Google Spain SL, Google 
Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González, judgment (Grand Chamber) of 
May 13, 2014), Digital Rights Ireland (CJEU, C- 293/ 12 and C- 594/ 12, judgment of April 8, 2014), and Schrems 
(CJEU, case C‐362/ 14, Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner, judgment of October 6, 2015) or the more re-
cent invalidation of certain terms and conditions within Facebook’s terms of service (“AGBs”) by a Berlin 
court: Landgericht Berlin, Judgement 16 O 341/ 15 of January 16, 2018, https:// www.vzbv.de/ sites/ default/ files/ 
downloads/ 2018/ 02/ 12/ facebook_ lg_ berlin.pdf.
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of reasons, reasons for norms, and norms.52 For Vesting, the role of code in digital commu-
nication amounts to a takeover of computer technology of the “old world” of consciously 
conceptualized Sollen.53
While it is true that the pervasive use of computing technology and the internet have sub-
stantially changed society,54 technology has not “taken over.” It is a concept, not a person, 
and has agency only in the metaphorical sense or when someone wishes to personalize ar-
guments for technical solutionism. It is never true that technology demands a certain so-
lution. It is always some other normative actor, pursuing limited self- interests, who uses 
technological solutionism as a crude tool to reach that goal.
What is true, however, is that computers55 have become a “meta- medium”56 with which 
we operate in a world of connected objects, the internet of things. This, according to 
Vesting’s media theory, is a fundamental fracture in the history of our culture evolution be-
cause symbolic forms of culture are now made dependent on “digital machines.”57 This has 
introduced a new third societal layer within modern society: after the society of individuals 
and the society of organizations, we are now experiencing the emergence of the society of 
networks.
This society of networks (or in Castells’ terminology, the Network Society58) is based on a 
three- layer model of regulation, which is responsive to new and disparate legal phenomena. 
There is continuity in this change: “Just as the community right of the welfare state changed 
the cultural frame of the state centered on individual rights, the group right of the welfare 
state is now placed within an enlarged cultural frame: the law of the network culture.”59 
Legal theory has to put front and center the “networked, non- hierarchical, dynamic repro-
duction of systems.” These dynamic approaches to ordering are connected to computer cul-
ture’s influence on the legal order, namely dynamization, fluctuance, and a softening and 
widening of the border from a Trennlinie to a Kontaktzone, from a clear line (legality/ il-
legality; norm/ not norm; public/ private) to an area of enmeshed normative productivity 
(e.g. norms of a public character set by private actors, enforced by them, and then tested in 
public forums, such as terms of service that may ultimately fail before national courts).60
This applies, according to Vesting, to national and international law: a functional, frag-
mented law of the world is progressively “decomposing international law” and setting it 
 52 Stanley Cavell, “This New Yet Unapproachable America. Lectures after Emerson after Wittgenstein,” 
Carpenter Lectures, II. Finding as Founding (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989/ 2013).
 53 Vesting, Rechtstheorie (2015), 146.
 54 From the perspective of the theory of media this dehierarchization/ heterarchy of sources is an echo of the 
transition from the book, containing text, read in a linear fashion, to the medium of the internet, based on non- 
linear hypertext and creating norms in decentralized networks (Ibid., 2015), 113).
 55 Or rather: the connected circuits within computers, as computers have just been the internet age’s most char-
acteristic technical artifact. Given the rise in internet use via mobile technology, especially in countries with fast 
growing internet penetration rates, the next generation of users may not associate the internet with the computer 
to the same degree and other devices or a new form of interaction with artificial intelligence might become the 
“meta- medium” used.
 56 Vesting, Rechtstheorie (2015), 152.
 57 Ibid.
 58 Manuel Castells, The Information Society: Economy, Society and Culture; Vol. 1: The Rise of the Network Society, 
2nd edn. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996/ 2000); Vol. 2: The Power of Identity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997); Vol. 3: End of 
Millennium, 2nd edn. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998/ 2000).
 59 Vesting, Rechtstheorie (2015), 153.
 60 Ibid., 179:  “[  . . .  ] muss auch die Rechtstheorie die netzwerkförmige, nicht- hierarchische, dynamische 
Reproduktion von Systemen in den Vordergrund rücken. [ . . . ]” (translation by the author).
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aside for “new networked, heterarchic patterns of orders.”61 Of course, one could make the 
opposite case. Functional, regime- specific norms with import on the internet’s regulation 
are, rather than decomposing international law, adding to it; they are not setting it and its 
mechanisms aside, but rather developing existing normative mechanisms or creating new 
ones that are more answerable to the challenges of channeling effective ICT governance 
globally and are making transnationally exercised public authority accountable.
As Luhmann noted, politics and law are key “risk carriers of social evolution” that tie the 
development of “contingent expectations structures” (one of his ways of describing “law”) 
to consolidated political systems. In his reading, only by giving up the state- bound capacity 
of legal- political standardization can a transition to a system of world society be achieved.62
Teubner takes things a step further by providing the argumentative ground for the crys-
tallization of a Weltrecht, the world’s law. Using the autopoietic model, such Weltrecht can 
be considered to be made up of all communications that are based on the legality/ illegality 
code.63 But this is of little epistemic value and offers no prescriptive insights. It is more in-
teresting to note that Teubner’s Weltrecht is made up of different legal systems that are tra-
ditionally segmented primarily by borders (national legal systems) or regions (regional 
systems of integration). However, national legal systems are not “closed” off. National rules 
allowing for the application of non- national law (Geltungsbrücken, “bridges/ avenues of ap-
plicability”) ensure transfers between orders within the Weltrecht.64
According to systems theorists, the concept of Weltrecht helps overcome the “legal- 
philosophical stateism” that blocks progressive conflict resolution models on a global 
scale. Law and politics remain inextricably state- bound, while economic processes and, 
it should be added for the purposes of this study, global information and communica-
tion flows argue against a differentiation on the basis of national boundaries.65 If states 
cannot fulfill the global need for law and order on a macro level, private ordering and self- 
organization will fill the normative vacuum. Simply put: if there is no “constitution” on the 
Weltrecht level— and there are only a few principles66 and fewer processes,— regimes will 
self- constitutionalize.
5.2.5 Self- Constitutionalizing Regimes
Fragmentation and decentralized norm production have led to the development of self- 
constitutionalizing sub- legal orders, civil sectors or regimes, including and especially with 
regard to the internet with humans positioned at the center of the Digitalverfassung as the 
regime’s Eigenverfassung.
 61 Ibid., 87:  “So wird das staatszentrierte Völkerrecht herkömmlicher Prägung seit einiger Zeit durch ein 
funktional ausgerichtetes, ‘fragmentiertes Weltrecht’ unterlaufen, das die Hierarchie des Völkerrechts dekompo-
niert und durch neue netzwerkartige, heterarchische Ordnungsmuster ablöst” (notes omitted; translation by the 
author).
 62 Niklas Luhmann, Rechtssoziologie, 4th edn. (Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2008), 338 (em-
phasis omitted).
 63 Gralf- Peter Calliess, “Systemtheorie,” in Sonja Buckel, Ralph Christensen, and Andreas Fischer- Lescano 
(eds.), Neue Theorien des Rechts, 2nd edn. (Stuttgart: Lucius&Lucius, 2009), 64.
 64 Ibid., 65.
 65 Gunther Teubner, Verfassungsfragmente. Gesellschaftlicher Konstitutionalismus in der Globalisierung 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2012), 87.
 66 See 5.2.7 and 5.2.8.
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Fragmentation is a less serious problem for (international) law67 and for the internet68 
than is often claimed.69 As Anne Peters has shown at the example of international law, 
substantial parts of the alarmist fragmentation discourse developed from the assump-
tion, more misguided than accurate, that international law (and, it can be added, law 
more generally) would have to be completely coherently structured if it was to be effective 
and legitimate.70
But effectivity and legitimacy of a regime are not properties intrinsically tied to regime 
coherence. It is true that norms that cohere with the normative goal of a system are usually 
more effective and legitimate and through their coherence stabilize the system, but norms 
can develop outside of coherence relationships and still be effective and legitimate, given 
that other “character traits” act in compensation of the failure of coherence, such as legal- 
cultural consonance or a very high level of norm effectivity.
Especially as societies develop and technologies demand more detailed regulation, re-
gime disintegration through normative centrifugal forces may take place. Central prin-
ciples (of international law), however, exercise a normative pull toward the center, even 
in times of ordered disorder. Here, a phenomenon reemerges that the ILC Fragmentation 
Report has also identified: regime development. That special fields within international 
law should emerge is not surprising. It is an “adequate response to the complexification 
of global society.”71 The normative tools we need to ensure coherence across the system 
and integration within it are present in international law. Peters also identifies the demise 
of hierarchy in (international) law but argues that traditional mechanisms of ordering, 
in which she includes hierarchy, “have been largely replaced by new mechanisms of 
stabilization.”72
Teubner is stricter when it comes to coherence. He identifies as a problem the 
move away of norm- making processes from traditional national centers toward the 
transnational periphery, where different entities engage in the self- production of 
rules that are sometimes detailed enough to serve as a regime unto itself: “lex mer-
catoria, lex sportiva, lex electronica.”73 Calliess similarly names lex mercatoria as an 
example of a private regime, developing a non- state legal order with global legitimacy 
(demands) without a (state) mediated coupling of economics and law.74 The newly 
emerging co- regulatory regimes contribute to global legal pluralism75 and have led to 
 67 Anne Peters, “The Refinement of International Law:  From Fragmentation to Regime Interaction and 
Politicization,” ICON 15 (2017) 3, 671– 704 (702).
 68 Milton Mueller, Will the Internet Fragment? Sovereignty, Globalization and Cyberspace (Malden, MA: Polity 
Press, 2017).
 69 See 4.3 and 4.4, where this point is made. See also ILC, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising 
from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law 
Commission, 13 April 2006, A/ CN.4/ L.682, para. 493.
 70 Anne Peters, “The Refinement of International Law:  From Fragmentation to Regime Interaction and 
Politicization,” ICON 15 (2017) 3, 671– 704 (702).
 71 Ibid.
 72 Ibid.
 73 Gunther Teubner, Verfassungsfragmente. Gesellschaftlicher Konstitutionalismus in der Globalisierung 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2012), 87. See, in a similar vein: Vesting, Rechtstheorie (2015), 143.
 74 Gralf- Peter Calliess, “Systemtheorie,” in Sonja Buckel, Ralph Christensen, and Andreas Fischer- Lescano 
(eds.), Neue Theorien des Rechts, 2nd edn. (Stuttgart: Lucius&Lucius, 2009), 53– 71 (67).
 75 Gunther Teubner, “Globale Bukowina. Zur Emergenz eines transnationalen Rechtspluralismus,” 
Rechtshistorisches Journal 15 (1996) 255 ff.
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regime collisions and to a certain level of fragmentation of global law.76 Calliess ap-
plies the concept of legal institutions to functionally differentiated, specialized cross- 
border regimes constructed by multiple actors.77 They can be considered regimes of 
law/ legal regimes (Rechtsregime) when they contribute to legal certainty in the world 
legal system.
Teubner has termed these regimes “autonomous constitutions of civil sectors of so-
ciety”:  Eigenverfassungen der [gesellschaftlichen] Zivilsektoren.78 This begs the two ques-
tions: first, how— in general— these auto- constitutionalist approaches can be legitimized, 
especially within developed societies; and second, how this applies to the digital sphere. 
Vesting, parsing Teubner, concludes that the problem of a “necessary digital constitution 
[Digitalverfassung] remains unsolved.”79 Certain societal values and goals must remain 
protected and must be channeled, in their performative energy, through norms, by the pou-
voir constituant, to influence the behavior of those (same selves) in the pouvoir constitué of 
the digital. Fundamental and human rights come into play as background to the constitu-
tional self- control of the order online as “norms of collision for evaluating contrary logics of 
acting,”80 usually put in wrong dichotomies such as sovereignty vs. internet universality or 
state control over internet speech vs. internet freedom.
Similarly, Teubner measures autonomous standards that emerge from within regimes 
and the dangers they might have for other sectors of society, not against the “political con-
stitution” (of states) but against the Eigenverfassung.81 These standards can be accepted 
as law (having Rechtsnormqualität) if their production is tied (procedurally) to regime- 
specific human rights standards, which are sensitive to the challenges of information and 
communication technologies.82 This translates into a systems theoretical explanation of 
why internet standards, contained e.g. in IETF’s Request for Comments series,83 are legit-
imate as instruments of normative ordering. The processes of norm production are open 
and based on the inclusion of all relevant actors in their respective roles. However, the 
question remains whether a procedural tie- in to human rights is enough.84 The impor-
tance of standards within the normative order of the internet, or in Teubner’s terminology 
within the Eigenverfassung of the internet, makes it imperative that the standards them-
selves, and not only the procedures in which they are established, are based on, and pursue, 
accepted purposes of the normative order/ Eigenverfassung that are framed in terms of 
human rights.
 76 Andreas Fischer- Lescano and Gunther Teubner, Regime- Kollisionen. Zur Fragmentierung des globalen Rechts 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2006), 24, 28 et seq.
 77 Gralf- Peter Calliess, “Systemtheorie,” in Sonja Buckel, Ralph Christensen, and Andreas Fischer- Lescano 
(eds.), Neue Theorien des Rechts, 2nd edn. (Stuttgart: Lucius&Lucius, 2009), 53– 71 (59).
 78 Gunther Teubner, “Globale Zivilverfassungen: Alternativen zur staatszentrierten Verfassungstheorie,” ZaöRV 
63 (2003), 1– 28 (1, 16).
 79 Vesting, Rechtstheorie (2015), 144.
 80 Ibid.
 81 Gunther Teubner, “Globale Zivilverfassungen: Alternativen zur staatszentrierten Verfassungstheorie,” ZaöRV 63 
(2003), 1– 28 (22).
 82 Vesting, Rechtstheorie (2015), 144.
 83 See 2.4.2.
 84 On the importance of processes, see Thomas Vesting, “Instituierte und konstituierte Normativität. 
Prozeduralisierung und multi- normative Systeme,” in Tatjana Sheplyakova (ed.), Prozeduralisierung des Rechts 
(Tübingen: Mohr, 2018), 101– 122.
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5.2.6 Internal Politicization of the Lex Digitalis
Transnational regimes, such as the lex digitalis, need to be politicized internally (i.e. rendered 
normatively more granular) as global constitutional fragments.
Global society is increasingly functionally differentiated.85 We can observe temporal 
inconsistencies in the political, economic, social, cultural, and legal processes, collectively 
described as globalization: “functionally differentiated systems such as law and politics re-
main stubbornly national, the economy and other societal systems refuse an internal dif-
ferentiation on the basis of territorial borders.”86 Put differently: politics and law are still to 
a large degree tied to the state, while the economy is global. With regard to the politics and 
law of the internet, this holds true to a certain degree only.
It is correct that certain processes within internet regulation take place exclusively 
or primarily within national political and legal systems (such as the German Network 
Enforcement Act). There are, however, two caveats: First, even issues of primarily national 
concern have an international dimension, especially in countries with an international, 
law- friendly constitution, such as Germany— from international legal norms relating to the 
role and responsibilities of actors to the position of the national normative intervention 
vis- à- vis the normative order of the internet. Second, the majority of norm- making that 
impacts the internet and that seeks to safeguard states and global society from the internet 
transcends bordered discourses.
Andreas Fischer- Lescano and Gunther Teubner identified the emergence of autono-
mous private regimes as characteristic of modern international ordering.87 Cautioning that 
not any order of norms by transnational entities is already a legal order, they demand the 
presence of a second order set of rules, institutionalizing processes for legal— first order— 
decisions.88 For Fischer- Lescano and Teubner, the “lex digitalis of the internet” is among 
the most prominent autonomous legal regimes. Their prime example of second order rules 
is the secondary normation for contesting acts of ICANN by internet users through the 
rules regarding the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) rules. Today, this norma-
tive element is only a fragment, albeit an admittedly well entrenched one, of the internet’s 
order. More often used second order rules, albeit within the field of private regulatory ar-
rangements, are those enshrining legal recourses to content moderation decisions by inter-
mediaries providing online discussion and interaction spaces, such as social networking 
services.
Global regimes were first identified as being “functional [and] focused on solving 
specific international problems.”89 Yet at least the regime of online order has stabilized 
 85 Gunther Teubner, Verfassungsfragmente. Gesellschaftlicher Konstitutionalismus in der Globalisierung 
(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2012), 258.
 86 Gralf- Peter Calliess, “Systemtheorie,” in Sonja Buckel, Ralph Christensen, and Andreas Fischer- Lescano 
(eds.), Neue Theorien des Rechts, 2nd edn. (Stuttgart: Lucius&Lucius, 2009), 53– 71 (67).
 87 Andreas Fischer- Lescano and Gunther Teubner, Regime- Kollisionen. Zur Fragmentierung des globalen Rechts 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2006), 41.
 88 Ibid., 43.
 89 Gralf- Peter Calliess, “Systemtheorie,” in Sonja Buckel, Ralph Christensen, and Andreas Fischer- Lescano 
(eds.), Neue Theorien des Rechts, 2nd edn. (Stuttgart: Lucius&Lucius, 2009), 53– 71 (69): “[globale Regimes], die 
sich nicht unter territorialen, sondern unter funktionalen Gesichtspunkten auf die Lösung spezifischer grenzüber-
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normatively since then, from a collection of norms aiming at solving specific conflicts and 
modulating behavior for regime- internal purposes, albeit on a transnational plane,90 to 
a Rechtsregime, a legal regime that contributes— beyond conflict resolution and steering 
behavior— to the creation and safeguarding of legal certainty in the international com-
munity, as a “partial system of the system of global law”91 with a self- constitutionalizing 
dimension.
If we accept this claim, constitutionalists then demand that the partial order needs to 
be politicized internally (to self- constitute). The democratizing potential of segmented 
orders can be realized through a dualism of “formally organized rationality and informal 
spontaneity.”92 In this reading, the normative order of the internet— the “constitution of 
the internet” (Verfassung des Internets)— would need to provide rules for both a stable 
normative setting and procedures for developing spontaneous rules. Each order needs 
then to establish the normative preconditions for its “internal politicization”:  the in-
clusive processes in which actors of the order dispute the societal role of the order and 
possible dangers for natural, social, and human environments.93 This discursive pro-
cess functions as an “auto- constitutionalization of global orders without a state,”94 or 
as the creation of “global orders beyond law.”95 It allows partial (sectoral, issue- specific) 
subsystems or regimes to develop their “constitutional” norms, stabilizing auto- 
constitutionalization processes. There is no guarantee for optimal outcomes:  power 
constellations within “global fragments” can influence these processes. “Corporate cap-
ture” or, in Fischer- Lescano’s and Teubner’s wording, “totalization dispositions”96 need 
to be countered through opposing forces, ensuring civil society participation in norm- 
making processes and individuals’ access to decentralized and centralized adjudicating 
institutions.
Transnational regimes can be considered as “carriers of constitutionalization pro-
cesses”: they are “constitutionable social orders.”97 This conclusion is premised upon a re-
definition of constitutionality: “constitutions” and “states” need to be decoupled as well as 
“constitutionalization” and “institutionalized political processes” and “constitutionaliza-
tion” and “power.” These processes can then lead to the transfer of sovereignty fragments to 
intermediary powers on the internet, which are at the center of social regimes that they then 
constitute. They thus paradoxically constitute their autonomy through self- referential pro-
cesses98 that are influenced by the embossing forces (Prägekräfte) of instituted (present) and 
constituted (created) normativity.99
 90 Ibid.
 91 Ibid.
 92 Ibid., 168 (translation by the author).
 93 Gunther Teubner, Verfassungsfragmente. Gesellschaftlicher Konstitutionalismus in der Globalisierung 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2012), 258.
 94 Ibid., 87.
 95 Thomas Dietz, Global Order Beyond Law. How Information and Communication Technologies Facilitate 
Relational Contracting in International Trade (London: Bloomsbury, 2014) (showing empirically that neither na-
tional laws nor international enforcement are used to execute many contracts. With international commercial 
arbitration also limited, complex decentralized and informal governance structures have emerged bottom- up as 
tools of enforcement).
 96 Andreas Fischer- Lescano and Gunther Teubner, Regime- Kollisionen. Zur Fragmentierung des globalen Rechts 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2006), 41.
 97 Ibid., 96 et seq.
 98 Ibid., 108.
 99 This is an important duality this study will return to, 6.3.
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5.2.7 Transnational Constellations
Even though the online order as lex digitalis has diversified to include non- highly coherent 
communities, its normative mixture of national legal orders, international regimes and trans-
national regulatory arrangements makes it a characteristic regime in which actors/ institu-
tions exercise transnational legal authority to varying degrees.
The exercise of legal authority is traditionally bordered and centralized, after a century- 
long process of monopolization of power, with the constitutionally legitimated institutions 
of modern states. But in recent decades, globalization- related processes have diversified 
the pool of actors exercising authority, diversified their nature, and influenced the way 
authority is exercised internationally or transnationally. As theory after the fact, transna-
tionalist approaches to (international) law emerged, attempting to conceptualize the trans-
national legal authority. This authority can be understood as “being largely coterminous 
with community expectations regarding the legitimate exercise of power transnation-
ally,”100 thus the administration of international legitimate rule that encompasses law but 
is not limited to it.
In these times of the pervasive use of information and communication technologies, 
the “paradigm of nation- state law” (staatliches Rechtsparadigma)101 experiences limita-
tions. While fact patterns and data flows transcend borders, states are (usually) estopped 
from transcending borders in exercising their jurisdiction. Gerd Winter has used the 
image of Goethe’s sorcerer’s apprentice. States have called the Zauberlehrling of globaliza-
tion and entered the transnational constellation but have lost control. States are still nec-
essary, Winter argues, to “pay the social costs and pacify social frustration,” but they are 
endowed neither with the necessary financial support nor the personnel. This is a rather 
skeptical view (and premises a lot on the narrow foundation that it was indeed states who 
have “invoked” globalization102 and that globalization is a recent process,103 two conten-
tions that are problematic104).
International law, the second order of norms coming to mind when fact patterns cross 
borders, may be applicable, but, as Winter writes, it is slow when measured against the 
substantial “need for norms”: cultural divergence and the sovereign equality make finding 
common normative solutions difficult.105 This frees up the normative space for a third 
 100 Günther Handl, “Extra- territoriality and Transnational Legal Authority,” in Günther Handl, Joachim 
Zekoll, and Peer Zumbansen (eds.), Beyond Territoriality. Transnational Legal Authority in an Age of Globalization 
(Leiden/ Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2012), 3– 12 (8).
 101 Lars Viellechner, Transnationalisierung des Rechts (Weilerswist: Velbrück, 2013), 99.
 102 But see Dilip K. Das, “Globalisation: Past and Present,” Economic Affairs 30 (2010) 1, 66– 70; Jerry Bentley, 
“Globalizing History and Historicizing Globalization,” Globalizations 1 (2004) 1, 68– 81.
 103 David Northrup, “Globalization and the Great Convergence: Rethinking World History in the Long Term,” 
Journal of World History 16 (2005) 3, 249– 67.
 104 The Silk Road in Asia of the first century AD is one immediately identifiable but by no means essential 
avenue of “globalization” (Peter Frankopan, The Silk Roads: A New History of the World (London: Bloomsbury, 
2016)). For the importance of integrating markets, see already Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes 
of the Wealth of Nations (1775). Cf. Economist, “When did globalization start?” September 23, 2013, https:// www.
economist.com/ blogs/ freeexchange/ 2013/ 09/ economic- history- 1 (arguing that market integration is “almost as 
old as humanity”).
 105 Gerd Winter, “Transnationale informelle Regulierung: Gestalt, Effekte und Rechtsstaatlichkeit,” in Gralf- 
Peter Calliess (ed.), Transnationales Recht. Stand und Perspektiven (Tübingen:  Mohr Siebeck, 2014), 95– 112 
(96– 7).
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category of norms, transnational norms in the narrower sense:  informal regulation by 
transnational actors or applicable to transnational settings which might be, in aggregate, 
highly suitable to ensure a fair distribution of rights and goods.
The primary attachment of rights to territories thus changes in light of the growing 
number of moving parts (and people, and (even connected) things) in times of globaliza-
tion. Illustrating this with the example of human rights, Stefan Kadelbach finds that these 
are no longer “exclusively attached to territories, but to actors as well, so that they cross state 
borders with international organisations, transnational enterprises, or development agen-
cies.”106 Similarly, on the internet, actors, data, their “attached” human rights, the cross- 
border nature of communications, and the difficulties of localizing internet traffic at any 
given point in time (and place) are in steady (and not always productive) conflict with the 
state obligation to respect, protect, and implement human rights.
Applying this to the internet, we see that internet intermediaries, standard- setting 
bodies, and international organizations exert what Gerald Spindler terms “external [and 
real] pressure on virtual spaces.” Acting within a national (and it should be added: interna-
tional) normative frame, these actors develop private transnational norms.107 Spindler con-
trasts these transnationalization dynamics with a perceived “renationalization of the law on 
the internet”: attempts and reactions of national legal orders to “re- localize fact patterns.”108 
For him, statal renationalization by law seems so powerful that it would be “hubris” to talk 
of a “lex informatica in analogy to a lex mercatoria.”109 By contrast, this study submits that 
lex informatica, as the sum of norms of what this study terms the “normative order of the 
internet,” is substantially more diverse than lex mercatoria. It is not hubris or talk ex ni-
hilo to posit the existence of an online order. Rather, it is analytically correct, empirically 
founded,110 and prescriptively necessary.111
Spindler argued that examples such as ICANN112 showed that private norm- creation 
on the internet primarily worked within “small highly coherent communities with sim-
ilar values and ideals,” in which enforcement is guaranteed by social control.113 In non- 
homogeneous normative communities, the externalities (costs) of enforcement would be 
too high. This claim, if true, would make a strong case against the normative order of the 
internet. However, it is submitted here, and will be explained in more detail in the next 
chapter, that the coherence is also present in the normative macro- order of the internet, that 
commitment to values and ideals exist, and that enforcement, where decentralized enforce-
ment is necessary to realize a norm’s content, has fewer costs than imagined. Many norms 
 106 Stefan Kadelbach, “The Territoriality and Migration of Fundamental Rights,” in Günther Handl, Joachim 
Zekoll, and Peer Zumbansen (eds.), Beyond Territoriality. Transnational Legal Authority in an Age of Globalization 
(Leiden/ Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2012), 295– 326 (323).
 107 Gerald Spindler, “Transnationalisierung und Renationalisierung des Rechts im Internet,” in Gralf- Peter 
Calliess (ed.), Transnationales Recht (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014), 219.
 108 Ibid., 221.
 109 And let us keep in mind that the Zauberlehrling’s messages are to avoid hubris and listen to one’s teacher/ 
master.
 110 See  chapters 2 to 4.
 111 See  chapters 6 and 7.
 112 ICANN is indeed a special case in point for a largely autonomous transnational regime. See Lars Viellechner, 
Transnationalisierung des Rechts (Weilerswist: Velbrück, 2013), 99, who made an important contribution to the 
more recent literature on transnationalization of law, with unparalleled clarity regarding the domain name man-
agement by ICANN as an effective and legitimate case of normative transnationalism online (127 et seq).
 113 Ibid., 221.
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of the normative online order do not need to be “enforced.” Rather, they shape behavior and 
invoke suo quoque justificatory narratives from the “space of reasons.”
Transnationalism can be approached via private114 and via public law.115 Descriptively, 
transnational law in the broader sense is a hybrid, containing rules from national legal or-
ders, public international law regimes, and transnational sets of rules (Viellechner calls 
them Regelungsarrangements).116
Transnational law in a narrower sense is only the third category of norms relevant in 
transnational constellations:  regulatory arrangements that are neither primarily affili-
ated with national legislators or part of international law.117 For Calliess, transnational 
law is characteristically created through the normative powers of global civil society, 
“founded on general principles of law and their concretization through societal prac-
tice.” Transnational norms are applied, interpreted, revised “primarily” by private actors. 
Calliess and Zumbansen see providers of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in 
this role,118 but they are only few good examples, such as ICANN’s dispute resolution 
policy regarding domain names. Rather, ICT companies are in the position of primary 
norm- producers and appliers within the transnational order online. It thus makes sense 
that (limited) codification of transnational norms (of the internet) takes place through 
collections of principles,119 standardized terms of service,120 and codes of conduct by pri-
vate actors.121
Transnationalism sharpens the evaluative focus regarding the quality of norms and their 
origin on the internet: they can be norms of self- regulation,122 norms of state regulation,123 
norms of international regulation,124 and norms of hybrid regulatory forms. Especially the 
latter norms are a regulatory arrangement that is characterized by its transnationality.125 
Together, transnationalized law is developed in processes of responsive legal pluralism, 
which allows combining contrarian but valid objectives— such as state sovereignty and in-
ternet universality— without “falling prey to radical particularity.”126
 114 Gralf- Peter Calliess and Peer Zumbansen, Rough Consensus and Running Code. A Theory of Transnational 
Private Law (Oxford and Portland, OR: Hart, 2012).
 115 Lars Viellechner, Transnationalisierung des Rechts (Weilerswist: Velbrück, 2013), 301.
 116 Ibid.
 117 Though arguably, international law encompasses soft law and most norms within transnational regulatory 
arrangements fall within this category and are thus part of international law in this reading. However, this study 
presents, in this section, the transnational approach to norm differentiation, which in its three- part structure has 
some advantages of clarity.
 118 Gralf- Peter Calliess and Peer Zumbansen, Rough Consensus and Running Code. A Theory of Transnational 
Private Law (Oxford/ Portland, OR: Hart, 2012).
 119 As we have seen in 3.4.8.
 120 See Lee A. Bygrave, Internet Governance by Contract (Oxford: OUP, 2015).
 121 See, for example, Global Network Initiative, Principles on Freedom of Expression and Privacy, http:// www.
globalnetworkinitiative.org/ principles/ index.php and the Accountability, Policy and Learning Framework, February 
2015, https:// globalnetworkinitiative.org/ wp- content/ uploads/ 2019/ 03/ Acct- Policy- Learning- Framework.pdf.
 122 David R. Johnson and David G. Post, “Law and Borders,” Stanford Law Review 48 (1996), 1367 (1367) (devel-
oping a theory of a newly bordered “cyberspace,” a “distinct Cyberspace that needs and can create its own laws and 
legal institutions”).
 123 Just see, already: Franz C. Mayer, “Europe and the Internet,” EJIL (2000), 149.
 124 Franz C. Mayer, “Das Internet, das Völkerrecht und die Internationalisierung des Rechts,” ZfRSoz (2002), 93 
(arguing that the internet is the “natural object of international law, if not its ideal object: a global phenomenon, 
transcending borders [. . .], a phenomenon, that a state can hardly regulate by itself ”).
 125 Lars Viellechner, Transnationalisierung des Rechts (Weilerswist: Velbrück, 2013), 147.
 126 Ibid., 301.
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The normativity of transnationalism and its constituant order is of importance. In transna-
tional settings, just as within states, law and law- like norms can reign in what Gerd Winter 
described in his study on transnational private regulation as the “subcutaneous power” of private 
actors.127 Within states the duty of state authorities to apply existing laws (or develop new ones) 
to private actors is well established as part of their duty to protect (and implement) the rights of all 
persons under states’ jurisdiction or control. On the international level, this duty is only emerging.
5.2.8 Permeability and Regime Dialog
Transnational theory provides us with normative concepts of how to integrate different regimes, 
including the horizontal application of human rights, dialogical normativity, a Vernetzung, 
and dual constitutionalization.
Transnational theorists provide the system with important tools to keep the different reg-
ulatory fields open for each other and to enable processes of norm transfer and re- transfer. 
We can call this phenomenon “transnational dialogical normativity.” Behind this dialog-
ical normativity lie transnationalism’s coherence- promoting powers. The three constituent 
parts of transnational law sensu lato (national law, international law, transnational sets of 
rules/ regulatory arrangements) are, to functionally differentiated degrees, interdependent, 
interrelated, and mutually reinforcing— and continuously engaged in processes of integra-
tion at variable speeds and geometries.
One avenue of normative interchange is the use of the transnational dimension of fun-
damental rights as a rule of collision for conflicts between national law(s) and transnational 
norms: in this reading fundamental rights in a horizontal application would function as 
foundation and limit for transnational regulatory arrangements.128
A second approach, formulated by Luhmann avant la lettre of transnationalism, seems to 
be the inclusion of cognitive mechanisms within the normative structure of transnational 
arrangements,129 so that these can self- adapt as autonomous systems and solve conflicts be-
tween the three constituant orders of transnational law.
A promising third approach is refining the three normative fields of transnational law 
(national, international, transnational regulation strictu sensu) to make them responsive 
to and for each other’s norms and narratives, and normative processes, through rules of 
collision.130 For Viellechner, responsivity means a combination of complementarity and 
subsidiarity,131 a Vernetzung of national legal orders, international regimes, and transna-
tional regulatory arrangements through a new “law of collision as horizontal constitutional 
law.”132 Even if the characterization of responsivity as part of a global “constitutional law” is 
not shared, the law of collision regulating interaction of the three normative sources is an 
essential element of the normative order of the internet.
 127 Gerd Winter, “Transnationale informelle Regulierung:  Gestalt, Effekte und Rechtstaatlichkeit,” in Gralf- 
Peter Calliess (ed.), Transnationales Recht (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014), 95– 112(108).
 128 Ibid., 217– 18, 293.
 129 Niklas Luhmann, Rechtssoziologie, 4th edn. (Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2008), 340 et seq.
 130 Lars Viellechner, Transnationalisierung des Rechts (Weilerswist: Velbrück, 2013), 117.
 131 Ibid., 269.
 132 Ibid., 265.
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The permeability of the three orders is one based on implied reciprocity which pre-
supposes that each order can conceive of and processes its limits and has meta- rules for 
performing these operations and for normative self- reflection.133 A regime’s ability to self- 
reflect (premised upon a collection of meta- rules allowing its participants to reflect on the 
regime’s limits and purpose) is tied to the power of regimes to center on their own identity 
and develop interdependency relationships with other orders/ systems. Teubner and Willke 
see this self- reflection as a “higher form of self- reference [. . .] oriented intentionally on [the 
regime’s] own identity.”134
Once regimes are considered to reach these levels of normative intricacies, the last step 
is their dual constitutionalization.135 Building on Teubner and Fischer- Lescano’s work on 
regimes, regime collisions, and constitutional fragments, Viellechner identifies the dimen-
sions of Eigenkonstitutionalisierung and Fremdkonstitutionalisierung:  auto- and hetero- 
constitutionalization. These processes will be discussed in more depth in the next chapter, 
as they can be usefully applied to the normative order of the internet. Let it be said here 
simply that auto- constitutionalization necessitates meta- rules, allowing for a system’s self- 
reflection, and that hetero- constitutionalization allows for important legitimacy trans-
fers: by interacting with them, national constitutions provide legitimacy for transnational 
regulatory arrangements, but also recognize them as law.136
Transnational law has developed into an accepted field of law. It has been stratified 
and sedimented to the point that interlegal dialog between national law, international 
law, and transnational regulatory arrangements can ask after the validity of national 
approaches and the force of law accorded to national legal phenomena in cross- border 
settings. Positing a norm as imbued with national legal Rechtskraft is not the end of pro-
cesses of legal communication, as before, but the first step toward what Fischer- Lescano, 
in opposition to Agamben, argues is “the very condition of transnational contestability 
[Appellabilität].”137
5.2.9 Hybrid Legal Spaces
The normative order of the internet can reestablish normative unity in light of norm conflicts 
in hybrid legal spaces, characterized by legal pluralism and multinormativity— normative 
phenomena, which have dealt a serious blow to monist and dualist conceptions of law.
Transnational law is connected to multinormativity and legal pluralism as one possible 
normative response.138 Multinormativity refers to “the coexistence of different modi of 
 133 Lars Viellechner, Transnationalisierung des Rechts (Weilerswist: Velbrück, 2013), 268– 9. Niklas Luhmann, 
“Selbstreflexion des Rechtssystems,” Rechtstheorie 10 (1979), 159 et seq.
 134 Gunther Teubner and Helmut Willke, “Kontext und Autonomie,” Zeitschrift für Rechtssoziologie 5 (1984), 
4 (14).
 135 Lars Viellechner, Transnationalisierung des Rechts (Weilerswist: Velbrück, 2013), 287.
 136 Ibid.
 137 Andreas Fischer- Lescano, Rechtskraft (Berlin:  August Verlag, 2013), 30. On the Weberian origin of 
Appellabilität, see Agathe Bienfait, Die “Verantwortungsgesellschaft ’als “Konfliktgesellschaft:’ Max Webers 
Beitrag jenseits von Fatalismus und Moralismus,” in Ludger Heidbrink and Alfred Hirsch (eds.), Verantwortung 
in der Zivilgesellschaft. Zur Konjunktur eines widersprüchlichen Prinzips (Frankfurt/ New York: Campus, 2006), 
165– 87 (172).
 138 Michael Grünberger, “Transnationales Recht als responsiver Rechtspluralismus,” Der Staat 55 (2016), 
117– 33.
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normativity within the same social space and the connected questions of classification, le-
gitimation and collision.”139 It also includes forms of normativity, which are not traditional 
sources of law, and offers conceptual advantages over “legal pluralism”/ Rechtspluralismus 
by avoiding the reference to “legal”/ Recht (thus excluding “non- legal” norms) and to “plu-
ralism,” which implies a deviancy from non- pluralism.140 But both notions will be used in 
the following. Multinormativity is present also in “mononormatively conceived legal or-
ders,” especially in sub- sectors of society.141 Each plurality of legal orders, each multinor-
mativity, also equates to a plurality of other normative orders.”142
The unity of law within a state is a fiction, though it has not always been recognized 
as such: “Just a generation ago,” Michael Stolleis writes, “the world of law [ . . . ] seemed 
relatively clear [übersichtlich],” at least to a “beginner” [emerging lawyer- scholar].143 
Historically, the coexistence (and concurrence and collision) of lawmakers and legal or-
ders was more the rule than the exception.144 It was rather the anti- feudalist liberalism and 
state/ nation- building of the nineteenth century, together with nationalisms of the early 
twentieth century and the later democratization, that shattered class- , wealth- , job- , and 
gender- based traditional societal structures, flattened the social order145 and broke open 
the circles of law/ Rechtskreise, formally conceived of as unchanging, unchangeable, and 
divinely ordained. Recall, for instance, the right of universities to police their students, in-
cluding by using university prisons,146 to the exclusion of other (e.g. city and ecclesiastic) 
authorities. Progressively, however, legal plurality has been recognized as fact. Especially 
in social fields “connected through modern communication technologies [  . . .  ] non- 
statal, autonomous norm- setting processes” can be seen, including “internet, sports and 
science.”147
Especially in these fields, norms emerge within “self- regulating systems” that Stolleis sees 
organized by “global companies, communication networks and market- regulating associ-
ations.” The other “players” are then subjected to these specific rules. Writing already in 
2008, Stolleis foresees the problems: “It starts with the fine- print terms and conditions and 
ends with global regulations of monopolists, to which the individual has to submit, when 
they wish to receive the service or information offered.”148 Eventually, individuals are con-
fronted with “non- statal norm collections,” especially when following the “order ‘Click 
here’.”149 This description holds true today.
 139 Thomas Duve, “Was ist ‘Multinormativität?’— Einführende Bemerkungen,” Rechtsgeschichte— Legal 
History 25 (2017), 88– 101(90).
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 143 Cf. Michael Stolleis, “Vormodernes und postmodernes Recht?” Quaderni Fiorentini 37 (2008), 543– 51.
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In light of the coexisting and colliding legal and quasi- legal norms, norm givers, and 
norm appliers, Schiff Berman diagnosed the emergence of a “hybrid legal space.”150 
Similarly, Gerald Spindler identified the external pressure on “virtual spaces, platforms and 
organizations” as a driving force behind the emergence of “complementary, private, auton-
omous, transnational norm- making processes and nationally produced legal frameworks 
which, together, can be characterized as hybrid regulation.”151
It is clear that the world’s hybrid legal space cannot be reconceptualized in a monist 
fashion. Universalist approaches are unrealistic in light of progressive diversification and 
complex normative dynamics within the global society.152 Global legal monist approaches 
are neither possible nor normatively preferential outside of institutionalizations of ius co-
gens norms, e.g. through treaty regimes against genocide (international criminal law), apart 
from key universal human rights commitments, and (and this is where it gets interesting for 
the purpose of the present study) with regard to the regulation of regimes protecting global 
common interests, such as the integrity of the internet (and the protection of the interna-
tional community from the internet and its uses and applications.)
A theory of normative legal pluralism queries less whether the state of legal pluralism is 
an empirically correct description of the normative status quo, but rather whether it is nor-
matively preferential over a return to models of norm- creation oriented toward equivalents 
of legal monism. Legal pluralism may indeed be normatively preferable over non- pluralist 
approaches within functional systems, as autonomous normative processes may be more re-
sponsive to their internal rationalities (and thus more responsive and legitimate) than “global 
law.”153 (This is the logic behind the normative preference for subsidiarity in most legal sys-
tems.) The diverse functional systems could then progressively auto- constitutionalize. This 
connects Günther to Fischer- Lescano’s and Teubner’s Verfassungsfragmente and regime col-
lisions (if plural orders collide).154 A further normative advantage would be an increased 
level of accountability of actors within pluralist sub- regimes.155
However, smaller pluralist orders are also more likely to be captured by special inter-
ests. Within any normative order the justification of norms is a matter of power.156 This 
power is connected to resources, including information and communication technology. 
“Who[ever] with the help of [ICTs] can successfully disseminate normative reasons or 
successfully immunize against criticism,” as Günther writes, can also determine the aggre-
gation and articulation of opinions in political processes and thus has “greater opportu-
nities to enforce [their] normative order over others and to immunize against criticism, 
 150 Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law Beyond Borders (Cambridge: CUP, 2012). 
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dissidence, and resistance, at least for extended periods of time.”157 Once the internal pres-
sure within the immunized system becomes too high, the normative order is in crisis— and 
might be overthrown. A revolution is thus an exchange in normative orders through means 
not foreseen in that order.
Schiff Berman shows that the capture of normative orders by special interests, especially 
the epistemic monopolization of the “space of reasons,” can be overcome by configuring the 
“internal management” processes of multi- normative spaces within the hybrid global legal 
space,158 to conceive of themselves as a “shared social space,” wherein everyone can take 
part in a “common set of discursive forms”159 to discuss the justifications for the order and 
its norms— a variation on both Forst (regarding justifications) and Habermas (regarding al-
most ideal discursive processes). Schiff Berman’s second condition would be the acceptance 
by all of certain principles and values necessary for finding functional solutions— another 
Habermasian contention – thus turning the shared social into a shared symbolic space.
Accepting multinormativity as a given, and as normatively preferable over monism in 
the global legal sphere, we need to ask how the global plurality of legal and quasi- legal or-
ders can be made compatible with each other. One answer is clearly the reliance on funda-
mental norms of international law and international legal principles as providing the frame. 
Teubner calls these “common reference points for all regimes to counterfactually imply a 
necessary abstract sense horizon,”160 whereas Günther refers to “common good- related for-
mulations relative to the system.”161 More practically, Günther’s suggestion for compatibili-
tization relates to the technicians of compatibility, including global legal experts, and those 
active in the communication of legal processes to the public to participate in the “cosmopol-
itan pluralist jurisprudence” by demanding publicly “reasons and justifications.”162
The system of law to manage multinormativity thus seems to be the Recht des 
Rechtspluralismus163 (the law of legal pluralism) as an “implicit meta- law of global ac-
tors,” containing rules on mutual recognition between normative orders. This meta- 
law is not new: already Rudolf Wiethölter’s model of institutionalism with a theory of 
collisions of interests (Kollisionstheoretische Institutionalismus)164 argues for the de-
velopment of a “meta- system law” to avoid one interest, within collisions of interests, 
turning paramount, leading to “Guts”- Abwägung instead of “Güter”- Abwägung, that 
 157 Klaus Günther, “Normativer Rechtspluralismus— Eine Kritik,” Normative Orders Working Paper 03/ 2014 
(2014), 8: “Wer über größere und stärkere ökonomische Ressourcen oder Gewaltmittel verfügt, wer mit Hilfe 
moderner Informationstechnologien normative Gründe strategisch erfolgreich verbreiten oder gegen Kritik erfol-
greich immunisieren, die politische Agenda bestimmen und den politischen Prozess mit je eigenen Themen und 
Gründen erfolgreich beeinflussen kann, wer ganze Bevölkerungsgruppen in Abhängigkeit bringen oder Eliten zu 
Klienten machen kann, hat größere Chancen, seine normative Ordnung gegenüber anderen durchzusetzen und 
gegen Kritik, Dissidenz und Widerstand zumindest über längere Zeiträume zu immunisieren” (translation by the 
author).
 158 Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism:  A Jurisprudence of Law Beyond Borders (Cambridge:  CUP, 
2012), 152ff.
 159 Ibid., 145– 50 (145).
 160 Gunther Teubner, Verfassungsfragmente. Gesellschaftlicher Konstitutionalismus in der Globalisierung 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2012), 241.
 161 Klaus Günther, “Normativer Rechtspluralismus— Eine Kritik,” Normative Orders Working Paper 03/ 2014, 
http:// publikationen.ub.uni- frankfurt.de/ files/ 34664/ Guenther_ Normativer+Rechtspluralismus.pdf, 17.
 162 Ibid., 14.
 163 Ralf Seinecke, Das Recht des Rechtspluralismus (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2015).
 164 Andreas Fischer- Lescano and Gunther Teubner, “Prozedurale Rechtstheorie:  Wiethölter,” in Sonja 
Buckel, Ralph Christensen, and Andreas Fischer- Lescano (eds.), Neue Theorien des Rechts, 2nd edn. (Stuttgart: 
Lucius&Lucius, 2009), 75– 89 (77).
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is the balancing of an interest instead of the balancing of interests.165 Such a meta- law 
that is based on safeguarding international common interest through multi- normative 
ordering must be sensitive to interest capture and can unite legal traditions by respon-
sive pluralistic approaches.166
5.2.10 Exercising Authority Beyond the State
In a growing number of international administrations, international public authority (IPA) is 
exercised by non- traditionally legitimated regimes. By applying fundamental principles pre-
sent across a plurality of national and international normative orders, we can assess the le-
gitimacy of exercise of IPA through actors/ institutions within the regime. This can be usefully 
translated to cases of exercise of international (public) authority within the normative order 
of the internet.
Changes in the concept of sovereignty167 and an internationalization of constitutional and 
administrative challenges in transnational constellations and, subsequently, the interna-
tionalization of constitutional168 and administrative169 law and the development of trans-
national constitutional law170 have moved research into the administration of issues of 
common interest and into the intersection of a plurality of normative orders.
Administration is power.171 The key question behind global administration is thus 
the exercise of authority on a transnational level. Traditionally, public authority (öffentli-
che Gewalt) was exercised by state powers within their bordered regimes. Following von 
Bogdandy’s work on international public authority,172 this authority can be understood as 
the “legally founded ability to legally or factually influence other actors in their freedom or 
use thereof.”173 Such authority can take the form of legally binding acts (e.g. supranational 
 165 Rudolf Wiethölter, “Begriffs- und Interessenjurisprudenz— falsche Fronten im IPR und Wirtschaftsverfassungsrecht. 
Bemerkungen zur selbstgerechten Kollisionsnorm,” in Alexander Lüderitz and Jochen Schröder (eds.), Internationales 
Privatrecht und Rechtsvergleichung im Ausgang des 20. Jahrhunderts. Bewahrung oder Wende? Festschrift für Gerhard Kegel 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1977), 213, 232. See also Claus Becker, Von Namen und Nummern. Kollisionen unver-
träglicher Rechtsmassen im Internet (Baden- Baden: Nomos 2005), 13 (using Wiethölter’s approach to reconstruct colli-
sions of law in the Internet domain market).
 166 Lars Viellechner, Transnationalisierung des Rechts (Weilerswist: Velbrück, 2013), 302.
 167 See 2.3.5 (on conceptions of custodial sovereignty for internet resources) and 3.3.4.2 (on the principle of sov-
ereign equality on the internet).
 168 Thomas Kleinlein, Konstitutionalisierung im Völkerrecht. Konstruktion und Elemente einer idealistischen 
Völkerrechtslehre (Heidelberg: Springer, 2012) (arguing that hierarchization, objectivization, and comprehensive 
models of rendering accountable any exercise of authority together with human rights obligations of international 
organizations have led to a “constitutionalization” in international law). Earlier approaches are contained in Jan 
Klabbers, Anne Peters, and Geir Ulfstein, The Constitutionalization of International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2009).
 169 Introducing the concept: Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, and Richard Stewart, “The Emergence of Global 
Administrative Law,” Law and Contemporary Problems 2 (2005), 15.
 170 Stefan Kadelbach and Thomas Kleinlein, “Überstaatliches Verfassungsrecht,” AVR (2006), 235. For a more 
function- oriented analysis, see Anne Peters, “Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of 
Fundamental International Norms and Structures,” Leiden Journal of International Law (2006), 579.
 171 Norton E. Long, “Power and Administration,” Public Administration Review 9 (1949) 4, 257– 64 (arguing 
that “[t] he lifeblood of administration is power” and that there is “no more forlorn spectacle [ . . . ] than an agency 
[ . . . ] deprived of power. An object of contempt to its enemies and of despair to its friends”).
 172 Just see Armin von Bogdandy, Philipp Dann, and Matthias Goldmann, “Völkerrecht als öffentliches 
Recht: Konturen eines rechtlichen Rahmens für Global Governance,” Der Staat 49 (2010), 23.
 173 Armin von Bogdandy, “Prinzipien von Staat, supranationalen und internationalen Organisationen,” § 232 
(275– 304), in Josef Isensee, Paul Kirchhof, et al. (eds.), Handbuch des Staatsrechts, Band XI: Internationale Bezüge, 
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legislation within the EU, sanction regimes of the UN Security Council), but can also be 
reified through non- binding acts. Decisions of international courts have been influential 
in shaping the international community, and courts and quasi- court adjudicatory systems 
have established themselves as administrators of some global common interest.174
International actors can also exercise authority through non- binding acts, when such 
acts “exercise pressure on other subjects which they can resist only with difficulties,”175 e.g. 
by publishing non- binding but influential standards whose acceptance is in the interest of 
states, however such interest may be measured (financial or reputational). Even standards 
without deontic quality, such as statistical data within state reports under the educational 
assessment system known as PISA, can functionally fulfill the definition of exercise of 
public authority, as they influence state policy and through it the freedom spheres of indi-
viduals like binding acts.176
The Basic Law expressly foresees the possibility to transfer sovereign powers to the EU 
(Article 23 (1)) and to international organizations (Article 24 (1)). Such transfers are the 
basis for the (at least formally legitimated instances of the) exercise of international public 
authority. Article 23, especially, is clear as to why these transfers are allowed: with a view to 
“establishing a united Europe,” Germany shall participate in the EU’s development “that is 
committed to democratic, social and federal principles, to the rule of law, and to the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity, and that guarantees a level of protection of basic rights essentially 
comparable to that afforded by this Basic Law.” Transfer of powers to international public 
authorities thus does not mean that a state gives up its principles or Hoheitsrechte.177 Rather, 
these principles need to be reconceptualized for the transnational constellations.
Under conditions of legal plurality and the plurality of normative orders, the exercise 
of legitimate public authority transnationally becomes intricate. As Armin von Bogdandy 
3rd edn. (2013) (also published as Armin von Bogdandy, “Prinzipielles zur Pluralität normativer Ordnungen. Zu 
den Anforderungen an die Ausübung öffentlicher Gewalt,” Normative Orders Working Paper 1/ 2013), 12.
 174 Armin von Bogdandy and Ingo Venzke, In wessen Namen? Internationale Gerichte in Zeiten globalen 
Regierens (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2014) (showing that international courts have long transcended their 
dispute settlement function and are now exercising international public authority which needs to (and can be) 
legitimated democratically).
 175 Armin von Bogdandy, “Prinzipielles zur Pluralität normativer Ordnungen. Zu den Anforderungen an die 
Ausübung öffentlicher Gewalt,” Normative Orders Working Paper 1/ 2013, 14– 15.
 176 Matthias Goldmann, Internationale öffentliche Gewalt. Handlungsformen internationaler Institutionen im 
Zeitalter der Globalisierung (Heidelberg: Springer, 2015).
 177 Just see BVerfG, judgment of November 22, 2001, BVerfGE 104, 151, NATO- Konzept (no development of a 
system of collective security that transcends legislative permission pursuant to Article 24 (2) Basic Law) and BVerfG, 
judgment of September 7, 2011, 2 BvR 987/ 10 (recalling that citizens are protected from their decision- making 
power in a democracy by broad transfers of responsibilities of the Bundestag to supranational institutions: “Art. 
38 GG schützt die wahlberechtigten Bürger vor einem Substanzverlust ihrer verfassungsstaatlich gefügten 
Herrschaftsgewalt durch weitreichende oder gar umfassende Übertragungen von Aufgaben und Befugnissen 
des Bundestages, vor allem auf supranationale Einrichtungen.” In particular, Article 38 (1) of the Fundamental 
Law protects from situations where “die Kompetenzen des gegenwärtigen oder künftigen Bundestages auf eine 
Art und Weise ausgehöhlt werden, die eine parlamentarische Repräsentation des Volkswillens, gerichtet auf die 
Verwirklichung des politischen Willens der Bürger, rechtlich oder praktisch unmöglich macht.” See also BVerfG, 
judgment of March 18, 2014, 2 BvR 1390/ 12, European Stability Mechanism:
the right to vote, which is protected by Art. 38 sec. 1 GG, guarantees the self- determination of the citizens 
and guarantees free and equal participation in the exercise of public power in Germany. Its guarantees 
include the principles of the requirement of democracy [. . .]. Art. 79 sec. 3 GG protects these principles 
as the identity of the Constitution even against interference by the constitution- amending legislature. In 
view of this, the legislature must take sufficient measures to be able to permanently meet its responsibility 
with respect to integration (Integrationsverantwortung). In particular, it may not relinquish its right to de-
cide on the budget, not even in a system of intergovernmental governance (2 (a)).
206 Theorizing Order(s) on the Internet
writes, national, international, and supranational institutions are not organs of one common 
legal community, but because of the influence of EU law and the internationalization of 
(German) law, “national, supranational and international organs exercising authority 
[Hoheitsträger] are connected so closely that the legitimation of effective public authority 
within Germany can only be established in a holistic context.”178
This holistic context is framed by common fundamental principles, namely human rights 
protection, rule of law, and democracy. They frame dogmatic discussions and discourses on 
legitimacy, transcending the three legal bodies and, as von Bogdandy argues, explain why 
institutions of one legal order resist acts of another— when the acts violate the principles.179 
Three principles (human rights protection, rule of law, and democracy) within the three 
orders (constitutional law, EU law, and international law) can be considered to form a min-
imum global consensus on legitimate exercise of public authority and apply to institutions 
and to the interacting legal orders.180
The theory and practices of the increasingly diverse administrations of international af-
fairs have stabilized as Global Administrative Law approaches.181 In these approaches we 
see social ordering on the trans- state level,182 which becomes increasingly detailed in light 
of complexifying transnational social spheres, with the private sector and civil society very 
active as participants in normative processes. However, with Teubner we have to agree that 
the “constitutional” elements of sectoral administrative ordering relate more to the de-
mands formulated by the internal, explicit or implicit, “constitutions” of regulatory actors 
(companies, civil society) and less to the area under regulation.183 In other words: global 
administrative law approaches tell us more about the authors of norms and their concep-
tion of norms than about the regulated field. However, the normalization of transnational, 
increasingly detailed administration through non- state actors is an important element in 
the acculturation of private ordering184 and has, to some degree, proven a template for the 
regulation of networked spaces.
It is especially the connection between global administrative law and global gov-
ernance that is interesting for the purposes of the theoretical examination of concepts 
pursued presently.185 Some have argued with some hyperbole that global administra-
tive law is a new “approach to the new nomos of the earth in the global era.”186 Global 
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(2009), 23.
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of global administrative law as a new paradigm of law,” International Journal of Constitutional Law 10 (2012), 4, 
1050– 75. On the inter- publicness dimension of international law, by contrast, which is nevertheless tied to admin-
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administrative law can function as a meta- constitution187 in that it provides for global 
concepts of legality and it furthers, via the global administration of common interest 
goods, the legitimacy of global governance approaches, including internet governance 
approaches.
5.2.11 Normative Ordering and Undernormativity
A normative order of the internet provides justification for its norms within a space of reasons 
accessible to all.
Rainer Forst has long been engaged in questions of justice and global order.188 Based on 
the conviction that transnational orders are orders of justice, he saw the need for “ho-
listic, radical change,”189 based on a critical theory of transnational justice.190 Such a 
theory provides— at a minimum— a practice of justification of distribution of justice and, 
ultimately, the realization of a just society.191 Its goal is the enabling of democratic self- 
determination in a justified fundamental structure.192
Forst conceptualizes a just society as having a justificatory superstructure, as positioned 
within an order of justification made up of a complex of different institutions, norms, and 
justification practices. Importantly, everyone has a Recht auf Rechtfertigung, a right to justi-
fication of the order in which they exist.193 No one should be subjected to norms and insti-
tutions which cannot be justified toward them, based on reasons which they can question. 
Practices of justice are thus based on justifications, which are based on justification prac-
tices.194 These are framed and ordered with an order of justification and narrativized. Such 
an order of justification is connected to the reasons for exercising power. The stories told 
about the exercise of this power are framed in justification narratives,195 which, together 
with the normative orders they explain and justify, develop out of specific historical, reli-
gious, and cultural, economic, social, and political constellations and experiences, but can 
be contested and changed.196
administrative law as a new paradigm of law,” International Journal of Constitutional Law 10 (2012), 4, 1050– 75) 
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In this view, every normative order is an order of justification, namely of social rules, 
norms, and institutions, which are the foundation for the distribution of goods and the le-
gitimacy of rule. The normative order as order of justification is premised upon justifications 
and produces them.197 Each order is embedded in (a) justification narrative(s) which is/ are 
developed over time, modified, and contested. As embodied rationality these narratives of 
justification are resources of order- sense (Ressourcen der Ordnungssinngebung).198
Forst develops this approach into a comprehensive “theory of fundamental transnational 
justice”199 and ties transnational justice closely to democratization. Forcing privileged ac-
tors to justify their behavior and thus give up the prerogative of (at least) not explaining 
one’s reasons (L’État c’est moi; Mein Wille ist Gesetz) is an act of democratization. In this 
view, “practical democracy is always democratization: a process of extending and equal-
izing the power of justification.”200
Forst approaches normative orders as comprehensive conceptions, but they cannot (be 
expected to) explain all normative phenomena. Christoph Möllers cautions that we should 
not fall prey to a modernist overreliance on the powers of order to formalize, stabilize, and 
justify norms.201 Normative orders in practice are gradual in nature. In some fields norms 
are more densely present, other fields of the same order are only loosely regulated, some-
times only with “formalism internal to the order.”202
In assessing the norms present in the normative order of the internet, Christoph 
Möllers’203 new theory of norms— the Possibility of Norms— is useful. He criticizes the 
way that too much of modern political theory is focused on unity and societal coherence. 
This endangers democratic orders by factually excluding deviance. In this view, an order 
characterized by undernormativity (he mentions digitalization as an example) is not 
less democratic but more democratic204 as it allows for more decision- making freedom. 
Indeed, with Harcourt,205 the predictive powers of institutionalized data- driven algo-
rithmic processes can be seen very critically. In this view, any democratic normative 
order has to allow for deviance and to ensure that algorithms play only a minor role in 
regulating behavior.
For Möllers, algorithms exclude normativity: “a society whose behavior is programmed 
has no space for norms.”206 This applies, of course, only in cases where algorithms close the 
deliberative space and function as anti- deviance devices, either explicitly or through nudging.207 
Not every algorithm does. Möllers suggests the inclusion of chance mechanisms as variance 
enablers to ensure contingency as a precondition for normative practices.208 This connects 
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Möllers to Luhmann’s position on contingency.209 Teubner, too, is critical of normative 
instruments that exclude interpretation: the binary logic of information and communication 
technology supplants, through self- executing technical standards, the decisional space re-
served for law: “As far as the internet code reaches, this excludes interpretation in the [coded] 
programmes.”210
This study submits that such an understanding of programs is too formalistic. They are 
normative in nature even if they are made up of code and encoded algorithmic decision- 
making. Each algorithmic decision can be traced back to a normative decision taken on the 
basis of certain normative standards. Only looking at the last “link” in the normative chain 
of commands (or the last step(s) in an algorithmic decision- making tree) and declaring that 
normativity is excluded because an algorithm applies operations automatically does not do 
justice to the complex nature of governance by211 and of212 algorithms.
5.3 Online Order Theories
5.3.1 Internet Constitutionalization
Societal constitutionalization processes on the internet contribute to the development 
of the normative order of the internet. Especially in the absence of a “constitutional mo-
ment,” internet constitutionalization theory has epistemic value by identifying key tenets of 
online order.
Constitutionalization is the last element in the progressive solidification of regimes.213 
Unlike general approaches to regime consolidation or constitutionalization, such as 
Teubner’s and an early Fischer- Lescano’s, online order theories devoted to “internet consti-
tutionalization” identify specific structural elements of an (or the) “internet’s constitution.” 
By this reference they usually do not mean that such elements should be contained in a con-
stitutional document, akin to a traditional constitution. This would be challenging in light 
of the internet’s character as a technical facility allowing information interchange and not 
a constitutionable entity even sensu lato, unlike, as will be submitted, its normative order.
Rather, internet constitutionalists identify certain fundamental tenets or structural 
elements of the internet’s order as “constitutional” (as in: essential for the distribution of 
power and the control thereof). The process of progressively ensuring a semblance of rule- 
of- law protection online, based on these tenets, is then what internet constitutionalists 
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would understand as “constitutionalization.” They base this approach, as does for instance 
Ingolf Pernice, on an open interpretation of constitutions as “layered order[s] ,” which con-
tain “elements as a legal foundation for societal direction on the political levels of commu-
nity, Land, state, EU and the international level” with processes of self- regulation by society 
being accompanied by international legal ordering. In sum, a global constitutional law 
emerges.214 States are important, but not to the detriment of others: in another contribu-
tion, Pernice sees the internet’s constitution as the “order of internet governance, in which 
many actors are active in different, but corresponding forums— with states being one actor 
among others.”215
Like transnational constitutionalization approaches generally, internet constitution-
alization is a “German discipline,”216 as Andrea Bianchi puts it, based on the assumption, 
identified by Martti Koskenniemi, of “German lawyers” that international problems 
“take place within a ‘legal system’ that can be articulated through the vocabularies of 
public law and the constitution.”217 This assumption holds water: “typical” German ap-
proaches are focused on “positive law and [are] idealistic”218 and, by combining global 
governance approaches and an orientation toward fundamental norms in international 
law, they have made important contributions to the idea of the objectivity of the interna-
tional legal order.219 This study builds on these approaches by introducing the idea of the 
normative order of the internet, which provides for the infra- and suprastructure of the 
articulable legal system.
Internet constitutionalists usually start by identifying the necessity of an order or 
Ordnungsrahmen for the internet to distribute responsibility between private and public ac-
tors.220 It is not essential for internet constitutionalization to take place to formally endorse 
transferal of public authority to non- states actors, but rather to develop and apply rules 
for the application and implementation of legal standards, themselves established in global 
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(Berlin:  Duncker & Humblot, 2014) 171– 208, HIIG Discussion Paper Series No. 2017- 03 (2017a), https:// 
ssrn.com/ abstract=2964926, 19:  “So wird Verfassung eine gestufte Ordnung, in ihren Elementen als recht-
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Kommune, Land, Staat und Europäische Union, bis hin zur globalen Ebene, wo Prozesse der gesellschaftlichen 
Selbstregulierung neben völkerrechtliche Ordnungsbemühungen treten und schrittweise Konturen eines globalen 
Verfassungsrechts erkennbar machen” (translation by the author).
 215 Ingolf Pernice, “Vom Völkerrecht des Netzes zur Verfassung des Internets: Privacy und Digitale Sicherheit 
im Zeichen eines schrittweisen Paradigmenwechsels (International Law of the Net and the Constitution of the 
Internet: Privacy and Cybersecurity in the Light of a Progressive Change of Paradigm),” HIIG Discussion Paper 
Series No. 2017- 02, https:// ssrn.com/ abstract=2959257, 22: “Verfassung des Internets soll vielmehr die Ordnung 
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chaus korrespondierender Foren tätig sind und Staaten nur ein Akteur unter anderen sind” (translation by the 
author).
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2016), 44.
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and Feminist Theory, vol. 15 (Zurich/ Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2011), 45– 69 (64).
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ZaöRV 67 (2007), 599– 621 (607).
 219 Stefan Kadelbach and Thomas Kleinlein, “Überstaatliches Verfassungsrecht,” AVR 44 (2006), 235.
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multistakeholder settings— all this in recognition of fundamental guarantees of democratic 
participation, rule of law, and fundamental rights.221 Democratic constitutions of states 
function as the “foundation and departure point,” but they must not “close themselves off to 
the influence and normative power of emerging orders.”222
Key tenets of the sum of norms fulfilling functions similar to those of constitutional 
character within states— the internet’s constitution— are thus first, the protection of 
human and fundamental rights, especially privacy, data protection, protection of pro-
perty, and free access. Second, the constitution, according to internet constitutionalists, 
needs to be democratically legitimated by, for instance, developing mechanisms to ag-
gregate and articulate opinions for instance through forums, such as the IGF.223 Third, 
any constitution needs to reflect the responsibility of states (and, as applicable, non- state 
actors) for those elements of the infrastructure of the internet which are essential for 
cybersecurity: only a “secure infrastructure [ . . . ] can ensure that the internet become 
operational as an instrument for democratic decision- making structures globally.”224 
Others have identified fundamental rights protection and power limitations in the in-
ternet ecosystem as central, in particular protection against private actors performing 
public functions.225
While internet constitutionalism is an attractive topic at the intersection of the bur-
geoning global governance and global constitutionalist approaches, the process is strong on 
rhetoric and weak on concrete standards.226 It is true that the online order needs to be based 
on common commitments to ensure fundamental rights— but this is already the case, if one 
recalls the WSIS documents, where all states committed to an information society based on 
international law, including the UN Charter, human rights, as contained in the UDHR, and 
oriented toward development. It is also true that any online order needs to ensure that the 
responsibilities for safeguarding common interests, such as ensuring internet integrity, are 
differentiated according to the actors’ roles.
Private entities need to be obliged to protect fundamental rights within the limits of the 
Ruggie Framework under the overall control of states who, following international human 
rights law, have to respect, protect, and ensure these rights to anyone within their control or 
jurisdiction.227 In this reading internet constitutionalization is not particularly innovative 
in conceptual terms but is rather an application of Teubner’s “regime constitutionalization” 
approach to the internet, identified as a special regime, coupled with insights from interna-
tional public authority and global constitutional theory.
An important contribution of internet constitutionalization lies in the recognition that 
key normative challenges on the internet are public order challenges (or, if one subscribes 
to the use of the word in the trans- state context, “constitutional” challenges). Gunther 
 221 Ibid., 25.
 222 Ibid., 26.
 223 Ibid., 27 et seq.
 224 Ibid., 29.
 225 Claudia Padovani and Mauro Santaniello, “Digital Constitutionalism:  Fundamental Rights and Power 
Limitation in the Internet Eco- System,” The International Communication Gazette (2018), 1– 7, http:// journals.
sagepub.com/ doi/ pdf/ 10.1177/ 1748048518757114.
 226 Ibid.,5.
 227 Andreas Fischer- Lescano, “Struggles for a Global Internet Constitution: Protecting Global Communication 
Structures Against Surveillance Measures,” Global Constitutionalism 5 (2016) 2, 145– 72 (identifying protection of 
the Internet system, horizontal application of fundamental rights, democracy and public control as functions of 
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212 Theorizing Order(s) on the Internet
Teubner, for instance, identifies the “lack of transparency in Google’s governance struc-
tures” as pointing to “constitutional questions of democracy and of public control” (emphasis 
added).228 Individual states can do little, by themselves, to answer these questions— they are 
international in character and need to be answered within the normative systems, and in 
discursive cooperation with the involved normative actors. Or, as Fischer- Lescano writes, 
“principles of democracy and of public control need to be anchored and, if necessary, legally 
enforced within the polycentric patterns of order themselves.”229
In any case, the “constitutional moment”230 seems to have passed. Commonly un-
derstood as a specific time when a shift can occur toward constitutionalization, or con-
stitutional reform, because of extra- constitutional dynamics (e.g. revolutions231), such a 
moment was identified a number of times in the last two decades. In 1997, David G. Post had 
suggested that the internet was approaching a “critical moment for its governance scheme” 
and a “constitutional moment” for cyberspace.232 Similarly, Susan Crawford described the 
reforms to ICANN in 2008 as that entity’s “constitutional moment.”233 Others have linked 
the emergence of the internet freedom principle to the “constitutionalization” of internet 
governance.234
Most of the more recent internet constitutionalization literature was a scholarly backlash 
against the normative instability after the Snowden revelations. This explains the notice-
able reliance on privacy as a key fundamental right (and not freedom of expression, usually 
considered the enabling right on the internet235), on anonymity236 and pseudonymity, and 
on encryption- related rights: defined as a “right to digital self- defense”237 and even a “fun-
damental right.”238
It is indeed in this intersection of the related theories of regime constitutionalization, 
global governance, and international public authority that the normative solution to the on-
line order problem, as presented here, lies, but, as is argued in the next chapter, the answer is 
more complex (but perhaps less elegant) than calling for a constitution.239
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5.3.2  Interoperability
Interoperability means the ability of technology to transfer data across different platforms 
and programmes, components and applications. A similar approach can be applied to the 
legal system to create legal interoperability. Generally, interoperability should be encouraged 
because advantages of “interop” outweigh manageable drawbacks, such as technological lock- 
ins, path dependencies and monopolization threats.
The internet is an open and distributed network of interconnected networks. Among its 
founding architectural principles, we find openness in the sense of an absence of central-
ized legal control or controlling infrastructure (apart from the Domain Name System and 
the root servers). Scholars have also identified its redundancy/ robustness/ reliability and 
its end- to- end nature (the internet is a network, sometimes described as “dumb,”240 that 
simply transmits data packages).241 Yet we also find interoperability as a foundational prin-
ciple of the internet. However, interoperability is not peculiar to the internet, as the success 
story of the “interoperable” shipping container shows, which can be used worldwide on 
land, sea, and air.242
As defined by Urs Gasser, interoperability (or “interop”) in the digital ecosystem is 
“the ability to transfer and render useful data and other information across systems, ap-
plications, or components.” This allows for seamless use and application of technologies 
and makes the concept of interop to be “central, and yet often invisible, to many parts of a 
highly interconnected modern society.” The invisibility of well- interlinked interoperability 
regimes explains why the importance of interop may be underestimated. As Gasser reminds 
us, already the mere fact “that someone can make a seamless international telephone call 
[ . . . ] is a tribute to interop.” This also applies to sending and receiving “the same e- mail on 
a phone or in a browser, regardless of device manufacturer or ISP,”243 and without having to 
worry about microdecisions regarding the speed and route of the data packets carrying the 
email’s content or the many virtual “handshakes” necessary to effect transportation or the 
standards used.
Early approaches have identified the importance of the interoperability of essential 
(emergency) services244 and of the role of governments and standard- setting bodies, 
 240 Though this is doubtful, see already Andrew Odlyzko, “Smart and Stupid Networks: Why the Internet is Like 
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assessment in light of today’s technology: “The Internet is growing explosively, and is even threatening to take over 
transport of voice calls” (emphasis added). This “threat” (at least for AT&T, the company the scholar was affiliated 
with) has materialized with VoIP.
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like the IETF, in ensuring interop245 and have concluded that an increased politicization 
of interoperability has taken place.246 Developing a theory of interoperability is urgent, 
as the pervasive presence of the internet of things is largely premised upon (technical) 
interoperability. Objects rely on seamless connection to other objects without human 
operabilitization.247
Apart from technical interoperability, what interests here chiefly is legal interoperability 
for the internet. Legal interoperability is both complex and crucial because it has the “ability 
to either enable upward mobility in the global economy or to reinforce existing power struc-
tures, depending on the choices made.”248 It is thus a normative concept and the process of 
identifying the necessity for interoperability, and developing rules regarding interopera-
bility, is political.249
Gasser identifies four layers of interoperability: at the institutional layer, interop 
allows different societal systems (regimes, orders) to function. Here, legal interop 
comes into play. At the technological layer, hardware and code must ensure interop. 
At the data layer, interconnected systems must be able to meaningfully interact 
through data transfer.250 Finally, there is a “human” layer, one of language- based 
interoperability.251
Apart from the economic case for interoperability (as Weber points out, “monetary 
costs of non- interoperable laws in a highly networked world will increase”252), there 
is a strong normative case to be made for legal interop:  fairness demands that sim-
ilar fact patterns should be treated similarly. Interoperability theorists have argued 
that the goal of legal interoperability should be to “achieve interoperable rules that 
create a level playing field for the next generation of technologies and social exchange.” 
Non- interoperability of legal systems and norms within systems harms non- dominant 
states, as major powers have expansionist tendencies with regard to application of 
(non- interoperable) laws.253
Among the benefits of ensuring interoperability we also find the continuance of the 
innovation- led development of the internet,254 and the fostering of innovation by reducing 
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lock‐in effects and lowering entry barriers. Among the disadvantages we can count 
increased privacy and security risks by interoperable sharing of information between plat-
forms (especially through in- company portability across services) and increased homoge-
neity on the internet, which might threaten cultural diversity.
Governments have an important role to play, especially on the institutional layer of inter-
operability as “caretakers of a robust and stable legal environment.”255 The law has to allow 
interoperability: it needs to “establish, adjust, or maintain interop,” but interoperability is 
also a feature of the legal system itself. This refers to the quality of a norm to be vertically and 
horizontally “translatable” into other jurisdictions and across national borders. Complete 
interoperability would lead to a coherent body of supranational world law, but complete ho-
mogeneity of laws is not a sensible aim:
Jurisdictions compete productively against one another, and learn from each other, 
through the creation of heterogeneous legal and policy regimes. Governments need to aim 
for interoperability among legal systems at an optimal, rather than maximum, level, just as 
in other interop challenges.256
Structurally, legal interoperability can either be achieved through multistakeholder 
norm- development processes with governmental authorities in a coordination func-
tion,257 or through a bottom- up approach without central coordination. Neither full 
harmonization of laws nor complete fragmentation and non- interoperability makes 
sense from a legal- economic and normative viewpoint. Weber, Palfrey, and Gasser 
agree:  “An in- between level of legal interoperability can usually be considered as 
good policy.”258 Apart from self- regulatory approaches to interoperability by compa-
nies, states can employ different regulatory models aiming at interoperability: harmo-
nization (unification of law), standardization, mutual recognition, reciprocity, and 
cooperation.
In order to give some guidance to the applicable normative systems and ensure coher-
ence, the legal community has developed rules on conflicts of law.259 While substantive 
rules matter most in managing legal interoperability, procedural aspects can also play a 
role. The venue selection allows parties to choose the preferred normative order; venue 
selection is limited by public interest exceptions that restrict this choice and give a pre-
vailing force to a specific national law. The venue selection can lead to legal interoper-
ability within a private group, in the sense that all group entities act on the basis of the 
same normative order.260
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5.3.3 Jurisdictional Approaches
Jurisdiction theory or “internet and jurisdiction” (I&J) approaches usefully identify the pit-
falls of extraterritorial application of national internet- related laws and try to minimize un-
intended normative consequences of national actions upon global operations through the 
development of transnational due process frameworks and jurisdictional principles for the 
internet.
Sovereign jurisdictions are still an essential means to categorize spaces, inter alia for the 
law of state responsibility (states remain responsible for certain cyber activities emanating 
from their sovereign territory) and for the no harm principle with a view to the internet’s 
public core. As previously discussed, the transborder nature of internet activity presents a 
“significant challenge to traditional legal institutions in enforcing jurisdiction over online 
activities,”261 but it does not fundamentally change the importance of cooperation and co-
ordination in jurisdictionally difficult questions.
There is indeed a tension between national jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce, 
based on sovereignty and the cross- border flows of data and services on the internet. 
Recognizing that normative development has a time delay, scholars within the I&J (in-
ternet & jurisdiction) network attempt to develop a transnational due process frame-
work for jurisdictional conflicts on the internet by selecting, collating, and analyzing 
jurisdiction- related cases globally as an evidentiary basis for policy- making.262 The I&J 
approach is based on the conviction that “[m] aintaining a global internet by default, 
which fulfills the ambitions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” requires 
“transnational legal cooperation.”263 Three core issues of particular transnational impact 
have been identified: first, the conditions and criteria under which domain name seizures 
(and thus DNS- level action) by states can be justified in light of their global impact;264 
second, how especially internet intermediaries can develop standards for content restric-
tion and moderation that combine the respect for most norms of 190+ legal systems and 
for international human rights (and give priority to the latter in cases of conflicts);265 and 
third, what limit national court judgments have to force companies to divulge (user) data 
located in a different country.266
Jurisdictional scholars are especially critical of the “extraterritorial extension of national 
jurisdiction,” which they see as— problematically— “becoming the realpolitik of internet 
 261 Andrew Murray, “Uses and Abuses of Cyberspace: Coming to Grips with the Present Dangers,” in Antonio 
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regulation,”267 coupled with legislation including clauses with extraterritorial reach. 
Consider the GDPR: while previously the CJEU had to establish an extraterritorial applica-
tion through its jurisprudence,268 the GDPR is now formally endowed with a transnational 
reach.269 The inward- looking dimension of resovereignization is the imposition, on foreign 
companies, of national laws, which may be in conflict with international law. “Data local-
ization” and forced geo- targeting to re- erect a semblance of national border walls on the 
internet are part of this trend.
Within jurisdictional approaches, traditional means of inter- state cooperation in 
exchanging data, such as Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs), are considered as ill 
equipped to handle jurisdictional challenges of extraterritoriality and sovereignty. This is 
due to the lack of the necessary speed of MLAT procedures for data- related queries, the 
“dual incrimination” problem (that MLATs only apply when the fact pattern lends itself to 
be qualified as a crime in both jurisdictions), and the lack of scalability (MLATs may work 
for single cases, but not among 190+ states with thousands of potential jurisdictionally 
intricate cases).270
Jurisdictional approaches aim at developing a transnational due process framework that 
ensures procedural interoperability. This is possible by reference to human rights as sub-
stantive strata of jurisdictional approaches, a basic commitment that then allows more in-
tensive discussion as to the concrete standards in transborder disputes. A framework would 
also allow for “interoperability among heterogeneous actors [such as states on the one and 
intermediaries on the other hand] by providing shared vernacular and mechanisms for 
their interactions”271— just like TCP/ IP functions as an interoperability enabler between 
heterogeneous networks.
The norms developed within these transnational due process frameworks would be “a 
new form of transnational soft law” and would have to guarantee procedural interopera-
bility and due process.272
5.3.4 Governance by Microdecisions
Microdecisions are taken both in technical and content- related settings. Be it the implemen-
tation of the right to be delisted in daily content management or the up- or downranking of 
content based on algorithm- dominated recommender systems, the opaque nature of the pro-
cedures of microdecisionary systems and their lack of scientific interrogability (no developing 
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jurisprudence, no reasoning, no explanation) serve as a reminder that algorithmic decision- 
making is highly problematic and needs to be comprehensively checked with a view to human 
rights compliance.
There is currently no global and uniform mechanism to solve disputes between users or 
between users, platforms, or third parties: “Each platform and online operator has its own 
system and method for handling these disputes,” Jacques de Werra notes.273 In solving these 
disputes there is, however, one commonality: the decisions are taken on a massive scale and 
are algorithmically predetermined.
While not as self- identifying as adherents of an independent school of thought, a 
number of scholars have focused on the role of these microdecisions in internet regula-
tion.274 Microdecisions are taken by usually private actors, i.e. internet intermediaries, on a 
huge scale and on a daily basis, often determined (or at least largely predetermined) by al-
gorithms. They are often handed down without the possibility of redress provided in tradi-
tional grievance mechanisms and with no possibility for involved parties to review the logic 
of the algorithm behind the decision or demand an explanation.275
Further, the microdecisions taken by intermediaries are usually not collected in a disag-
gregated form and cannot be reviewed, by scholars or the public, as to the decision- making 
parameters. Quantitative indicators may be provided, but they are often incomplete or mis-
leading.276 It is impossible, on this basis, to develop either a comprehensive critique of the 
substantive decisions taken in microdecision processes (only very few cases are discussed 
and reviewed in public277) or to identify “jurisprudential” trends.
Google, in implementing the obligations under the CJEU’s Google Spain judgment 
(ensuring a limited right to be delisted from a search engine’s results when the information 
meets certain criteria of e.g. irrelevance278), had to develop its internal system of microdeci-
sions, including a weighing of different human rights and thus a form of privatized human 
rights microjustice system largely outside of traditional avenues of recourse and redress. 
For this phenomenon, Jacques de Werra has coined the notion of “massive online micro 
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justice.”279 His critical premise is sound: as “balancing rights and interests is complex and 
delicate, it would seem reasonable to consider that this mission should ultimately be en-
trusted to an independent judicial or quasi- judicial body that shall decide quickly and in 
a uniform manner.”280 However, the de- indexing requests submitted to Google are not de-
cided by such a body, but are rather decided within microdecision processes.
De- indexing is a very good example of both the advantages (for companies) and dis-
advantages (for the public) of microdecisionary systems: many small individual cases are 
submitted, organized algorithmically, and decided without hearing, evidence (beyond the 
context provided in the submission), or interaction between Google and the authors of the 
request. While the cases are simple by themselves, as de Werra readily admits, in aggregate 
they “raise potentially important and complex legal issues (in terms of balancing of con-
flicting rights), for which justice must be rendered.”281 These complex legal issues can only 
be comprehensively treated when qualitative transparency is ensured.282
One model of alternative dispute resolution (ADR), which deals successfully with 
internet- related disputes, is the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy 
(UDPR),283 adopted by ICANN in 1999. The UDRP is a key element for many scholars 
looking for regime- internal juridification or constitutionalization trends with regard to the 
internet or the emergence of a “lex digitalis,” including Teubner, Vesting, Fischer- Lescano, 
and extensively Viellechner, who have pointed to the “jurisprudence” resulting from UDRP 
procedures. Over recent years, the number of cases by year averaged 2,500.284
The UDRP provides a legal framework to resolve disputes between domain name reg-
istrants and third parties over abusive registration and use of generic Top Level Domains 
(e.g., .biz, .com, .info, .mobi, .name, .net, .org) and certain country code TLDs that have 
subscribed voluntarily to the UDRP.285 Under the UDRP, the parties are required to submit 
to mandatory administrative proceedings, conducted by a dispute resolution service pro-
vider, when a third party claims that a domain is identical or confusingly similar to a trade-
mark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; and the third party has no rights 
or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and the domain name has been regis-
tered and is being used in bad faith.286
UDPR proceedings handle much lower numbers than microdecision procedures and the 
panels do consider evidence (even though the decision- making processes are quick). What 
makes them interesting to global constitutionalists and regime theorists, however, is that 
the proceedings are, as de Werra puts it, “legally delocalized and essentially independent 
from any legal system because the substantive elements, on which the UDRP is based and 
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decisions are rendered, are independent from any national or regional regulation.”287 This 
shows that an internet- related alternative dispute resolution mechanism can be successful 
and respect rights related to redress of grievances on a global scale, using accepted proce-
dures and being as transparent as possible about the substantive standards used.288
For de- indexation, an ADR procedure along the lines of the UDRP seems feasible, with 
some variations (including that applicants can decide whether to use the system or rather 
national courts).289 For content moderation decisions, however, an ADR system avoiding 
microdecisions can only be conceived for exceptional cases as an external redress mech-
anism of the second or third recourse level, in addition to existing national judicial institu-
tions. This demand becomes more pressing as microdecision systems persevere that are not 
even controlled by the lenient standards crystallizing under the Ruggie Principles.
A slightly different notion of microdecisions is one employed by Florian Sprenger, who 
focuses on technical microdecisions essential for internet- based communication flows. 
Content- related microdecisions within companies, such as Google, are taken “by machines 
for humans on data.” Technical microdecisions, by contrast, are taken “by machines for 
machines on data”290— for humans (to communicate), one might add in times before the 
singularity. Indeed, the technical implementation of the transfer protocols used on the in-
ternet foresees that each “bit packet” (one of the smaller communicable units for online 
communication) on its way to the receiver is submitted to uncountable microdecisions— 
on the best path to the receiver, the speed of traffic, the priority between packages. These 
microdecisions are loci of power, with the internet protocol architecture being the power’s 
modus.291 Following Alexander Golloway, we can thus reconfirm the normative power of 
internet protocols,292 which localize “control” in protocols at the moments of microdeci-
sions after technical decentralization has attempted to distribute it.293
The protocols on which these microdecisions are based are, as this study has discussed, 
developed by different actors and are thus part of the normative frame of the internet.294 
Microdecisions in this sense are taken in the very brief moments of interruption at each 
node of the internet, when artificial intelligence decides, based on protocols, as to the direc-
tion, speed, and priority of the bit packet. The distributed nature of microdecisions ensures 
that power is not monopolized.295 In that, microdecisions are subsidiarity- oriented.
The key problem with technical but to a much larger degree with content- related 
microdecisions is the lack of knowledge about and remedies against them.296 As the Draft 
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Recommendation on roles and responsibilities of internet intermediaries of the Council 
of Europe Committee of Ministers confirms, states shall not allow microdecisions to 
fall outside the protective ambit of human rights, here Article 13 of the ECHR. As the 
Recommendation puts it, states shall “guarantee an effective remedy for all violations of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms by internet intermediaries [ . . . ] and ensure that 
intermediaries provide access to prompt, transparent and effective reviews of user or af-
fected party grievances and alleged terms of service violations and provide for effective 
remedies.”297
Intermediaries, too, are obliged— under the Ruggie Framework— to ensure that 
they make available effective remedies and dispute resolution systems to provide 
prompt and direct redress of grievances. Acknowledging that size matters (“the com-
plaint mechanisms and their procedural implementation may vary with the size, im-
pact and role of the internet intermediary”), all remedies must allow for an impartial 
and independent review and include “inquiry, explanation, reply, correction, apology, 
reinstatement, deletion, reconnection and compensation.”298 Microdecisional sys-
tems without adequate dispute resolution systems attached regularly fail these criteria 
and put intermediaries on the wrong side of their corporate responsibility regarding 
human rights obligations.
5.3.5 Governance by Infrastructure
Infrastructure theory is based on the “turn to infrastructure” of internet scholarship, which 
recognizes infrastructure as places of political interventions, and loci of power, through which 
various externalities are advanced. Governance by infrastructure emerges parallel to govern-
ance of infrastructure and must be carefully scrutinized.
In his lex informatica, Joel Reidenberg described how, in his take, rules are formed through 
technology.299 Legal form follows technological function, law follows code. Twenty years 
on, the “turn to infrastructure” in internet governance is premised upon the perception 
of technical architecture “as one of the strongest, if not the strongest structuring element 
of internet governance.”300 First coined by Laura DeNardis, the “turn to infrastructure in 
to the >250,000 requests to delist links [ . . . ]. We should know if the anecdotal evidence of Google’s process is rep-
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internet governance”301 focuses the governance debate from governance of infrastructure to 
the challenges associated with governance by infrastructure.302
The infrastructures of internet governance have become important “sites of economic 
and political power and, as such, they are being co- opted for [non- technical] purposes”303 
and used as “proxies to regain (or gain) control or manipulate the flow of money, informa-
tion, and the marketplace of ideas in the digital sphere.”304 Infrastructuralists point to the 
progressive recognition of infrastructure as a “means to advance various externalities” with 
battles on policy priorities escalating “in consort with the rising recognition of the role of 
infrastructure in mediating political and economic conflicts.”305
The three key infrastructure- related aspects of internet governance are: the control over 
critical internet resources, the Domain Name System, and the protocols; network- layer se-
curity and interconnections technology; and the infrastructures of information interme-
diation.306 The specificity of a protocol does not change the fact that protocols can be “sites 
of mediation over political and economic values debates.”307 A case in point would be the 
protocol- based mediation, by authentication and encryption standards, between com-
peting values (privacy vs. security).
Governance by infrastructure in the ‘information intermediation’ prong also means that 
companies are actively shaping public policy issues by establishing policies and modera-
tion rules regarding privacy and freedom of expression and by developing rules and pro-
cesses to deal with, inter alia, enforcement of intellectual property rights and reactions to 
state requests for censorship. Policy decisions by companies are far- reaching. As DeNardis 
writes, “decisions of search engines address issues such as privacy in online advertising, 
censorship requests from governments, and reputational issues related to rankings and rat-
ings.”308 All actors in the internet governance ecosystem are aware of the normative power 
of the factual control of companies over infrastructural resources.309
The internet’s turn to infrastructure relies on the identification of network architecture 
as internet governance: by making design choices regarding the network, programmers af-
fect its politics, including the balances between rights (and actors as rights enforcers).310 
Niva Elkin- Koren understands architecture as being a dynamic parameter in a process of 
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reciprocal influences of law and technology design. Yet in order to “make technology vis-
ible,” as Elkin- Koren demands, the concept of law must be reassessed. According to Elkin- 
Koren the law does not just act responsively and bend itself to accept new technologies, 
rather it shapes them and affects their design.311
At the same time infrastructure is used as an element “of technological disruption and 
circumvention of critical infrastructure.”312 Human rights are impacted by infrastructure- 
related attacks.313 At least after the transfer of oversight function from the US government 
to the “global multistakeholder community,” reforming the oversight over the root zone file 
is no longer a symbolic internet governance reform demand.314 Further, cybersecurity is 
a key focus of infrastructural turn theorists. This approach is already reflected in the GGE 
2015 report, which emphasizes the importance of territorial sovereignty over internet re-
sources but includes the obligation to use internet infrastructure lying within one’s territory 
responsibly.315
Internet “kill- switches” are the most “extreme form” of internet control via infrastruc-
ture. Internet shutdowns have been described as the “intentional disruption of internet or 
electronic communications, rendering them inaccessible or effectively unusable, for a spe-
cific population or within a location, often to exert control over the flow of information.”316 
Though the end- to- end nature, implying a lack of centralized control, is a key feature of the 
internet and usually ensures both its resilience and resistance to interventions, it is possible 
in some countries (or parts of a country) to “switch off ” the internet by a number of feasible 
technological steps, especially when internet connectivity to the “outside” world is concen-
trated at a few entry points/ ports under the control of a limited number of companies that 
are liable to be controlled by authorities.317
The cases of Egypt in 2011 and Libya before the NATO intervention, Iraq, Sudan, and 
Syria in 2012 and 2014, and parts of China in 2014 illustrate this use of infrastructure to 
further political agendas, even though switching off the internet is illegal in light of the in-
ternational protection of communication (freedom of expression, freedom of opinion, and 
freedom of information) in almost all cases. Attempts by states to legitimize interferences 
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with communicative rights by arguing for a national security exception (e.g. Article 19 
(3) lit a (1) ICCPR) will usually fail on the grounds of proportionality).318 Exceptions may 
be, under special circumstances, calls for war or incitement to genocide through the in-
ternet that can only be effectively suppressed in a specific region or a specific time by a 
limited and proporationate shutdown.319 As the Human Rights Committee, in Mukong vs. 
Cameroon, confirmed, promotion of human rights and democracy can never be suppressed 
by references to national security and unity.320
The number of partial shutdowns has increased greatly with sixty- one documented shut-
downs in 2017 in states ranging from India and Pakistan to Belarus and Vietnam.321 In 
2018, too, internet shutdowns in parts of Bali, Cameroon, Chad, India, Togo, Venezuela, 
and other states were used as tools by governments to silence activists, oppositional politi-
cians, or grassroots movements.322 Even in a democratic state such as India, the government 
routinely uses partial shutdowns as a tool to police potential disruptions. Between January 
2012 and April 2018, 172 partial shutdowns were recorded, with ninety- two being “preven-
tive” in nature, i.e. imposed in anticipation of protests, and eighty being ordered in order to 
contain ongoing unrest.323 Internet shutdowns as tools of states to manage information and 
communication exchanges and to use infrastructure control to reach certain, often illegiti-
mate, policy objectives has become pervasive. Apart from the violations of human rights a 
shutdown causes, the periods of non- connectivity have a serious economic impact on the 
affected areas.324
Technically, any attempt to “shut down” the internet means trying to interrupt the trans-
mission of data packets.325 A state wishing to do so needs to control a number of elements 
on both the network interface and the application layer of the internet. On the network in-
terface layer, a state attempting to shut down the “national” internet needs to stop national 
ISPs from providing their service, force local Internet Exchange Points to stop national 
network- to- international internet interconnections, or physically disrupt internet cables 
(“cutting” the connection in the most direct sense of the word). On the application layer 
of the internet, states may try to remove the access of their state’s DNS to the root servers 
to disallow host name- to- IP address translation, thus rendering internet address queries 
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unsolvable for the national DNS. Finally, states can target the Border Gateway Protocol that 
ensures trans- ISP connections on the global internet.326
As previously mentioned, companies exercise substantial normative- factual power in an 
infrastructuralist reading of governance, in particular through their quasi- judicial powers 
on a large scale. These powers have sometimes accrued organically but have also been des-
ignated as such by courts. They include weighing human rights (as in Google Spain) or 
exercising moderation- related duties as providers of online platform services, toughened 
by Delfi327 and the ECtHR’s subsequent jurisprudence (MTE and Index.hu ZRT v. Hungary 
(2016)328 and Pihl v. Sweden (2017)329). Intermediaries implement their duties and obliga-
tions “via [the] infrastructure”330 they control. As they also run much of the physical infra-
structure, such as online data storage facilities (server farms), they are directly responsible, 
similar to states, under the Ruggie Principles, toward the global community.
Just as interoperability is even more important in the internet of things than in the in-
ternet of people (devices cannot communicate without clear and precise conditions set by 
interoperability regimes; people can and often do331), governance by infrastructure will be-
come an essential governing approach in the internet of things. As the internet of things is 
based on smart devices interconnecting seamlessly, the technological “backbone” on which 
this interoperability/ interconnectedness rests becomes a key site of intervention and con-
flict. This is why politicized infrastructures need to be framed both as objects of protection 
to ensure the common interest in the integrity of the internet and as potential sources of 
danger for the international community, if misused.
The added value of infrastructure approaches is the identification of the gradual 
“siphon[ing] away [of control over the internet] from formerly more transparent processes,” 
which is progressively “wielded by [  . . .  ] hidden processes” of infrastructure manage-
ment.332 Co- option of infrastructure for the purposes of pursuing narrow policy goals can 
only be countered by ensuring that the processes of managing internet infrastructure are 
open and transparent. Using the law and changing norms to “bring about desired economic 
effects” now has an alternative: the use of architecture and internet infrastructure. Thus, 
legal interventions in architecture and infrastructure of the internet have become “another 
tool that actors can use to further their interests.”333
Infrastructure- focused approaches are normatively important by underlining the con-
trolling function of the corporeal dimensions of the internet, of the internet’s physicality 
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which is factually under control of private actors and, as applicable, of states exercising their 
sovereignty. Within the normative order of the internet rules need to be established to en-
sure both the protection of internet infrastructure as an essential element to internet integ-
rity and the protection from misuses (or state/ corporate capture) of internet infrastructure.
5.3.6 Reconceptualizing Governance
The online order theories presented above have focused on aspects of internet governance, 
such as jurisdiction and infrastructure, and have conceived of their approach as a tool to 
increase regulatory legitimacy, solve jurisdiction conflicts, and make the internet govern-
ance regime more answerable to non- state actors. There were, however, no comprehensive 
approaches attempting to change the basic set- up of the internet governance system.
One such approach, the new Global Cyberspace Framework, was developed by Rolf 
H. Weber.334 It is based on and confirms the “specific nature of cyberspace,” relies on the in-
tegration of all relevant actors by realizing “an appropriate multi- layer regime,” and incorp-
orates substantive principles.335 The framework relies on structured rule- making processes 
on multiple layers: “multi- layer governance.” For these, normative multilayer governance 
principles need to be developed.336
The “guiding principles” include formal/ procedural and substantive principles. The 
formal/ procedural principles ensure dynamism and flexibility, giving normative weight 
to institutions/ actors most “apt to deal with the respective issue,” user- centrality, and 
community- relatedness. The framework’s substantive principles remain vague, including 
international legal principles developed in the “offline” world and newly adapted princi-
ples for the internet. Participation of all relevant actors in their respective roles is a key 
factor in legitimizing the framework. It must be comprehensively realized and procedurally 
protected.337
Weber argues that his framework must also comply with “basic socio- legal values,”338 in-
cluding an acknowledgment of cultural diversity, recognition of cyberspace openness, and 
acceptance of neutrality and interoperability. The framework will only be realizable, Weber 
writes, if the degree of “organization” of actors is high enough. Weber suggests that his 
Global Cyberspace Framework be embedded “into internationalized policy structures, and 
a procedural regime, which relies on the multi- layer/ polycentric governance model and on 
multistakeholder participation, which takes proper account of the functional dimensions 
of a normative order.”339 To succeed, existing policy structures need to be internationalized. 
For Weber, the “most central issue” of his framework consists in the “need for reaching a 
consensus on the applicability of some guiding principles.”340 Such a consensus, however, 
remains elusive, as the promulgation of many declarations of principles illustrates.341
 334 Rolf H. Weber, Realizing a New Global Cyberspace Framework. Normative Foundations and Guiding 
Principles. (Zurich: Schulthess and Springer, 2014).
 335 Ibid., 154.
 336 Ibid., 109.
 337 Ibid., 117– 20, 129.
 338 Ibid., 136.
 339 Ibid.
 340 Ibid., 156.
 341 See 3.4.9.
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5.4 A Theory of the Normative Order of the Internet
5.4.1 Making Normative Change Visible
Not every illegal act points to a failure of the past norm entrepreneur, the lawmaker. Not 
every political change indicates a revolution. Not every anomaly in science points to a par-
adigm change, in Thomas S. Kuhn’s sense. But, as he writes, “if they are more than the usual 
mysteries of normal science, then the transition to crisis has started.”342 There are quite a 
few “mysteries” with regard to the legitimacy and applicability of norms on the internet, 
some of which have been discussed in the previous chapters, some of which will be debated 
in the following ones.
It can therefore be said with more than a modicum of plausibility that something like 
Kuhn’s transition to crisis is the current state of internet regulation. Applying his thinking 
on scientific revolutions to structural approaches to normative ordering, a new paradigm of 
regulation is at hand. This study calls this paradigm “the normative order of the internet.” 
In Kuhn’s telling, in these times, the rules of “normal research” are less rigid, as the previous 
paradigm (through which a certain scientific field is seen) becomes less strict. This study 
understands Kuhn to mean that this includes a great receptivity of the scientific (and regula-
tory) field to new methodological approaches and new theories.
It is characteristic (for Kuhn) for this moment in time (transition to crisis) that given data 
is used in a new (scientific) system differently. Similarly, this study argues that it is charac-
teristic of the present state of the internet that what Kuhn terms “data,” and what is presently 
understood to include norms and practices related to the internet, is “used” differently: that 
is norms and practices are assessed, under the normative orders approach, in a broader 
context, encompassing national law, international law, and regulatory arrangements of a 
different character.
In his chapter on the Invisibility of Revolutions, Kuhn complains that post- revolutionary 
academic writings (written after the paradigm change) tend to rewrite history by presenting 
scientific progress in a linear fashion: adding facts, notions, a law, a theory like bricks when 
constructing a building— all in light of the paradigm. Such historization is highly selective 
regarding the discourses considered authoritative for the framing of historical progress, as 
recounted or reconstructed.343 Linearity and selective historization may render revolutions 
invisible.344 This study, by contrast, strives to make the normative “revolution” regarding 
online rule (or at least the evolution toward a more stratified normative order) visible. Such 
an endeavor can only succeed if the process of visibilization rests upon a firm theoretical 
foundation.
 342 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962/ 1970) 
(in German: Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen, 2nd edn. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1976)), 96.
 343 Gérard Leclerc, “Histoire de la vérité et généalogie de l’autorité,” Cahiers internationaux de sociologie, 111 
(2001) 2, 205– 31 (para. 32: “L’histoire de l’autorité n’est à proprement parler ni nominaliste, ni idéaliste; non plus 
qu’elle n’est nihiliste ou métaphysique. Elle est une analyse historique et sociologique des discours collectifs (cul-
turels) en tant qu’ils sont légitimes, fondés sur des bases institutionnelles, et gouvernés par le télos de la vérité, 
c’est- à- dire en tant qu’ils sont des croyances vécues sur le mode de la conviction, du savoir, de la recherche, bref 
différents modes de prétention à la possession de la vérité.”
 344 Thomas S. Kuhn, Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen, 2nd edn. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 
1976)), 147– 51.
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In the following, key tenets of the approach employed here to construct and evaluate the 
normative order of the internet will be presented. These are the foundations for a theory 
of the normative order of the internet and are thus coherent with a view to the common 
purposive denominator (they offer perspectives on (aspects of) the normative order of the 
internet).
5.4.2 Theoretical Imports
This study has looked into phenomena of normative ordering, especially the processes 
leading to the emergence of norms and their relationship with national legal systems. The 
following theoretical insights can be imported into a theory of the normative order of the 
internet.
Theoretical Scripts. With this as a background foil, the following imports can be made 
from the more general and online order- oriented theories and approaches discussed in the 
previous two sections. Looking back at the more general theories discussed above,345 we can 
confirm that legal theory has developed different “scripts” to explain phenomena related to 
information society (Castells), “computer culture” (Vesting), and digitization more broadly.
Fluidity of the Normative. An import insight to be garnered from previously discussed 
theories is that the legal system is not that different, conceptually, from the internet. Like the 
internet, the legal system at its most basic level deals in binary operators (lawful/ unlawful), 
is multilayered, and operates under conditions of uncertainty and contingency. Another 
theoretical import is that the networked society is ruled by “liquid” forms of law: law that is 
less static than non- internet- related law and that allows for regime- internal self- reflection 
and self- optimization processes. Also here, similarities to information technology become 
apparent. Self- optimization (including outlier detection and “dimensionality reduction” to 
reduce complexity346) and machine learning are essential technologies for complex algo-
rithms in big data- driven systems.347
This liquid law is made up of different kinds of norms, including legal and non- binding 
ones, but also normative “arrangements” of a different character. They are also “liquid” in 
the sense that one may flow into the other. An anonymity- related standard, adopted in an 
IETF RFC process by rough consensus, might flow into respective regulation on the na-
tional and European levels. The Council of Europe recommendation on roles and responsi-
bilities of internet intermediaries may influence national law. The EU GDPR, with its right 
to explanation regarding certain uses of algorithms, influences normatively relevant and 
codified internal practices and terms of service of companies worldwide.
Dehierarchization and Fragmentation. An important theoretical insight for under-
standing the normative challenges of regulating the internet is that “network culture” and 
digitization have impacted the normative hierarchy in legal orders. They have in particular 
contributed to the normative dynamics that resulted in the emergence of a substantial body 
of private norms by companies and standards by standard- setting bodies that have destabil-
ized traditional hierarchical relations between norms based on an imagined Geschlossenheit 
 345 See 5.2.
 346 Ethem Alpaydin, Machine- Learning (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2016), 72.
 347 Ibid., 73.
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(unity/ solidity) of the (national) legal system, allowing “foreign” norms only under strict 
procedural rules.
Private norms, standards, and informal transnational normative arrangements impact 
to a much larger degree the social reality of a substantial part of individuals and objects 
active on the internet and the way they interact. This normativity of the factual overlays 
the facticity of the normative, i.e. the influence that traditional norms within the Stufenbau 
have on activities related to the internet. By this “vote of the practice,” norms grow in impor-
tance (and their legitimacy demands with them) that are neither firmly anchored within the 
Stufenbau nor traditionally legitimated.
Weltrecht and Hybridity. This intersects with theoretical approaches regarding the idea 
of Weltrecht, a body of norms encompassing all norms and, in the form of Internetweltrecht, 
all norms applicable to the internet or rather, more broadly still, all phenomena of digitality 
which, with Felix Stalder, can be understood as the “set of relations that today is realized on 
the basis of the infrastructure of digital networks in the production, use and transformation 
of material and immaterial goods as well as in the constitution and coordination of personal 
and collective action.”348 A transition to this idea of Internetweltrecht helps divorce norma-
tive ordering from national boundaries. Naturally, it is a construct, a philosophical support 
structure, that (1) helps understand how existing normative hierarchies within cognizably 
segmented legal systems (e.g. Austria, Germany, EU) can become diffuse and (2) how inter-
actions between norms from different segmented systems can interact.
The concept of Weltrecht is thus a big normative equalizer by stripping away national 
denominators. It allows for the collection of single unsystematized norms, which can then 
be reconfigured in their concrete interaction without the insurmountable conflict- of- laws 
problems that theoretizing all possible normative interactions between a line of code, a 
soft law principle, an internet standard, a national constitutional law, an EU regulation, a 
Council of Europe recommendation, a clause in an international treaty etc. might enter into.
This ties in conceptually to the challenge of legal hybridity and its normative “manage-
ment.” The normative orders approach re- establishes normative unity in light of norm con-
flicts in hybrid legal spaces. Just as internet- related Weltrecht approaches are one way of 
showing that norms from different regimes, of varying normative pull, authored by different 
actors, exist and interact, and that designing abstract interaction protocols is difficult, the 
concept of legal hybridity directs the analytical view toward the exercise, in international 
administrations, of international public authority by non- traditionally legitimated regimes.
Transnational Politicization. A further import into a theory of the normative order of 
the internet is the normative deepening of regimes by their politicization in the form of self- 
constitutionalization. Fragmentation and decentralized norm production have dynamized 
normative processes leading to the development of self- constitutionalizing sub- legal orders, 
civil sectors or regimes, including and especially with regard to the internet. These regimes 
are transnational in character— such as the content management regimes at the intersection 
of international internet intermediaries’ terms of service (though nationally different legal 
regimes on the ground need to be respected)— and need to be politicized internally (i.e. 
rendered normatively more detailed and more receptible to legitimacy demands).
 348 Felix Stalder, Kultur der Digitalität (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2016), 18 (translation by the author).
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Transnational theory provides us with normative concepts of how to integrate different 
regimes, including the horizontal application of human rights. Even though the online 
order as lex digitalis has diversified to include non- highly coherent communities, its nor-
mative mixture of national legal orders, international regimes, and transnational regulatory 
arrangements makes it a characteristic regime in which actors/ institutions exercise trans-
national legal authority to varying degrees.
Pragmatic Ordering. This study has also shown that theories focused on online order 
have developed important insights into the emergence of rule- based order on the in-
ternet.349 Progressively, societal “constitutionalization” processes have supported the iden-
tification of key principles of online order by providing for the societal dynamics that have 
allowed key principles to exercise normative pull on other norms which then coalesce nor-
matively around these principles, similar to how a magnet attracts metal (scraps).
This bottom- up approach that considers norms in their entirety and multifaceted na-
ture (and the narratives that give an order meaning) is informed by pragmatism. In a de-
parture from seemingly artificial academic constructs, such as a new Global Cyberspace 
Framework, the normative orders approach accepts the messy and fuzzy normative char-
acter of the internet and its governance, while nonetheless developing a normative frame 
through which the development and application of rules for the internet can be explained 
and criticized.
Interoperability. Transferring properties of internet architecture to the internet govern-
ance system, the (legal) interoperability approach is of special importance for the concept of 
normative order. Interop(erability) is the non- innate and non- trivial ability of technology 
to transfer data across different platforms and programs, components, and applications of 
a legal system to interact with other norms without undue friction or legal “transaction 
costs.” In light of the internet’s multilayer- multiplayer architecture and polycentric rule- 
making processes, the interoperability of norms is highly important, especially because 
problem- specific normative solutions might conflict: a conflict- of- laws law for the internet 
must be able to work at different levels of complexity and granularity.
This includes jurisdiction- oriented approaches, which try to minimize unintended nor-
mative consequences of national actions upon global operations through the development 
of transnational due process frameworks and jurisdictional principles for the internet.
Decisionary and Physical Infrastructure. A final import of online order theories for a 
theory of the normative order of the internet must be the role of the decisionary and phys-
ical infrastructure. With regard to decisions, a workable theory must find an approach to 
the microdecisions taken in both technical and content- related settings. Traditionally con-
ceived of as lacking any interrogability, their prevalence online highlights the necessity of 
a human rights- sensitive and technology- neutral approach to normatively framing algo-
rithmic decision- making with a view to human rights compliance.
The internet cannot work without its infrastructure. The loci of infrastructure (do-
main name systems, servers, Internet Exchange Points) have become targets of attack and 
instruments of normative power. Any theory of a normative order of the internet must in-
tegrate this “turn to infrastructure” of internet scholarship and recognize the externalities 
 349 See 5.3.
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advanced through existing infrastructure. Governance by infrastructure emerges parallel to 
governance of infrastructure and must be carefully scrutinized.
5.5 Envisaging the Normative Turn
For Pierre Bourdieu, codification needs to be accompanied by a theory on the effects of 
codification.350 Codification enables “l’instauration d’une normativité explicite, celle de 
la grammaire ou du droit.”351 Codification produces objectification and formalization, 
rationalization and normalization— and thus coherence control. It changes the nature of 
things: “un changement de statut ontologique.”352 The normative order established by law, 
however, is not transhistorical but contingent: lawyers, who see this temporal and social 
contingency of law, are “gardiens de l’hypocrisie collective”353 though even in hypocrisy 
they are amassing social and epistemic capital and then exercising substantial power. We 
can avoid this trap if we do not engage in formal codification. The normative order of the in-
ternet is not an exercise in changing the ontological status of the artifact “internet”. Rather, 
it is a necessary construct of an approach toward ordering the interaction of normatively 
relevant players and the interfacing of normative layers.
Varying Bourdieu, this study posits that conceiving of and finding online order is neces-
sary as an essential presupposition for societal interactions. Indeed, Boris Groys describes 
human life as a “prolonged dialogue with the world.” This dialog is based on certain phil-
osophical presuppositions defining its medium and form, and today “we practice our dia-
logue with the world primarily via the internet.” Wanting to ask the world a question, “we 
act as internet users.” Under the internet’s current regime, intermediaries (Groys focuses 
on Google) define the rules under which we can ask this question. Today, says Groys, 
“Google plays the role that was traditionally fulfilled by philosophy and religion. [It is] the 
first known philosophical machine that regulates our dialogue with the world [ . . . ].”354 By 
giving specific context to words searched for, Google “presupposes and codifies the rad-
ical dissolution of language into sets of individual words.” Thus, Google dissolves all dis-
courses by turning them into the word clouds that function as collections of words beyond 
grammar.”355
The current state of the internet seems similar, if we supplant “words” with “norms” 
and “grammar” with “order.” This is the argument presented here: we are faced with online 
norms without order; and we need order to stabilize normative expectations and to make 
sense of the implementation of the finality of sociopolitical processes collected within the 
rubrum of internet governance.
 350 Soraya Nour, “Bourdieus juridisches Feld:  Die juridische Dimension der sozialen Emanzipation,” in 
Sonja Buckel, Ralph Christensen, and Andreas Fischer- Lescano (eds.), Neue Theorien des Rechts, 2nd edn. 
(Stuttgart: Lucius&Lucius, 2009), 179– 99 (191).
 351 Pierre Bourdieu, “Habitus, code et codification,” Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales (1986), 40– 4 (42).
 352 Ibid.
 353 Pierre Bourdieu, “Les juristes, gardiens de l’hypocrisie collective,” in F. Chazel und J. Commaille (eds.), 
Normes jurididques et régulation sociale (Paris: LGDJ, 1991), 95– 9.
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Just as theory orders the world, ordering itself— based on theory— is a way to make the 
world. Citing Nelson Goodman, Andrea Bianchi notes that “[t] heories are ways of world-
making.”356 Goodman, in his own Ways of Worldmaking, describes composition and de-
composition via labels, weighting according to relevance/ irrelevance or other categories, 
ordering, deletion, and supplementation and deformation (corrections or distortions) as 
“ways” to make the world. Deletion and supplementation are especially interesting here. 
Goodman sees the scientist as
rejecting or purifying most of the entities and events of the world of ordinary things while 
generating quantities of filling for curves suggested by sparse data, and erecting elaborate 
structures on the basis of meagre observations [thus striving] to build a world conforming 
to his chosen concepts and obeying his universal laws.357
We see that Goodman is critical of ordering and seems to suggest that scientists develop 
order for their own sake rather than for the sake of the “ordered.” This is a pitfall this study 
seeks to avoid. However, we can agree that the subsequent normative order of the internet is 
an exercise in systematization and systematic deletion.358 It must also be admitted that the 
normative order approach is a “chosen concept,” but the choice was explained and the rea-
sons discussed. This study tries to show how the norms within the order relate to the order 
as a whole and thus “obey” the universal laws posited. However, this study makes the case 
that epistemological reasons for the adoption of a normative orders approach to regulating 
digitality dominate. Varying Goodman, obeying universal laws makes sense, when data and 
norms point to their effectivity and legitimacy.
This normative order of the internet, as will be presented here on the next pages, is a 
meta- law of order for the internet. Such a meta- law can only be understood in light of the 
theoretical approaches described in the last chapter. They function like so many different 
lenses when targeted at digitality. These lenses all fit (each on its own, but most also to-
gether) within the “glasses” of a theory of a normative order of the internet. Some theories 
help sharpen the focus (or explain) how “regimes” auto- constitutionalize; some theories 
help explain how normative change happens. After this chapter’s discussion, they are pro-
vided with enough substance that they can be used to put into focus so many key aspects 
of the normative order of the internet for it to become the object of the subsequent chapter.
This study has persistently, and again in the last paragraph, used the term “normative 
order of the internet” or “online order” and has thus accrued a substantial conceptual debt. 
It will be paid in full in the following  chapter 6, where the order resulting from the internet’s 
normative turn, whose foundations have been conceptually laid in the last chapters, will be 
presented.
 356 Andrea Bianchi, International Law Theories. An Inquiry into Different Ways of Thinking (Oxford:  OUP, 
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no temperature as lying between 90 and 90.1 degrees.”
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 The Normative Order of the Internet
6.1 The Normative Turn
6.1.1 A New Regulatory Order for the Internet
In a recent analysis of cybersecurity norms, two authors identified a “huge void in in-
ternational regulation” after the “failure” of the negotiations in the UN’s Group of 
Governmental Experts. If correct, this would be troublesome, especially in light of “re-
cent cyber- attacks with global reach.”1 But there is no normative void,2 even less a “huge” 
one. The regulatory frame regarding the internet as a whole and cybersecurity in partic-
ular, as this chapter shows, is flexible, elastic, and scalable: we call it the normative order 
of the internet. This order will now be presented, contextualized, and tested in light of the 
legitimacy demands placed upon it by the international community and the normative 
demands set for it by its role as the body of norms governing the development and use of 
the internet.
In the evolution of the internet’s regime, as has been hypothesized and will be shown 
in this chapter, a normative turn has taken place: the normative order’s internal rules of 
norm- production produce the technological and societal forces that, through learning 
normativity, develop norms autonomously within the order. It is thus— and this is a key 
hypothesis— not technicity that forms the norm, but the normative order and its norms, 
which allow for the development of (and set the limits to) technicity.
Such an order must necessarily be characterized by elasticity in that its rules are mark-
edly less tightly woven with regard to regulatory areas such as internet standards than, 
for instance, cybersecurity or cybercrime. The norms within the normative order are not 
only primarily Regimeverfassung or Regimerecht norms, but rather stem from a broad 
variety of legal and quasi- legal sources, including national law, international law, and 
transnational regulatory arrangements, such as standards and soft law. As a legal order 
it operates through the form of law and analogously to it. Its actors— states, legal per-
sons, natural persons— fulfill diverse functions as norm entrepreneurs, norm appliers, 
and norm enforcers. Though not without autonomous elements, the normative order of 
the internet is interlinked through legitimation relationships with national and interna-
tional legal orders.
The order’s justification narratives control new norms by assessing their technical con-
sistency and legal- cultural consonancy with the order’s purpose. The order thus offers a 
 1 Theodore Christakis and Karine Bannelier, “Reinventing Multilateral Cybersecurity Negotiation after the 
Failure of the UN GGE and Wannacry: The OECD Solution,” EJIL Talk, February 28, 2018, https:// www.ejiltalk.
org/ reinventting- multilateral- cybersecurity- negotiation- after- the- failure- of- the- un- gge- and- wannacry- the- 
oecd- solution.
 2 Similarly, Emilie Legris and Dimitri Walas, “Regulation of Cyberspace by International Law,” ESIL Reflection 
7 (2018) 1, http:// www.esil- sedi.eu/ node/ 2060.
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frame to assess the legitimacy of digitality- related norms, to explain their emergence and 
predict their success in terms of “community” adoption and implementation. The norma-
tive order of the internet is thus both an empirical- conceptual and normative construct: an 
epistemological concept of online order(ing) that provides for legitimacy (and justifica-
tion) narratives and establishes an elastic normative space, with principles and processes for 
solving public policy conflicts connected to safeguarding the internet’s integrity. Its central 
added value is to relate the disparate norms of different legal systems, and of different char-
acter, to one another in a holistic approach and to develop shared normative vocabularies 
for the internet and a common finality framed by common narratives of justification.
The normative order of the internet, as developed and defended in this chapter, is nei-
ther conceived of as being constructed on a blank normative slate nor does it purport to 
bring absolute stability of normative expectations, a key element of any legal (or quasi- legal) 
order. Rather, it builds upon and strongly draws from the existing regulatory structures that 
have previously been instrumental, if in an unstructured, ad hoc manner, in anchoring the 
inchoate field of internet regulation and governance. Again: the normative order of the in-
ternet, as envisaged by this study, encompasses conceptually all regulatory layers and all 
regulatory players. It is, however, no normative panacea. Serious conflicts pitting different 
actors online and clashes between legal orders and among the norms of single orders will 
persist. The concept introduced here is a frame through which to understand better the in-
ternet and the normative dynamics present on it and to help relate applicable norms from 
different legal systems to each other through a coherence- enhancing ordered framework of 
processes and principles and justification narratives.
It is not suggested that the normative order of the internet constitutes a new “reign” of or 
over the internet, even if some authors believe that such a “reign” might be necessary. In his 
book Pax Technica, Philip N. Howard describes the past twenty- five years as an “internet in-
terregnum,”3 with different actors demanding (states) or exercising (companies) regulatory 
(quasi- )authority to varying degrees.4 But just as the internet has never been “without (any) 
rule,” only without a traditionally legitimated and constructed legal frame and without an 
overarching comprehensive theory of online order, more recent historical scholarship sees 
even the historical interregnum period more positively.5 Thus the historical interregnum 
was only a time inter a specific kind of regnum, but not the absence of a regnum per se.6 The 
argument formulated here with regard to the internet is remarkably similar. There is and 
always has been some order, some regnum on the internet. Yet there have been few attempts 
to reconceptualize this regnum as an ordered system of norms, especially as it suffered from 
the lack of a centralized enforcing and legitimating institution.
The normative order of the internet, as conceived in this study, still does not exhibit a 
centralized enforcement institution. Arguably, this role has been systematized and diffused. 
It is, as will be made clear in this chapter, the order itself, with its principles and norms, 
which can be stabilized sufficiently to “stand on its own” and exert compliance pull. Just as 
 3 Philip N. Howard, Pax Technica. How the Internet of Things May Set Us Free or Lock Us Up (New Haven/ 
London: Yale University Press, 2015), 66.
 4 With a view to the internet of things as a new physical layer of networked devices, he develops a new public 
policy for a responsible internet, see ibid., 148 et seq.
 5 Marianne Kirk, “Die kaiserlose, die schreckliche Zeit”— Das Interregnum im Wandel der Geschichtsschreibung 
(Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2002).
 6 Peter H. Wilson, The Holy Roman Empire. A Thousand Years of Europe’s History (London: Penguin, 2016), 37.
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the non- interregna times usually saw a more solidified form of the exercise of power, the 
normative order of the internet can function as an explanatory model for creating more 
predictable and thus stable normative relations between players and decreasing legal and 
jurisdictional conflicts.
The argumentative structure in which the presentation and contextualization of the nor-
mative order of the internet takes place in this chapter is shaped as follows: after identi-
fying the emergence of a normative turn on the internet (6.1), the chapter then discusses the 
“nomos of the internet” (6.2) as a concept configuring the normative order of the internet. 
Subsequently, the normativity of the order (6.3) and its legal status, including its norms and 
normative processes (6.4), are presented. Section 6.5 addresses the principles of the norma-
tive order, before the order’s legitimacy and legitimation (6.6), including narratives of justi-
fication within the order (6.7), are analyzed. This chapter ends with a section on the facticity 
of the normative order of the internet (6.8) and conclusions (6.9.) leading toward the study’s 
last thematic  chapter 7.
6.1.2 Stopping the Singularity
The normative order of the internet, as it is constituted and presented, is a flexible, holistic, 
and dynamic order. Its presentation follows, varying Immanuel Kant, the gradual devel-
opment of reason:7 its evolution is a story of “reason developing from notions.”8 This is the 
approach followed by this study as well: by parsing normativity on the internet, this study 
develops its order. The approach is not focused on historicizing the normative evolution 
of internet regulation, but rather analyzing the evolution, status quo, and trajectory of the 
normative order of the internet. Therefore, the normative order of the internet is presented 
normatively as well as empirically.
Establishing a normative order of the internet is essential for reducing risks inherent in 
technological progress. Two important German thinkers of the mid- twentieth century have 
independently identified these dangers. Published before the advent of the internet, they 
nevertheless offer insights into the dangers of the technological condition (and the tech-
nological conditioning of society and its laws). Current and future man, as Günther Anders 
described them, meaning people today and people tomorrow, are characterized through 
a discrepancy between growing technological capacities and the failure of imagination to 
provide an imaginarium for technology’s catastrophic consequences.9 He thus feared tech-
nological advancements without a concomitant ethical base, without normative bounds.
Similarly, Hans Jonas argued that the “new territory of collective practice, which we enter 
through high technology, is a no man’s land for ethical theory.”10 The regulatory polestar 
(“Kompaß”) must be the “vorausgedachte Gefahr selbst,” the “preimagined danger itself.” 
From it develops, following Jonas, the “new obligations of new power” through a “heuristic 
 7 Immanuel Kant, Lose Blätter zu den Fortschritten der Metaphysik (AA XX.), (edited by Gerhard Lehmann) 
(Berlin: Berlin- Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1971), 330.
 8 Ibid., 343: “Geschichte der sich aus Begriffen entwickelnden Vernunft” (translation by the author).
 9 Günther Anders, Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen Bd. I: Über die Seele im Zeitalter der zweiten industriellen 
Revolution (Frankfurt am Main: Beck, 2009).
 10 Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation (Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp, 2003), 7– 8 (“Das Neuland kollektiver Praxis, das wir mit der Hochtechnologie betreten haben, 
ist für die ethische Theorie noch ein Niemandsland”).
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of fear.”11 This is a precautionary approach to technology regulation avant la lettre, coupled 
with a clear identification of the commensurate growth in power and obligations of internet 
actors, today’s “new powers.”
The normative order of the internet serves to curtail Jonas’ “new power,” it provides a 
map stratifying ethical concerns for his “no- man’s- land for ethical theory,” to which we may 
add, for our purposes, legal theory and practice, and it complexifies the “heuristic of fear” by 
disaggregating the premises of the heuristic: put otherwise, the normative orders approach 
to the internet puts an end to what Jonas feared without specifically referring to it: the legal 
singularity. This is modeled upon the technological singularity, a concept introduced by I. J. 
Good and John von Neumann and popularized by Vernor Vinge12 and Rey Kurzweil,13 as 
the moment when “machine intelligence will surpass human intelligence.” This leads to the 
“Singularity— technological change so rapid and profound it represents a rupture in the 
fabric of human history.”14
For the purpose of this study, at the moment when non- traditional, transnational nor-
mative arrangements become so powerful that they create their own processes, legitimacy 
narratives, and normative logics— and in effect supplant traditional, democratically legiti-
mated national and international processes, narratives, and normative logics— such a legal 
singularity would occur. It has not and, given residual and strong legal self- defense mech-
anisms of democratic states and the solidity of the case for the emergence of a normative 
order of the internet, it will not. A theoretical example would be the case of courts around 
the world refraining from ensuring citizens’ rights against terms of service agreements by 
powerful internet companies. Rather, the inverse seems to be true.15
In any case, some authors have cautioned that this view of the coming of the singularity 
is faulty because of the “complexity break”:16 as machine intelligence approaches human in-
telligence, progress becomes slower. Something similar is happening on the internet. Cases 
are increasingly becoming more complex and the relations between actors have become 
more multilayered and diverse: this is complexity at work which slows down the fragmen-
tation into different orders and the multiplication of normative sub- regimes which may, in 
aggregate, have led to the legal singularity.
In any case, the normative order of the internet, as it is presented here, serves to stop 
any legal singularity- based fears. The normative order is a comprehensive approach to 
limiting the dangers of a legal singularity and normalizing discussion on the state of the 
rule of law and the laws of ruling on the internet. The normative order fills the “void of 
 11 Ibid.
 12 Vernor Vinge, “The Coming Technological Singularity: How to Survive in the Post- Human Era,” in G. A. 
Landis (ed.), Vision- 21: Interdisciplinary Science and Engineering in the Era of Cyberspace (Washington, DC: NASA, 
1993), 11– 22.
 13 Ray Kurzweil, The Singularity is Near (New York: Penguin, 2005), 135– 6.
 14 Ray Kurzweil, “The Law of Accelerating Returns,” Kurzweil Accelerating Intelligence (Blog), March 7, 2001, 
http:// www.kurzweilai.net/ the- law- of- accelerating- returns.
 15 Just see recently, Landgericht Berlin, Az 16 O 341/ 15, February 12, 2018 (declaring illegal a number of sub-
stantial clauses in Facebook’s terms of service (AGBs)).
 16 But see Paul G. Allen, “The Singularity Isn’t Near,” MIT Technology Review, October 12, 2011, https:// www.
technologyreview.com/ s/ 425733/ paul- allen- the- singularity- isnt- near (“Rather than the ever- accelerating ad-
vancement predicted by Kurzweil, we believe that progress toward this understanding is fundamentally slowed by 
the complexity brake. Our ability to achieve this understanding, via either the AI or the neuroscience approaches, 
is itself a human cognitive act, arising from the unpredictable nature of human ingenuity and discovery”).
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ungovernability” on the internet caused by dissonances of power and law17 in what one 
researcher called the “algorithmic state of exception.”18 In contrast to Giorgio Agamben, 
who— following Foucault— had declared these “states of exception”19 (here:  putting 
people outside the law) for the new normal, the normative order is comprehensively 
constructed.
Algorithms do not cause states of exception in which the law does not apply and fun-
damental rights are not protected. They can be governed, as this study shows throughout, 
and are part, as normative artifacts, of the online order. For that, algorithms just as all other 
moving parts of the normative infrastructure on the internet need to be addressed (that 
is: regulated). This is premised upon their addressability. In this view, we can argue that 
much of the perceived crisis of the regulatory power of law on the internet has been limited 
by “a crisis of addressability.”20 If this is the case, as seems plausible, then the approach of 
the normative order of the internet is chiefly to systematize the processes and principles for 
“addressing” actions online.
Consider early attempts to introduce street numbers in towns, such as in Vienna in 
1770– 1772, which were met with strong opposition from the better- off, who saw this as 
an illegitimate attempt to tag their palaces (we would call it “democratically’) just as the 
small houses some doors down.21 This systematized the houses and made them easier to 
find for postal workers. Similarly, the normative order of the internet, by making norms 
(and actors) addressable and thus comparable, is presented here as an important step 
toward ensuring that dangers emanating from the internet are normatively met and the 
integrity of the internet is thus ensured. The regulatory focus of the normative order must 
thus be holistic.
However, the introduction of a house- by- house numbering system in eighteenth- 
century Vienna contains another lesson. The measure was promoted publicly as a measure 
to fight crime: “[an initiative which aimed] blos allein zu besserer Ausfindigmachung derer 
verdächtig liederlich und gefährlich Leuten,” used only for the “beybehaltung der ruhe, und 
Sicherheit” and to keep citizens safe.22 However, the government’s actual impetus behind 
the introduction was the possibility to increase tax revenue and to ensure a more effec-
tive recruitment system for the army by counting all young men and identifying their resi-
dences.23 Rather than enhancing (human) security, the goal was ensuring financial stability 
and gathering military resources. With this small example we see already that exercises in 
ordering are not intrinsically positive. Rather, it is the actual and not the publicly stated goal 
of the exercise of ordering that is essential for measuring its legitimacy.
 17 Evan Light and Jonathan A. Obar, “Surveillance Reform: Revealing Surveillance Harms and Engaging Reform 
Tactics,” in Ben Wagner, Matthias C. Kettemann, and Kilian Vieth (eds.), Research Handbook on Information 
Technologies and Human Rights (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2019), 195– 222.
 18 Dan McQuillan, “Algorithmic States of Exception,” European Journal of Cultural Studies 18 (2015), 564– 76.
 19 Giorgio Agamben, Ausnahmezustand (Homo sacer, part II, vol. 1) (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2004).
 20 Benjamin H. Bratton, The Stack. On Software and Sovereignty (Cambridge, MA/ London:  MIT Press, 
2015), 26.
 21 First, red numbers were painted on houses big and small, starting from the center of Vienna, working out-
wards. As houses were demolished and new ones built, this led to disorder, which was remedied by a streetwise 
numbering system in 1862 and the introduction of postal codes in 1966. See, instructively, Anton Tantner, Ordnung 
der Häuser, Beschreibung der Seelen:  Hausnummerierung und Seelenkonskription in der Habsburgermonarchie 
(Wiener Schriften zur Geschichte der Neuzeit) (Vienna: Studienverlag, 2007), 44.
 22 As cited in ibid., 35.
 23 Ibid.
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6.1.3 Regulatory Remit
The regulatory remit of the normative order of the internet is challenging. Almost all so-
cietal interactions today have some connection “to the internet.” Therefore, the normative 
order “of the internet” could be perceived as a concept so broad that its epistemic usefulness 
is limited. Fixing the normative order’s focus on artifacts and devices is also problematic, as 
the importance of devices changes and new ones appear. They are merely instantiations of 
progress, prone to evolve and merely mediate human– machine interaction. The normative 
order is thus conceived as independent of any one concrete mediating technology.
Fixating on an artificial online/ offline dichotomy also seems problematic. Be it smart de-
vices,24 (killer) robots,25 the regulation of metadata,26 or cloud computing,27 trying to dis-
tinguish between legal questions of “internet- based” and unconnected use no longer serves 
to describe global social realities. Each of these fields, almost chosen at random among 
many social reifications of progress, has serious “offline” implications. Smart fridges can be 
programmed to refuse further food outtake, once a certain number of calories is judged to 
have been consumed by the owner, thus functioning as a public health instrument (with its 
use possibly positively incentivized, through nudging the user toward the regime- optimal 
decision, by reduced premiums on health insurance subsidized by states). Further, robots 
may be used for nefarious purposes, especially as weapons, to inflict kinetic offline damage.
Two conclusions can be drawn from this. First, the dichotomy between online and offline 
regulation— as a general rule— is epistemically irrelevant in today’s connected world (with 
connected here meaning the connection between our lived world- realities and internet- 
enabled life- actions).
However, as Indra Spiecker has shown, this can be different for specific categories of 
norms or interferences with rights or public goods, such as interferences with data. As we 
take up multiple roles on the internet, traditional law, often wedded to concepts such as 
protection of the offline consumer and editorial responsibility in pre- internet times, falls 
short. Under the conditions of modern information society, consumers can be produ-
cers, readers can be editors. The function of law of assigning responsibility (and liability) is 
much more difficult under conditions of anonymity, a multiplicity of roles, and geograph-
ical uncertainty.28 Online interferences with data (Informationseingriffe) are special because 
of the legal uncertainty, anonymity of users and data providers, limited legal protection, 
lack of limits regarding the time dimension, and methodology and space of collecting data. 
Interferences with information/ data are different from interferences with other protected 
goods because they are not experienced physically, do not materialize readily, or do not (al-
ways) force behavioral changes.29 A functional normative order of the internet needs to take 
into account the different results that normative interventions in regulatory processes and 
fields may have.
 24 Samuel Greengard, The Internet of Things (Cambridge, MA/ London: MIT Press, 2015).
 25 John Jordan, Robots (Cambridge, MA/ London: MIT Press, 2016).
 26 Jeffrey Pomerantz, Metadata (Cambridge, MA/ London: MIT Press, 2015).
 27 Nayan B. Ruparelia, Cloud Computing (Cambridge, MA/ London: MIT Press, 2016).
 28 Cf. Indra Spiecker gen. Döhmann, “Online- und Offline- Nutzung von Daten: Einige Überlegungen zum 
Umgang mit Informationen im Internetzeitalter,” in Michael Bartsch und Robert G. Briner (eds.), DGRI- Jahrbuch 
(Cologne: Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt), 39– 53 (39).
 29 Ibid., 42.
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In order to overcome the online/ offline dichotomy, Mireille Hildebrandt developed 
the notion of “onlife,”30 arguing that the “current life world can no longer be described by 
dichotomizing online and offline.” Therefore onlife “singles out the fact that our ‘real’ life is 
neither on- nor offline but partakes in a new kind of world [ . . . ].”31
The second conclusion is that the normative order of the, using Hildebrandt’s new 
coinage, onlife world seems too artificial to make intuitive sense. Different normative or-
ders exist with regard to different social fields, the internal differentiation of world society 
allows for many diverging, converging, overlapping, and conflicting normative orders. 
There is, however, substantial added value in identifying the normative forces shaping the 
use and development of the internet and framing them within a normative order of the in-
ternet. This is this chapter’s goal.
But first, let us discuss the regulatory focus of the normative order of the internet. A nor-
mative order of the internet can therefore definitely not be a normative order of only the 
internet. If the limits of the order are thus difficult to fathom, does this mean that the whole 
approach followed in this study is flawed? Decidedly not. As smart fridges, robots, meta-
data, and clouds show, one can differentiate between norms related to the order of the in-
ternet and norms related to unconnected regulatory fields.
What is essential, for the purpose of this study, is that there must be a (1) material (non- 
trivial) connection between the regulatory question or the norm and the internet as a 
network of networks (2) in the normative sense. As an example, let us return to fridges: con-
ducting online research for a new fridge meets the first criterion (use of the internet) but, as 
the use is merely a means to an end, this does not meet the second. The use of the internet 
is trivial (within the context of this study). If potential buyers, however, encounter a site on 
which the data protection practices and the protocols used by an online- enabled “smart 
fridge” are discussed, perhaps even its protection from being hacked and conscripted into 
botnets,32 they engage with norms belonging to the normative order of the internet as con-
ceived of here. Regulatory, security- related questions regarding the internet of things, in-
cluding smart fridges, are part of the normative order of the internet. There is a non- trivial 
connection that is also normative.
Buying a robot is another example. The contract to buy a robot is based in civil law and 
civil law questions of contractual obligations (such as paying schedule and risk transferral 
upon receipt) do not engage the normative order of the internet as presently understood. 
However, robots work on the basis of artificial intelligence, which is only implementable 
through machine learning by algorithms based on big data sets. All these aspects of robot 
construction and programming, including norms and guidelines for behavioral standards 
of robots, are (1) materially connected to the internet in a (2) normative sense. The norms 
regulating these aspects are thus norms of the normative order of the internet.
The internet, in this context, is notably not only the network of networks, but rather a 
notion that encompasses both the infrastructure necessary to use the network of networks 
and also digitality in a broader sense. With Stalder, digitality can be understood as refer-
ring to “relations based on the infrastructure of digital networks in the production, use and 
 30 Mireille Hildebrandt, Smart Technologies and the End(s) of Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2015), 42.
 31 Ibid.
 32 As happens with regularity, just see Eric Limer, “How Hackers Wrecked the Internet Using DVRs and 
Webcams,” Popular Mechanics, October 21, 2016, https:// www.popularmechanics.com/ technology/ infrastruc-
ture/ a23504/ mirai- botnet- internet- of- things- ddos- attack.
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transformation of material and immaterial goods and constitution and coordination of 
individuals and collective action.”33 The normative order of the internet could therefore also 
be called the normative order of digitality, but “internet,” read as encompassing digitality 
for the purposes of this study, is more broadly accepted and thus more intuitive.
6.2 The Nomos of the Internet
Importantly, the normative order of the internet is not conceived of as a replacement of any 
other order or legal systems. Rather, it complements them by structuring, contextualizing, 
legitimizing existing norms and offering a frame and a space for their critique and contes-
tation. In normatively challenging times, with states reconfiguring their sovereignty over 
the internet and its physical artifacts, with private actors pushing toward self- regulation 
through private law and its enforcement, and with a growing body of transnational reg-
ulatory arrangements of different normative density and breadth, the normative order of 
the internet can be used as a theoretical structure, a model of, with, and for norms that ex-
plains, justifies, and predicts normatively relevant behavior with a material connection to 
the internet.
The normative order of the internet is an innovative way of normatively perceiving and 
regulating social interactions with regard to the internet. Norms relevant for the order on-
line are perceived according to meta- norms to be presented and legitimized in the following 
section and, through this perception, included within the order norms.34 This brings us to 
the nomos of the internet. The concept, as used here, denotes a meta- order of the complex 
normative space of the internet.
This nomos of the internet constitutes the normative order of the internet. Norms par-
taking in the normative order of the internet are norms of the internet’s nomos. This nomos, 
as presently understood, is neither purely a taxis nor a kosmos: neither a purely artificial 
normative order nor a necessary natural order.35 The nomos of the internet, as configured 
in, and constituting, its normative order, combines elements of ordering ex material neces-
sity and of principle- based ordering. It further appears as an argumentative suprastructure 
(or meta- narrative) that frames the development of the normative order of the internet. 
While there is no single decision or new norm that is determinative of the beginning of the 
“turn” to nomos, the solidification of the normative approach to the internet, through prin-
ciples and processes, allows us to determine that such a turn is upon us.
By positing that the nomos of the internet configures the normative order of the internet, 
this study makes the case that the nomos of the internet is more than the sum of norms it is 
constituted of, a legal Lebenswelt of sorts. This approach was first taken by Robert M. Cover, 
who, in a 1983 article, introduced the notion of a nomos having a connected narrative. “We 
inhabit a nomos,” he writes, “a normative universe. We constantly create and maintain a 
world of right and wrong, of lawful and unlawful, of valid and void.” But rules form only a 
 33 Felix Stalder, Kultur der Digitalität (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2016), 18.
 34 This is no different from modern philosophy and modern art, which does not strive to make the objec-
tively “there” viewable, but rather denies the existence of the objective view and relies on, and glorifies, subjective 
impression.
 35 See for this usage: Thalin Zarmanian, “Ordnung und Ortung/ Order and localisation,” in Stephen Legg (ed.), 
Spatiality, Sovereignty and Carl Schmitt (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), 291– 297 (295).
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small part of the “normative universe that ought to claim our attention.” Apart from the set 
of legal institutions and prescriptions collectively called nomos, exists a narrative to “locate 
it and to give it meaning”: “[f] or every constitution there is an epic, for each Decalogue a 
scripture.”36
These normative poetics become important when we take Cover seriously. He writes that 
“each prescription is insistent in its demand to be located in discourse— to be supplied with 
history and destiny, beginning and end, explanation and purpose [and] every narrative is 
insistent in its demand for its prescriptive point, its moral.”37 With regard to the normative 
order of the internet this can be read as affirming, from a different perspective, a point made 
earlier in this study, namely that norms in order to be legitimate need to be consonant with 
the normative order of the internet and that a narrative’s “moral” is conceptually close to 
the “regulatory purpose” of the online order (or one of its purposes), thus the legitimating 
“story” or “stories” of the normative order of the internet.
Conceiving of the normative order of the internet, as configured by the nomos, is of epi-
stemic value in a different way as well: as Cover writes, the nomos is a concept requiring no 
formal authority, no state. The “creation of legal meaning,” Cover calls the process “juris-
genesis,” is a process distinct from the formalized process of creating laws. Legal meaning 
is created by applying laws in context “through an essentially cultural medium.”38 This is of 
course a conception of normativity premised upon a cultural approach. But even without 
adopting Cover’s approach pro toto, the insight is important that we can (and have to) dis-
tinguish between normative processes leading to norms and their application.
Using Cover’s concept of jurisgenesis as a conceptual lens allows us to recognize, for ex-
ample, that within the nomos any norms/ actor interaction that has an observable result, 
and be it the assurance of a right or the confirmation of a prescription, can be normatively 
relevant (thus creating “legal meaning”). It is the intrasocietal processes of applying norms, 
contesting them, and changing them that Cover refers to when he speaks about this act of 
creating legal meaning, which is part of the nomos. These theoretical approaches to the 
normative order are relevant for the assessment of the normative order’s legitimacy from 
the perspective of the participant, the normative actor. They matter therefore for the pre-
sent chapter. To illustrate the multifaceted nature of an act of jurisgenesis, we can employ 
a Platonion distinction: depending on the perspective of the normative actor, any legal de-
cision taken by them can be one of epistēmē (knowledgful, conscious legal value- creating), 
one of doxa (based on common understanding without deeper reflection but with a sense of 
membership in a normative community), or one of technē (when the decision is automatic 
and represents unreflected practice).
This study will return to the role of narratives as instruments to gauge the legitimacy of 
the normative order of the internet below.39 What readers should take with them at this 
stage is the dual nature of the nomos of the internet. The “richness of the nomos,” as Cover 
calls it, marks the normative order in which the nomos is located and which it helps to con-
stitute. The nomos of the internet with its “varied and complex materials” helps establish 
“paradigms for dedication, acquiescence, contradiction, and resistance.”40
 36 Robert M. Cover, “The Supreme Court, 1982 Term— Foreword. Nomos and Narrative,” Harvard Law Review 
97 (1983) 4, 1– 68 (4) (notes omitted).
 37 Ibid., 5.
 38 Ibid., 30.
 39 See 6.6.
 40 Cover (1983), 9– 10.
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6.3 Normativity of the Order
6.3.1 Explicit and Implicit Normativity
Normativity in the law of computer culture, in the digital condition, has a performative di-
mension: it performs a break with traditional concepts of normative hierarchy. There is no 
stringent separation of, and evaluation of, legal sources based on their origin.41 Rather than 
the origin of norms or the identity of the norm- creators, two dimensions of normativity 
stratify the norms of the online order. With Vesting this study understands modern law as a 
“network of constituted, explicit legal norms [Rechtsnormen] on the one hand and an insti-
tuted, partially implicit normativity on the other hand.” This understanding makes clear 
why the normative texts (the norms) cannot be separated from the “cultural texts” (which 
need not be written texts), influencing the conditions of implicit normativity. Vesting spe-
cifically refers to declarations of rights that— as documents with constitutional qualities— 
share an especially strong connection to the period, place, and practices of and at their 
adoption, but the point is equally valid with regard to norms generally.42
6.3.2  Constitutionalization
We have addressed constitutionalization of the internet before.43 Societal constitutionaliza-
tion processes with the normative order of the internet lead to stabilization of central prin-
ciples of the normative order. The normative order of the internet is progressively stabilized 
through these normative developments. The trend of orders to become denser in terms of 
norms and more detailed with regard to the rights and obligations provided, but also to un-
derstand themselves as regulating on an important level a social substratum of society, are 
elements of constitutionalization.
Within the normative order of the internet, elements of Eigenkonstitutionalisierung and 
of Fremdkonstitutionalisierung, of auto- and hetero- constitutionalization, can be observed. 
The key difference is that auto- constitutionalization is premised upon the existence of 
meta- rules, allowing for a system’s self- reflection, while hetero- constitutionalization allows 
for important legitimacy transfers from national constitutions and the implicit recognition 
of them as normatively relevant.44
The hetero- constitutionalization of the normative order of the internet encompasses all 
processes by which national legal orders and the regime of international law influence the 
development of the principles and processes— thus: the norms— of the internet’s normative 
order. The international legal rules relevant for the normative order of the internet have 
already been discussed earlier.45 The relationship of national legal orders to the normative 
order of the internet will be at the center of the next chapter.46 At this stage, it shall suffice to 
say that normatively relevant interactions between international and national legal orders 
 41 Thomas Vesting, Die Medien des Rechts: Computernetzwerke (Weilerswist: Velbrück Wissenschaft, 2015), 112.
 42 Thomas Vesting, Rechtstheorie, 2nd edn. (Munich: Beck, 2015), 11 (translation by the author).
 43 See 5.2.6 and 5.2.8.
 44 See 5.3.1.
 45 See 3.2 and 3.3.
 46 See  chapter 7.
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and the normative order of the internet are evidence of, first, the recognition of the norma-
tive order of the internet, and second, of the normative necessity to stratify this order. While 
certain implicit practices influence the constituted normativity of the normative order of 
the internet, national legal orders and the international law- based order are important 
sources of principles and processes determining the normativity of the normative order of 
the internet.
The techniques of managing interactions between the normative order and national legal 
orders (especially its recognition as a source of a normative tertium— beyond national or 
international law) are based on the online order’s responsivity which allows, as Viellechner 
writes in a study of transnational normativity, “the interweaving of national legal orders, in-
ternational regimes and transnational regulatory arrangements through a newly conceived 
collision law as horizontal constitutional law.”47 This “horizontal constitutional law” is an 
example of hetero- constitutionalization. It is based on the application in a transnational 
context of (national) fundamental and (international) human rights.48 Such an application 
can be considered a “constitutionalizing” “Grund und Grenze” (foundation and limit) of 
transnational regulatory arrangements.49 Through the increasingly detailed process of safe-
guarding human rights in transnational orders, and particularly with regard to digitality, 
national constitutions and the international legal order provide a legitimacy framework for 
transnational normative arrangements and accept them, under certain conditions, as law.50
This acceptance is, in a formal view, the central hetero- constitutional act, and will figure 
prominently in the analysis in the next chapter, as will more recent developments calling 
its centrality into question. These trends include a reduction of the significance of the gate-
keeper function of national (constitutional) law when it comes to non- traditional norms. 
Progressively, as the next chapter will show, norms that belong neither to national nor to 
international legal orders are applied in national courts. They may not be formally accepted 
as law but are normatively relevant. As this study will show, they are best understood with 
a view to the evolution of a normative tertium that is neither part of the first (national) or 
second (international) category of laws. The tertium norms, such as internet standards and 
governance principles, are applicable (if their legal structure enables this) because of rea-
sons other than (only) a national Rechtsanwendungsbefehl.51
This study has addressed auto- constitutionalization (self- constitutionalization) above,52 
so the presentation of this regime- internal normative solidification can be succinct here. 
Unlike hetero- constitutionalization processes, the autonomous regime- internal “thick-
ening” of the norms and normative processes can take place independently of other regimes 
and traditional forces of constitutionalization, such as nation- state norms. The normative 
frame, in which autonomous normative processes take place, is defined by the normative 
order (in casu: of the internet) and, taking up the constituted/ instituted normativity ap-
proach, by instituted practices that solidify into norms.
 47 Lars Viellechner, Transnationalisierung des Rechts (Weilerswist:  Velbrück, 2013), 265 (translation by the 
author).
 48 Ibid., 293.
 49 Ibid., 217– 18.
 50 Ibid., 287. See, on the conditions, below 6.4.
 51 A type of “order,” contained in a law, decided by a democratically legitimated legislative body, for a non- 
national norm to be applied like national law. See 7.5.
 52 See 5.2.5.
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Auto- constitutional tendencies are natural effects of regime- internal demands for in-
creasingly detailed regulation, coupled with a growing disconnection from the princi-
ples and normative processes of non- regime norms. As the ILC’s Fragmentation Report 
put it, this is merely an “adequate response to the complexification of global society.”53 
The challenge of auto- constitutionalization lies less in the development of norms, but 
rather in the necessity to ensure the simultaneous evolution of a law of conflicts that al-
lows regulation of one regime to interact with norms of other regimes horizontally, and 
vertically with national and international legal norms stratified in traditional normative 
hierarchies.
Transnational regulatory arrangements, such as the normative order of the internet, exist 
largely independently of traditional normative hierarchies.54 Alternatively, we therefore 
have to identify, within these self- constitutionalizing orders, foundations for regime stabili-
zation, self- affirmation, and plurality management.55
6.3.3  Localization
The normative order of the internet is not relegated to a particular social sphere, such as the 
public or the private sphere, or a particular system of law, such as public law or private law. 
As has been hypothesized and shown, it includes international and national legal norm, 
and the broad category of tertium norms— that is transnational regulatory arrangements, 
code, and standards. Its norms are (usually) part of either international or national legal 
systems and do not cease to be so when qualified as norms within the normative order of 
the internet. The order, as discussed earlier, encompasses norms that evidence a material 
(non- trivial) and normative connection between the regulatory question(s) or norm(s) and 
the internet as a network of networks.
The normative order of the internet is localizable only as a specific form of the internet’s 
hypertext, namely not the successful links (taking those who click on one to another web-
site or localized piece of internet content, such as media files)56 but rather the lesser- known 
StretchText, a technological feature that has been largely ignored. With StretchText, gaps be-
tween information online are clickable and they then reveal additional layers of informa-
tion. Content providers can thus establish a hierarchy of information encouraging readers 
to click on gaps to “show more,” when more information is required.57 Similarly, the norma-
tive order of the internet is an order that, given its layered nature, contains multiple levels of 
complexity. Prima facie only principles may be observable, especially internet governance- 
related principles, and among them chiefly human rights- oriented norms. However, once 
“users” (normative actors) “click on the gap” (apply the norms), new layers of normative 
complexity unfold that allow for a more nuanced regulation.
 53 Ibid.
 54 Gunther Teubner, “Globale Bukowina. Zur Emergenz eines transnationalen Rechtspluralismus,” 
Rechtshistorisches Journal 15 (1996) 255 ff.
 55 See 6.4.
 56 Theodor H. Nelson, “Brief Words on the Hypertext,” January 23, 1967, https:// archive.org/ details/ 
SelectedPapers1977/ mode/ 2up.
 57 George P. Landow, Hypertext 3.0:  Critical Theory and New Media in an Era of Globalization, 3rd edn. 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 95.
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6.4 Legality of the Order
6.4.1 The Normative Order of the Internet as a Legal Order
No one would doubt that Germany’s liberal and democratic basic social order, the 
freiheitlich- demokratische Grundordnung, is based on law, in particular constitutional law. 
The “normative order” of Germany is a proudly and profoundly legal order. Yet within 
the German legal system, there exist norms of very different character, from non- binding 
norms to DIN (Deutsche Industrienorm; German Industrial Norm) standards that exercise 
normative pull through epistemic authority,58 from laws to fundamental rights guarantees 
enshrined in the Fundamental Law (Grundgesetz). The existence of non- binding norms 
within a normative system does not detract from the latter’s qualification as a legal system 
or order.
National legal systems consist primarily of formally binding norms within a Kelsenian 
Stufenbau59 and only comparatively few non- binding norms. This is particularly true for 
countries with strong protection of the rule of law, as the principle of legality prescribes 
that any state action needs to be based on law. This discourages normative innovation 
but safeguards fundamental rights, which is a valid trade- off given the conflicting inter-
ests involved. In the normative order of the internet the inverse is observable. There are, 
depending on how one approaches the definition of the order, many different normative 
instruments present: from national laws and international regulations to transnational reg-
ulatory arrangements, the majority of which, especially in the third category, are not for-
mally binding norms (they do, however, exercise a normative pull toward adherence, as will 
be described below60).
When introducing the concept of “normative order,” this study has referred to the ap-
proach by Forst and Günther, who see norms less in terms of legality grounded in formality 
and more in terms of functionality. Norms, to them, are “practical reasons to act [con-
taining] the claim of being binding upon the addressee.”61 These claims are narrativized and 
contextualized, habituated in practices, and contained in customs (implicit, instituted nor-
mativity) and conventions as social contracts (implicit again) or conventions as treaties (ex-
plicit constituted normativity). The claims of being binding are thus not legal in that they are 
premised upon a legal procedure to ensure compliance, but nevertheless exercise, through 
their claim to be binding, a certain compliance pull (if they meet the legitimacy criteria dis-
cussed below, including consonance with the order’s normative goal62).
But norms in the context of this study are legal in the sense that they shape and frame the 
legal space (Rechtsraum), contribute to ensuring legal peace (Rechtsfrieden), provide for a 
law of collision (Kollisionsrecht) between applicable regimes and are treated by and large as 
legal norms or at least legality heuristics which ease decisionary burdens.
 58 Though some are referred to in laws and thus are part, by reference, of the legal system.
 59 Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (1934), 21, (edited by Matthias Jestaedt) Reine Rechtslehre. Studienausgabe der 
1. Auflage 1934, (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 33.
 60 See 6.6.
 61 Rainer Forst und Klaus Günther, “Die Herausbildung normativer Ordnungen. Zur Idee eines inter-
disziplinären Forschungsprogramms,” in Rainer Forst und Klaus Günther (eds.), Die Herausbildung normativer 
Ordnungen. Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven (Frankfurt/ New York: Campus, 2011), 11– 30 (16).
 62 See 6.6.
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Taken together, the norms constituting the normative order of the internet (those norma-
tively relevant for the internet and digitality in a materially relevant way) form a multilay-
ered legal order. This does not mean that they are centrally ordered or hierarchically layered. 
A normative order is, this has been discussed above but merits to be reiterated here,63 a 
“complex of norms and values with which the fundamental structure of a society (or the 
structure of international, supranational, or transnational relationships) is legitimated, in 
particular the exercise of political authority and the distribution of basic goods.”64 These 
are key legal functions. At the same time, the normative order of the internet is more than a 
purely legal order as it relies on norms and processes that cannot easily be conceptualized in 
the language, logic, and legitimacy structures of traditional legal systems.
The order extends to regulating and legitimating (or providing the normative tools for 
contestation of) the exercise of private or public authority and the distribution of basic 
goods in relation to the use and development of the internet by multiple actors, including 
internet access and access to internet content. It enshrines a rule of norms, the set of norms 
and normative expectations that shape the use and development of the internet, which lead 
to a rule of law.
The measure of legality of the normative order cannot be the “political constitution” (of 
states), against which it would fall short (but so does the international legal order). Rather 
the normative yardstick must be the normative order of the internet’s Eigenverfassung,65 
as instituted by practices, and auto- and hetero- constituted. Norms from the third cate-
gory (e.g. informal transnational regulatory arrangements and internet standards) may 
not be legal norms in traditional national or international legal approaches (they are the 
tertium), but they can be considered to have some or most of the qualities of legal norms 
(Rechtsnormqualität), if they meet internal, regime- specific transnationalized and objective 
human rights- based checks and balances as to their production, content, and application.66
This is why internet standards, contained for example in IETF’s Request for 
Comments series,67 are both legitimate as instruments of normative ordering and have 
Rechtsnormqualität. They may not be Rechtsnormen, but this is of little import, as they have 
both the procedural pedigree and normative content that gives them the potential to be 
norms.68 This calls to mind Möllers’ approach to norms as “positively marked possibilities,” 
pointing to a “possible situation” or a “possible event” to be realized.69
 63 See 1.2.3.
 64 Rainer Forst und Klaus Günther, “Die Herausbildung normativer Ordnungen. Zur Idee eines inter-
disziplinären Forschungsprogramms,” in Rainer Forst und Klaus Günther (eds.), Die Herausbildung normativer 
Ordnungen. Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven (Frankfurt/ New York: Campus, 2011), 11– 30 (15): “Unter ‘normativer 
Ordnung’ verstehen wir den Komplex von Normen und Werten, mit denen die Grundstruktur einer Gesellschaft 
(beziehungsweise die Struktur inter- bzw. supra- oder transnationaler Verhältnisse) legitimiert wird, namentlich 
die Ausübung politischer Autorität und die Verteilung von elementaren Lebens- und Grundgütern” (translation 
by the author).
 65 Teubner, Gunther, “Globale Zivilverfassungen:  Alternativen zur staatszentrierten Verfassungstheorie,” 
ZaÖRV 63 (2003), 1– 28 (22).
 66 Vesting, Die Medien des Rechts: Computernetzwerke (2015),144.
 67 See 2.4.2.
 68 On the importance of processes, see Thomas Vesting, “Instituierte und konstituierte Normativität. 
Prozeduralisierung und multi- normative Systeme,” in Tatjana Sheplyakova (ed.), Prozeduralisierung des Rechts 
(Tübingen: Mohr, 2018), 101– 122.
 69 Christoph Möllers, Die Möglichkeit der Normen (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2016), 13– 14: “Normen sind [ . . . ] als 
positiv markierte Möglichkeiten zu verstehen. Normen verweisen auf einen möglichen Zustand oder ein mögli-
ches Ereignis. [ . . . ] Die positive Markierung einer Möglichkeit zeigt an, dass diese sich verwirklichen soll” (trans-
lation by the author).
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6.4.2 Norms of the Order
To which norms does the above apply? What are the norms of the normative order of the in-
ternet? As defined above, for a norm to be part of the normative order of the internet, there 
must be a (1) material (non- trivial) and a (2) normative (not merely factual) connection 
between the norm and the internet as a network of networks.
Civil law provisions regarding payment in a contract for internet access with an Internet 
Service Provider are norms that are connected to the internet, but in a trivial way. However, 
norms within that contract that would allow the Internet Service Provider to reduce con-
nection speeds for downloading certain online content are non- trivial and normatively rel-
evant for regulating digitality. Courts can decide whether payment is due on a contract by 
looking at the contract and past civil jurisprudence. When assessing norms related to net 
neutrality and preferential treatment of specific content, however, they have to enter the 
normative force field conceptualized in the normative order of the internet to understand 
holistically the genesis and importance of these norms both materially and normatively 
connected to the internet.
Just as it is virtually impossible (and also of little epistemic value) to enumerate all appli-
cable norms within a national legal order, stratifying all norms of the normative order will 
not be attempted here. But some order is necessary for the norms of the order.
Norms within the normative order, which are both materially and normatively con-
nected to regulating digitality, can be distinguished according to their normative character 
as formally binding or non- binding (materially, this bears repetition: they have effects inde-
pendent of their formal genesis). Möllers calls non- binding norms “non- norms”70 or, more 
convincingly, cognitive norms. A different, more often used term that avoids shouldering 
the metaphysical burden of the concept of cognition would be soft law. Soft law norms can 
be prescriptive, they are just not formally binding. They have normative implications and 
are, indeed, often a preferred tool of normation in normative arenas where multiple actors 
dominate or where timely regulation is important. Soft law norms have strong orientative 
value independent of any formal obligations, especially because already in the act of their 
adoption lies a certain recognition of their content by the normative actor.71
On the basis of their origin, we can distinguish between norms of national law, of interna-
tional law, and other sources, be they private companies or internet standard- setter. These 
norms of the normative tertium will become particularly important in the next chapter, as 
their integration into national and international regulatory frameworks is of special interest 
to this study (and where it will be shown that a normative tertium datur). The normative 
tertium consists of the norms of transnational regulatory arrangements impacting the in-
ternet, from internet standards to terms of service of internet companies, from informal 
agreements between Internet Exchange Points to guidance on non- discriminatory use of 
algorithms in selecting advertisements shown to social network users or rules on the use 
of artificial intelligence in cloud server storage optimization. Their normative remit is vast. 
While they become visible primarily in cases of normative conflicts, their existence needs to 
be acknowledged.
 70 Which seems strange because the norms need not be binding to become norms, especially as he defines them 
as positively marked possibilities: as pointing to an achievable, changeable status post quod. See ibid., 139.
 71 Ibid.
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To name but one example: certain coding practices, such as privacy by design, are ex-
plicitly normative and thus form part of the normative order’s normativity, while others 
engaging questions of formal logic— that is the techné of using algorithms— may not. 
They are merely factual tools of coding, instantiated in lines of code without material 
normativity.
We can also differentiate norms within the normative order of the internet by their re-
spective “legislator.” Possible actors within the normative order of the internet include— 
as by the Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG)— “Governments, the private 
sector and civil society.”72 Governments can also act via international or regional organiza-
tions. Companies can develop norms individually (e.g. terms of service) or collectively (e.g. 
industry standards). Civil society groups can become norm entrepreneurs by themselves 
or as a collective. Further, any configuration between the actors is possible. Indeed, reli-
ance on multiple actors call for their inclusion in all stages of the normative process. “[I] n 
their respective roles,” they develop and apply, as per the accepted definition of the WGIG, 
“shared principles, norms, rules, decision- making procedures, and programmes that shape 
the evolution and use of the internet.”73 For the purposes of the normative order, all these 
normative instruments can be understood as norms sensu latiore. The norms of the norma-
tive order of the internet have substantially enriched the legal vocabulary leading to, what 
Habermas terms, an evolution of the composition of the legal medium (Rechtsmedium)74 
and, following Vesting, of the media of law (Die Medien des Rechts75).
National Laws. National laws regulate the frame of internet use by anyone under a 
state’s jurisdiction and control even though, as previously demonstrated,76 the classic state- 
oriented law paradigms of norm completeness (all relevant social interactions are regulated 
by national norms) and closed legitimacy loops (all existing norms have been democratically 
legitimated and can provide for further normative developments imbued with the same le-
gitimacy) are challenged by globalization and deterritorialization through the use of ICTs. 
Importantly, however, states and their legal systems do not fade away: “the virtual space 
does not mean [ . . . ] the end of the sovereign constitutional state.”77 States continue to fulfill 
(ideally) a constitutional and international law- based duty in protecting their citizens and 
their societies, including societal values, such as openness, concepts, such as publicness, 
and systems of public opinion, such as threats emanating from new technologies and from 
social change that these technological advances engender.
 72 Report of the Working Group on Internet Governance (2005), http:// www.wgig.org/ docs/ WGIGREPORT.
pdf.
 73 Ibid.
 74 Jürgen Habermas, “Im Sog der Technokratie, in Jürgen Habermas, Im Sog der Technokratie: kleine politische 
Schriften XII (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2013), 7: “Heute zeigen sich auch auf internationaler Ebene Anzeichen für 
eine Rationalisierung der staatlichen Herrschaftsausübung, welche einer Veränderung in der Komposition des 
Rechtsmediums entspricht.”
 75 The titular notion of Vesting’s tetralogy is “Die Medien des Rechts.” See Thomas Vesting, Die 
Medien des Rechts:  Sprache (Weilerswist:  Velbrück Wissenschaft, 2011); Thomas Vesting, Die Medien des 
Rechts: Schrift (Weilerswist: Velbrück Wissenschaft, 2011); Thomas Vesting, Die Medien des Rechts: Buchdruck 
(Weilerswist: Velbrück Wissenschaft, 2013); and Vesting, Die Medien des Rechts: Computernetzwerke (2015). See, 
in particular, Vesting, , Die Medien des Rechts: Computernetzwerke (2015), passim and 83– 4. For an English version 
of the tetralogy, see Thomas Vesting, Legal Theory and the Media of Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2018).
 76 See, 2.4.2.
 77 Stephan Hobe, “Cyberspace— der virtuelle Raum,” in Josef Isensee, Paul Kirchhof, et al. (eds.), Handbuch des 
Staatsrechts, Band XI: Internationale Bezüge, 3rd edn. (2013), § 231, no. 44 (“Der virtuelle Raum bedeutet [ . . . ] 
nicht das Ende des souveränen Verfassungsstaates”) (translation by the author).
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Looking closely at national norms, it is highly difficult to emerge with a clear picture. It is 
only with more distance that the mosaic of rules (“Regelungsmosaik”78) to ensure rights and 
freedoms becomes visible. National norms that are materially connected in a normatively 
relevant way to the internet can be considered to form part of the normative order of the in-
ternet. Given the number of national legal systems, it does not make sense to undertake ex-
ercises of enumeration. What is notable, however, is that with most technology, periods of 
lax regulation turn into phases of more intensive regulatory activity leading to substantially 
more granular norms. This, in turn, can lead to both material and jurisdictional conflicts, 
especially as states have reemerged as territorial data controllers and have acted, through 
data localizations laws, against forces of deterritorialization through the use of ICTs.79
International Law. Reiterating a point made earlier: For a norm to be part of the nor-
mative order of the internet, there must be a (1) material (non- trivial) and (2) normative 
(not merely factual) connection between the norm and the internet as a network of net-
works. This study earlier (and passim) showed the applicability of international law to the 
internet.80 Painting with broad brushes, international law protects the security, stability, 
robustness, resilience, and functionality of the internet, thus:  its integrity as a matter of 
common interest.81
The applicability of international law to the internet, as a matter of principle, has not been 
seriously questioned in some time.82 This WSIS consensus83 lasted and allowed the UN’s 
GGE to confirm, in its 2015 report,84 that international law, the UN Charter, and interna-
tional legal principles apply to the internet.85 As the international community aspires to 
regulate the internet in a peaceful manner “for the common good of mankind,”86 the report 
continues, “[t] he adherence by States to international law, in particular their Charter obli-
gations, is an essential framework for their actions in their use of ICTs and to promote an 
open, secure, stable, accessible and peaceful ICT environment.”87
What are the norms of international law that form part of the normative order of the in-
ternet? Since international law as a whole applies to the internet, one could argue that all 
international legal rules can be considered part of its normative order. However, this would 
ignore the dual materiality and normativity condition set for the relation of a norm’s content 
and the internet. Rather, looking at the definition of the GGE cited in the paragraph above 
we can see that any norm regulating actors in their use of ICTs and in their policies toward 
safeguarding internet integrity are part of the normative order of the internet’s “interna-
tional law” branch.
 78 Wolfgang Hoffmann- Riem, “Freiheitsschutz in den globalen Kommunikationsinfrastrukturen,” JZ 69 (2014) 
2, 53– 63 (63).
 79 Lars Viellechner, Transnationalisierung des Rechts (Weilerswist: Velbrück, 2013), 99. On ICANN’s domain 
regime, see ibid., 127 et seq.
 80 See 3.2.
 81 See 2.3.
 82 The last larger project with this goal seems to have been Jack L. Goldsmith and Tim Wu, Who Controls The 
Internet? Illusions of a Borderless World (Cambridge: CUP, 2006), xii.
 83 World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), Declaration of Principles, WSIS- 03/ GENEVA/ DOC/ 4- E, 
12 December 2003, para. 1.
 84 United Nations, Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of 
International Security, Report of the Secretary General, A/ 70/ 174 of July 22, 2015, http:// www.un.org/ ga/ search/ 
view_ doc.asp?symbol=A/ 70/ 174 (“GGE report (2015)”).
 85 Ibid., para. 26.
 86 Ibid., para. 28 (c).
 87 Ibid., para. 25.
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This study has explained earlier88 which rules of international law are especially rele-
vant for the internet. It is, broadly speaking, the norms discussed there— ius cogens norms, 
treaty- based norms, customary rules, general principles, soft law— that also form part of 
the normative order of the internet. It is important to note that international legal norms do 
not only influence state behavior even though their primary regulatory objects (and sub-
jects) are states.89 International law- based rules within the normative order of the internet 
impact the behavior of all three actor groups:90
 – individuals are empowered by normative commitments to ensuring that they can exer-
cise their human rights online; conversely, they are obliged not to violate international 
rules prohibiting, for example, online calls to genocide or the propagation of qualified 
hate speech;
 – states are allocated duties (e.g. regarding the internet’s stability) and given certain rights 
based on a technology- sensitive reading of sovereignty; they are also obliged, within 
the “protect” dimension of their human rights obligations to adopt a legal framework 
which requires business entities to exercise “human rights due diligence”;91
 – private sector companies engaged in internet- related business models should respect 
the internationally recognized human rights for users and affected parties, independ-
ently of a state’s ability or willingness to fulfill its own obligations,92 by, for instance, 
employing safeguards relative to the public service value they provide with the inten-
sity of the precautions the company should implement relative to the potential impact 
and damage and the importance of their service for the exercise of human rights.93
Other Normative Arrangements: The Normative Tertium. The internet is a space full of 
norms. Some form part of the normative order of the internet, others are developed and ap-
plied decentrally and unsystematically or fade away, when left unapplied. Norms that origi-
nate neither from states nor within the international legal order are of special interest in this 
study. It is their role as instantiations of a normative tertium (next to national and interna-
tional law) that requires their assessment in terms of legality and legitimacy, especially since 
their normative role is substantial. With regard to actual internet use, it is these norms of 
the normative tertium that are most often encountered. Admittedly, being able to go online 
is premised largely upon “invisible” (functioning) national and international rules (which 
remain both essential and important), but the lived “normative experience” is structured 
overwhelmingly by normative arrangements that are neither specifically national nor inter-
national, but rather multifaceted and transnational.
The normative tertium includes technical “rules of the road,” published in RFCs and de-
veloped bottom- up on mailing lists of engineers. It includes the large normative field of 
 88 See 3.3.
 89 Cf. Ian Hurd, How to Do Things with International Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017).
 90 See 3.2.
 91 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 24 on State obligations under 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the context of business activities, UN Doc. 
E/ C.12/ GC/ 24 of 10 August 2017, para. 16.
 92 Council of Europe, Recommendation CM/ Rec(2018)2 of the Committee of Ministers to member states 
on the roles and responsibilities of internet intermediaries, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 7 March 
2018, PP 6.
 93 Ibid., para. 2.1.2.
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norms set by companies that structure the usage and experience in privately owned on-
line communication spaces, including terms of service, user standards, and behavioral 
guidelines. True, these norms are situated in, bordered by, and normatively shaped by na-
tional and international rules. Courts may declare inapplicable certain terms of service.94 
International law may influence the formulation of hate speech- related community guide-
lines of a social network. Yet this does not change the fundamental role of norms of the 
tertium. Without their systematization bringing any added epistemic value, they perform, 
in their aggregate, an important internal “constitutionalization” function by stabilizing 
expectations.95
When stabilized expectations are particularly strong, internet governance principles 
emerge. They are part of the normative tertium and vary, in their normative character, be-
tween internet- specific restatements of principles of international law, soft law, and expres-
sions of desired policy by the norm entrepreneur.
6.4.3 Normative Processes
Process as Product. The normative order of the internet encompasses not only substantive 
norms (and provides for their systematization) and rules regarding their interaction, but 
also norm- generative processes. This is important because within the normative order of 
the internet, as Finnemore and Hollis have argued, “in important ways, the process is the 
product when it comes to cybernorms.”96 Though the authors focus on cybernorms, their 
conclusion ties in with the process- orientation regarding internet (governance) norms 
more generally.
In the NetMundial Principles contained in the NetMundial Multistakeholder Statement 
(2014),97 for example, internet governance process principles are given a special place. 
They clarify how internet governance should be practiced: through democratic processes 
involving all actors and ensuring the meaningful and accountable participation of all, 
through processes that are open, participative, and consensus- driven, transparent and ac-
countable, inclusive, and equitable. Institutions and processes connected with the internet 
should be inclusive and open to all.
The internet governance process is, this study submits, only part of the normative product 
in the sense of Finnemore and Hollis. Yet processes matter also in an actor- oriented reading 
of the online order. Consider how Teubner differentiates between three constitutional or-
ders: nation states, transnational regimes, and indigenous groups. The constitutional orders 
of nation states are embedded in national legal systems. The constitutions of transnational 
regimes are focused on a “functionally differentiated sector of world society and thus 
 94 Cf., among many recent cases, Landgericht Berlin, Az 16 O 341/ 15, February 12, 2018 (declaring illegal some 
clauses in Facebook’s terms of service (AGBs), including one for the Facebook mobile app, that activated by default 
location- based services and allowed chat partners to see one’s location without previous explicit agreement by 
the user).
 95 See  chapter 7.
 96 Martha Finnemore and Duncan B. Hollis, “Constructing Norms for Global Cybersecurity,” AJIL 110 (2016), 
425– 79 (477) (emphasis added).
 97 NetMundial Multistakeholder Statement, Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet 
Governance, April 23– 24, 2014, São Paulo, Brazil, http:// netmundial.br/ wp- content/ uploads/ 2014/ 04/ 
NETmundial- Multistakeholder- Document.pdf .
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constitute a ‘self- contained regime,’ reflecting the internal rationality [Eigenrationalität] 
of the societal sector connected to the regime.”98 However, Teubner cautions that these 
Regimeverfassungen— being self- contained— are without a firm grounding in the political 
processes of society as a whole. In this light, the normative order of the internet is definitely 
not a Regimeverfassung. The normative order of the internet does not regulate any differen-
tiated sector of society and thus cannot constitute a self- contained regime. Rather, it is con-
nected to political processes oriented toward the “Gemeinwohl,” the common good.99 (But 
it can be contended that Teubner’s definition of a Regimeverfassung is unnecessarily strict.)
Teubner’s third category of normative orders, indigenous normative orders, are “much 
stronger embedded in the society as a whole than the law of nation states.” They appear 
mainly in societies or parts of society without a functionally differentiated legal system and 
their norms are closely linked with “religious, political and economic systems of interaction 
and those focused on traditional knowledge.”100
The normative order of the internet can hardly be considered an indigenous norma-
tive order, even if the early Barlowian discourse on internet freedom, anarchy and internet 
exceptionalism would seem to lend itself to precisely this argument as would notions of 
“digital natives;” and so would the reference to interactions between traditional knowledge 
(programming skills, codes, and practices later enshrined in RFCs) and the political eco-
system. But many aspects of the internet are regulated by functionally differentiated legal 
systems. What is missing is the overarching normative order to connect the legal systems 
and provide for principles to manage the interfaces between the orders: the normative order 
of the internet. This order must be able to develop through regime- internal change. This is 
only possible if the processes of norm production are also loci of normative learning.
Processes as Loci of Normative Learning. One such approch is “global experimen-
talist governance,” developed by de Búrca, Keohane, and Sabel. This approach includes in-
itial actor reflection, articulation of a framework understanding with open- ended goals, 
implementation of these goals, feedback provided from local contexts, and periodic re- 
evaluations of the goals and practices.101
Such a “learning”- oriented normative system is in constant flux and highly responsive to 
factual and political developments, while respecting subsidiarity. As the normative order 
of the internet cannot be based on such a model in light of its uncertain outcomes and the 
unresolved problem of avoiding special interest- capture, such a “learning and adapting” ap-
proach to norm development can be useful in closely monitored suborders. Unlike Ostrom’s 
governing the commons model,102 the experimental governance model does not preclude a 
center as information pooler and peer evaluation organizer.103
The scholars behind global experimentalist governance admit themselves that their “in-
stitutionalized process of participatory and multilevel collective problem solving, in which 
the problems (and the means of addressing them) are framed in an open- ended way and 
 98 Gunther Teubner, Verfassungsfragmente. Gesellschaftlicher Konstitutionalismus in der Globalisierung 
(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2012), 255 (translation by the author).
 99 Ibid.
 100 Ibid., 256.
 101 Gráinne De Búrca, Robert O. Keohane, and Charles Sabel, “Global Experimentalist Governance,” British 
Journal of Political Science 44 (2014) 3, 477– 86 (479).
 102 Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons (New York: CUP, 1990).
 103 Gráinne De Búrca, Robert O. Keohane, and Charles Sabel, “Global Experimentalist Governance,” British 
Journal of Political Science 44 (2014) 3, 477– 86 (478).
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subjected to periodic revision by various forms of peer review in the light of locally gener-
ated knowledge,” is an ideal- type in the Weberian sense and that actual implementations 
may not come close to the dynamic problem- solving approach.104 The cognitive dimen-
sion of the process is echoed in other novel governance approaches and points to a per-
ceived lack of reflexivity and reform potential based on “learning experiences” within 
traditional legal systems. In this vein, for instance, Calliess and Zumbansen, in their Rough 
Consensus and Running Code approach to transnational law, seek “to acknowledge [ . . . ] 
learning experiences in order to productively integrate them into an enriched concept of 
[ . . . ] governance.”105
Already the Global Cyberspace Framework approach106 attempts to substitute messy ap-
proaches to the normative order of the internet with a model of a multilayer regime com-
posed of polycentric rule- making processes. Distributed internet governance approaches 
go one step further and are characteristic of a distributed proceduralization. They rely on 
highly dynamic normative ad hoc coalitions to issue problem- specific normative solutions. 
Their most interesting character trait is the attempted transfer of properties of internet ar-
chitecture to the internet governance system.
Distributed processes are based on models of non- centralized deliberation, decision- 
making, and implementation of normative solutions.107 The approach suggests a distrib-
uted model of normativity online, based on multi- institutionality that is seen as the final 
evolutionary step in a gradually changing process of norm development including cen-
tralized regulation, the multistakeholder appproach, and devolved national governance 
approaches. Distributed development of internet (governance) norms is based on flexible, 
decentralized “collaborative arrangements for actors and institutions to coordinate collec-
tive action.”108
Based on open governance theory, distributed governance approaches promote inclusion 
of all actors and in particular citizen engagement. In a simulacrum of data packet transfers 
on the internet, distributed governance employs a “routing” function to ensure interopera-
bility of normative responses by collecting and collating them. Distributed approaches are 
also considered to allow for granularity (through localization of finding solutions) and scale 
(through globalization of their implementation).109
Distributed governance so conceived is based on identifying and mapping the issues 
raised, formulating responses, and implementing or enforcing them. Thereafter, a review or 
evaluation period is set.110 To allow normative processes to follow along these steps, “distri-
butionists” favor the creation of roadmaps to guide actors within the so conceived internet 
governance ecosystem in their identification of the nature of the problem, its severity, the 
optimal geographical sphere and the appropriate actors to address the issue, and any preex-
isting framework equipped to deal with the issue.111
 104 Ibid., note 3.
 105 Gralf- Peter Calliess and Peer Zumbansen, Rough Consensus and Running Code. A Theory of Transnational 
Private Law (Oxford/ Portland, OR: Hart, 2012), 247.
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 107 Cf. Stefaan G. Verhulst, Beth S. Noveck, Jillian Raines, and Antony Declercq, “Innovations in Global 
Governance: Toward a Distributed Internet Governance Ecosystem,” GCIG Paper Series No. 5, December 2014, 
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A similar distributed approach was also suggested by the Panel on Global Internet 
Cooperation and Governance Mechanisms (“Ilves” panel),112 which developed a “col-
laborative, decentralized internet governance ecosystem” based on “distributed govern-
ance groups,” a four- step “internet governance process,” and “enablers.” The approach as 
presented is based on the conviction that three fundamental design properties of internet 
architecture— distributed, participatory, layered— should be transferred to the internet 
governance ecoystem.113 A diversity of structures and governance systems should include 
all actors, with the ecosystem comprising local, regional, national, and global layers of gov-
ernance, with the subsidiarity principle in mind.114
The key building blocks of the distributed internet governance ecosystem are the “dis-
tributed governance groups.”115 These are “loosely coupled, collaborative, and mutually- 
dependent groups or organizations and/ or individual experts that come together through 
a set of mutual commitments to address a specific issue.” They are created ad hoc with a 
specific issue in mind and solve the issue “with an outcome consisting of a policy recom-
mendation/ model, a standard, a specification, and/ or a best practice”— and then they may 
“fade away.”
The Ilves report sees several advantages in having short- lived normative actors, in-
cluding: a shift of control away from top- down systems of singular authorities; rapidly coa-
lescing experts acting “at internet speed” on solutions; localization; facilitation of informed 
dialog; and its function as a de- marginalization tool.116 The latter is especially a reflection of 
the substantive basis for the distributed governance groups’ decision- making: they should 
base themselves, according to the Ilves report, on the “NetMundial Principles,” including 
human rights and shared values, the protection of intermediaries, assurances for internet 
architecture principles such as the unified and unfragmented internet space, its security, 
stability, and resilience, its open standards, and its open and distributed architecture.117
Under the Ilves report, the “internet governance process” includes four steps: issue iden-
tification, solution mapping, solution formulation, and solution implementation, with the 
implementation being primarily voluntary— unlike the enforced implementation foreseen 
in the previous approach. However, some solutions may be formalized through “social con-
ventions, regulations, directives, treaties [or] contracts.”118
Finally, the report relies on “enablers”: “enabling information, communication, and em-
powerment mechanisms,” including forums and dialogs, facilitating broad engagement; 
expert communities; and empowering capacity development and toolkits collection pro-
cesses. Though the reconceptualization of governance as distributed governance seems 
prima facie attractive, the socio- legal preconditions allowing for such an approach have 
not yet materialized. The distributed governance theorists, however, make a good point in 
 112 ICANN/ World Economic Forum, Report by the Panel on Global Internet Cooperation and Governance 
Mechanisms, Towards a Collaborative, Decentralized Internet Governance Ecosystem (2014), https:// www.icann.
org/ en/ system/ files/ files/ collaborative- decentralized- ig- ecosystem- 21may14- en.pdf.
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at 5.3.5.
 114 ICANN/ World Economic Forum, Report by the Panel on Global Internet Cooperation and Governance 
Mechanisms, Towards a Collaborative, Decentralized Internet Governance Ecosystem (2014), https:// www.icann.
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showing what kind of preplanned processes could legitimately take the place of the current 
inchoate institutionality of internet governance processes.
Differentiated Processes. Recall Finnemore and Hollis, who continue their process- 
orientation by arguing that an “approach that negotiates only content and ignores norm 
construction and evolution processes will have limited effects.”119 This, of course, does not 
mean turning the process into a subject of fundamental rights protection, which would be 
Teubner’s solution. He elevates cultural processes to subjects of fundamental rights with 
“traditional knowledge itself ” as the subject of fundamental rights in an institutional 
reading.120 Nevertheless, in global legal approaches, fundamental rights need to be “de- 
individualized”121 and processes repositioned as important normative vectors of develop-
ment and thus protected by fundamental rights.
This further implies that the concept of the normative order of the internet, as employed 
here, must focus as much on establishing robust processes of norm production, including 
norm revision, as it must on the norms these processes generate. In brief: the normative 
order of the internet materializes as a profoundly process- oriented order. This process- 
orientation takes into account that norms of the online order are less static than traditional 
legal norms, both in their application and their evolution: online norms “will evolve over 
time through repeated interactions among those involved in the norms’ construction and 
use.”122
It can be observed that many normative processes within the third category of norma-
tive order norms— the transnational, soft law arrangements— are running along the lines of 
distributed governance approaches without explicit commitments to the Ilves report. Many 
normative processes within the normative order’s transnational dimension include issue 
identification by informal networks and actors, the mapping of normative solutions by de-
centralized, distributed bodies, and the formulation and implementation of solutions (with 
the latter happening only sporadically), if these normative solutions are not, as the Ilves 
report suggested, formalized through “social conventions, regulations, directives, treaties 
[or] contracts.”123
These processes are not very innovative, given comparable governance challenges in 
other regimes, such as climate change. However, there is one approach, conceptualized for 
transnational private law, which fits particularly well both as an epistemic model and nor-
mative proceduralization of the order: rough consensus, running code. This is backgrounded 
by the diagnosis, with Gralf- Peter Calliess and Peter Zumbansen, of “nothing less than a 
fundamental contestation and erosion of boundaries between state and non- state actors, 
official and unofficial law, public and private ordering”124 happening on the internet.
For Calliess and Zumbansen, the special advantages of this fluid approach to norma-
tivity on the internet lie in the capacity to distinguish between norm- creation processes, 
understood as “contextualized learning processes (‘rough consensus’)” and the emergence 
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of normative bodies (“running code”).125 Applying this within the normative order of the 
internet, we can proceduralize questions of legality and negate the “validity of juxtaposing 
‘soft law’ regimes with ‘rule- of- law’ regimes,” which only serve “to immunize the latter 
against all methodological contestations.”126 We have already established that the normative 
order of the internet, at its core, is a legal order and that any clear delimitation of binding 
norms and non- binding norms is epistemically impossible and normatively unhelpful. Just 
as there are soft law elements in traditional rule- of- law regimes, particularly national legal 
systems, the normative order of the internet encompasses norms of different character and 
binding quality.
We note, finally, that an approach based on fluid notions of normativity, such as the one 
described here, can deliver a responsive and reflexive order. Norms emerge when there is 
rough consensus and they are integrated into the larger system of codes of the normative 
order, which they thus change, but without being immune to change themselves, just like 
running code.
The first two categories of norms within the normative order of the internet are thus es-
tablished within traditional processes of international and national lawmaking, albeit with 
progressive dynamizations in light of the internet’s normative challenges. The key norma-
tive challenge of the order now is the adequate incorporation of the “new host of norms 
into existing bodies of law,”127 i.e. the development of a framework for the integration of 
transnational norms of the normative order of the internet into national legal systems (the 
subject of  chapter 7). As principles form an important part of these norms, they will be 
addressed now.
6.5 Principles of the Order
6.5.1 Notions of Principles
Robert Alexy, who adapted and refined Ronald Dworkin’s theory of principles, argued 
that norms can either be rules (Regeln) or principles (Prinzipien).128 Their difference is a 
structural- formal one: rules “encode” definitive commands (Rechtsfolgen), while principles 
only do so prima facie. They are optimization commands.129 This becomes evident espe-
cially when norms collide. When rule- norms collide, only one of them can be applied, thus 
requiring either an exception to be read into one of the rules or one to be declared inap-
plicable. When principle- norms collide, both remain applicable prima facie and must be 
weighed in light of the fact patterns to concretize them into a rule.130
Just as the optimization potential of the logical structure of principles as optimization 
commands has been raised,131 the notion of principles in Alexy’s theory of principles has 
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been criticized as overly demanding in that it differs substantially from the notion of ge-
neral principles of law or legal principles.132 This study’s notion of principles leans strongly 
toward the latter, evidenced by previous analyses. This study has, for instance, previously 
analyzed which fundamental principles of international law are relevant for the normative 
order of the internet.133 Following the reasoning of the Group of Governmental Experts in 
its 2015 report, among the key principles of international law we find sovereign equality, the 
settlement of international disputes by peaceful means, the prohibition of the threat or use 
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, the respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the non- intervention in the internal affairs 
of other states.134
This study has also shown that within internet governance arrangements the notion of 
“principles” has a specific meaning, namely the collections of norms, standards, technical 
preference, and commitments that actors committed to in various “declarations of princi-
ples.” A substantial number of these documents were adopted, starting from 2011 during 
a period of normative development described as the “internet principle hype.”135 As dis-
cussed, these “collections of principles” allowed actors to publicize their normative expecta-
tions and assert their normative preferences. The normative common ground between the 
diverging declarations of principles constitutes the principles of the normative order of the 
internet that (most) actors can agree on.
The “internet principles” thus vary widely in their thematic orientation. This contrasts 
with a more focused approach of some scholars identifying common principles across legal 
orders. Armin von Bogdandy, for example, has identified three normative (meta- )principles 
across national (German constitutional) law, European law, and international law.136 These 
are the principles of the rule of law, of human rights protection, and of democracy. Though 
they have different legal foundations in the three orders, they can act as a common frame for 
the legal and political processes regarding the management of legal pluralism and, in par-
ticular, the relations between national, international, and European law. Following the in-
ternational public authority theory, von Bogdandy identifies as the key meta- principle the 
inclusion of citizens in the exercise of that authority. This seems like a sensible procedural 
principle which legitimizes other principles, including substantial ones. With regard to the 
normative order of the internet, procedural and substantial principles can be identified. The 
key principles of the normative order of the internet function both as principles and rules. 
They can be applied directly and indirectly, and they influence the development of other 
norms within the system.
In a sense they are also optimization commands insofar (varying Alexy) as they influence 
(optimize) the normative development of the order of the internet. Reading other norms 
of the normative order of the internet as optimizable in light of commonly agreed princi-
ples lends them substantial power. Internet principles influence the development and ap-
plication of all norms belonging to the normative order of the internet. These are, as can be 
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recalled, norms that evidence a (1) material (non- trivial) and a (2) normative (not merely 
factual) connection to the internet as a network of networks. Since the norms of the norma-
tive order of the internet, as will be shown in the next chapter, form part of national legal 
systems as a normative tertium, the principles that influence their evolution and application 
are important.
6.5.2 Substantial Principles
The most broadly accepted compilation of non- trivial principles related to the internet are 
the NetMundial Principles,137 which are the outcome document of a long process of nego-
tiations that included representatives from all actor groups.138 The following are the key 
substantial principles that actor representatives reached agreement on:
 – protection of human rights online just as offline, in accordance with international human 
rights legal obligations, based on the UDHR and the UN human rights conventions. 
Important rights include freedom of expression, including the right to seek, receive, and 
impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers; freedom of 
association, including the right to peaceful assembly and association online through so-
cial networks and platforms; the right to privacy, including a right not to be subjected to 
arbitrary or unlawful surveillance, collection, treatment, and use of personal data, and a 
right not to be subjected to mass surveillance unless lawful, necessary, and proportionate; 
rights of persons with disabilities, including full access to online resources through ap-
propriate design and development; freedom of information and access to information; 
and the right to development, with the internet playing a vital role in helping to achieve 
the full realization of internationally agreed sustainable development goals;
 – protection of intermediary liability with limitations only provided in a proportionate 
way with a view to, inter alia, the importance of economic growth and the free flow of 
information;
 – cultural and linguistic diversity;
 – unfragmented space:  the internet needs to be kept and protected as a “globally co-
herent, interconnected, stable, unfragmented, scalable and accessible network- of- 
networks, based on a common set of unique identifiers, that allows data packets/ 
information to flow freely end- to- end regardless of the lawful content”;139
 – security, stability, resilience, reliability, and trustworthiness of the internet premised 
upon strong cooperation between actors;
 – enabling environment for permissionless innovation, which presupposes investment 
in ICT infrastructure.
 137 Based on the NetMundial Multistakeholder Statement, Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the 
Future of Internet Governance, April 23– 24, 2014, São Paulo, Brazil, http:// netmundial.br/ netmundial-  
multistakeholder- statement.
 138 It should be noted that the author of this study was nominated by the global academic community as one 
of the members of the preparatory committee for the NetMundial Multistakeholder Meeting and took part in a 
number of preparatory sessions.
 139 NetMundial Multistakeholder Statement, Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet 
Governance, April 23– 24, 2014, São Paulo, Brazil, http:// netmundial.br/ wp- content/ uploads/ 2014/ 04/ 
NetMundial- Multistakeholder- Document.pdf.
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Some of these principles are drawn strongly from existing international (and national) law 
and conversely influence these normative orders, such as the principle of human rights pro-
tection online. Other principles, such as the protection of intermediaries, can influence 
the normative approaches by states to the regulation of internet companies through laws 
regulating their rights and obligations, such as the German Network Enforcement Law. 
Commitments to cultural and linguistic diversity on the internet are political exhortations 
rather than clear legal principles, though diversity as a value is not foreign to international 
or national legal systems.
The last three substantial principles all relate to characteristics of the internet space: it 
should remain unfragmented, based on common identifiers, with free information 
flows and permissionless innovation— a secure, stable, resilient, and reliable network 
of networks. This principle evidences the normatively non- distinct nature of “internet 
principles.” The exhortation to keep the internet unfragmented is to be read in light of 
the dangers of governmental/ legal, technical, and commercial internet fragmentation. 
The countervailing forces to fragmentation that have led to the development of the in-
ternet “regime” (the normative order of the internet) are informed by the principle of an 
unfragmented space. This is normatively relevant but is neither a norm as principle nor 
a norm as a rule, rather it is a norm as policy. These substantive principles procedurally 
frame and substantively inform the normative development of the normative order of 
the internet.
6.5.3 Procedural Principles
The NetMundial principles contain a number of procedural principles as well. As noted 
earlier (and as will be discussed in more detail below in light of its implications for legit-
imacy), the participation of actors in norm- setting processes is essential for the success 
of normative processes as measured by the legitimacy and effectivity of the normative 
output. Therefore, substantive and procedural standards regarding the normative order 
of the internet are interconnected and mutually reinforcing. One example is the substan-
tive principle committing actors to the security, stability, resilience, reliability, and trust-
worthiness of the internet, which is described as premised upon “a strong cooperation 
between stakeholders,” nationally, regionally, and globally.140 Demanding such coopera-
tion (at least) implies that procedural structures are in place that allow for such coopera-
tion to be realized.
Further, in demanding open standards to be promoted as a matter of principle, and “in-
formed by individual and collective expertise and decisions made by rough consensus, that 
allow for a global, interoperable, resilient, stable, decentralized, secure, and interconnected 
network, available to all,”141 the cooperation structures foreseen by substantive principles 
are refined: expertise collection and its processing through rough consensus procedures. We 
thus see that a principle of the normative order of the internet clearly posits the importance 
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of open standards developed in collaborative decision- making processes, allowing for col-
lective stewardship of the processes, their evolution, and the resources managed. The prin-
ciple encourages voluntary collaboration with “technical experts to resolve technical issues 
in the appropriate venue in a manner consistent with this open, collaborative approach.”
The NetMundial Statement contains key internet governance “process principles.” 
Processes related to the production of norms within the normative order of the internet 
more broadly need to be:
 – multistakeholder- based and democratic, ensuring the meaningful and accountable 
participation of all actors;
 – as open, participative, consensus- driven as possible (to allow for the full and balanced 
participation of all actors from around the globe);
 – transparent (with easy- to- understand decisions and a thorough documentation of de-
cision- making processes);
 – accountable (ensuring independent checks and balances);
 – inclusive and equitable (with all processes being as bottom- up as possible to enable the 
involvement of as many actors as possible);
 – distributed (throughout the decentralized, multistakeholder- based ecosystem of norms);
 – collaborative (based on encouraging cooperative approaches) and enabling meaningful 
participation (including capacity- building for newer or underrepresented groups); and
 – agile (with both processes and standards being technology- neutral).
Most of the process- oriented principles regarding internet governance are important 
for the establishment of processes that lead to more legitimate outcomes and thus en-
sure the participation of all actors in the exercise of authority through the actors of the 
normative order of the internet. These include, in particular, transparency and account-
ability of normative processes and the integration of all relevant actors. The principle of 
agility and the integration of all relevant actors is an important element of procedural 
normativity.
In designing normative processes within the normative order of the internet, the pro-
cedural principles need to be implemented. Existing processes that meet many or most of 
these requirements are considered legitimate. One example is the procedure used by the 
IETF to discuss and adopt new technical internet standards, the Request for Comments 
(RFCs). The procedure is based on the inclusion of all relevant actors in their respec-
tive roles, open, participative, transparent (with all documents available online and dis-
cussions taking place chiefly through publicly accessible mailing lists), as inclusive as it 
can be given entrenched power disequilibria in global society, distributed and decen-
tralized with the IETF providing only the factual frame for the normative debate, very 
collaborative, providing for capacity- building for newer or underrepresented groups, 
comparatively agile with standard improvement possible at a later stage,142 and roughly 
consensus- based.143
 142 Cf. Gralf- Peter Calliess and Peer Zumbansen, Rough Consensus and Running Code. A Theory of Transnational 
Private Law (Oxford/ Portland, OR: Hart, 2012), 135.
 143 Cf. RFC 2418: S. Bradner (ed.), RFC 2418, Working Group Guidelines, September 1998, http:// tools.ietf.org/ 
html/ rfc2418#section- 3.3, 3.3.
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6.5.4 Normative Descriptors of the Order
Apart from substantive and procedural principles, there are also further characteristics or 
normative descriptors of the normative order of the internet, which do not amount to ac-
cepted “principles,” but exert influence on the interpretation of online order norms and on 
their evolution. They are not principles or norms but rather characteristics or descriptive 
elements of the normative order of the internet, but nevertheless have normative relevance.
Layered Nature. The normative order of the internet is a layered order encompassing dif-
ferent levels of regulation. These layers are partly tied to (geo)political institutions, such as 
states and regional organizations. But, as Benjamin H. Stratton argues in a study of software 
and sovereignty, “planetary- scale computation” can only be made “accountable as a design-
able platform” by the “decentering of some conventional ideas about political geographic 
norms.” The overlapping and intersecting layers have created a “thickened vertical jurisdic-
tional complexity.” It is for this “layered complexity” that the normative order of the internet 
establishes a model explaining and justifying normative developments.144
The normative order of the internet is an order for what Stratton terms the “Stack.”145 
Arguing that computation takes different forms at different scales, he sees “energy and min-
eral sourcing and grids; subterranean cloud infrastructure; urban software and public ser-
vice privatization; massive universal addressing systems [and various interfaces]” as part of 
a “vast [ . . . ] software and hardware Stack,” an “accidental megastructure.” Within this meg-
astructure, normatively relevant conflicts occur, which range from trivial to fundamental:
the [NSA] versus Unit 6139 [Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s advanced persis-
tent threat unit], NSA versus Anonymous, Anonymous versus Syrian Electronic Army 
[hackers supporting the Assad regime in Syria], NSA versus Syrian Electronic Army versus 
ISIL versus FSB [Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation] versus North Korea 
versus Samsung versus Apple versus European Parliament, and so and on.146
Though the conflicts alluded to here center around cybersecurity with only a small nod to-
ward more mundane legal conflicts between companies (Samsung vs. Apple) and between 
them and regional organizations (Apple vs. European Parliament) and their legal systems, 
they serve to illustrate the necessity of a coherent normative approach explaining and justi-
fying the management of normativity with regard to the internet.
Real- Time Law. Though the nomos of the internet has both a normative genealogy, ex-
plained in  chapter 2, and normativity, its predictive power has certain limits. In a call for a 
new “experimental culture within the law and within legal theory,”147 Vesting argues that 
computer culture (his description of what Castell termed network society, or Stalder digi-
tality) has influenced private contract practices in that technological uncertainties require 
“vague frameworks [ . . . ] for contractual arrangements,” which are then progressively sub-
stantialized by instituted practices.148
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Similarly, within the normative order of the internet norms of different character and 
formality may apply to the same set of facts. Matthew Jennejohn has called this form of 
governance “braided” with a blend of formal agreements and informal contracts: “formal 
contracts ‘braid’ with informal social norms.”149 Vesting has shown that this dynamic nor-
mative approach can be made to react to societal developments, especially when technolog-
ical advancements are concerned. He identifies braided governance as a model that unites 
constituted and instituted orders,150 enabling the emergence of a legally binding frame that 
allows for technical innovations in a way that is fair to all participants.151
While traditional regulatory approaches provide norms ex ante, the normative order of 
the internet can be considered, in parts, a model of “just- in- time” regulation. Since circum-
stances change quickly, ex ante regulation may be out of date fast. Therefore, just- in- time 
regulation, which is reactive to changes in social reality, is characteristic of the normative 
order of the internet. As Vesting writes, the growing “reflexivity of law for new dynamic 
hybridizations cannot be ensured through regulation [ . . . ] ex ante, but rather happens in 
‘real time’ [ . . . ] or ex post through monitoring and stabilization of coordination patterns 
[. . . .].”152 In order to be adaptable, norms and the normative order as a whole have to show 
some elasticity.153
6.6 Legitimacy of the Order
6.6.1 Conditions of Legitimacy
This study has hypothesized that the normative order of the internet is a legitimate order. 
Internationally, the integration of all actors in norm- setting processes proceduralizes le-
gitimacy. Nationally, as will be discussed in the next chapter, existing procedures to legit-
imize non- legal norms can be applied mutatis mutandis with the same result. Returning 
to the international level, we can find that a substantial part of the norms making up the 
normative order of the internet are norms of international law. Therefore, Louis Henkin’s 
finding that “almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and al-
most all of their obligations almost all of the time”154 is relevant for assessing the condi-
tions of legitimacy of the normative order of the internet. Indeed, legitimacy is closely tied 
to rule- confirming behavior. Without a sense of obligation (which might be grounded in 
the epistemic superiority of a normative approach), rule- conforming behavior remains 
sporadic and erratic.
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This sense of obligation is tied to the perceived legitimacy of a norm.155 Thomas 
M. Franck defined legitimacy as a property of a rule or institution (or, it could be added, an 
order) “which itself exerts a pull towards compliance on those addressed normatively be-
cause those addressed believe that the rule or institution has come into being and operates 
in accordance with generally accepted principles of right process.”156 Right process is one 
way of formulating demands regarding the processes related to the genesis of norms. Franck 
argued further that a single norm’s legitimacy (and thus compliance pull) depends on its 
determinacy (ascertainable normative content), symbolic validation through an authority 
figure/ institution and coherence with, and adherence to, a broader system of rules.157 A var-
iation of these criteria will be useful to assess the legitimacy of online order norms.
The level of normativity of a normative order varies. The normativity of a norm— and 
of a normative order— is one of its properties. It is related to, and dependent on, its legiti-
macy.158 It is impossible to make a general claim regarding the legitimacy of norms of the 
normative order of the internet. Depending on their character (international legal norms, 
national legal norms, norms forming part of the transnational regulatory arrangements), 
they are already situated within established legitimacy structures that do not need to be 
fundamentally revisited for the internet. Just consider: when applying international law’s 
well- established non- intervention principle to online settings, there is no obvious need 
for providing a theory of the principle’s (customary law rule’s) legitimacy. Similarly, na-
tional laws providing for certain obligations for intermediaries, such as the German 
Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz, may be flawed, but their legitimacy as laws is not prima facie 
in question. Only in cases of substantial violation of core principles of the normative order 
of the internet (such as minimum consultation levels with all relevant actors) will the legiti-
macy of norms of national or international law have to be revisited for the purposes of their 
position within the normative order of the internet.
This is not so for order- specific norms, such as internet governance principles, and for 
the order itself. Their legitimacy needs to be demonstrated. As explained previously, this 
study understands norms belonging to the normative order of the internet as being those 
having a (1) material (non- trivial) and a (2) normative (not merely factual) connection 
to the internet as a network of networks. Based on Franck’s criteria for the legitimacy of 
norms, these norms need to be formally and materially legitimated. Formal legitimation 
is achieved through symbolic validation through norm emergence in a multistakeholder 
process.
For a norm to be materially legitimated, it needs to
 – be determinate enough for its purpose (thus allowing for non- binding instruments),
 – cohere with the core principles of the normative order of the internet,
 – be consonant with the order’s values as expressed in its principles, and
 – adhere systematically to the normative order as a whole.
 155 Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (Oxford: OUP, 1990). For a more recent inter-
pretation, see Thomas M. Franck, “The Power of Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Power: International Law in an 
Age of Power Disequilibrium,” AJIL 100 (2006), 88.
 156 Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (Oxford: OUP, 1990), 24.
 157 Cf. Thomas M. Franck, “Fairness in the International Legal and Institutional System,” Recueil des Cours de 
l’Academie de Droit International 240 (1993), Vol. III, 26.
 158 Cf. Peter Koller, Theorie des Rechts. Eine Einführung, 2nd edn. (Vienna: Böhlau, 1997).
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Thus, formally, legitimacy within the normative order of the internet is proceduralized (this 
is the input and throughput dimension of legitimacy). The norms emerging from these pro-
cesses are often epistemically good normative solutions. This is the output dimension of 
legitimacy. This study will now address the role of integrating all relevant actors as a pro-
cedural approach to legitimacy (6.6.2) and then address the legitimacy of the order itself 
(6.6.3).
6.6.2 Proceduralizing Legitimacy
Norms that emerge through processes in which all actors that have stakes in the outcome 
of the process are involved are thus symbolically validated. Traditionally, global normative 
processes, such as the adoption of treaties, were state focused. Yet this primacy of states has 
been challenged by the emergence of heterogeneous actors.159 However, reverting to a nor-
mative individualism160 and centering legitimacy- enhancing processes on the individual 
ignores the important role states still have in international relations: As “states are officially 
held to be the legal representatives of citizens on the international plane (however fictitious 
this might be for some states),” Anne Peters argues, they are still “– as a group— the most 
powerful global actors, and are (in most areas of the world) important repositories of polit-
ical, social, and cultural identity.” Therefore, both international law and the normative order 
of the internet with its processes of legitimacy need to remain, “in order to preserve a suffi-
cient level of legitimacy,” linked to states.161
This link to states is dual in nature. H. H. Koh, in true New Haven fashion, argues that 
its origins lie in the transnational legal process that leads to “domestic obedience” through 
internalization of international norms162 or, in the present case, normative order norms. 
Importantly, he finds that “[p] articipation in transnational legal process creates a normative 
and constitutive dynamic.”163 This participation implies the legitimacy of the outcome.
Though individuals are the ultimate unit of law and society and their protection the end 
of law and society, they, the non- state actors that represent them, and the private sector 
companies that count them as their customers cannot be the primary legitimacy- conferral 
agents to the exclusion of states. Rather, as Peters underlines, the “involvement of non- state 
actors in law- making and - enforcement can be an important additional source for the le-
gitimacy of global governance” and of the legitimacy of the normative order of the internet 
and its norms.
With regard to the normative order of the internet, legitimacy is proceduralized through 
a reliance on multiple actors, normatively acting in their respective roles. This is an approxi-
mation of an ideal discourse setting as envisaged by Habermas. Within the normative order 
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Through Accessible Cyberinfrastructure,” in Andrew Chadwick and Philip N. Howard (eds.), Routledge Handbook 
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 160 Which is not without conceptual pitfalls. See, on the precariousness of “individualizing,” Dale Shin, “The 
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(ed.), Individualism: The Cultural Logic of Modernity (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2011), 203– 18.
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of the internet, just as within any social order, both laws and institutions are less than per-
fect. The procedures they install may lead to normatively suboptimal results that may not 
be considered legitimate.164 Therefore Habermas substituted a formal criterion in order to 
ensure legitimacy of results: perfect discourse situations in which every participant knows 
everything and has the same power.165 The normative outcomes of these discourses would 
then be legitimate. As ideal discourse situations do not exist, different approximations have 
emerged.166 With regard to the normative order of the internet, this approximation relies on 
the integration of various actors, based on inclusive normation processes in which all three 
actor groups of internet governance take part (states, the private sector, and civil society). 
Each of these actor groups, and the norms they produce, is legitimated differently.
Governments, as representatives of the states, draw their legitimacy from their tradi-
tional role as sovereign members of the international community through the exercise of 
jurisdiction over their territory. In Weberian terms they represent traditional authority,167 
and, as a legitimate global public authority has not yet emerged, they are also by default 
rationally legitimate. International organizations as participants in processes involving rel-
evant actors are legitimated through their membership (states) and progressively seek to 
enhance their legitimacy by developing accountability mechanisms.
Private sector companies are also legitimate international actors. They are responsible, 
varying the Ruggie Principles, for the formative forces emanating from their spheres of in-
fluence. Their participation in normative processes is value- rationally justified. Companies, 
following Milton Friedman’s argument that capitalism and freedom are intertwined and 
mutually reinforcing,168 are important to counterweigh power allocation with political ac-
tors,169 especially on the internet. Yet states need to ensure that ICT companies do not act 
irresponsibly due to a lack of regulation,170 while at the same time avoiding the pitfalls of 
overregulation.171
Civil society represents individuals. Their justification is therefore instrumental- rational 
in Weberian terms. Civil society organizations collect and articulate the view of individuals 
as an efficient filter and focus in normative processes. Through processes of differentiation 
and specialization, civil society organizations have also gained legitimacy through their 
character as repositories of specialized (expert) knowledge on the basis of which they can 
intervene authoritatively in normative processes.172
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Participation by all relevant actors proceduralizes legitimacy and symbolically vali-
dates the norms, independent of the norm’s epistemic legitimacy because of its regulatory 
focus.173 The inclusion of all relevant actors in normative processes is not only the closest 
approximation to an ideal discourse but also the procedural translation of democratic legit-
imacy in transnational constellations. Understanding the integration of all actors who have 
stakes in the outcome of normative processes as a proceduralization of democracy is pre-
mised upon an appreciation of the importance of democratic legitimacy in transnational 
constellations.
Democracy is a controversial term in international law.174 While commitments 
abound,175 there is no single globally accepted model.176 In terms of international law, de-
mocracy can now be considered a teleological principle177 that is framed by the human 
rights to democratic governance and particularly periodic, secret, fair, and free elections. 
These rights can be inferred from the right to self- determination in common Article 1 of 
the Civil and Social Covenant, Article 25 of the Civil Covenant, Article 21 of the UDHR, 
and subsequent practice178 as well as consistent regional codifications (Article 10 (2) of the 
ECHR, Articles 13, 15, and 16 of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR and 
Articles 10 and 11 of the African Convention on Human and People’s Rights (AfrCHPR)).179 
Realizing these rights within states is difficult enough as the number of non- democratic 
regimes globally show. Ensuring democratic participation and thus increasing the legiti-
macy of normative outcomes in transnational settings can only be achieved by applying 
democratic principles— especially regarding participation, in casu through representatives, 
in normative processes within the normative order of the internet.
The process of including all relevant actors proceduralizes legitimacy in the normative 
order by institutionalizing qua procedure the democratic rights of actors with regard to 
decisions on the distribution of rights and obligations in the internet’s order. Each actor 
has a specific role to play. In online settings, this is usually understood as the “practice of 
forms of participatory democracy that allow for all those who have a stake and who have 
the inclination to participate on equal footing in the deliberation of issues and the design of 
policy.”180 Enabling participation, legally and practically, is essential to ensure that all actors 
can participate in normative processes. There is no duty to participate ( “inclination”) and 
some normative processes will be influenced more strongly by one actor than another. The 
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process remains open, however, and participation must be possible. In order to ensure ef-
fectivity, enforcement/ implementation can be assigned to a single actor. Yet implementers 
are accountable to the decision- making actors.181
Including all relevant actors in norm- making is lived practice in almost all relevant nor-
mative processes organically situated within the normative order of the internet, with the 
exception of exercises in norm entrepreneurship by some sovereignty- oriented states, such 
as the International Code of Conduct for Information Security developed by, inter alia, 
China and Russia.182 Its lack of success in the face of propagation attempts shows the risks 
(from the perspective of norm entrepreneurs) of ignoring the legitimacy- enhancing func-
tion of including all relevant actors (and, in the case of the Code of Conduct, of drafting a 
sovereignty- oriented document that is materially at odds with tenets of the normative order 
of the internet).
Normative processes that include all relevant actors are in sum the most effective for 
legitimacy- conferring proceduralization of the interests or stakes of actors in the out-
come of a normative process. By harnessing the legitimacy- conferring function of states, 
the power over communicative processes wielded by private sector companies (and their 
concomitant influence on user behavior) and the function of civil society actors as forces 
of aggregation and articulation of individual preferences through a fair and open process, 
this inclusive approach to norm- making ensures input and throughput legitimacy. This is 
coupled with regulatory results that profit from expert knowledge, thus increasing their ep-
istemic legitimacy (output dimension of legitimacy).183 Regulatory results of norm- making 
processes that include all relevant actors are also usually effective, which only increases 
their legitimacy, in turn making them more effective.
Normative processes that include all relevant actors as proceduralizations of legitimacy 
are not unique to the normative order of the internet.184 Examples from environmental and 
international development law as well as international criminal law185 show that whenever 
non- state actors fulfill key functions in “administering” a legal field, their input is sought 
out to enhance norm- conforming behavior by all actors after normation.
The optimal design of inclusive norm- making structures is difficult to establish. Existing 
problems include power differences and information disparities between actors and the 
monopolization of processes by advantaged actors, such as big countries, economically 
powerful internet companies, or experts with specialized knowledge. Bad actors, including 
those who only purport to belong to a different actor, such as non- governmental organiza-
tions that are actually governmental in terms of funding, staffing, and input into normative 
processes, need to be identified and sidelined.186
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Concrete realizations of normative strategies to include all relevant actors have been 
discussed previously.187 Ideally, these processes are institutionalized as forms of partici-
patory and multilevel collective problem solving that ensure that both the problems and 
the procedures to overcome them are flexible and can be periodically revised.188 Locally 
and regionally— respecting the subsidiarity principle189— “governance groups” that in-
clude all relevant actors have been shown to lead to legitimate and effective regulation.190 
Empirically, the representativity and leadership of the discussion process have emerged as 
key factors to reach normatively successful outcomes.191
6.6.3 Legitimation of the Order
Having shown why and how legitimacy is proceduralized in the normative order of the in-
ternet, this study now turns to the legitimation of the normative order of the internet itself. 
This study has already discussed one avenue of legitimacy- conferral, the hetero- constitutive 
process by which normative orders outside of states are legitimized by integration into ex-
isting, legitimate orders.192 But other avenues of internal legitimation exist: first, the order 
enshrines the proceduralization of legitimacy through its commitment to including all rele-
vant actors. Second, as discussed previously at length in  chapter 3,193 the normative order of 
the internet is necessary to ensure the common interest in the protection of the functionality 
of the internet and the protection of states and non- state actors from the dangers emanating 
from use and misuse of the internet, as such also legitimate. States alone cannot by them-
selves regulate the internet. International law provides a regulatory frame but is not detailed 
enough to regulate emerging online threats.
The normative order of the internet develops and legitimizes norms necessary to secure 
the internet as a critical infrastructural resource and as equally critical for other essential 
infrastructures. National legal systems cannot by themselves cope with the challenges of in-
ternational data flows. A normative system is necessary to establish norms, entrench values 
in online ordering processes, and, inter alia, set limits to the power of non- state actors and 
the privatization of internet management functions.194 As Möllers rightly analyzes, the 
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legitimacy (justification) of normative orders can be differentiated according to the tempo-
rality of the act: original, actualizing, or prospective.195 The normative order of the internet 
has emerged decentrally in an unplanned fashion and therefore only actualizing and pro-
spective legitimacy seems to matter. Positing that the order is legitimate has consequences 
because with such an argument comes the order’s “right to rule, understood to mean both 
that institutional agents [e.g. governance groups] are morally justified in making rules and 
attempting to secure compliance with them and that people [here: actors] subject to those 
rules have moral, content- independent reasons to follow them and/ or to not interfere with 
others’ compliance with them.”196 In the case of the normative order of the internet, the 
content of most norms is an added epistemic reason for their legitimacy and exercises addi-
tional, independent compliance pull.
Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane, in an international relations- based reading of 
legitimacy, argue that institutions (but this applies to orders as well) are morally justified, 
if they do not “contribute to grave injustice (‘minimal moral acceptability’), no obvious al-
ternative [ . . . ] would perform better (comparative benefit) and [they respect their] own 
guidelines and procedures (institutional integrity).”197 The normative order of the internet, 
rather than contributing to injustice, is oriented toward ensuring the protection of and from 
the internet and has a clear development- and human rights- orientation. Alternatives, such 
as a state- led system or an international organization, have not yet emerged and do not 
seem imminent. The last element— institutional integrity— is more controversial and can 
be discussed under the notion of accountability.
Accountability in the context of the internet means that the formal and informal insti-
tutions that are relevant in internet governance and internet policy processes must justify 
themselves to the international community organized in normative structures that include 
all relevant actors in their respective roles.198 Through accountability the democratic partic-
ipation of all actors can be assessed. Decisions of these formations must be made in accord-
ance with generally accepted principles of human rights, the rule of law, and democracy.199 
These principles are crucial for assessing the legitimacy of all acts of international public 
authority.200 Even if no international public authority is exercised, but rather only (form-
less or only weakly proceduralized) influence over the “space of the reasons” (Raum der 
Gründe)201 of other actors, the principles still remain normatively relevant.
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This claim— that all actors, including individuals, have a right to demand accountability 
from normative actors of internet governance, without a state mediating this right— can be 
interpreted as a right to justification. This right exists independently of, and concurrently to, 
the existing obligation of states to secure for anyone within their territory or under their ju-
risdiction all applicable rights, including through participation in international normative 
processes. This alone is a strong argument against exceptionalism and unilateralism and for 
participation in the normative machinery of international law and the conferral of some 
national authority to international or supranational organizations, as these processes ac-
tually increase sovereignty (through participation and influence on outcomes) rather than 
diminish it. Keeping with this approach is Rainer Forst’s postulation of the right of everyone 
not to be subjected to norms or social conditions that cannot be adequately justified toward 
them.202 Of course, the justification of policies is a matter of power.203 ICANN, for example, 
is a powerful actor in the normative order of the internet and has historically been able to 
effectively defend itself against criticism. This is also due to ICANN’s resources, including 
its communicative power:
Whoever has greater and stronger economic resources or means of violence, who with the 
help of modern information technologies can successfully disseminate normative reasons 
or successfully immunize against criticism, determine the political agenda and success-
fully influence the political process with their own topics and reasons [ . . . ] has greater 
opportunities to enforce its normative order over others and to immunize against criti-
cism, dissidence, and resistance, at least for extended periods of time.204
Enforced norms may be effective, but they are not necessarily legitimate (if they are not en-
forced and thus not effective, they could also be illegitimate; they can become legitimate if 
they are shown to be epistemically sound and if actors internalize them without resisting 
norm propagation efforts). But, fundamentally, legitimacy of the normative order is de-
pendent in part on mechanisms that ensure that no online actors can use their economic 
resources or ownership of ICTs or control thereof (through a social network site or search 
engine, for example) to disseminate normative reasons (to shape justification narratives) to 
the exclusion of others. Following this approach, for example, both the normative practices 
and the terms of service of powerful providers of online communicative spaces, such as so-
cial networks, need to be viewed critically and tested as to their legitimacy.
In a study on the accountability of international organizations, the International Law 
Association has developed principles of accountability, the application of which can en-
hance citizens’ “democratic participation” in non- traditional international organizations 
as well as private or hybrid forms of regulation and information. These include principles 
such as good governance (transparency, access to information, participatory decision- 
making process, traceable financial management), good faith, constitutionality and 
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institutional balance, control, justification, procedural regularity, objectivity and impar-
tiality, and due diligence.205 Proceduralization, and with that we return to the arguments 
presented in the previous section, can ensure that informal regulation and non- formally 
legitimated formations nevertheless produce norms that can be considered democrati-
cally legitimized.206
6.7 Narratives of Justification
As Robert M. Cover argued, prescriptions (norms) need to be “located in discourse” (con-
textualized discursively) and “supplied with history and destiny, beginning and end, expla-
nation and purpose”207 (conceptualized functionally). For each nomos, a narrative exists 
which locates the nomos and “give[s] it meaning.”208 Narratives can perform an impor-
tant function in legitimizing a normative order. The constitution, Cover argues, is a center 
“about which many communities teach, learn and tell stories.”209
Within the normative order of the internet, the “constitution” at the center of narrativ-
ization are the principles and processes of the order. We cannot meaningfully analyze the 
impact of, for instance, changes in the terms of service of a social network to the detri-
ment of privacy protection without understanding the way these are perceived by users. 
We cannot assess the likelihood of success of a treaty dealing with liberalization of intellec-
tual property rights without understanding how these issues are perceived by the affected 
communities and may be (mis)used to channel normative discontent. Submission to, or 
objections against, changes in norms (thus elements of their legitimacy) are only intelli-
gible if one understands the narratives underlying the normative practices on these sites. 
These processes do not end. For all practical purposes, normative orders are constantly 
evolving. Norms are narrativized and renarrativized: “Each stage of legal codification,” as 
Steven Fraade argues, “produces the next stage of legal commentary [but] also necessitates 
the reframing of received laws in new (or renewed) narratives of historical, ideological, 
and teleological signification.”210 Fraade adapts Cover’s notion of nomos and narrative by 
arguing that the dynamic interrelation of law and the narrativized history and destiny of the 
law are more condensed. Rather than nomos and narrative, he perceives nomos to exist as 
narrative.211
This provides the link to the legitimation of the normative order of the internet. The 
order (nomos) is narratively (practically) legitimated. Actors in the order can demand jus-
tification for the order’s structure. With regard to global orders regulating the distribution 
and management of rights or goods, this demand is framed as one of transnational (distri-
butive) justice. The demand for justification of the order vis- a- vis any actor is an antidote to 
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the entrenchment of (global) power asymmetries often reflected in the design of normative 
orders.
To remedy these asymmetries, Rainer Forst has introduced the right to justification (Recht 
auf Rechtfertigung), which institutionalizes a “duty to provide a better argument.”212 This 
duty is incumbent upon those individuals/ institutions wielding powers in any social set-
ting and provides for the establishment of procedures, which ensure that no order- internal 
power relationships remain unchallengeable. Through public pressure and institutionalized 
participation rights those wielding power and profiting from asymmetric power relation-
ships are forced to provide justificatory reasons (or admit the lack thereof with illegitimacy 
as a consequence).213
In the Habermasian tradition Forst considers essential the breadth and effectivity of par-
ticipation possibilities regarding “discussions and decisions on transnational global internal 
politics [Weltinnenpolitik]” and the “measure to which reciprocally shareable reasons are 
guaranteed in these procedures.”214 This approach anchors legitimacy in a process: the pro-
cess of justification, which is narrativized. This proceduralization of legitimacy through 
processes in which norm emergence is tied to the provision of justificatory reasons for these 
norms must take place on a global scale, when issues of global (distributive) justice are con-
cerned. The distribution of rights regarding the internet is undoubtedly an issue of global 
justice: a “context of social relations in which different actors have countervailing claims 
that need assessment in light of principles of justice,”215 especially in light of global interde-
pendence of economy and ecology, of treaties and institutions.
According to Forst everyone has a fundamental right to justification, amounting to a 
qualified “power of veto” against norms and practices which cannot be justified recipro-
cally towards all.216 In a context of global transnational justice everyone has a right to the 
resources necessary to establish a democratic order in their state and to see that their state 
is becoming “a participant of the global economic and political system, with the same rights 
as others.”217 Similarly, everyone has a right to take part in the normative order of the in-
ternet as a stakeholder. As a condition for its legitimacy, the normative order must be set 
up in a way that ensures to all the possibility to take part in its evolution, through, for ex-
ample, grants for participation in normatively relevant meetings of bodies within the order. 
Similarly, national legislation must be adapted to ensure that the state can function as an 
actor representing its citizens in the administration of questions of global distributive jus-
tice in the context of the internet.
Just as states have committed, in the GGE 2015 report, to confidence- building meas-
ures to strengthen international peace and security,218 states are obliged (drawing from 
their duty to ensure the right to democratic governance and political participation) to sup-
port structures favoring participation. Since establishing national computer emergency 
response/ cybersecurity incident response teams can be considered a duty under the pre-
caution limb of the due diligence principle,219 states should organize (as many do) national 
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multistakeholder- based opinion- aggregation forums, such as national Internet Governance 
Forums, as clearing houses for participation of their national actors in the normative order 
of the internet.
6.8 Facticity of the Order
6.8.1 Facticity and Ordering
The normative order of the internet is coded through law. It is a legal order, but a legal order 
sui generis in that it differs markedly from traditional centralized legal orders with their re-
spective monopolistic exercise of authority and relatively simple constitutional justification 
narratives. In an insightful analysis of digital culture, Felix Stalder identified three charac-
teristics of the “culture of digitality”: referentiality (use of existing cultural material for one’s 
own production), communality (collective frame of reference to stabilize meaning and gen-
erate options), and algorithmicity (use of algorithms to reduce and form information flows, 
so they become meaningful to humans).”220
These defining forms of digital culture can be repurposed as lenses through which to see 
the normative order of the internet, with each lens putting into focus specific “traits” of the 
normative order. The normative order of the internet contains referential, communal, and 
algorithmic elements. It is referential in that it is based on existing norms, which it system-
atizes; it is communal as it is relies on legitimacy- enhancing norm- making processes that 
encompass all actors and provide them with a collective frame of reference; finally, it is al-
gorithmic in that algorithms are important regulatory artifacts within the normative order 
and, as part of machine learning programs, need to be measured against overarching values 
just as norms.221
The normative order of the internet is also an inferable order. This is in keeping with the 
dynamics of machine learning in the networked society. Machine learning means that the 
task of programmers is replaced with learning programs and algorithms that are coded so 
they can learn directly from data. As Ethem Alpaydin explains, the role of the programmer 
has changed substantially: “[once], it used to be the programmer who defined what the 
computer had to do, by coding an algorithm in a programming language.” The agency is 
evolving: “[now] we do not write programs but collect data. The data contains instances of 
what is to be done, and the learning algorithm modifies a learner program automatically in 
such a way so as to match the requirements specified in the data.”222
This is an interesting approach: if, having established a “learning algorithm” (the exist-
ence of regime- internal processes of normative reflection and self- learning within the nor-
mative order that allow for dynamic change), this study has succeeded in “collecting” (i.e. 
describing and successfully stratifying) the norms of the online order (and showing both 
their legitimacy in abstracto and the legitimacy of the order as a whole), and these norms 
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(as data in the simile here employed) can help the learning algorithm adapt the learner pro-
gram (the normative order of the internet).
This is an intriguing proposition, especially given the large amounts of data/ norms 
which meet the two criteria for inclusion in the normative order. The resources for ma-
chine learning (data) and for the self- controlled development of the normative order of 
the internet (norms) are constantly accruing. While companies moved first from singular 
data storage systems to decentralized solutions, now individuals store their data in various 
places, especially cloud- based services.223 Data, like norms in this study’s understanding, 
have become decentralized. It is no longer the company server/ the national legal systems 
that alone contain all necessary data/ norms. Yet they are still (usually) easily accessible and 
can be used by machines to detect patterns, something they are very good at, especially in 
large data sets: “the inference of a hidden model,” namely the underlying factors of human 
behavior and their interaction, “from the observed data [  . . .  ] is at the core of machine 
learning.”224 (This is why machine learning has also energized the field of artificial intel-
ligence225). Similarly, the “hidden model” of the normative order of the internet can be 
inferred from the norms related to it. Thus, the processes and principles of the normative 
order of the internet crystallize as meta- law of the internet.
It is important to note that the normative order of the internet, as any normative order, 
is by nature gradual and open, not determinate and closed.226 Normative orders function 
in praxis through processes of normative thickening and widening. Neither the notion 
of “norms” nor that of “order” can be read to include or exclude ex ante norms from 
any single normative order: it is only with the help of a meta- law of order, what Möllers 
calls “order- internal formalisms,”227 that orders of norms and normative orders are con-
stituted. They emerge slowly but are also imbued with a certain continuity. Breaking 
a norm does not invalidate the order, just as crimes do not challenge legal systems if 
they remain exceptional and are treated as norm violations. Rather, an order reaches a 
breaking point only when deviance is no longer recognized as such or reacted to by the 
relevant “order community.” Only when a violation of a norm is no longer perceived as 
such has the norm ceased to exist in the normative sense. This applies, mutatis mutandis, 
to the order as a whole.
The conception of “dynamic ordering” (dynamische Ordnungsbildung) is based on the 
realization that the internet challenges the legal order, a point this study has reiterated. 
The challenges include a dynamization of actors and instruments and the norms that have 
become hybridized and are structurally coupled to other social systems. This challenges 
theory (ideas), but it also challenges law (norms). In this sense the concept of a normative 
order of the internet can have substantial influence, given the destabilizing effect of “com-
puter culture” in today’s information society. Dynamization, hybridization, renarrativiza-
tion are all reasons why the law must provide society with more Erwartungssicherheit, a 
better sense of what to expect, more security and reliability in terms of expectations, namely 
the realization of legal interests.
 223 Ibid., 143.
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6.8.2 Facticity and Imperfectness
Rather than an “attack on law as a normative instance,”228 information and communica-
tion technologies challenge the law to develop further as a normative instance. Though law 
is important for regulating the internet, as variously mentioned in the foregoing chapters, 
“law” is not the only category of norms relevant for the normative order of the internet. 
Instead, a convincing theory of the normative order of the internet needs to be holistic in 
its approach to norms. It would be easy for purposes of systematization to argue that only 
norms that “make sense” within the normative order, that fit structurally, cohere in terms 
of purposiveness of the order, and have the same regulatory ethos, are “part” of the online 
order. But such an approach would amount to normative “à la carte- ism.” Non- conforming 
norms are still “part” of the normative order, but they can be criticized because of these 
non- conforming traits from within the order.
The dynamics of ordering online settings may disappoint those favoring establishing for-
mally binding norms on the internet. Recall the GGE 2015 report, which includes norms, 
rules, and principles for the responsible behavior of states, including the duty for states not 
to knowingly allow their territory to be used for internationally wrongful acts and the duty 
of states not to conduct or knowingly support ICT activity contrary to their obligations 
under international law.229 These principles (and the applicability of international law on 
the internet more broadly) were endorsed by the leaders of the G20 (Group of 20) and re-
ferred to affirmatively by the UN General Assembly.230 However, the cyberattack against the 
Ukrainian power grid happened only months after the submission of the GGE report, in 
December 2015, and the influence operations on social media regarding the US 2016 elec-
tion shortly after that.231
This is evidence that the process of developing norms accepted by all actors on the in-
ternet is slow and incomplete. However, the norms for state behavior are still important 
commitments, which, as “multilateralization of norms” more generally, help raise the “rep-
utational costs of bad behaviour.”232 In order to raise them, however, norm- non- conforming 
behavior needs to be identified and “called out” by, for instance, national criminal proceed-
ings against individuals involved in Chinese cyberespionage against the US in 2015– 2016233 
and Russian individuals targeting the US election system in information operations in 
2016– 2017.234
A holistic approach to the normative order considers norms during their whole life cycle. 
In political science terminology: they emerge as exercises of norm entrepreneurship, they 
are progressively implemented until a tipping point is reached, after which norms start to 
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cascade (and are applied broadly) and, in a final step, are decentrally internalized through 
prohibitive (reputational or economic) costs for non- compliance.
With regard to the internet, Nye sees the world as “largely at the first stage” (norm pro-
duction), perhaps entering the second (progressive pre- tipping/ cascading implementa-
tion).235 This is undercomplex, as “norms” on the internet are in very different positions 
within their “life cycle.” Some norms are far from being so “successful” as to cascade toward 
compliance (even if one does not look at the question of intrinsically motivated norm ad-
herence). Other norms, such as technical neutrality of the Internet Exchange Points, are 
broadly accepted.
But a norm- centered (individualizing) approach to the normative order of the internet 
(instead of a norms- centered, systemic one) has its limits. In a critical review of norm- 
setting progress in the GGE, Eneken Tikk suggests giving up comprehensivity in normative 
approaches to the internet. She bases her suggestion on the experience of the 2017 pro-
cess, which ended— unlike the normatively successful GGE process in 2015236— without a 
consensus document on new norms and good practices for states: “Given these near- dead 
ends, real issues might best be taken up bilaterally or multilaterally between countries and 
entities that have mutually agreed priorities and issues.”237 She suggests a “strategic pause in 
global talks” and then “bilateral consensus building” with an “à la carte” approach, enabling 
“willing countries to contribute according to their strategic ambitions, political priorities 
and available, realistic capabilities.”238
A functional theory of the normative order of the internet, however, needs to be based 
on a more holistic approach. A la carte approaches, proceduralized through ad hoc govern-
ance groups that dissolve once a norm has been developed, may bridge short- term norma-
tive gaps, but are no equivalent— even and especially in aggregate— to a holistic normative 
order of the internet, which is able to explain and justify the normative development of the 
internet and can provide the normative frame for digitality. Just as international law is much 
more than the sum of legal developments traceable back to the self- interest of states (sim-
ilar to the à la carte approach), the common- interest basis of the internet and the functional 
goal of information society, which the normative order of the internet is oriented toward 
(ensuring human rights, respecting international law, furthering human development), can 
be called upon as strong arguments for holistic ordering.
6.9  Conclusions
This chapter has established, as has been hypothesized, that a normative turn has taken 
place on the internet: the normative order’s internal rules of norm- production produce the 
technological and societal forces that, through learning normativity, develop norms auton-
omously within the order. This chapter has thus shown that, by using the legal code, we can 
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develop a normative order of the internet which does not ab initio depend on a state but 
includes states as normative actors and national law as a central source of norms. The order 
as envisaged here is largely autonomous, yet it is connected to other legal orders and has a 
global remit. The normative order of the internet is a legitimate order made up of norms 
which themselves are legitimated procedurally, through processes involving all relevant ac-
tors in their respective roles, and materially, through reference to the order’s purposes. It is 
thus not technicity that forms the norm, but the normative order and its norms which allow 
for the development of (and sets the limits to) technicity.
This chapter has demonstrated that a (or rather: the) normative order of the internet has 
emerged and legitimately and effectively frames the development of norms that influence 
the use and development of the internet. It conceptually encompasses all regulatory layers 
and players, is flexible, holistic, and dynamic. Its goal is to reduce the risks inherent in tech-
nological progress. The order does not seek to regulate all fact patters with a connection to 
the internet but only those that evidence a (1) material (non- trivial) connection between the 
regulatory question or the norm and the internet as a network of networks (2) in the norma-
tive sense. The contract to buy a smart fridge would thus not be a question of the normative 
order of the internet. The powers of a smart fridge to communicate within the internet of 
things and the home appliances company’s strategies to minimize the danger of the smart 
fridge being hacked and drafted into a botnet with spam coming out of the user’s kitchen, 
however, are very much a topic normatively relevant for the online order.
Having reconstructed the normative turn, that is, the turn toward the nomos, this 
chapter then showed how the normative order of the internet undergoes processes of auto- 
and hetero- constitutionalization. The normative order of the internet, as presented here, is 
a legal order. There is no Kelsenian Stufenbau on the internet, but the order is legal in the 
sense that it frames the legal space, seeks to ensure legal peace (Rechtsfrieden, rule of law) 
and, in addition, operates through the form of law and analogously to it. Its actors— states, 
legal persons, natural persons— fulfill diverse functions as norm entrepreneurs, norm ap-
pliers, and norm enforcers.
The order’s narratives of justification control new norms by assessing their technical con-
sistency and legal- cultural consonancy with the order’s purpose. The norms themselves can 
come from different sources and be of varying degrees of normativity. They include national 
laws and international legal acts, but also— importantly— a legal tertium: rules that belong 
to neither category. These include standards, soft law commitments, internet principles, 
terms of service, and hate speech guidelines. In their aggregate, they form an essential part 
of the normative order of the internet and are among the norms that most directly frame the 
user’s experience with the internet.
The normative order of the internet encompasses norm- generative processes and in-
cludes, through these, all relevant actors. This is one of the key principles of the normative 
order. Among the others we find the protection of human rights and intermediaries, the 
protection of the internet’s unfragmented nature and its functionality, and the furtherance 
of cultural and linguistic diversity.
As hypothesized, the normative order of the internet is a legitimate order with its le-
gitimacy proceduralized through normative processes that include all actors. Each field of 
norms— international law, national law, transnational normative arrangements— is legit-
imated either through traditional normative processes or by their integration into na-
tional legal orders. Each actor group is legitimated directly or indirectly and transfers this 
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legitimacy potential to the normative outcome, which is often— additionally— epistemically 
legitimate. The normative order itself is legitimate as a necessary order to ensure protection 
of and from the internet. The process of justifying the order is narrativized. As any order 
participant has a right to justification against norms and practices generally reciprocally, 
the normative order of the internet is, as most social orders, an order of justification.
The normative order of the internet has autonomous elements and is capable of self- 
constitutionalizing through a model of learning normativity on the basis of meta- rules 
(principles). Yet the order is also connected to international and national legal orders and is 
integrated into national law through judicial and systematic integration, as will be seen in 
the following chapter.
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 The Normative Order of the Internet  
in National Legal Orders
7.1 The Protective Dimension of National Legal Orders
The protective function of law is challenged by the internet: internet- based communi-
cation makes the protection of fundamental rights difficult because tangible “parts” of 
the internet necessary to ensure communication are physically situated outside of the 
territorial state.1 While the possibility to communicate is broadly protected through co-
operative measures (transnational data flows), there is, as Cornils argues, “no discernable 
trend to internationalization or transnationalization of the protection of legal interests 
[Rechtsgüter] in [national] communication law.” The protective function of law is still ex-
ercised in essence by states while the dangers are progressively outside of their territories 
or within their territories, but emanating from private actors. But the distinction between 
enabling communication (internationally) and regulating content/ protecting human 
rights (nationally) may not be a symptom of system dysfunction but rather a reflection 
of state interests.2 In this case, it must also be in the interest of the state to ensure the in-
tegration of the norms within the normative order of the internet through controlled, 
legitimizing processes.
As hypothesized, the normative order of the internet is substantially a legitimate norma-
tive order. Internationally (and transnationally), designing normative processes to encom-
pass participation possibilities for all relevant actors in their respective roles proceduralize 
legitimacy. However, under national legal systems, legitimacy conferral to the norms of the 
normative order of the internet works differently.
It has therefore been hypothesized that integrating the normative order of the internet 
internally leads to legitimate normative results, as traditional methods of legitimacy con-
ferral in national legal systems for norms below the level of law (and thus created outside 
traditional legitimacy- conferral mechanisms) serve this purpose. It should be understood 
that this only applies to a certain category of norms within the normative order of the in-
ternet, that is the transnational normative arrangements, standards, and code. Some norms 
from within the normative order of the internet are directly implemented through technical 
standards, such as those agreed upon by rough consensus in the framework of RFC proce-
dures,3 without formal integration by states of the norm into their legal system or a general 
commitment to accept certain norms as being part of the law of the land, as applies to most 
rules of international law.
 1 Matthias Cornils, “Entterritorialisierung im Kommunikationsrecht,” VVDStRL 76 (2017), 391– 442 (433). 
(translation by the author).
 2 Ibid., 434.
 3 See  chapter 3.1.
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This last chapter will thus analyze and systematize the integration of the norms of the 
normative order of the internet in the German legal system as an exemplary national legal 
regime. The first section will address the character of normative integration of order norms 
as exercises in legitimation (7.2). After this exposition, the following sections discuss the 
constitutional (7.3) and judicial (7.4) integration of the norms of the normative order. The 
legitimacy- conferring function of integrating tertium norms nationally is highlighted in 
7.5, which differentiates between different techniques of integration that all have a long 
pedigree. After discussing and dismissing critique of the integration of the normative 
order in national legal systems from a functional perspective (7.6), the chapter ends with 
conclusions (7.7).
7.2 Normative Integration as Legitimation
The normative order of the internet is an order of internet- related norms of different char-
acter, including national laws, international law, and transnational normative arrange-
ments. The last chapters have shown this order to be legitimate and constitutionalized (and 
constitutionalizable) through internal dynamics (auto- constitutionalization) and external 
processes (hetero- constitutionalization).4
National norms and international legal norms that form part of the normative order of the 
internet are legitimate within their regime- specific modalities and logics. This solves what 
Vesting terms the “problem of the digital constitution”5 by ensuring that societal values and 
goals remain protected and are channeled, in their performative energy, through norms, by 
the pouvoir constituant, to influence the behavior of those (same selves) in the pouvoir con-
stitué of the digital. Transnationally, normative processes have been found to give birth to 
and seek the implementation of non- traditional norms, with processes showing evidence of 
internalization and incorporation of norms created in transnational processes in different 
legal systems.6 Fundamental and human rights come into play within national law as back-
ground to the constitutional self- control of the order norms as “norms of collision for eval-
uating contrary logics of acting.”7
The normative order of the internet is a legitimate order. Its norms can be legitimated 
procedurally and materially. It consists of national law, international law, and transnational 
norms or normative arrangements. As states continue to play a central role in global society 
as repositories of culture and affiliation and as centers of narratives of belonging, any norms 
that apply need to be made relevant for the norm- applying powers within states through 
integration into national legal orders. This applies to all norms that form part of the norma-
tive order of the internet by being materially connected to the internet in a normative sense.
However, some norms are less in need of legitimation through national legal systems 
than others. National norms automatically form part of national law without any additional 
normative acts. International norms, belonging to the normative order of the internet, are 
 4 On constitutionalization, see 6.3.2.
 5 Thomas Vesting, Die Medien des Rechts: Computernetzwerke (Weilerswist: Velbrück Wissenschaft, 2015), 144.
 6 Felix Hanschmann, “Theorie transnationaler Rechtsprozesse,” in Sonja Buckel, Ralph Christensen, 
and Andreas Fischer- Lescano (eds.), Neue Theorien des Rechts, 2nd edn. (Stuttgart:  Lucius&Lucius, 2009), 
375– 99 (390).
 7 Cf. Vesting (2015), 144.
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part of national law following constitutionally provided processes of adoption or integra-
tion of international law. It is only the “tertium,” the third category of norms— transnational 
arrangements, soft law standards, private norms, technical standards— which are more dif-
ficult to conceptualize through a national legal frame.
As Stefan Kadelbach recalled almost 15 years ago in a review of international legal 
scholarship in Germany, the hitherto unsatisfying discussion on monism vs. dualism 
has been substantially enriched in more recent times:8 the direct application/ applica-
bility of “objective” international law has been dynamized by discussions on the proper 
role of international legal norms and on how national legal systems should cope with 
non- traditional norms that do not submit to constitutionally envisaged “checks” by 
presupposing a Rechtsanwendungsbefehl (an “order,” contained in a law, decided by a 
democratically legitimated legislative body, for a non- national norm to be applied like 
national law).
National constitutions have traditionally treated national law and international law as 
the two possible sides of a legal “coin.” As this study has shown in the previous chapters, 
however, the normative order of the internet contains a large number of norms that belong 
organically neither to international law nor to national legal orders. These transnational 
normative arrangements are a tertium, non- national and non- international legal norms 
that form part of the normative order of the internet and are nevertheless, through processes 
which will now be described, procedurally and materially legitimated as norms. When this 
chapter refers to the integration of the normative order of the internet into national legal 
systems, it mainly understands this to mean the integration of tertium norms. International 
legal norms forming part of the order, on the one hand, are legitimated— from an inter-
national law perspective— either through their emergence in traditional norm- making 
processes or, when they are new softer norms, through normative processes involving all 
relevant actors. National legal norms, on the other hand, have a presumption of legitimacy 
as they flow from constitutionally enshrined lawmaking processes.
7.3 Constitutional Integration of the Normative Order 
of the Internet
7.3.1 Multinormativity as Reality
The economic, social, and legal processes discussed under the heading of “globalization” 
have necessitated a progressive opening of national legal orders.9 The following rough peri-
odicization of norm interaction can be suggested:
 8 Stefan Kadelbach, “Völkerrecht als Verfassungsordnung? Zur Völkerrechtswissenschaft in Deutschland,” 
ZaöRV 67 (2007), 599– 621 (607).
 9 The opening of legal orders for another is linked to legal pluralism (Klaus Günther, “Normativer 
Rechtspluralismus— Eine Kritik,” Normative Orders Working Paper 03/ 2014, http:// publikationen.ub.uni- 
frankfurt.de/ files/ 34664/ Guenther_ Normativer+Rechtspluralismus.pd and Ralf Seinecke, Das Recht des 
Rechtspluralismus (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2015)), while the “logical” necessity for a functional normative order 
to be open is demonstrated already by Ilmar Tammelo, “Logical Openness of Legal Orders: A Modal Analysis 
of Law with Special Reference to the Logical Status of Non Liquet in International Law,” American Journal of 
Comparative Law, 8 (1959) 2, 187– 203.
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 (1) only “national” (or territorial) law applies within specified territories;10
 (2) non- territorial (i.e. international) law only applies after a consent act;
 (3) international law can be applied directly (in certain cases) without the intermediation 
of states;11 and
 (4) non- international law- based norms, including standards and soft law, are applicable 
within states and integrated into the national legal order.
These four periods overlap to a certain degree. The application of international law via a 
consent act (2) and the direct application of ius cogens and certain objective international 
legal norms (3) is the accepted status quo.12 The advent of standards as legal tertium and 
their integration into national law, however, is a more recent trend.
As shown earlier,13 if a national legal order acknowledges the normative relevance of the 
tertium norms, it accepts multi- normativity,14 and thus the “coexistence of different modi 
of normativity within the same social space.”15 Questions of implementation of the tertium 
norms and of their legitimation ensue. The German Basic Law (Grundgesetz, GG) appears 
to navigate the challenges of multinormativity well, as it shows instances of permeability 
and openness.
7.3.2  Permeability
There is no single treaty enshrining “international control over the internet.”16 However, 
such a treaty is not necessary. The normative order of the internet as a comprehensive nor-
mative framework for the regulation and governance of the internet is not premised upon 
the existence of such a treaty delineating rights and obligations of states and non- state ac-
tors. International law already provides the foil against which the normative tensions be-
tween global, regional, and national normative approaches to internet regulating can be 
measured.
Cornils fears that interpreting duties of normative restraint into the (German) constitu-
tion is problematic given the lack of such a “conventional anchor.”17 But this runs counter 
 10 With “nationality” and “national” law being constructs that have only developed slowly. See Klaus Günther, 
“Normativer Rechtspluralismus— Eine Kritik,” Normative Orders Working Paper 03/ 2014, http:// publikationen.
ub.uni- frankfurt.de/ files/ 34664/ Guenther_ Normativer+Rechtspluralismus.pd, 3– 4.
 11 Cf. Theodor Meron, Humanization of International Law (Amsterdam: Brill, 2014). On disintermediation, 
see Matthias C. Kettemann, The Future of Individuals in International Law. Lessons from International Internet 
Law (Utrecht: Eleven Publishing, 2013) and, on the special role of internet governance law as a key normative 
field of disintermediation which ushers in “a new trend whereby individuals enjoy recognition at the international 
level,” Mary Rundle and Malcolm Birding, “Filtering and the International System: A Question of Commitment,” 
in Ronald Deibert, John Palfrey, Rafal Rohozinski, and Jonathan Zittrain (eds.), Access Denied. The Practice and 
Policy of Global Internet Filtering (Cambridge, Mass./ London: The MIT Press, 2008), 73– 101 (74).
 12 On objective international law, see Jochen von Bernstorff, “German Intellectual Historic Origins of 
International Legal Positivism,” in Jörg Kammerhofer and Jean d’Asprement (eds.), International Legal Positivism 
in a Post- Modern World (Cambridge: CUP, 2014), 50– 80 (68).
 13 See, on administering hybrid normative spaces through multinormativity, 5.2.9.
 14 Michael Grünberger, “Transnationales Recht als responsiver Rechtspluralismus,” Der Staat 55 (2016), 
117– 33.
 15 Thomas Duve, “Was ist ‘Multinormativität’?— Einführende Bemerkungen,” Rechtsgeschichte— Legal History 
25 (2017), 88– 101 (90).
 16 Oliver Dörr, “Die Anforderungen an ein zukunftsfähiges Infrastrukturrecht,” VVDStRL 73 (2014), 
323– 67 (359).
 17 Matthias Cornils, “Entterritorialisierung im Kommunikationsrecht,” VVDStRL 76 (2017), 391– 442 (433).
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to the open conception of German constitutional law. Let us recall, with Andrea Bianchi, 
that transnational constitutionalization is a “German discipline.”18 German lawyers, Martti 
Koskenniemi argues, see normative developments taking place “within a ‘legal system’ that 
can be articulated through the vocabularies of public law and the constitution.”19 Thus, the 
normative order of the internet is closely linked to public law approaches, based on existing 
positive law but including certain idealistic elements— a feature of (international) legal ap-
proaches that Stefan Kadelbach considers typical of German (language) international law 
scholarship.20
International law, national law, and transnational normative arrangements are the three 
constituent orders of the normative order of the internet.21 As with all law, it is public na-
tional law (especially constitutional law) that then ensures the implementation of these 
norms. When it comes to the internet, norms from all three normative sources regulate the 
same social space. This phenomenon is called multinormativity.22 Multinormativity, how-
ever, is also present within the three orders, as even national legal systems, which are tradi-
tionally conceived mononormatively, share the normative space with other social orders.23 
Just as the management of legal pluralism necessitates meta- rules,24 multinormative spaces 
(and the internet can be justly characterized as one) need to rely on orders (within the nor-
mative order of the internet) that are open to one another and responsive.
Ideally, the orders adapt and become responsive25 and allow norms and concepts to mi-
grate and to flow into each other. For this to happen, the normative orders must be provided 
with a level of permeability. Following Franzius, this normative permeability is based on 
the principle of constitutional plurality.26 Collisions between the norms and narratives of 
different orders applying themselves to similar fact patterns have contributed to the emer-
gence of a framework of collision.27 This framework of collision in private law is the law of 
conflicts of law.
In public law, collisions of constitutions are usually impossible by definition. Either the 
constitutional law of one state applies or that of the other. While this is true with regard 
to many aspects a constitution usually regulates (for example: non- dual citizens can only 
vote once in one country, keeping in mind the problem of contested territories and nor-
mative nationality), the “impossibility” of collisions is dealt a serious blow by, e.g., human 
 18 Andrea Bianchi, International Law Theories. An Inquiry into Different Ways of Thinking (Oxford:  OUP, 
2016), 44.
 19 Martti Koskenniemi, “Between Coordination and Constitution: International Law as a German Discipline,” 
in Kari Palonen and Hubertus Buchstein (eds.), Redescriptions. Yearbook of Political Thought, Conceptual History 
and Feminist Theory, vol. 15 (Zurich/ Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2011), 45– 69 (64).
 20 Stefan Kadelbach, “Völkerrecht als Verfassungsordnung? Zur Völkerrechtswissenschaft in Deutschland,” 
ZaöRV 67 (2007), 599– 621 (607): “In dieser Lehre vom objektiven Völkerrecht einer Staatengemeinschaft kommt 
etwas für die deutschsprachige Völkerrechtswissenschaft Typisches wieder zum Vorschein: Sie ist zugleich am 
positiven Recht orientiert und idealistisch und steht damit in deutlichem Gegensatz zu realistischen Positionen” 
(notes omitted).
 21 Gerald Spindler, “Transnationalisierung und Renationalisierung des Rechts im Internet,” in Gralf- Peter 
Calliess (ed.), Transnationales Recht (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014), 193– 222.
 22 Cf. 5.2.9. See also Thomas Duve, “Was ist ‘Multinormativität’?— Einführende Bemerkungen,” 
Rechtsgeschichte— Legal History 25 (2017), 88– 101 (90).
 23 Ibid., 98.
 24 Klaus Günther, “Normativer Rechtspluralismus— Eine Kritik,” Normative Orders Working Paper 03/ 2014, 
http:// publikationen.ub.uni- frankfurt.de/ files/ 34664/ Guenther_ Normativer+Rechtspluralismus.pd, 3.
 25 Niklas Luhmann, Rechtssoziologie, 4th edn. (Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2008), 340 et seq.
 26 Claudio Franzius, Recht und Politik in der transnationalen Konstellation (Franfurt am Main:  Campus, 
2014), 258.
 27 Lars Viellechner, Transnationalisierung des Rechts (Weilerswist: Velbrück, 2013), 117.
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rights- related norms transcending one order that enter into conflict, when applied, with 
other norms from a different order. Responsivity includes elements of complementarity and 
subsidiarity,28 and is the conceptual bridge toward a “law of collision as horizontal consti-
tutional law.”29
German constitutional law provides ample space for normative self- reflection.30 This 
ability is tied to the existence of meta- rules of self- reflection and premised upon a regime’s 
or order’s ability to “self- reflect without destabilizing itself.”31
7.3.3  Openness
The ability of a normative order to self- reflect does not equal obligations of normative 
reticence in applying national legal rules. For Cornils, in light of a missing “interna-
tional legal point of reference,” “the constitutional friendliness towards international 
law cannot contain a subclause of internet friendliness [Internetfreundlichkeit] as 
long as the Internet is not an international institution [Einrichtung] in the sense of the 
law.”32
This is in reference to the openness (or “friendliness”) of the German constitution toward 
international law. Article 25 of the Basic Law prescribes that “general rules of international 
law shall be an integral part of federal law” and “shall take precedence over the laws and 
directly create rights and duties for the inhabitants of the federal territory.” There are thus 
two parts to the friendliness/ openness principle: first, general rules of international law are 
an integral part of federal law; and, second, they take precedence over the laws and citizens 
enjoy rights and duties stemming from them without interposition (or an act of acceptance) 
by the state, unless an additional state is necessary because of the non- self- executing nature 
of the norm.33
The internet is a global interconnection of networks, an “internetwork,” and not an insti-
tution. What should rather be compared to international law as a potential target to open 
public law toward is thus not “the internet” but rather the normative order of the internet. 
This order has been defined in this study as the
complex of norms, values, and practices that relate to the use and development of the in-
ternet and with which the activities of, and relationships among, states, private companies, 
and civil society with regard to the use and development of the internet are legitimated, in 
particular the exercise of private or public authority and the distribution of basic goods, 
including internet access and access to internet content.34
 28 Ibid., 269.
 29 Ibid., 265.
 30 Ibid., 268– 9. Niklas Luhmann, “Selbstreflexion des Rechtssystems,” Rechtstheorie 10 (1979), 159 et seq. See 
also 5.2.8.
 31 Gunther Teubner and Helmut Willke, “Kontext und Autonomie,” Zeitschrift für Rechtssoziologie 5 (1984), 
4– 35 (14).
 32 Matthias Cornils, “Entterritorialisierung im Kommunikationsrecht,” VVDStRL 76 (2017), 391– 442 (436) 
(translation by the author).
 33 See Hans Dieter Jarass, Art. 25, in Hans Dieter Jarass and Bodo Pieroth (eds.), Kommentar zum Grundgesetz, 
14th edn. (Munich: C.H.Beck, 2016), para. 3.
 34 See  chapter 1.2.3.
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At the same time, the Federal Constitutional Court confirmed that the Basic Law did not 
foresee a submission of the German legal system under the international order and the sine 
qua non primacy of international law. Rather, the formulation in Article 25 should increase 
respect for “international organizations that secure peace and freedom and international 
law without giving up the ultimate responsibility [of the German public authorities] to en-
sure the protection of human dignity and respect for fundamental rights.”35 There is no 
constitutional duty, however, to implement, without restrictions, all international legal 
norms.36
This study, however, submits that the Basic Law is generally open to the norms from 
within the normative order of the Internet— as delineated for instance in the Federal 
Constitutional Court’s Bodenreform III and Völkerrechtsdurchbrechung cases— applicable to 
general rules of international law.
The case for this is further strengthened by past practice of the German government re-
garding the evolution of non- traditional internet- related norms in processes involving all 
relevant actors. In 2014, the German government submitted to the Global Multistakeholder 
Meeting on the Future of Internet Governance, the NetMundial meeting, the “German 
Government Proposal on Global Internet Principles (2014).”37 It included, as Principle 1, 
a commitment to a “global, open and free nature of the internet as a single commons” and 
described the internet as “a driving force for progress towards development in its various 
forms including economic growth, encouraging innovation and allowing for creativity.”38 
Further principles contained in Germany’s document include that people have the same 
rights offline as online, that “access to the internet should respect the principles of non- 
discrimination, transparency and openness,” that the “rule of law must be the foundation 
for legislation and normative development online,” that states “must ensure full compliance 
with their obligations under international law,” and that the “security, stability, robustness 
and resilience of the internet as well as its ability to evolve should be a key objective of in-
ternet governance.”39
Already Human Rights Council Resolution 20/ 8 (2012) recognized the globality and 
openness of the internet as a key driving force toward progress.40 We similarly find openness 
as a key architectural principle of the internet’s fundamental make- up and as a key principle 
of standard- setting. This technical openness of the internet is mirrored by the openness (or 
friendliness) of German constitutional law into which the normative order of the internet, 
as presented and normatively constructed in this study, finds entry and gives rights and im-
poses obligations, without intermediation by the state, to non- state actors.
 35 BVerfG, judgment of 26 October 2004, 2 BvR 955/ 00, 2 BvR 1038/ 01, BVerfGE 112, 1 – Bodenreform III, 
para. 94:  “Das Grundgesetz (. . .) ordnet nicht die Unterwerfung der deutschen Rechtsordnung unter die 
Völkerrechtsordnung und den unbedingten Geltungsvorrang von Völkerrecht vor dem Verfassungsrecht an, son-
dern will den Respekt vor friedens- und freiheitswahrenden internationalen Organisationen und dem Völkerrecht 
erhöhen, ohne die letzte Verantwortung für die Achtung der Würde des Menschen und die Beachtung der 
Grundrechte durch die deutsche öffentliche Gewalt aus der Hand zu geben [ . . . ]” (translation by the author).
 36 BVerfG, order of 15 December 2015, 2 BvL 1/ 12, BVerfGE 141, 1 – Völkerrechtsdurchbrechung, paras. 64, 69.
 37 Germany, Federal Foreign Office, Commissioner for International Cyber Policy, German Government 
Proposal on Global Internet Principles (February 2014), submission to NetMundial, http:// content.NetMundial.
br/ contribution/ german- government- proposal- on- global- internet- principles/ 32.
 38 Ibid.
 39 Ibid.
 40 Human Rights Council, Resolution 20/ 8, The promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the 
Internet, UN Doc. A/ HRC/ RES/ 20/ 8 of 16 July 2012, para. 2.
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Article 25 of the Basic Law provides for a duty to interpret German law in a way that is 
friendly to international law. Substantial parts of the normative order of the internet are made 
up of international legal norms. It is therefore not a stretch to argue that internet- related norms 
of international law must be respected.41 In that reading, the Network Enforcement Act needs 
to be carefully measured not only against German law but also international law.
7.4 Judicial Integration of the Normative Order of the Internet
7.4.1 Threats to Rights as the Normative Background
States have a sovereignty- based obligation to ensure all human rights to everyone within 
their jurisdiction or control. Under German constitutional law, the state is obliged to ensure 
to all actors fundamental and human rights protection.42 This includes the necessary infra-
structure to communicate. Infrastructure law must be formulated in such a way as to enable 
the infrastructure- based provision of goods of general interest to the population.43 Just as 
roads are essential for the existence of the state, enabling communication is important for 
the social cohesion of state and society.44 Dörr traces this duty back to the responsibility 
of states, based on the principle of the social state, to provide fundamental goods to eve-
ryone and the protective duties of states (Schutzpflichten) to enable the realization of human 
rights, which in a country with an advanced system of the rule of law, such as Germany, 
happens via legislation.45
Protecting human rights is one of the ends of the normative order of the internet.46 
The protection of human rights is challenged by phenomena connected with progres-
sively stronger use of ICTs in society47 and the role of the internet in mediating or ena-
bling economic and political, private, and public activities. These include the use of 
algorithms in shaping individual48 and public49 communicative spaces, mass collection of 
 41 Hans Dieter Jarass in Hans Dieter Jarass and Bodo Pieroth (eds.), Kommentar zum Grundgesetz, 14th edn. 
(Munich: C.H.Beck, 2016), Art. 25, para. 4a.
 42 Cf. Thilo Marauhn, “Sicherung grund- und menschenrechtlicher Standards gegenüber neuen Gefährdungen 
durch private und ausländische Akteure,” VVDStRL 74 (2015), 373– 400 (385).
 43 Oliver Dörr, “Die Anforderungen an ein zukunftsfähiges Infrastrukturrecht,” VVDStRL 73 (2014), 
323– 67 (337).
 44 Ibid., 338.
 45 See Thilo Marauhn, “Sicherung grund- und menschenrechtlicher Standards gegenüber neuen Gefährdungen 
durch private und ausländische Akteure,” VVDStRL 74 (2015), 373– 400 (394).
 46 World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), Tunis Commitment, WSIS- 05/ TUNIS/ DOC/ 7- E, 18 
November 2005, para. 2; Human Rights Council, Resolution 32/ 13, The promotion, protection and enjoyment 
of human rights on the Internet, UN Doc. A/ HRC/ RES/ 32/ 13 of 18 July 2016; NetMundial, Multistakeholder 
Statement, Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet Governance, April 23– 24, 2014, São Paulo, 
Brazil, http:// netmundial.br/ wp- content/ uploads/ 2014/ 04/ NETmundial- Multistakeholder- Document.pdf. See 
also 6.5.2.
 47 Internet Usage Statistics, World Internet Users and 2018 Population Stats, December 31, 2017, http:// www.
Internetworldstats.com/ stats.htm.
 48 Jan- Hinrik Schmidt, “Filterblasen und Algorithmenmacht. Wie sich Menschen im Internet informieren,” in 
C. Gorr and M. C. Bauer (eds.), Gehirne unter Spannung: Kognition, Emotion und Identität im digitalen Zeitalter 
(Berlin/ Heidelberg: Springer, 2018), 35– 51.
 49 Jan- Hinrik Schmidt, Jannick Sørensen, Stephan Dreyer, and Uwe Hasebrink, Algorithmische Empfehlungen. 
Funktionsweise, Bedeutung und Besonderheiten für öffentlich- rechtliche Rundfunkanstalten (Hamburg:  Verlag 
Hans- Bredow- Institut, 2018), Hans- Bredow- Institut Working Papers No. 45, https:// www.hans- bredow- institut.
de/ uploads/ media/ default/ cms/ media/ w188msk_ 45AlgorithmischeEmpfehlungen.pdf.
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data,50 the new roles of private actors, especially intermediaries,51 and the transnational-
ization of communicative and contractual relations.52 States can still regulate the internet, 
and ensure human rights protection effectively, as long as the underlying fact patterns re-
main “purely national.”53 Germany’s Basic Law is “incorporated into the social- ethical prin-
ciples of German society,” so that rule of law and peaceful relations between individuals 
(Rechtsfrieden), both offline and online, are assured. Yet as soon as cases exhibit interna-
tional dimensions, the reliance on the state’s guarantee of citizens’ fundamental rights is 
becomes more challenging— and may ultimately be factually impossible.54
7.4.2 Internet Access as a Precondition for Exercising 
Fundamental Rights
Ensuring internet access is an important human right that is intimately connected to the 
exercise of other human rights online.55 In some states, the right to internet access is spe-
cifically prescribed or can be developed dogmatically.56 In the case of Yıldırım v. Turkey, 
the ECtHR confirmed that a right to internet access is part of the right to information and 
communication, protected by national constitutions: “it can therefore be inferred from all 
the general guarantees protecting freedom of expression that a right to unhindered internet 
access should also be recognized.”57
International and European law provide for the frame in which constitutional law guar-
antees the right to internet access. Responsible state organs should not wait passively for 
international law to crystallize into a conventional guarantee of internet access but should 
rather actively seek to integrate the right to access into national law. In doing so, the legis-
lator, as per the Federal Constitutional Court, has a certain leeway.58 The Basic Law protects 
primarily subject rights, but there exist objective- legal duties of the legislator to provide for 
the (normative and technical) infrastructure necessary to realize these rights. Ensuring the 
infrastructure necessary for the realization of human rights has been termed Grundrechtsv
oraussetzungschutz: ensuring a status for all in which fundamental rights can be realized.59 
 50 Critically, Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Report on Mass surveillance, Rapporteur Mr. Pieter 
Omtzigt, Doc. 13734 of 18 March 2015.
 51 Cf. Council of Europe, Recommendation CM/ Rec(2018)2 of the Committee of Ministers to member states 
on the roles and responsibilities of internet intermediaries, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 7 March 
2018, preamble.
 52 Gerald Spindler, “Transnationalisierung und Renationalisierung des Rechts im Internet,” in Gralf- Peter 
Calliess (ed.), Transnationales Recht (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014), 219.
 53 Utz Schliesky, Christian Hoffmann, Anika D. Luch, Sönke E. Schulz, and Kim Corinna Borchers, 
Schutzpflichten und Drittwirkung im Internet. Das Grundgesetz im digitalen Zeitalter (Baden- Baden:  Nomos, 
2014), 146.
 54 Ibid., 147.
 55 ECtHR, Yıldırım v. Turkey (December 18, 2012), application no. 3111/ 10.
 56 This section draws on Matthias C. Kettemann, “Das Recht auf Internet zwischen Völkerrecht, Staatsrecht und 
Europarecht,” Völkerrechtsblog, October 7, 2015, doi: 10.17176/ 20170920- 161413, Matthias C. Kettemann, “Das 
Internetgrundrecht zwischen Völkerrecht, Staatsrecht und Europarecht (II),” Völkerrechtsblog, October 9, 2015, 
doi:  10.17176/ 20170920- 161818, and Matthias C. Kettemann, “Das Internetgrundrecht zwischen Völkerrecht, 
Staatsrecht und Europarecht (III),” Völkerrechtsblog, October 12, 2015, doi: 10.17176/ 20170920- 162122.
 57 ECtHR, Yıldırım v. Turkey (December 18, 2012), application no. 3111/ 10, para. 31.
 58 But see BVerfG, judgment of the First Senate of July 18, 2012, 1 BvL 10/ 10, Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz, 
para. 94.
 59 Cf. Wolfgang Weiß, Privatisierung und Staatsaufgaben. Privatisierungsentscheidungen im Lichte einer grun-
drechtlichen Staatsaufgabenlehre unter dem Grundgesetz (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2002), 147.
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The status negativus of fundamental rights— the right to unhindered internet access as per 
the ECtHR’s Yıldırım case— needs to be understood in conjunction with a state duty to im-
plement rights.
In 2008, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that the general right of personality 
pursuant to Article 2 (1) in conjunction with Article 1 (1) of the Basic Law encompasses 
a “fundamental right to the guarantee of the confidentiality and integrity of information 
technology systems.” The Court first focused on the status negativus, confirming that “[t] he 
individual relies on the state respecting the expectations of the integrity and confidenti-
ality of such systems which are justified with regard to the unhindered development of the 
personality.”60
The state has to respect (“achten”) fundamental rights, but it must do more. Since the 
(negative) right to informational self- determination does not provide for a normative 
defense in situations where “personality endangerments” emerge from reliance by the in-
dividual on the use of information technology systems by entrusting personal data to the 
system,61 a further right needed to be established. This “fundamental right to the guar-
antee of the integrity and confidentiality of information technology systems” is to be ap-
plied, by contrast, “if the empowerment to encroach covers systems which alone or in 
their technical networking can contain personal data of the person concerned to such a 
degree and in such a diversity that access to the system facilitates insight into significant 
parts of the life of a person or indeed provides a revealing picture of the personality.”62 
Forcing the state to ensure the integrity of these IT systems closes a protection loophole 
and ensures that new types of endangerment of human rights due to scientific and tech-
nical progress are met.
Already in 2013, the German Federal Court of Justice (BGH) confirmed that the 
internet is used on a daily basis by the majority of German citizens and that the in-
ternet is of “central importance” for daily life; non- access “significantly impacts the 
material foundation of living.”63 The facts underlying this case go back to 2008 and 
2009. In the twelve years since Germany’s highest civil court ruled internet access as 
significant for the way citizens live their lives, the importance of internet access has 
only increased.
In light of these judgments a right to access can therefore be developed dogmatically as 
an objective- legal fundamental rights implication, as an independent right to internet ac-
cess within the right to the provision of a subsistence minimum by the state (Article 1 in 
conjunction with Article 20 (1) of the Basic Law) or, finally, as a “gateway” right to the exer-
cise of other rights.64
 60 BVerfG, judgment of the First Senate of February 27, 2008, 1 BvR 370/ 07, para. 181.
 61 Ibid., para. 200.
 62 Ibid., para. 203.
 63 BGH, Judgment of January 24, 2013, III ZR 98/ 12, 22 (“Die Nutzbarkeit des Internets ist ein Wirtschaftsgut, 
dessen ständige Verfügbarkeit seit längerer Zeit, jedenfalls vor dem hier maßgeblichen Jahreswechsel 2008/ 2009, 
auch im privaten Bereich für die eigenwirtschaftliche Lebenshaltung typischerweise von zentraler Bedeutung ist 
und bei dem sich eine Funktionsstörung als solche auf die materiale Grundlage der Lebenshaltung signifikant 
auswirkt”) (translation by the author).
 64 Wolfgang Hoffmann- Riem, “Freiheitsschutz in den globalen Kommunikationsinfrastrukturen,” JZ 2 
(2014), 53– 63.
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7.4.3 Access and Subsistence Minimum
In light of the central role of the internet as a locus of communication, ensuring access 
amounts to a duty of states as part of the right to be provided with a subsistence minimum. 
In its Hartz IV judgment, the Federal Constitutional Court confirmed each citizen a “di-
rect constitutional benefit claim to a guarantee of a subsistence minimum.” This minimum 
must cover “those means which are vital to maintain an existence that is in line with human 
dignity.” The uniform fundamental rights guarantee related to the subsistence minimum 
encompasses “both the physical existence of the individual, that is food, clothing, house-
hold goods, housing, heating, hygiene and health and [ensures] the possibility to maintain 
inter- human relationships and a minimum of participation in social, cultural and political 
life, given that humans as persons of necessity exist in social relationships”65 The minimum 
participation in social, cultural, and political life cannot be conceived of, under the condi-
tions of modernity, without access to the internet. Humans become persons (social beings) 
by defining themselves in communicative processes with others. These processes now often 
take place on the internet.
The Court guarantees the subsistence minimum as a statutory claim ensured by a par-
liamentary statute, containing “a concrete benefit claim on the part of the citizen towards 
the competent benefit institution.” Parliament needed to implement the subsistence min-
imum: “[the] obligation incumbent on the legislature to make the provisions material to the 
realisation of the fundamental right itself already emerges from the principles of the rule of 
law and of democracy.”66
The Court also recognizes that needs change as society evolves, both in absolute and 
relative terms. What is necessary to ensure a dignified existence depends on the circum-
stances of the rights holder and “the respective economic and technical circumstances.” 
Note the reference to the “technical circumstances,” which must be read to include the 
evolution of internet technologies, especially when the Court goes on to explain that the 
principle of the social welfare (Article 20 (1) of the Basic Law) forces Parliament to as-
sess social reality “in a manner that is appropriate to the present day and realistic with 
regard to the guarantee of the subsistence minimum that is in line with human dignity, 
which for instance is different in a technological information society than was previ-
ously the case.”
What matters are the “actual circumstances” in today’s internet age:  the legislature 
has a narrower scope to determine what is necessary when concretizing the needs re-
lated to rightsholders’ physical existence and a broader one “when it comes to the nature 
and scope of the possibility to participate in social life.”67 In a follow- up 2014 ruling, the 
Court reiterates that the requirements of the Basic Law to effectively ensure a dignified 
minimum existence need to be adapted to actual conditions and constantly scrutinized 
by the legislator.68
 65 BVerfG, judgment of the First Senate of February 09, 2010— 1 BvL 1/ 09, Hartz IV, para 135 (notes omitted).
 66 Ibid., para. 137.
 67 Ibid., para. 138.
 68 BVerfG, order of the First Senate of July 23, 2014, 1 BvL 10/ 12, paras. 1– 149.
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7.4.4 Fundamental Right to Access as a Human Right to Access
In its 2012 judgment on the Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz, the Federal Constitutional Court 
extended the protective ambit of the Hartz IV decision while keeping its reasoning intact. 
Article 1 (1) of the Basic Law, read together with Article 20 (1) (the principle of the social 
welfare state), guarantees dignity through the instrument of a subsistence minimum. But 
the fundamental right to this subsistence minimum is a human right as per Article 1 (1) of 
the Basic Law.69
Using language identical to that of the Hartz IV decision, the Court confirmed the ex-
istence of a “direct constitutional benefit claim to the guarantee of a dignified minimum 
existence” for all. It guarantees “the entire minimum existence,” encompassing physical ex-
istence (food, clothing, household items, housing, heating, hygiene, and health) but also 
guaranteeing “the possibility to maintain interpersonal relationships and a minimal degree 
of participation in social, cultural and political life, since a human as a person necessarily 
exists in social context.”70 Again, the Court confirmed that the scope of the benefit claim de-
pends on societal and technological developments: “on the specific living conditions of the 
persons in need, and on the respective economic and technical circumstances.”71
Ensuring that everyone within Germany can develop their personality in social con-
texts is essential for their development into citizens. Establishing communicative relations 
through participation in, and ownership of, communicative and socializing processes72 is 
key to sociality.73 Sociology informs us that we, as human beings, are constantly at work 
on ourselves: we are “Existenzbastler,”74 and in today’s internet age the important aspects 
of one’s “existence” in technologically advanced societies (as an employee, as a person, as a 
rightsholder) are mediated through the internet and need to be protected as such by states. 
Conversely, users (and online media) engage in attempts to construct audiences (views, 
likes, upvotes) to enhance one’s reputation.75 The right to internet access is thus a key right 
not only of information society, but of society in times when the conditio humana is (de)con-
structed and (re)narrativized through media, and the media of law are changing.
We can therefore conclude that German law contains an Internetgrundrecht, a fun-
damental right to internet access, which imposes upon the state a number of different 
obligations. These include ensuring the infrastructure necessary for internet access, 
the individual’s ability to access the internet through provision of minimum subsist-
ence, and a legal framework that ensures to everyone secure communication online. This 
Internetgrundrecht, as normatively preconfigured in international law, ties in with the con-
stitutional principle of friendliness to public law and respect for human and fundamental 
 69 BVerfG, judgment of the First Senate of July 18, 2012, 1 BvL 10/ 10, Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz.
 70 Ibid., para. 64.
 71 Ibid., para. 66.
 72 Oliver Dimbath, “Vergemeinschaftende Vergesellschaftung und die Intention eines Dritten” in Gert Albert, 
Rainer Greshoff, and Rainer Schützeichel (eds.), Dimensionen und Konzeptionen von Sozialität (Berlin: Springer 
VS, 2010), 33– 45.
 73 Bernhard Waldenfels, Sozialität und Alterität— Modi sozialer Erfahrung (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 
2015).
 74 Cf. Ronald Hitzler, “Der Goffmensch,” in Anne Honer, Michael Meuser, and Michaela Pfadenhauer (eds.), 
Fragile Sozialität. Inszenierungen, Sinnwelten, Existenzbastler (Berlin: Springer VS, 2010), 17– 34.
 75 Nora A. Draper and Joseph Turow, “Audience Constructions, Reputations, and Emerging Media Technologies: 
New Issues of Legal and Social Policy,” in Roger Brownsword, Eloise Scotford, and Karen Yeung (eds.), Oxford 
Handbook of Law, Regulation, and Technology (Oxford: OUP, 2017), 1143– 68.
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rights and is further evidence of the integration of the normative order of the internet into 
the German legal system.
7.5 Systematic Integration of Tertium Norms
7.5.1 Automatic Application
The normative order of the internet is made up of international norms, national norms, and 
transnational normative arrangements.76 Previously, this study has argued that for a norm 
to be part of the normative order of the internet it must be (1) materially (non- trivially) 
and (2) normatively (not merely factually) connected to the internet. International legal 
norms, such as the principle of custodial sovereignty regarding critical internet resources, 
e.g. Internet Exchange Points, are part of the normative order, and, as general rules of in-
ternational law, part of Germany’s legal order as per Art. 25 of the Basic Law. National laws 
forming part of the normative order of the internet are applicable per se and provide for 
rights and duties for citizens without further normative intervention.
7.5.2 Post- Consent Application
The origin of norms influences their impact and legitimacy. A national norm of one country 
is (usually) not applied in another country. Cases of extraterritorial application of norms are 
few77 and often controversial.78 International law, by contrast, is often universally conceived 
and thus most states have developed techniques of integrating international legal norms. 
Under Article 25 of the German Basic Law, general rules of international law are an “integral 
part of federal law” and shall “take precedence over the laws and directly create rights and 
duties for the inhabitants of the federal territory.” The rules are different regarding treaties. 
These are concluded pursuant to Article 59 (1) of the Basic Law by the Federal President, 
but are not directly applicable if they regulate “political relations of the Federation or re-
late to subjects of federal legislation.” In these cases, the Basic Law reserves a role for the 
Bundestag. These treaties “shall require the consent or participation, in the form of a federal 
law, of the bodies responsible in such a case for the enactment of federal law” (Article 59 
(2) of the Basic Law).79
 76 See  chapter 6.4.2.
 77 See for instance the approach of the General Data Protection Regulation, Regulation (EU) 2016/ 679 OJ L 
119/ 1 of 4 May 2016. Pursuant to Article 3(2), the GDPR applies to controllers or processors of data not established 
in the EU in cases where “the processing activities are related to: (a) the offering of goods or services, irrespective of 
whether a payment of the data subject is required, to such data subjects in the Union; or (b) the monitoring of their 
behaviour as far as their behaviour takes place within the Union.”
 78 Cf. the US Alien Tort Claims Act of 1789:  Harold Berman, “The Alien Tort Claims Act and the Law of 
Nations,” Emory International Law Review 9 (2005), 69. For a recent application of the Act, see Deutscher 
Bundestag (Wissenschaftlicher Dienst), Voraussetzungen für die Zuständigkeit US- amerikanischer Gerichte nach 
dem Alien Torts Claim Act Schadensersatzklagen der Herero und Nama, AZ WD 2- 3000- 021/ 17, March 2, 2017, 
https:// www.bundestag.de/ blob/ 502258/ 30c9d52ce0e5a6f0a97c3e99b05264f6/ wd- 2- 021- 17- pdf- data.pdf.
 79 Article 32 (3) GG provides that insofar as “the Länder have power to legislate, they may conclude treaties with 
foreign states with the consent of the Federal Government.”
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This consent or participation, taking the form of a federal law, nationalizes the interna-
tional norm (that is not already part of nationally applicable law pursuant to Article 25) by 
reconfiguring it as part of national law: this is the Rechtsanwendungsbefehl. The assessment 
becomes more difficult when it comes to “objective international law”: norms which are 
universal- idealistic in character but oriented toward positive law. Their role has changed 
substantially in recent years to the point that they have reinvigorated and added nuance to 
the debate between monist and dualist approaches to international law.80 This is especially 
true for the growing body of international human rights law and its judicial interpretation 
and ius cogens rules.
The approach pursued here goes beyond the debates surrounding monist and dualist ap-
proaches to international law. Both are of little use as dogmatic constructions for solving 
questions of the normativity of transnational regulation: they serve “neither analytically 
nor normatively as theoretical constructions”81 to conceptualize the legal order. Dualist 
approaches provide little help in establishing how to integrate transnational norms (as 
tertium) into national legal orders, given that they argue for the existence of a primum (na-
tional law) and secundum (international law) and leave the integration of the latter into the 
former to national law’s rules on consent acts. Monism with an international law primacy 
might be the base of a liberal- cosmopolitan reading of international law but suffers from the 
same shortcomings as global- legalist approaches. Monism with a national law primacy is 
difficult to unite with conceptions of an international law- based global community of states.
This act of consent remains a central figure in the integration of international/ transna-
tional rules in national legislation. Premising the “legality” of norms on formal acts of con-
sent, however, risks ignoring the influence of transnational regulation that is not part of 
traditional international law (which can be “nationalized” through formal acts of consent). 
In the 2004 Görgülü decision, the German Constitutional Court confirmed that the prin-
ciple according to which German judges are bound by statute and law (pursuant to Article 
20 (3) of the Basic Law) includes decisions of the ECtHR “as part of a methodologically 
justifiable interpretation of the law”:82 “Both a failure to consider a decision of the EC[t] HR 
and the ‘enforcement’ of such a decision in a schematic way, in violation of prior- ranking 
law, may therefore violate fundamental rights in conjunction with the principle of the rule 
of law.”83
While decisions by international courts are not per se binding, their application be-
comes an obligation for states when the treaty underlying their function is integrated into 
federal law by a parliament consent act.84 But what, this section will ask, if such a consent 
act is missing? This study has posited throughout that there are non- national and non- 
international legal norms that form part of the normative order of the internet and are 
 80 Stefan Kadelbach, “Völkerrecht als Verfassungsordnung? Zur Völkerrechtswissenschaft in Deutschland,” 
ZaöRV 67 (2007), 599– 621 (607).
 81 Armin von Bogdandy, “Prinzipien von Staat, supranationalen und internationalen Organisationen,” § 232 
(275– 304), in Josef Isensee, Paul Kirchhof, et al. (eds.), Handbuch des Staatsrechts, Band XI: Internationale Bezüge, 
3rd edn. (2013) (also published as Armin von Bogdandy, “Prinzipielles zur Pluralität normativer Ordnungen. Zu 
den Anforderungen an die Ausübung öffentlicher Gewalt,” Normative Orders Working Paper 1/ 2013), 12 (transla-
tion by the author).
 82 BVerfG, order of the Second Senate of October 14, 2004, 2 BvR 1481/ 04, para. 47.
 83 Ibid.
 84 See Christoph Gusy, “Wirkungen der Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte in 
Deutschland,” JA (2009), 406; and Matthias Ruffert, “Die Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention und innerstaat-
liches Recht,” EuGRZ (2007), 245.
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procedurally and materially legitimated as norms. They are a “tertium.” Thus, this study 
posits, not only tertium datur,85 but so does this normative tertium contain formally and 
materially legitimated norms that form part of national legal systems.
7.5.3 Deformalized Application
The example of cybersecurity can illustrate what norms are to be counted as transnational 
normative arrangements (tertium) and not as international legal norms, which are either 
(as general rules of international law) an “integral part of federal law” under Article 25 
of the German Basic Law or incorporated into German law through a consent act by the 
legislative power.
Many of the norms of cybersecurity are part of the international legal duty of coopera-
tion.86 Recognizing this, the GGE report of 2015 recommended setting confidence- building 
measures to strengthen international peace and security, which would increase interstate 
cooperation, transparency, predictability, and stability, in particular by facilitating “cross- 
border cooperation to address critical infrastructure vulnerabilities.”87 Duties to cooperate 
can thus be internationally legally mandated obligations for states. Depending on their nor-
mative form, they can be part of the normative tertium. This is particularly applicable for 
norms developed in technical norm- setting processes, such as the RFC series, or soft law 
standards.
As illustrated by the April 10, 2018, Council conclusions on malicious cyber activities, 
however, international law and transnational soft norms are often interrelated. First, the EU 
confirms that it is committed to upholding that “existing international law is applicable to 
cyberspace and emphasizes that respect for international law, in particular the UN Charter, 
is essential to maintaining peace and stability.”88 Yet the EU also recognizes that the inter-
connected nature of cyberspace necessitates “joint efforts by governments, private sector, 
civil society, technical community, users and academia to address the challenges faced” and 
calls on actors to accept their “responsibilities to maintain an open, free, secure and stable 
cyberspace.”89 This norm can be termed a “tertium” norm within the normative order of the 
internet and can be reformulated as follows: each actor should participate in norm- making 
processes in light of its specific responsibilities. Clearly, this rule cannot be directly applied by 
national courts. A parliamentary consent act cannot be sought due to the lack of clarity as 
to the normative content. However, the norm has relevance for national legal systems due to 
 85 This study thus varies the law of the excluded middle: tertium non datur. Formulated more fully as prin-
cipium exclusi tertii sive medii inter duo contradictoria, the notion goes back to Aristotle (Met. III, 7, p. 1011 b 
23): “alla mên oude metaxy antiphaseôs endechetai einai outhen” (“there is nothing between the contradictions”), 
as quoted in Friedrich Kirchner, Wörterbuch der philosophischen Grundbegriffe (Heidelberg: Georg Weiss Verlag, 
1890/ 1907), s.v. Principium exclusi tertii seu medii inter duo contradictoria (online at http:// www.textlog.de/ 2117.
html).
 86 See Rüdiger Wolfrum, “Cooperation, International Law of,” in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (MPEPIL) (Oxford: OUP, 2008) (December 2010), paras. 10– 12, and 
3.3.4.5.
 87 United Nations, Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of 
International Security, Report of the Secretary General, A/ 70/ 174 of July 22, 2015, http:// www.un.org/ ga/ search/ 
view_ doc.asp?symbol=A/ 70/ 174 (“GGE report (2015)”), para. 19.
 88 Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on malicious cyber activities, 10 April 2018, Doc. 7517/ 
18, Annex, http:// www.consilium.europa.eu// media/ 33721/ malicious- cyber- activities- en.pdf.
 89 Ibid., 3.
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its soft normativity. It can enter national legal systems as a soft law standard, a legal tertium 
beyond national and international law.
Similarly, fostering and ensuring cybersecurity are prerequisites for the full realization 
of all human rights,90 and as such normative approaches supporting cybersecurity are in-
ternational law- based and, through national Cybersecurity Declarations (and consent acts 
by parliaments), form part of the “primum” and “secundum” of law from a national per-
spective. By contrast, the May 2017 WannaCry Ransomware attack shows how vulnerabil-
ities are caused by a number of factors, including software companies who fail to provide 
updates or no longer service vulnerabilities, affected companies that have slow patch cycles, 
secret services that stockpile vulnerabilities, and states that do not force essential service 
providers (like healthcare companies) to ensure that their systems are stable and secure.91 
The norm “software companies need to provide updates and service vulnerabilities” has at 
least some identifiable normative content. However, it is neither international law nor na-
tional law, but rather forms a specific transnational norm.
Directive (EU) 2016/ 1148, concerning measures for a high common level of security of 
network and information systems across the Union,92 identifies the need for “closer inter-
national cooperation to improve security standards and information exchange, and to pro-
mote a common global approach to security issues” regarding network and information 
systems.93 Most of these security standards are norms that are neither national nor interna-
tional law- based though they are normatively relevant for the purposes of both orders. This 
is particularly relevant because these norms influence directly the activities of operations of 
essential services and digital service providers.
The Directive also provides that a “culture of risk management, involving risk assessment 
and the implementation of security measures appropriate to the risks faced, should be pro-
moted and developed through appropriate regulatory requirements and voluntary industry 
practices.”94 Similarly, the Directive considers that states should “encourage compliance 
or conformity with specified standards so as to ensure a high level of security of network 
and information systems at Union level”95 and, in Article 19 (1) of the Directive, requires 
member states to “encourage the use of European or internationally accepted standards 
and specifications relevant to the security of network and information systems.” Article 16 
(1) references the “state of the art” that states need to consider in passing measures to ensure 
that digital service providers develop a normative and organizational framework respon-
sive to the risks posed to the security of network and information systems by their services, 
including (lit e.) “compliance with international standards.”
Thus, in this one Directive alone references are made to “appropriate regulatory require-
ments,” “voluntary industry practices,” “European standards,” “internationally accepted 
standards,” “international standards,” and “specifications.” All of the norms underlying 
 90 Matthias C. Kettemann, “Ensuring Cybersecurity through International Law,” Revista Española de Derecho 
internacional 69 (2) (2017), 281– 89, 283.
 91 CCDCOE, “WannaCry Campaign: Potential State Involvement Could Have Serious Consequences,” May 16, 
2017, https:// ccdcoe.org/ wannacry- campaign- potential- state- involvement- could- have- serious- consequences.
html.
 92 Directive (EU) 2016/ 1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concerning measures 
for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union, OJ L 194, 19 July 2016.
 93 Ibid., recital 43.
 94 Ibid., recital 44.
 95 Ibid., recital 66.
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these normative notions belong to the tertium as neither clearly national nor clearly interna-
tional. Their position and role in national legal orders is difficult to pinpoint. Generalizing 
assessments of their relative position are impossible to make. Transnational norms are ei-
ther (1) ignored by states; (2) translated into national law (or applied after formal consent); 
or (3) de facto applied and, through its application, integrated and legitimized without a 
clear Rechtsanwendungsbefehl. The first “avenue” consists of a failure of effective norm prop-
agation;96 the second “avenue” is the traditional normative track for non- national law; the 
third avenue is most challenging as a tool for norm integration. Reconstructing the applica-
tion of tertium norms is the task of the following sections.
7.5.4  Transposition
One approach that German law takes to incorporate tertium norms is the transposition of 
European legislation into national laws. With regard to the normative order of the internet, a 
recent example is Directive (EU) 2016/ 1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 6 July 2016 concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and in-
formation systems across the Union,97 which was transposed into German law by a 2016 
law introducing changes to the Law on the Federal Office for the Security of Information 
Technology (Gesetz über das Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik 
(BSI- Gesetz— BSIG)).98
The Directive’s recitals reference transnational regulatory arrangements, such as “secu-
rity standards”:99 “appropriate regulatory requirements and voluntary industry practices 
[ . . . ] for a culture of risk management, involving risk assessments and the implementa-
tion of security measures appropriate to the risks faced.”100 Recital 66 recalls that standard-
izing security requirements is a “market- driven process.” States should encourage actors 
to comply or conform with “specified standards” to ensure the “convergent application of 
security standards” leading to a “high level of security of network and information sys-
tems.”101 The European institutions may even “draft harmonised standards” in accordance 
with Regulation (EU) 1025/ 2012 on European standardization.102
Returning to the Directive, Article 16 (1) on security requirements and incident noti-
fication obligations of digital service providers includes references to the “state of the art,” 
that is internationally accepted standards.103 States are obliged to ensure that digital ser-
vice providers take necessary technical and organization- related measures to manage risks. 
 96 See  chapter 6.8.
 97 Directive (EU) 2016/ 1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concerning meas-
ures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union, OJ L 194, 19 July 
2016, p. 1– 30.
 98 Gesetz über das Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik of 14 August 2009 (BGBl. I  S. 
2821) (last changed by Article 1 of the Law of 23 June (BGBl. I S. 1885)).
 99 Directive (EU) 2016/ 1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concerning meas-
ures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union, OJ L 194, 19 July 
2016, recital 43.
 100 Ibid., recital 44.
 101 Ibid., recital 66.
 102 Regulation (EU) 1025/ 2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on European 
standardisation, OJ L 316/ 12, 14 November 2012.
 103 The new § 8c of the BSI- Gesetz turns this into the obligation to ensure an adequate level “unter 
Berücksichtigung des Stands der Technik.”
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These measures must be “state of the art” and take into account, inter alia, “compliance with 
international regulations.” This section was transposed into German law in the new § 8c of 
the BSIG,104 which translates compliance as “Einhaltung” and international standards as 
“internationale Normen.” This illustrates one problem with the German concept of Normen 
(norms): Normen can be standards and Normen can be norms.
Article 19 of the Regulation on standardization encourages the use of standards, namely 
“European or internationally accepted standards and specifications relevant to the se-
curity of network and information systems,” but the Regulation, as a matter of principle, 
recognizes the existence of “technical specifications that are not national, European or in-
ternational standards.”105 These technical specifications include standard- like normative 
instruments that have not been formally endorsed by standard- setting organizations na-
tionally or internationally.
As a key regulatory instrument of the normative order of the internet, Directive 
(EU) 2016/ 1148 shows clearly how references to standards and standardized practices 
can enter into German law through transposition of supranational law. Similarly, di-
rect application of European regulations, such as the Standardization Regulation, pro-
vides for the inclusion of non- standard “technical specifications” into the national 
normative order.
7.5.5  Referencing
While soft law can be applied without formal consultation of the legislature,106 the inclu-
sion of soft law standards (directly or by reference) in German legislation increases their 
rational and formal legitimacy. This process may occur in tandem with the transposition of 
EU law. However, even without EU foundations, German laws regulating national aspects 
of the normative order of the internet have included references to transnational normative 
arrangements, such as internet standards. A good example is the Act on the Federal Office 
for Information Security, the BSIG.107
Already § 2 (2) of the BSIG, on the concepts used in the law, defines “security of 
information technology” as compliance with “certain security standards for the 
availability, integrity, or confidentiality of information, by means of security precau-
tions.” How can these certain security standards develop if not through international 
standard- setting in inclusive processes involving all relevant actors? Furthermore, § 3 
(1) (4) defines the tasks of the Federal Office for Information Security, including “de-
veloping criteria, procedures and tools to test and evaluate the security of information 
 104 Through this law: Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie (EU) 2016/ 1148 des Europäischen Parlaments und 
des Rates vom 6. Juli 2016 über Maßnahmen zur Gewährleistung eines hohen gemeinsamen Sicherheitsniveaus 
von Netz- und Informationssystemen in der Union (BGBl. I, Nr. 40 of June 29, 2017).
 105 Chapter VI of Regulation (EU) 1025/ 2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 
on European standardisation, OJ L 316/ 12, 14 November 2012.
 106 Stefan Oeter, “Vom Völkerrecht zum transnationalen Recht  – ‘transnational administrative networks’ 
und die Bildung hybrider Akteursstrukturen,” in Gralf- Peter Calliess (ed.), Transnationales Recht. Stand und 
Perspektiven (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014), 388– 402 (394– 5).
 107 BSI Act of 14 August 2009 (Federal Law Gazette I, 2821), last amended by Article 1 of the Act of 23 June 2017 
(Federal Law Gazette I, 1885).
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technology systems or components and to test and evaluate compliance with IT secu-
rity standards.”108
Similarly, § 3 (1) (6) charges the Office with “testing information technology systems and 
components and confirming compliance with IT security standards defined in the Federal 
Office’s technical guidelines” (emphasis added). Again, these standards are not standards 
derived (only) from German law and practice, but rather draw substantially from interna-
tional normative developments of norms that this study has identified as belonging to the 
normative tertium within the normative order of the internet.
German law, in casu the BSIG, distinguishes between standards developed by the Federal 
Office (based— as non- fragmentation- producing, standard- setting endeavors usually are— 
on standards developed in international normative processes or identical to them) and 
their “enactment” as a formal part of Germany’s public law. Under § 8 (1) of the BSIG, on the 
Federal Office’s guideline powers, the Office is provided with the power to “develop min-
imum standards for ensuring the security of federal information technology.” In a second 
step, these standards can then be developed as “general administrative regulations for all 
federal bodies”: “[i] n consultation with the Council of Chief Information Officers of the 
federal ministries, the Federal Ministry of the Interior may issue the standards developed in 
full or in part as general administrative regulations for all federal bodies.”
These standards as regulations can take a different form when other bodies are in-
volved, especially “courts and [certain] constitutional bodies,” such as the Bundestag, the 
Bundesrat, and the Federal President (see § 2 (3), second sentence). Then the regulations 
have the status of recommendations.
A further reference included in German legislation that invokes the international nor-
mative development of transnational norms is one to “state of the art,” when information 
and communication technologies are concerned. As argued previously, the “state of the art” 
can only realistically be determined with reference to sources outside of Germany. These 
sources are the normatively relevant practices among, and connected standards produced 
by, the global internet community.
Moreover, § 8a (1) BSIG obliges operations of critical infrastructures “to take appro-
priate organisational and technical precautionary measures in order to avoid disruptions 
of the availability, integrity, authenticity and confidentiality of their information technology 
systems, components or processes that are decisive for the functionality of the critical 
infrastructures operated by them” and, in so doing, “the state of the art shall be observed” 
(emphasis added). Also, § 8c (2) on special requirements regarding providers of digital 
services prescribes that they “shall ensure a security level of the network and information 
systems corresponding to the existing risk, taking into account the state of the art.”
The last sentence of this norm confirms the integration by law of the normative ter-
tium: “In this context,” that is the one of providers of digital services ensuring appropriate 
security, among the “aspects” to consider we find, at number five, “the compliance with 
international regulations.” “International regulations” figures in the law’s German original 
as “internationale Normen.” As the previous section shows, this illustrates how Normen 
(norms) can be both standards and legal norms.
 108 Emphasis added.
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7.6 Reterritorialization as a Challenge to the  
Normative Order of the Internet
The previous sections have proven the claim that Germany’s legal system systematically 
“nationalizes” and legitimizes the norms of the normative order of the internet through pro-
cesses of, inter alia, transposition and referencing. This approach is based on the conception 
that the norms of the normative order of the internet need to be integrated into national 
law to be effectively propagated. This duty to anchor the normative order of the internet in 
(a) national legal system(s), however, can be viewed critically in light of the deterritorial-
ization of law,109 which includes a “pluralistic symbiosis of private- autonomously created 
norms, international law and national law.”110 Applying this definition, the norms of the 
normative order of the internet seem like an exemplary deterritorialized order. However, 
even though territoriality is challenged in different legal arenas, tying legal relations to a 
territory remains a key element of the process of implementing a normative order. Does this 
mean that we need to withdraw in toto any claim to a transnational normative order, which 
conflicts with the claim for “just one territorial legal culture and order?”111
The case is more differentiated. Though deterritorialization (and globalization processes) 
substantially challenge the classic state- oriented law paradigm,112 states as constituted in 
their territories (and, essentially, by their territories) do not fade away: “the sovereign con-
stitutional state does not end with the emergence of virtual space”.113 “Virtual spaces” make 
the essential role of states in protecting their citizens from threats emanating from new 
technologies more difficult to fulfill, but do not fundamentally alter it. The biggest challenge 
is posed by the plurality of normativity (“Regelungsmosaik”114). Yet public law has reacted 
to these developments. Scholars have identified successful processes of functional and spa-
tial adaption.115 Public law recognizes progressively the emergence and existence of norms 
from transnational spaces, their relevance and legality within national legal orders, and the 
existence of “social spaces in which more than territorial law is applicable.”116
There are also strong arguments that the territoriality of the legal order of a state needs 
to undergo a new calibration in light of the “federalization processes” states are faced 
with.117 This federalization of national legal orders needs to be both responsive to legiti-
mate norms from non- national sources and develop normative permeability with regard 
to these.118 International law especially is necessary to qualify whether “unilateral regula-
tory demands of powerful actors” are legitimate— or not.119 In German constitutional law, 
 109 On the notion of deterritorialization, see Kirsten Schmalenbach, “Völker- und unionsrechtliche Anstöße zur 
Entterritorialisierung des Rechts,” VVDStRL 76 (2017), 245– 76 (249).
 110 Ibid., 251– 2 (translation by the author).
 111 Matthias Cornils, “Entterritorialisierung im Kommunikationsrecht,” VVDStRL 76 (2017), 391– 442 (436– 7).
 112 See, further, 2.4.2.
 113 Hobe, Stephan, “Cyberspace— der virtuelle Raum,” in Josef Isensee, Paul Kirchhof, et al. (eds.), Handbuch 
des Staatsrechts, Band XI: Internationale Bezüge, 3rd edn. (2013), § 271, no. 44 (“Der virtuelle Raum bedeutet [ . . . ] 
nicht das Ende des souveränen Verfassungsstaates” (translation by the author).
 114 Wolfgang Hoffmann- Riem, “Freiheitsschutz in den globalen Kommunikationsinfrastrukturen,” JZ 69 (2014) 
2, 53– 63 (63).
 115 Kirsten Schmalenbach, “Völker- und unionsrechtliche Anstöße zur Entterritorialisierung des Rechts,” 
VVDStRL 76 (2017), 245– 76 (271).
 116 Ibid., 271.
 117 Ibid., 271 (translation by the author).
 118 Ibid., 272 (translation by the author).
 119 Ibid. (translation by the author).
 
Reterritorialization as a Challenge 299
the international law friendliness of the Basic Law internalizes (and constitutionalizes) this 
qualification. As this study has argued, the normative order of the internet can be qualified 
as legitimate by applying international law and international legal theory.120
Though the notion of territoriality is changing, the more important development seems 
to be the differentiation of international law and the emergence of functional regimes, in 
which sectoral regulatory objects are more relevant as qualifiers for the application of law 
than territoriality. This ties in with the development of international legal regimes, outside 
of treaty regimes, “in more broadly ‘cultural’ ways,” as the ILC’s Fragmentation Report put 
it.121 These sectoral, functional regimes include non- governmental participants and “rep-
resent non- governmental interests in a fashion that might influence their interpretation 
and operation.” They operate through normatively loose administrative coordination (or 
none at all) and include a cognitive- motivation element for normative engagement, namely 
participation as a proxy for “mutual supportiveness” to the point where participants seek 
regime- optimal outcomes.122
Regimes are thus examples of functional normativity. Jürgen Bast referred to global gov-
ernance and International Public Authority as examples of functional normative layers.123 
This study argues that the normative order of the internet as a whole can be considered 
such a functional regime, which thus transcends territoriality as the application nexus. It 
is the function of the normative order, conceptualized through international legal theory 
and constituted by national normative orders, that gives the normative orders its normative 
impetus. It is a functional and necessary order. This approaches what a commentator on 
Bast termed the innovative “constitution of spaces [. . .] in the sense of output legitimation 
of power.”124 Indeed, the normative order of the internet is constituted in and constitutes 
(through auto- and hetero- constitutionalization processes)125 the normative space of in-
ternet regulation that, in a second step, permeates national legal orders.
Rather than acceding to the territorial argument— that the normative order of the in-
ternet is only valid through its implementation in national legal orders— the functional ar-
gument reiterates that the normative order of the internet is one of necessity. It is legitimated 
through its effectiveness, which increases its effectivity. As Jürgen Bast argues, we need to 
be aware of the “historical gains in rationality through territorial authority”126 (emphasis 
added), but also take into account that under the conditions of today’s political, social, cul-
tural, and economic processes social processes can no longer be effectively steered through 
normative processes within nation states. Deterritorialization of these societal processes 
must coincide with a deterritorialization of normative processes. This is especially true for 
the internet.
Yet even in light of existing normative mechanisms within (German) national law to in-
clude the newly created norms, some authors argue that deterritorializing communicative 
 120 See  chapter 6.6.
 121 ILC, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of 
International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, 13 April 2006, A/ CN.4/ 
L.682, 252.
 122 Ibid.
 123 Jürgen Bast, “Völker- und unionsrechtliche Anstöße zur Entterritorialisierung des Rechts,” VVDStRL 76 
(2017), 277– 315 (292).
 124 Heiko Sauer, Aussprache, VVDStRL 76 (2017), 317 (translation by the author).
 125 See  chapter 6.2.
 126 Jürgen Bast, “Völker- und unionsrechtliche Anstöße zur Entterritorialisierung des Rechts,” VVDStRL 76 
(2017), 277– 315 (309) (translation by the author) (notes omitted).
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processes has actually led to a “reterritorialization of the law of communication.”127 This 
argument, put forward lately by Matthias Cornils, runs counter to much of what this study 
has argued. He posits, inter alia, that the “expertocratic design” of normative processes is 
suitable for “technical- operative” questions, but there were no indicia that “transnational 
rule- making in the field of the law of communication [Kommunikationsrecht]” can be ex-
tended beyond that.128 However, he admits himself that this is changing in the field of youth 
protection law and the law of hate speech.129
Though some functional areas of the normative order of the internet, such as internet 
standard- setting, are very effectively developed by non- state regimes,130 states continue to 
regulate “localizable” dimensions of internet- related activities.131 As long as fact patterns 
remain national, the legal and constitutional framework, at least in Germany according to a 
study on the role of the Grundgesetz in the internet age, has adapted well:132 rule of law and 
peaceful relations between individuals (Rechtsfrieden) are assured both offline and online. 
While some argued that geography (or more precisely territoriality) has “ended” in terms of 
international law,133 others saw rather a new role for the concept.134 But ensuring that trans-
national rules within the normative order, and the order as a whole, are implemented within 
the territory of one state is a task that falls ultimately to the state exercising sovereignty.
The Group of Governmental Experts in its 2015 report underlined the importance of 
sovereignty: “State sovereignty and international norms and principles that flow from sov-
ereignty apply to the conduct by States of ICT- related activities and to their jurisdiction 
over ICT infrastructure within their territory.”135 States therefore continue to have (and 
must exercise) jurisdiction over those parts of the internet, physical and non- kinetic, that 
are located within their territory, and, in doing so, ensure that the normative purposes of 
the normative order of the internet are implemented.
Cornils argues that states have agreed to the establishment of the internet as a “transna-
tional entity with transnational traffic control,” with the “open and ubiquitous communi-
cation” which transnational infrastructure is inherently based on. This would imply that 
the transborder communication flows should not be subjected to territorial “special dis-
tricts [Sonderbezirke] with their own laws.”136 The history of the internet’s normative evo-
lution,137 however, suggests that states have not actually established the internet as such an 
 127 Matthias Cornils, “Entterritorialisierung im Kommunikationsrecht,” VVDStRL 76 (2017), 391– 442 (437).
 128 Ibid., 428 (translation by the author).
 129 Ibid., 428.
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entity, but it has emerged in a bottom- up, decentralized, and mainly expert- led process over 
decades.
It was also, arguably, not states that influenced the emergence of the fundamental admin-
istrative infrastructure of the internet but rather a state, namely the USA. It was not until 
the mid- 1990s that discussions on internationalizing and diversifying accountability over 
decisions regarding critical internet resources resulted in the commitment by the US gov-
ernment to transition IANA functional management to ICANN as a private sector entity.138
The cross- border data flows characteristic of the internet and the bordered nature of 
states (limiting organically their jurisdiction) are in conflict.139 But Cornils seems to make 
the case that the “transport level and internet regulation [ . . . ] are not necessarily norma-
tively firmly correlated,” thus “allowing only a regulatory minimum on the level of applica-
tion.”140 This approach of two “levels” of rules on the internet is not sufficiently detailed. As 
this study has shown above,141 more nuanced approaches142 to the internet argue for the ex-
istence of at least four “internet layers.” These range from physical infrastructure and logical 
resources (including IP addresses) (and often a third transport layer) to an application(s) 
and content/ transactions (data) layer, but often also include a specific legal layer (national 
law, international law). There are thus not only a transport layer and a regulatory layer.
Further, authors seeking to differentiate between the “universal” technological dimen-
sion and the “local”/ “national,” regulatory/ legal dimension often focus on the case of China’s 
model of censorship143 to show that the choice of how content is regulated remains a purely 
national one. It is correct that attempts by sovereignty- oriented states, such as Russia, UAE, 
China, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Sudan, and Egypt, to include greater state oversight over in-
frastructure and logical layer- related decisions have been largely unsuccessful,144 while na-
tional regulatory internet management has been scaled up, by some states, to restrictive and 
authoritarian levels without clear condemnation by the international community.
China itself, in an earlier white paper, argues that an “authoritative and just interna-
tional internet administration organization” should be installed under UN auspices with 
all countries being able to participate “in the administration of the fundamental inter-
national resources of the internet, and a multilateral and transparent allocation system 
should be established on the basis of the current management mode.”145 However, sec-
tion III of the white paper references the importance of human rights (“Chinese citizens 
fully enjoy freedom of speech on the internet”146). While this is inaccurate in light of 
 138 US DOC/ NTIA, Management of Internet Names and Addresses, ICANN Statement of Policy (“White 
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international human rights standards,147 it shows that national regulation, even in illiberal 
states (in terms of internet rule), refers to international standards. In addition, the Chinese 
member of the UN Group of Independent Experts did not object to the commitment, in 
the GGE report of 2015, to international law as being applicable to ICTs and on the in-
ternet as a whole.
This brings us to the argument that only a “minimum” of rules can be developed re-
garding the non- transport dimension of the internet in light of the challenges of terri-
toriality. This is inaccurate. As the GGE report of 2015 concluded, “international law 
[is] an essential framework for [state] actions in their use of ICTs.”148 Six principles are 
particularly relevant: state sovereignty; sovereign equality; settlement of international 
disputes by peaceful means; non- intervention in the internal affairs of other States; pro-
hibition of the threat or use of force; and respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.149
As previously shown,150 rather than being inapplicable to the normative challenges of 
the internet, due to the bordered nature of some regulatory questions, international law 
(especially through its human rights regime) protects individuals on the internet (and from 
dangers emanating from the internet). This study has shown the power of general principles 
of international law which, in aggregate, provide substantial protection for the internet’s 
integrity and, conversely, protect states (and individuals) from attacks through cyberspace. 
Applicable principles (and largely customary norms) include the non- use of (the threat of) 
force, peaceful settlement of international disputes, non- intervention in domestic affairs, 
the duty of cooperation, the principle of sovereign equality, the no harm principle, the prin-
ciple of good faith, and the principle of prevention and due diligence.
When Cornils argues that content regulation just as the control over physical internet 
infrastructure remains “in essence a domain of states and conglomerates of states,”151 he 
fails to add that this regulation can only be exercised within the limits imposed upon states 
by international legal norms within the normative order of the internet. States that exercise 
control over critical internet resources, especially infrastructure, are bound by customary 
international duties based on the recognition that the protection of and from the internet 
lies in the common interest.152 This has been discussed in this study under the notion of 
custodial sovereignty.153 States that exercise authority over critical internet resources, such 
as infrastructural resources, act as custodians of the global interest in the internet’s integrity 
which the resource located in their territory, such as an important Internet Exchange Point 
or a root server, contributes to. So as to ensure that states exercise this custodial duty in a 
way that meets their international obligations, other states have certain monitoring rights 
and assistance duties.154
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7.7  Conclusions
Having shown earlier in this study that a normative turn has taken place on the internet 
and that the normative order of the internet thus constituted is legitimated in international 
norm- making arenas by the inclusion of all relevant actors in normative processes, this 
chapter takes on the more challenging task of establishing how the normative order of the 
internet is integrated in national legal orders. This is a key argumentative step because the 
legitimacy of the normative order as such and of its norms is dependent not only on self- 
constitutionalization processes but on the acceptance by overarching regimes, international 
law, and national legal systems, which is symbolically validated through system interaction.
The integration of the tertium norms from the normative order of the internet into na-
tional legal orders can be assimilated to an external “constitutionalization” of the norma-
tive order of the internet through national law. (National) law, as Karl- Heinz Ladeur writes, 
integrates the norms which were privately produced in a self- organized manner: “it makes 
their content more binding and their applicability last longer; the self- binding nature of the 
norm is enriched by a Fremdbindung.”155
In terms of international law, the process of norm production that is characterized by the 
inclusion of all relevant actors serves as a powerful proxy for intrinsic legitimation. This is 
shown to be different for national legal systems which are more wedded to the traditional 
notion of legitimacy of norms through their emergence in constitutionally framed norma-
tive processes. But national legal systems are imbued with an important protection function 
toward its citizens and, as member of the international legal community, the global public.
The chapter proves the hypothesis that through integration by national legal systems, in 
this case the German one, the norms of the normative order of the internet are legitimated. 
This particularly concerns, as has been shown, one category of the three that make up the 
normative order of the internet: the transnational normative arrangements and standards 
which amount to a “tertium” alongside international legal rules and national norms.
The chapter has identified three major arenas of integration of “tertium” norms from 
within the normative order of the internet. First, constitutional integration, which is pre-
mised upon the recognition by the state’s constitution, the Basic Law in this case, of mul-
tinormative influences, characterized then by a certain permeability of the constituted 
order and an openness toward norms emanating from the normative order of the internet. 
Second, normative order norms, especially tertium norms, are integrated by the judicial 
system, which recognizes the importance of reacting dynamically to emerging threats. This 
means taking into account the non- binary and flexible normativity of transnational norma-
tive arrangements within the bounds of German law in deciding cases. As a case in point 
the study shows how internet access as a precondition for exercising fundamental rights is 
ensured by the judicial system.
The human rights standards applied in these settings have international legal founda-
tions, but are also developed, and necessarily so, from a national perspective, through a 
process described as horizontal application (or horizontalization) of human rights (pro-
tection).156 This development is an important aspect of the progressive crystallization of 
 155 Karl- Heinz Ladeur, “Die objektiv- rechtliche Dimension der wirtschaftlichen Grundrechte – Relativierung 
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transnational constitutional law157 at the intersection of a plurality of normative orders. Or 
as Stefan Kadelbach put it, human rights travel through a progressive attachment not to 
state territories, “but to actors as well, so that they cross state borders with international 
organisations, transnational enterprises, or development agencies”158 or, it may be added, 
while navigating on the internet.
Courts, especially, apply a horizontalized version of national human rights to tertium 
norms and thereby preempt the application of (internet) standards that violate tenets of na-
tional legal orders. As Gerd Winter argues, the normative approaches of private actors (and 
many tertium norms are the results of such normative projects) cannot create islands of ex-
clusively private norms within sovereign states.159 The legislative duty to protect the rights 
of all within a state’s territory or under its control cannot be avoided by states. However, we 
can coclude that states should exercise caution in demanding the sine qua non application 
of their national constitutional human rights protection framework. If every state evaluates 
all emerging non- traditional norms in light of all human rights (especially ex ante), trans-
national cooperation becomes difficult.160
Third, and most tellingly, the chapter analyzes the systematic integration of “tertium” 
norms within German law. It is here that traditional normative processes of including 
non- legal (i.e. non- binding) norms are shown to develop into a meaningful instrument to 
legitimize these norms and with it the order. The study differentiates between automatic 
application of tertium norms and application after a form of “consent” by the state. Most in-
teresting, however, are the deformalized processes of applying tertium norms. Finally, trans-
position and referencing, both well- entrenched legislative techniques, are presented and 
examples of their application to, and thereby legitimation of, tertium norms are provided.
In a concluding section, the study shows how reterritorialization of the normative order 
of the internet seems to run counter to the international and non- bounded character of 
the internet. Yet, a functional perspective on “nationalization” trends of especially tertium 
norms will lead to the conclusion that additional legitimacy- conferral mechanisms (in-
cluding habituation to these norms when they are integrated into national legal processes) 
add an important national layer to the international legitimation approaches previously 
described.
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Conclusions
The internet has evolved into a central medium for societal interaction, individually and 
communally, locally and globally. Our communicative practices have changed substan-
tially. This has impacted the development and application of rules for the internet. Online 
just as offline, law is society’s most important medium to ensure order, rule, and justice. 
Understanding the genesis, content, and legitimation of legal and non- legal rules on the 
internet, and the constitution of the rule of the internet, thus becomes essential. The suppo-
sition that the complexity of the internet’s relational space can only be met with an equally 
sophisticated multilayered model of a regulatory order makes intuitive sense. But the nor-
mative order of the internet— posited as such for the first time in this study— is part of an 
epistemic exercise of complexity reduction. By explaining the genesis, ontology, and legit-
imation of the normative order of the internet, this study decomplexifies and demystifies 
rules and rule on the internet and has developed a unique theory of online regulation. The 
study shows, importantly, that there is a rule on the internet and that international rules (or 
norms), national laws, and transnational regulatory arrangements are all essential parts of 
this theory of online rule and regulation. .
The study is neither motivated by utopian ideals of the internet as a liberating medium, 
nor is it characterized by technocratic pessimism. Information and communication tech-
nologies are not imbued with ethereal qualities. Rather, they are the objects of regulation, 
to which norms of different origin are applied. Similarly, code and algorithms, Internet 
Exchange Points, and clouds are not actants in the sense of Bruno Latour. Though code 
and algorithms produce normative effects and Internet Exchange Points, cloud services 
providers and communication platforms exercise (some degree of) control and power 
over vast amounts of data running through or stored on their infrastructure, they are 
constrained by regulation and subjected to norms forming part of the normative order of 
the internet.
The overall question that motivates this research is related to a concept this study estab-
lished for the first time: the normative order of the internet. What is the genealogy, ontology, 
legitimacy, finality, and impact of the normative order of the internet? Put differently: how 
did it evolve, what is it made up of, how is it legitimized, what is its regulatory goal, and how 
is it (and its constituent norms) implemented and legitimated within and through the inter-
national legal order and in national legal orders?
The leading hypothesis of this study is that actors on the internet fulfill diverse functions 
as norm entrepreneurs, norm appliers, and norm enforcers. States, individuals, and private 
sector companies create and execute, contest and confirm norms. The norms’ genealogy, 
legitimacy, and enforceability vary greatly: from normative practices to non- binding stan-
dards by standard- setting bodies, from laws and national constitutions to ius cogens norms. 
It is only through a careful analysis of the facticity and normativity of the rules applied on 
the internet in these interactions that a model of a comprehensive and nuanced normative 
order of the internet can be distilled. Importantly, this order— though conceived holistically 
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with a unifying function— is hybrid in nature and is made up of international legal norms, 
national law, and transnational regulatory arrangements.
This normative order of the internet integrates norms that are materially and normatively 
connected to the use and development of the internet at three different levels (national, re-
gional, international), of two types (privately and publicly authored), and of substantially 
different character (from ius cogens to technical standards). It is shown to be a legal order 
that operates through the form of law and analogously to it. Its actors— states, legal per-
sons, natural persons— fulfill diverse functions as norm entrepreneurs, norm appliers, and 
norm enforcers. As this study has demonstrated, the order’s justification narratives con-
trol new norms by assessing their technical consistency and legal- cultural consonancy with 
the order’s purpose. Though not without autonomous elements, the normative order of the 
internet is interlinked through legitimation relationships with national and international 
legal orders.
The normative order of the internet is decidedly not a hierarchical system of explicit 
norms in the Kelsenian tradition. There is no Grundnorm. It is rather a complex of norms, 
values, and practices that relate to the use and development of the internet. Through the 
order, the activities and interaction of different actors— including states, private companies, 
and civil society, as they relate to, or are mediated by, the internet— are regulated, and the 
exercise of private or public authority and the distribution of basic goods, including internet 
access and access to internet content, are normatively framed. The normative order of the 
internet is thus the set of norms, normative expectations, and legitimation narratives that 
shape the use and development of the internet. This being in essence a study grounded in 
law, the epistemic spotlight remained on the normativity of the order, though the impor-
tance of narratives in establishing justification (orders) is expressly noted.
This internet has indeed developed into a vital medium of communication through 
which individuals exercise their human rights, especially through the enabling right of 
freedom of expression, including the right to seek, receive, and impart information and 
ideas of all kinds, through any media of one’s choice, regardless of frontiers. “The internet,” 
however, is not an ethereal subject of utopian normative projects and projections; it is 
merely a hardware- based data- transfer capability, running software based on protocols that 
ensure interconnectivity. Both the internet’s public core and the servers necessary for it to 
function are indispensable for critical infrastructure (power grids, for example) to work 
and are, in themselves, critical (information) infrastructure. Therefore, safeguarding the 
internet’s integrity (its security, stability, robustness, resilience, and functionality) in the 
common interest has evolved into an international legal obligation of states, individually 
and as members of the global community. This obligation is meant to mitigate substantial 
societal risks incurred by states, their citizens, and the private sector by misues of the in-
ternet and attacks against the integrity of the internet.
As this study has demonstrated, the normative actors on the internet have influenced the 
composition of the medium of law, as it applies to online settings, and have moved it toward 
a more flexible geometry of normativity. Non- binding norms and principles, standards, and 
code have developed into a “tertium,” a third category of norms apart from international 
and national norms. Emerging in the contested space between technical necessity and 
socio- legal values, they evidence a variable normative density and transcend legal binarity 
(lawful/ unlawful) in their content. Yet this non- legal normativity needs to be (and actu-
ally is) reoriented through a value- based normative approach that nevertheless embraces 
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standard- setting procedures, including internal norm (re)production mechanisms of tech-
nical standard- setters. Thus refuting the internal logics of technicity as controlling (in) nor-
mative debates, the study confirms that code is law in that it is normative, but not law in the 
sense that it supplants legal norms or is hierarchically superior or practically controlling. 
Code does not just appear, it is written in processes that can be regulated, by coders who 
can be subjected to norms, employed by companies with values and targets to be debated 
in public forums, with aims and functions that can be measured against the finalities of the 
normative order of the internet. Protocols therefore “have politics” and norms need to be 
consistently applied to their development and implementation. This finding applies to algo-
rithms and algorithmic decision- making, including selection and recommendations logics 
that have clear implications for rights and freedoms, by, for example, influencing design 
and content of the informational basis for discourse essential to any democratic society in 
algorithmified media markets.
In a substance- oriented analysis of international legal rules applicable to the internet, 
arguments for the development of a new system of “international law for the internet” are 
shown to be without foundation. International law fully applies to the internet. Sovereignty 
over territory and all layers/ artifacts of the internet within them is exercised by nation states 
increasingly effectively, sometimes overzealously, but based on constitutional obligations 
to secure rights of citizens and international law. Though there are no general international 
conventions pertaining to the management and use of the internet, its technical foundations 
are protected indirectly through the enabling dimension of human rights treaties. There are 
no customary rules that directly protect the integrity of the internet, but important general 
principles of international law that offer indirect protection of and from the internet, some 
of which have crystallized into binding custom or have even reached ius cogens status and 
can now, as is shown, be applied to the internet. One example is the inclusion of cyberat-
tacks as prohibited forms of the use of force and as a prohibited form of intervention, if the 
level of “force” is not quite reached, in the non- intervention principle
Apart from international law, the second foundational order of the internet is the nor-
matively less stringent but nevertheless influential internet governance regime. The norms 
developed within the normative processes of internet governance are part of the category 
of transnational regulatory arrangements, which form— as was hypothesized— an element 
of the normative order of the internet. Internet governance is a normatively valuable ad-
dition to international law as a system of stewardship of internet resources and the socio- 
political processes related to their steering. It normatively frames, in a non- binary (legal/ 
illegal) logic, with varying, flexible normativity, the “softer” and “broader” topics of internet 
regulation, such as accountability in contrast to traditional (international) legal approaches 
focusing on, say, international cooperation to fight cybercrime. Yet the study critically en-
gages internet governance processes and shows them to suffer from normative indetermi-
nateness. The constant commitment to the integration of all actors in normative processes 
(“multistakeholderism’) also suffers from substantial conceptual deficits, as references to 
the importance of the concept cloud meaningful discussion on the realization of the goals 
pursued by such an integrative normative approach. Process is important, but (the norma-
tive) product, too. Yet the inclusion of multiple actors that have (to varying degrees) legally 
protected, or at least legally relevant, interests in the outcome of an international normative 
process is not per se new in international law, as examples from civil society participation in 
treaty- making in environmental law and international criminal law demonstrate.
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Before developing the notion of the normative order of the internet further, the study 
then addresses dimensions of disorder on the internet. Acknowledging that every (legal) 
order has chaotic tendencies, the lack of formal institutions (such as in national law), or 
decentralized control through states (such as the rules of international law), makes the in-
ternet especially prone to normative disorder. Three phenomena are identified: (1) norma-
tive froth is present when a number of different norms are applicable to similar situations 
without clear indications that one norm is preferred. During the “internet principle hype” 
many actors developed similar norms without recourse to another or any sensitivity to the 
liquidification of commitments by their variation. In that, an exercise in norm- making can 
have anti- normative effects, just as attempts to introduce a new standard to supplant ex-
isting ones may result in just another standard. (2) Normative frictions are more serious 
norm conflicts that go beyond non- hierarchical coexistence of duplicative or slightly varied 
norms. Examples include diverging national judgments on factually similar issues or when 
states introduce regulation that is not responsive to similar challenges in neighboring 
jurisdictions. (3) Normative fractures evidence a larger problem of rule on the internet 
and include substantial conflicts (of norms, practices, or even trust) that can lead to dis-
order. Fractures have appeared, for instance, in the normative treatment of cyberwar, with 
some states arguing for and others against inclusion of cyberattacks into the logic of the UN 
Charta’s Chapter VII. This has even led to the breakdown of an important UN- led exercise 
in developing shared understandings of the meaning of international law on the internet. 
Further fractures, as this study shows, have appeared with regard to normative approaches 
between human rights- oriented states, such as Sweden and Switzerland, and sovereignty- 
oriented states, such as Russia and China, that seek, and regulate for, more governmental 
control of the internet, nationalize telecommunications providers, provide for data localiza-
tion laws, and apply strong penalties to online dissent (or filter dissenting speech).
Serious counterarguments against the validity of the normative order of the internet, as 
a unifying concept, can be drawn from the technical, commercial, and governmental frag-
mentation of the internet. Technical fragmentation impedes the full interoperability of the 
underlying internet infrastructure. Commercial fragmentation is caused by business prac-
tices constraining or preventing internet universality. Political- legal, or governmental, frag-
mentation includes policies, laws, and judgments that inhibit the free flow of information 
regardless of frontiers.
Proving the hypothesis correct, the study identifies countervailing technical forces (the 
internet invariants), which are the foundation of a technical defragmentation pull that the 
law— through the normative turn— realizes through norms. Interoperability theory and 
jurisdiction- based conflict- of- laws approaches are also shown to work toward a unified 
normative order of the internet.
In order to situate the normative order of the internet within theoretical approaches 
to establish (online) order, the objectification and formalization, rationalization and nor-
malization (and thus coherence- controlling) functions of ordering are theoretically estab-
lished. The rich body of theories on order(ing) is parsed with a view to their relevance to 
the normative order of the internet. Systems theory, in particular, proves relevant with its 
description of binary coding as a property of the legal system. This theoretical import is 
meaningfully coupled with theories of dehierarchization, which transcend the presupposi-
tion of the existence of basic norms in legal systems and focus on norms as products of the 
“network society” (and sectors of society) constituting it.
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No single theory of the normative order of the internet has yet emerged, but as, in Kuhn’s 
terminology, the paradigm shift toward a normative order of the internet seems imminent, 
key theoretical imports are made that help delineate and substantiate that order. These 
imports include notions of the fluidity of the normative, the concept of meta- law influ-
encing the evolution of order, the dehierarchization of norms and normative systems, the 
tendencies of normative orders to fragment, the transnational politicization of commons- 
management, and the role of governing by control over infrastructure.
Having laid the necessary theoretical foundations, the study— in a key step— then pos-
its the emergence of a normative order of the internet. This approach has considerable ex-
planatory and predictive potential as to the evolution of norms impacting the use and 
development of the internet. At this point the study answers some of the key elements of 
the questions formulated at the beginning and, as has been hypothesized, establishes that 
a normative turn has taken place on the internet: the normative order’s internal rules of 
norm- production produce the technological and societal forces that, through “learning 
normativity,” develop norms autonomously within the order, but controlled by the prin-
ciples of the order. These norms are contested— as they emerge— in light of their internal 
coherence, their consonance with other order norms, and their consistency with the order’s 
finality. However, normativity that learns from its environment can no longer be described 
using traditional categories of, and criteria for, subjectivity. Thus a theory of normativity 
(“of the law”) that goes back to Kant needs to be fundamentally rethought: with norm- based 
self- organization as the principle of life that enables the transcendental constitution of 
normativity.
The study shows that a normative order of the internet has emerged that self- 
constitutionalizes, builds its own “nomos,” and stabilizes this nomos through narratives it 
produces. The order does not ab initio depend on a state but includes states as normative 
actors and national law as a central source of both norms and the legitimation of transna-
tional normative arrangements. Importantly, the study shows how a normative order has 
emerged on the internet that conceptually encompasses normative activities by all actors on 
all regulatory levels (national and international juro- political spheres and private spaces). 
The order is selective in that it does not seek to regulate all fact patterns with a connection 
to the internet, but only those that evidence a (1) material (non- trivial) connection between 
the regulatory question and the internet as a network of networks (2) in the normative sense.
The normative order of the internet encompasses norm- generative processes and in-
cludes, through its processes, normatively relevant action by all actors. These actors develop 
normative expectations, which are debated, contested, and realized on the basis of shared 
principles within the order. The study shows which substantial and procedural principles 
are applicable, including commitments to ensuring human rights, keeping the internet as 
an unfragmented space, and ensuring the security, stability, reliability, and trustworthiness 
of the internet, premised upon a strong cooperation between actors. Such cooperation is 
proceduralized within the order as well.
As hypothesized, the normative order of the internet is a legitimate order, with its legit-
imacy proceduralized through normative processes that include all actors. As shown, the 
order is also legitimate in a utilitarian reading because it is a necessary order. States cannot 
by themselves regulate the internet; international legal norms, or public law, are not enough. 
International law provides a regulatory frame but is not detailed enough to regulate emer-
ging online threats and technological challenges. Transnational arrangements alone cannot 
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solve questions of distribution of basic goods and rights and legitimize— by themselves— 
the exercise of international public authority. Taken together, however, the order’s norms 
secure the internet as a critical infrastructural resource and as equally critical for other es-
sential infrastructures.
Each field of norms within the order is legitimized through either traditional normative 
processes (international law, national law) or by its integration into national legal orders 
(transnational normative arrangements). Each actor group in the norm- making processes 
is legitimized directly or indirectly and transfers this legitimacy potential to the normative 
outcome, which is often— additionally— epistemically legitimate. The normative order it-
self is legitimate (additionally) as a necessary order to ensure protection of and from the 
internet. The process of justifying the order is narrativized. As any order participant has a 
right to justification against norms and practices generally reciprocally, the normative order 
of the internet is an order of justification.
In the concluding chapter, the study delves more deeply into the relationship of national 
legal orders and the normative order of the internet, especially in light of processes of legiti-
mation of the “tertium” norms, the category that includes standards and other transnational 
normative arrangements. Internationally, the norm creation process, which allows for the 
integration of all actors, legitimizes the normative outcome. This is not a particularly new 
approach for international law, but its link to the normative order of the internet has not 
yet been clearly made. Tertium norms have been progressively recognized within national 
legal orders through processes of formal and non- formal application, transposition, and 
referencing.
The normative order of the internet thus established, parsed, and legitimized is both an 
empirical- conceptual and a normative construct: it provides legitimacy (and justification) 
narratives and functions as an elastic normative space, with principles and processes for 
solving public policy conflicts connected to safeguarding the internet’s integrity and pro-
tecting states and societies, natural and legal persons, from dangers related to internet use 
and misuse. It importantly includes the normative tertium and is thus a unifying theory. 
These transnational norms and normative arrangements transcend binary normative solu-
tions and can counteract diffusions of regulatory responsibility in transnational settings.
Establishing the normative order of the internet was a conservative exercise in that the 
study showed how to secure not the internet, which is merely a technological facility, but 
the interests of all actors, individually and collectively, in the use and development of the in-
ternet insofar as this invokes the exercise of private or public authority and the distribution 
of basic goods and rights.
We can conclude: if the project of establishing a normative order of the internet under-
taken in this study has succeeded, it is at this point of the study evident that law (as a system 
with the function of protecting shared values, legitimizing the exercise of authority and the 
distribution of basic goods and rights) does not follow technicity (as a quasi- normative 
form). This is both an empirical and a normative argument. Rather, only a holistic and sys-
tematic approach to normative ordering on the internet, as has been pursued in this study, 
can lead to a theory of a just rule on (and of) the internet.
This rule must protect rights and values online (the internet’s nomos), legitimize the 
exercise of private and public authority (through stabilizing the nomos normatively and 
through narratives), and ensure the fair distribution of basic goods and rights as they relate 
to the internet, including internet access and access to internet content.
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